Base Defense: How Many More Warnings?
ignoring the known knowns
It has long been a dirty little secret that we made a decision to “accept risk” in defending our bases from attack. That momentary bet became a habit…and then part of the environment.
The Army, especially during GWOT, didn’t just underfund air defense in general and treat it as a secondary career field—it never even considered what was needed to defend bases. The USAF? No better…and they relied on the Army for air defense. It was only 18 months or so ago they started to experiment with base defense.
In the halls of the Pentagon, the military historians and Red Teams lost the argument to the accountants and the pet theories of The Smartest People in the Room™. When things got too sporty to ignore, a few bases received modified CIWS from the Navy, but that is about it.
At the start of this decade, Patriot air defense was already a “high-demand/low-density” asset simply because we didn’t properly resource them in either missiles or units for decades. Yes, GWOT…but by 2010, that pressure on personnel was lessening significantly, and following President Obama’s “Pacific Pivot” speech, funds and thinking should have quickly shifted to the high-end fight.
We dithered.
Then after a few years, the Military Gods of the Copybook Headings were kind enough over six years ago to send us a firm reminder that we needed to get serious.
Iran responded to the killing of General Qassem Soleimani by launching "Operation Martyr Soleimani," launching a dozen ballistic missiles at Al Asad Airbase and Erbil on January 8, 2020.
We were lucky no one was killed.
Have we learned our lesson? It appears not.
We are in, what, the fifth spring of the Russo-Ukrainian War? What is one of the big takeaways from this conflict, something obvious? That’s right, the vulnerability of bases, especially air bases, to attack drones of all kinds. Small FPV drones, Shahed-sized drones, or even your standard land attack cruise missiles. You better be ready for them, as they are ready for you.
Do we even need to review the experience of Israel, not just in the last few years, but for decades? I hope not.
So, what is clear as day?
Static bases within range of your enemies long-range fires—ballistic or drone—will be attacked.
Conventionally armed ballistic missiles in the Short, Medium, Intermediate, and soon Intercontinental range are part of the threat you need to defend against.
Drones can attack your base at any time, from any direction, in a variety of sizes.
All this is known.
An Iranian strike that wounded US troops at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia also damaged multiple aircraft and likely completely destroyed an E-3 Sentry aircraft. The attack some 60 miles south of the capital of Riyadh in the early hours of March 27 is said to have involved a coordinated precision barrage of at least one Iranian ballistic missile and several attack drones.
According to reports, some 10 to 12 American service members were injured in the attack, with at least two in serious condition. The base, a major operating location for US Air Force platforms during the war, has been attacked several times since the beginning of Operation Epic Fury/Operation Roaring Lion. Earlier in the week, 14 others were wounded in an attack, and another missile strike on the base on March 1 killed one service member.
The strike on Friday hit an installation housing troops and also caused significant damage to US KC-135 Stratotanker refueling aircraft that are essential for sustaining long-range US and Israeli air operations, along with the E-3 Sentry AWACS, one of the most important command-and-control platforms in the US inventory.
OK, that is a conflict zone. Roger. Understand. You will take hits at war…but PSAB? You would think that something as critical as PSAB would be well defended. Were the incoming missiles and drones even engaged?
We’ll find out at some point, but a place like PSAB not having the best base defense possible is hard to imagine. It is almost as hard to imagines as if the bases that our nuclear capable bombers use were undefended.
Oh.
Over the course of a week, multiple waves of sophisticated drones penetrated the airspace over Barksdale Air Force Base near Shreveport — a critical hub of America’s nuclear bomber fleet and the headquarters of Air Force Global Strike Command.
These drones were likely custom built, requiring advanced signals expertise far beyond any hobbyist. The disruptions apparently succeeded in delaying bombers taking off to strike targets in Iran, according to ABC News.
…
While it’s unclear who is behind the Louisiana incursion, it’s impossible to ignore that a new era of drone warfare has begun — and that the U.S. is not ready. During a NATO exercise in Estonia last year, 10 Ukrainian drone operators role-playing as the enemy mock-destroyed 17 armored vehicles and disabled two allied battalions in a day. NATO forces couldn’t even locate the operators.
These vulnerabilities are no longer theoretical. Iran originally supplied Russia with its Shahed drone designs for use against Ukraine. Now Russia is sending upgraded versions back — with improved engines, better navigation and enhanced resistance to electronic jamming. Moscow is also sharing satellite imagery and targeting data to help Iran strike American bases and personnel.
Were this an emerging threat or something novel, it would be understandable, but this threat is not.
Years ago, I developed a new measure of time that I find helpful in military matters. It is called a “WorldWar.” It is the length of time from Pearl Harbor to the defeat of Imperial Japan, or 1,365 days.
The attack on Al Asad and Erbil on January 8, 2020, it has been 2,273 days, or 1.67 WorldWars.
The Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022 has been going on 1,465 days, or 1.07 WorldWars.
It would be as if we never recognized the threat posed by carrier aviation in the entire length of WWII in the Pacific.
Perhaps former DepSecDef Kath Hicks’s “Replicator” initiative (announced .68 of a WorldWar ago) could have put some focus on base defense? I know it is unsexy, but it is important.
Yes, I know, it can seem to be an easy thing to point out failures like this. But these are not Rumsfeldian Unknown-Unknowns, or even Known-Unknowns. These are long standing Known-Knowns.
And yet, we find ourselves with our pants around our ankles.
For a successful equipping of a military, experienced reality in the field must take precedence over pet theories, process, and bureaucracy. That is why we have senior leaders, isn’t it? We have to to break through these adhesions and develop a better mindset toward clear and present dangers to—because they are no longer in production—irreplaceable assets.
The Military Gods of the Copybook Headings will not be trifled with. They will not be fooled.
A good chunk of the problem is that, to put it bluntly, base defense capability isn't "sexy" the way shiny new fighters are. It's the same reason we don't have new minesweepers or ground attack aircraft, why QoL concerns for personnel don't get prioritized, and why our shipyards are in such terrible condition.
About ten years ago I escorted a Korean Army SOF general on a tour of Camp Smith (INDOPAC HQ). He said he was surprised that we would put such an important HQ on a hill, totally out in the open, in plain view of Pearl Harbor. He said all of their HQs are underground on the south side of mountains.