AUKUS Update II: Electric Boogaloo

...the more you look, the better it gets..

Both in comments here, social media, and a variety of SEPCOR, Monday’s post on AUKUS got a lot more interest than I thought it did. That makes for a happy Salamander, as it is clear that along the broad spectrum of the navalist and Five Eyes community, the importance of this project is well understood and supported.

In a way, I feel like I cheated an opportunity, so let’s assign some reading to everyone, pull out some interesting tidbits from the reading, and maybe slap a moonbat or two while we’re at it.

Here is the syllabus for today’s Substack. I’ll quote from various places…and yes, it is another opportunity to thank the good people doing the hard work at the Congressional Research Service (CRS).

• AUKUS Nuclear Cooperation: CRS, February 5, 2026

• Navy Virginia-Class Submarine Program and AUKUS Submarine (Pillar 1) Project: Background and Issues for Congress: CRS January 26, 2026

• AUKUS Pillar 2 (Advanced Capabilities): Background and Issues for Congress: CRS, May 21, 2024

Remember where this is all going, From the January 2026 CRS report:

In September 2021, the Australian, UK, and U.S. governments announced a significant new security partnership, called AUKUS (pronounced AW-kus, rhyming with caucus).⁴² One major initiative under AUKUS, referred to as Pillar 1, is a project to

• rotationally deploy four U.S. SSNs and one UK SSN out of a port in Western Australia;

• sell three to five Virginia-class SSNs to Australia and subsequently build three to five additional replacement SSNs for the U.S. Navy; and

• have the United States and UK provide assistance to Australia for an Australian effort to build additional three to five SSNs of a new UK-Australian SSN design called SSN AUKUS to complete a planned eight-boat Australian SSN force.

If calendars are not your specialty, note which political party was in power in 2021. It should go without saying, but many of the usual suspects on the I-hate-America-really-hard-when-a-Republican-is-in-office left in Australia can’t get their narrow-minded petty-politics out of the way of clear thinking. They almost go into hibernation when a Democrat is in power, but when that changes, they just turn their knob to 11. This is more than anti-Trump feelings. I’ve seen this movie a few times over the decades.

Call those people out and don’t let them go down that rabbit hole…because they absolutely want to go there.

There is much more than that in Australia than in the USA, thank goodness, where there is broad support. The only real pushback are from those who really don’t want to have any decrease in USN SSN by sending what can be built to Australia. That’s an honorable position, just one I don’t agree with.

That isn’t what even the center-left Australian Labor government has to deal with. Just one example, guess who is leading an independent review of AUKUS by a gaggle of musty-crusty leftists in the Australian Labor Party:

The former environment minister Peter Garrett will lead an independent inquiry into the Aukus defence pact, launched by a group of Labor veterans and public figures concerned proper scrutiny has never been applied to the $368bn defence plan.

Garrett, the Midnight Oil frontman and longtime environmental campaigner, will be the lead commissioner on the five-month community-based investigation, being launched on Tuesday.

The guy was cringe in the 1980s and is but a farce to sane people today…but we don’t live in a sane world.

We all know where this will go, and hopefully it will receive the disdain it deserves:

Garrett said the new inquiry – supported by trade unions and non-profit organisations – would consider if the subs can be delivered on time and on budget, how nuclear waste will be managed and if Australia’s defence and strategic interests are well served by the deal.

He has previously lashed Aukus, saying the plan “stinks” and represents “the most costly and risky action ever taken by any Australian government”.

“This inquiry is doing the job that a proper parliamentary inquiry should be doing,” Garrett told Guardian Australia.

“How is it that there’s been inquiries about the submarine program in other countries and we haven’t had a full parliamentary inquiry here?”

A group of commissioners will be named to lead the inquiry, convened under the auspices of the Australian Peace and Security Forum.

Critical to its deliberations will be the rise of China and the prospect of conflict in the Indo-Pacific region.

Nuclear non-proliferation issues, employment and environmental consequences are also among the inquiry’s terms-of-reference.

You can’t make this stuff up, but we must push through it all.

As I said yesterday:

AUKUS is not a Trump plan, nor an Albanese plan. It is an Australian, American, and British plan that is already bringing on other partners. Making this personal and partisan only demonstrates the immaturity of the people trying.

This is not Australia and the U.S.’s first time working on nuclear issues. From the February 2026 CRS report:

On August 7, 2024, President Joseph Biden submitted to Congress an “Agreement among the Government of Australia, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Government of the United States of America for Cooperation Related to Naval Nuclear Propulsion.” This In Focus explains the agreement’s substance, as well as provisions of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954, as amended (P.L. 83-703; 42 U.S.C. §§2153 et seq.), concerning the content and congressional review of such agreements.

The agreement, which entered into force on January 17, 2025, permits the transfer of nuclear material and naval nuclear reactors among the three governments. This agreement supersedes a 2022 agreement that permitted only the transfer of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information (NNPI) and Restricted Data (RD). The latter agreement entered into force on February 8, 2022.

…

The United States and Australia first concluded a civil nuclear cooperation agreement in 1957. Those governments updated that agreement in 1979 and renewed it in 2010. Australia sells around 36% of its $1 billion in uranium exports to the United States. The United States is also a major processor of Australian uranium sold to other countries. Australia does not currently possess any nuclear power plants, but it operates one research reactor. This agreement “specifically prohibits the transfer of restricted data under it,” as well as “sensitive nuclear technology, sensitive nuclear facilities and major critical components.”

If Midnight Oil’s overly emotive vocalist is the best they have to throw at AUKUS, it is probably pretty safe.

For everyone else who has to live in the real world and realize that the democratic Western and Western-adjacent order is not a given, and its greatest threat is stretching out from the Asian mainland into the Pacific and then the globe, AUKUS is set up to be a catalyst for creating a whole series of capabilities that will complicate any plan for war, that if we do it right, may prevent that war from ever happening.

Above was focused on Pillar 1 of AUKUS. What is really exciting is the promise of Pillar 2.

From the May 2024 CRS report:

AUKUS Pillar 2 refers to a suite of cooperative activities conducted by the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia to develop and field “advanced capabilities” under the AUKUS security partnership. To date, Pillar 2 activities have been coordinated among the three governments by a number of means, including topic-specific working groups. At least eight such groups are currently active: six address technological areas and two address functional areas. The current working groups are

• Undersea capabilities;

• Quantum technologies;

• Artificial intelligence and autonomy;

• Advanced cyber;

• Hypersonic and counter-hypersonic capabilities;

• Electronic warfare;

• Innovation; and

• Information sharing.

That right there is sexy.

That is the future, and by pulling our best minds and industry together, we can all get there faster.

1+1=3

Alignment with National Strategies

The U.S., British, and Australian governments have each identified AUKUS as an important part of their respective national strategies. The Biden Administration’s 2022 U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy cites AUKUS efforts under its “Reinforce Deterrence” line of effort, characterizing the partnership as contributing to the defense of U.S. interests, deterrence of adversary aggression, and the promotion of regional security.¹⁷ In addition, the 2024 U.S. National Defense Industrial Strategy states that AUKUS supports DOD’s “economic deterrence” priority.¹⁸ The United Kingdom’s “Integrated Review Refresh 2023” asserts that the AUKUS partnership will “allow [the UK and its allies] collectively to balance against coercive behaviours and to preserve an open and stable international order.”¹⁹ AUKUS also features prominently in Australia’s 2024 National Defence Strategy, which describes the partnership as “essential to building the Australian Defence Force’s capacity to deliver impactful projection across the full spectrum of proportionate response.”²⁰

Formal DOD and executive branch statements concerning AUKUS have generally avoided focusing on particular threats or challenges, instead referring to more abstract interests and goals.²¹ However, some analysts argue the pact responds to a perception among its members that the intentions and capabilities of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) pose a significant and growing threat to Indo-Pacific security. This perspective has also been articulated by a number of U.S. policymakers, including some senior executive branch officials and Members of Congress. In April 2024, for instance, Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell referred to the capabilities developed through AUKUS as creating “enormous implications in a variety of scenarios, including in cross-[Taiwan] strait circumstances,” and in March 2023 House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) Chairman Michael McCaul offered the following characterization of the partnership:

We are facing a generational challenge from the Chinese Communist Party. We must bring all tools to bear in our effort to counter Chairman Xi’s attempts to disrupt the global balance of power. With AUKUS, our three nations can achieve the shared strategic goal of defending the Indo-Pacific region, while maintaining our technological and military superiority.²²

This view—that AUKUS is part of a broader response to the perceived threat from the PRC—appears to be shared by the other AUKUS governments. During the AUKUS Optimal Pathway Announcement, for example, British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak explained the need for an increased focus on defense by citing a number of particular challenges, including “China’s growing assertiveness.”²³ In 2022, Australia’s then-Prime Minister Scott Morrison described AUKUS as a response to, in part, PRC “attempt[s] to reshape our region, and the world, in a way more conducive to autocracies than liberal democracies.”²⁴

As other nations come onboard, they are signaling the exact same thing.

In August of 2024 in a publication by the Parliament of Australia, Adam Broinowski pointed out where AUKUS can be an opportunity to bring an even closer security cooperation with friends and allies in the Pacific to everyone’s benefit:

Consideration of extending Pillar 2 began as early as 2021, including New Zealand’s potential ‘Tier 2 AUKUS’ participation. Engagement with ‘Strand B’ countries Japan and South Korea was also recommended. With criteria for Pillar 2 participation based on shared strategic culture and a military strategic symmetry to maximise AUKUS’s effectiveness in the Indo-Pacific, prospective countries include Japan, South Korea, New Zealand and Canada. In addition, Taiwan has also expressed interest.

Both Japan and South Korea have bilateral security alliances with the US, have increased their military spending and share close military interoperability with US forces. Each country also plans to increase defence industrial integration (shipbuilding, munitions production, repair), boost its economic security and diversify its supply chains with the US.

On 8 April 2024, the AUKUS members announced Japan’s potential Pillar 2 participation on a project-by-project basis, which was reciprocated by Prime Minister Kishida. A similar announcement for South Korea’s participation followed on 1 May 2024 at the Australia-Republic of Korea 2+2 meeting in Melbourne.

The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force has advanced uncrewed and undersea systems, conducts satellite-assisted maritime surveillance, mapping and monitoring (including undersea warfare research projects with Australia), and contributes to integrated air and missile operations. Japan has also launched a new policy on military AI.

Meanwhile, since the Yoon government’s foreign policy shift to a ‘global pivotal state’ in 2022, South Korea has boosted bilateral ties with Japan and under the US–Korea–Japan trilateral format. It has also established the Defense AI Center, strengthened its AI-powered surveillance and robotic systems, and increased defence exports, including to the Australian Defence Force.

U.S.A., Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Japan, South Korea, maybe Taiwan and a few more. I don’t know about you, but that is a hell of a team.

The broad political spectrum of both parties know this, that is why in spite of the change of governments we have seen in almost all these nations in the last half decade, AUKUS continues forward.

Japan, especially, will bring so much to the table in Pillar 2.

Austin Wu at the Pacific Forum gets it.

In his January confirmation hearing, Secretary of State Marco Rubio called the AUKUS agreement a “blueprint” for other US partnerships—stressing the ability of the agreement to “(create) a geopolitical and strategic balance in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond.” As the AUKUS agreement comes up on the fourth anniversary of its signing, Rubio’s comments have again driven consideration to potentially expanding Pillar II of the agreement beyond the three original signatories. As the US looks to build on the AUKUS model, expanding the reach of Pillar II is a logical next step.

…

Critics have argued that Pillar II expansion could dilute the focus of the partnership and exacerbate underlying issues. However, these concerns are unfounded. Japan is fully committed to Indo-Pacific deterrence, especially containing China. It’s new national security strategy and national defense strategy have emphasized the Chinese threat to Taiwan. Moreover, it is already a leading defense partner for all three AUKUS states. Instead of weakening the focus of AUKUS, expanding pillar II to include Japan reinforces the partnership’s commitment to Indo-Pacific deterrence.

…

Rather than the additive nature of traditional alliances, Pillar II provides multiplicative potential, helping buttress both the quality and quantity of Indo-Pacific deterrence. At the same time, Pillar II is a risk, with close collaboration requiring mutual trust and security. On both these fronts, Japan is a natural partner. As a global leader in several of the critical technologies that AUKUS is attempting to leverage, as well as a decades-long partner of all three AUKUS countries, Japan provides both the scale and trust needed to help AUKUS achieve its mission of ensuring Indo-Pacific security.

As the lead nation, the U.S. is leading from the front. We are sacrificing to make this happen, taking on risk on the bet that the resulting advantage will be an overall national security positive.

Like we discussed yesterday, ignore those complaining about the transfers of active Virginia Block IV SSNs. They are either ignorant, bad-faith actors, or most of them—just strategically wrong.

The U.S. is not just throwing off used boats to the Australians. Reflagging U.S. Navy SSN to the Australia knock back an already shrinking U.S. submarine force…especially as the last of the Los Angeles Class SSN end their service life.

We are providing, with four boats, better than two years of submarine production to make this happen.

If that isn’t friendship, I don’t know what is.

As mentioned earlier, although Virginia-class boats have been procured at a rate of two boats per year, the actual Virginia-class production rate has never reached 2.0 boats per year, and since 2022 has been limited by shipyard and supplier firm workforce and supply chain challenges to about 1.1 to 1.2 boats per year, resulting in a growing backlog of boats procured but not yet built. As also mentioned earlier, the Navy and industry are working to increase the Virginia-class production rate to 2.0 boats per year, and subsequently to 2.33 boats per year, the rate the Navy states will be needed to not only execute the two-per-year procurement rate, but also build replacement SSNs for the three to five Virginia-class boats that are to be sold to Australia under the AUKUS submarine (Pillar 1) project that is discussed later in this report, and to reduce the accumulated Virginia-class production backlog. How quickly this effort will succeed in increasing the Virginia-class production rate to 2.0 boats, and subsequently to 2.33 boats per year, is not clear.

I’d like to wind things up by pointing your way to Brent Ramsey’s article at The Patriot Post from June 2nd, The Thunder Down Under: Australia.

In his review of recent efforts to bolster Australia’s defense, he outlines five cornerstone points as to why we should make sure that we don’t just reinforce our existing relationship with Australia, but bring them closer for both our benefit. Australia isn’t the only nation getting a significant gain from this.

1.) Australia’s location makes it, in effect, a southern anchor of the Indo-Pacific and a key to U.S. policy in the region and any potential defense of Taiwan should the PRC take military action. Australia would be a key partner for logistics support, fuel, repairs, munitions stockpiles, reconnaissance, submarine access to the South China Sea, and providing a sanctuary away from combat operations for U.S. and allied ships.

2.) Northern Australia is a U.S. training and launch location. We are building infrastructure in Tindal, Darwin, and Amberley, locations that can and will support aircraft of all types and Marine forces. A quick glance at the map shows that Australia links the Pacific to the Indian Ocean, a major factor in any military planning of a potential fight in the South China Sea over Taiwan or any U.S. treaty ally.

3.) U.S. space operations, both civil and military, already depend heavily on Australian advanced space support sites. The U.S. also receives major help from Australia in intelligence gathering.

4.) Australia’s Jindalee Operational Radar Network, described by Australia as “a world-leading high-frequency, skywave over-the-horizon radar system,” provides exceptional surveillance at long ranges for air and marine operations, disasters, and search and rescue. Its military applications are of strategic importance.

5.) Critical minerals are plentiful in Australia. The U.S. and Australia signed a critical minerals and rare earths framework in 2025 that will ease pressure on the U.S. by providing an alternative to China for these vital minerals that our defense depends on.

Sold.