I’m a simple man.
I’m not asking for magic beans. I’m not interested in something PPT thick. I’m not so interested in what may be IOC in 2035. No. Not really.
What can you get to address this problem in a POM cycle?
Via Johannes R. Fischbach at IISS, the above does not even cover the … well … sigh:
The US also maintains an advantage in its VLS-equipped submarine force, a capability that the PLAN may only now be introducing. But, here too, the US Navy faces a dip with the pending retirement of its four modified Ohio-class nuclear-powered guided-missile submarines, each playing host to 154 VLS cells.
…
The main reason for this has been a fall in the number of the ageing Ticonderogas, which were, until now, the most heavily armed of the US Navy’s surface platforms in terms of cells, with 122 each. At the same time, new US warship construction is neither keeping up with those reductions nor with Chinese major warship output. Currently, Arleigh Burkes are being completed at a rate of 1.6 per year. By comparison, the Chinese Type-052D (Luyang III) is somewhat smaller and less heavily armed (64 compared to 96 cells) but had an annual production rate of 3.1 until 2022. China also continues construction of other classes including the Type-055 cruiser (at its peak at a rate of two per year).
The only other principal new US surface combatant under construction is the Constellation-class frigate, but this design is slated to house only 32 VLS cells per platform and is not scheduled to see service before 2029. The vessel that will most directly replace both the Ticonderogas and the Arleigh Burkes, the new-generation DDG(X), is still in the design phase and is not anticipated to be under build until the early 2030s. The gap between the capacity of the US Navy and that of the PLAN is set to continue to close for the foreseeable future.
I know none of this is news to regular readers here, but it shockingly is for an almost unimaginable number of people who have access to the levers of power, or work directly for those who do.
There are a significant number of people who are now beating the drum of this who have watched this happen without saying a word.
We see you.
So, what can be done? We can only do what we can. First of all, load up as many LCS MK-70 mods as you can. Like I called for back in October, we should have auxiliary cruisers already in the fast-track “good enough” design phase.
These are all third-best ideas, but we have procrastinated so long, the third-best is the only option that will show up in useful numbers for over a decade to two.
The best option, new construction, is already baked in. Our industrial capacity is maxed out and will be for years. The second best option, extending ships, has already been done but it hampered by three decades of almost criminal neglect and poor maintenance partially explained by the same problem the best has.
So, we have third best…which is what has been used successfully for centuries when naval powers were faced with similar problems.
Life it fast and the timeline is short. Get to work.
"Currently, Arleigh Burkes are being completed at a rate of 1.6 per year. By comparison, the Chinese Type-052D (Luyang III) is somewhat smaller and less heavily armed (64 compared to 96 cells) but had an annual production rate of 3.1 until 2022. China also continues construction of other classes including the Type-055 cruiser (at its peak at a rate of two per year)."
Math. It's hard. I wonder why the author didn't spell it out for the reader?
AB (96 cells) x 1.6 = 153.6 VLS cells per year
(T_052D (64 cells) x 3.1) + (T_055 (112 cells) x 2.0) = 422.4 VLS cells per year
It won't take long for those curves to intersect.
Once you get those extra tubes, you'll then have to solve SM-6 production rate. And a "good-enough" cruiser? LOL. Look at what the community is doing to a proven FFG design.