Bring Rainier and Bridge out of Reserve
...the Other Sal makes my argument for me...
As of Monday night, after a bunch of OSIT accounts said that the USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77) had passed through Gibraltar, more and more reports indicate the contrary, she and her escorts are off Namibia, about to head around the Cape of Good Hope instead. It was kind of fun watching the competing reports.
There are quite a few reasons to do this. We’ll find out the reason this time at some point, but don’t get lost in the details. It isn’t nothing.
As usual, The Other Sal went to the chartroom to make sure everyone understood the state of play.
Stop for a second—there is a gift here if we are willing to accept it. Remember one of the fundamentals we like to revisit here: small and medium sized conflicts will give you hints as to what you will need when the next big war comes.
Sal Mercogliano nailed it.
It is time to re-engage on a question I asked back in March.
With each passing month, this requirement is screaming for action louder and louder.
The accountants got hold of them during the second Obama Administration, as Sam reported at the time.
The Navy will decommission two of Military Sealift Command’s youngest refueling and Fleet support ships in a bid to save $251 million as part of the Department of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2014 budget, Navy officials told USNI News on Monday.
Supply-class ships USNS Bridge (T-AOE-10) will decommission in 2014 and USNS Rainier (T-AOE-7) and will decommission in 2015 based on the 2012 Navy Force Structure Assessment, Navy officials said. The FSA reduced the number of Fleet oilers from 19 to 17, leaving two Supply-class and 15 Henry J Kaiser class oilers.
When Rainier was put in reserve, she only had 21 years of active service. Bridge, only 16 years. In theory, both were stricken from the naval register in 2022, but they’re still in reserve.
We no longer have the luxury of the delusions of the Obama Era Navy.
The cult of efficiency had its run of things, now we need the advocates of effectiveness to leverage the power and influence they have.
The requirement for more auxiliaries if we plan to contest the People’s Republic of China west of the International Date Line is self-evident.
The Supply-class fast combat support ships were designed at the end of the Cold War, the last time the U.S. Navy found itself challenged at sea. The reality and math that led to her class have returned. The Gods of the Naval Warfare Copybook Headings are calling for this speed and capability again.
Fix the mistakes of the past. Get the Rainier and Bridge ready to come back to the fleet. In parallel, fast-track a new AOE that has the same ability to keep up with the fleet.
Another mistake we can correct. The Supply-class were once USS and not USNS.
When they were USS and not USNS, they were armed.
NATO Sea Sparrow Missile Launching System; Close-in weapons system (CIWS), two 25-mm guns; four .50 caliber machine guns; countermeasures set AN/SLQ-32(V)3; 4 decoy launchers; torpedo countermeasures transmitting set (NIXIE)
That’s a good start. Replace with the best modern equivalent+. They need more, a lot more. There are places to put them We’ve discussed that recently here, no need to repeat it. Read up if needed, the older stuff and the newer.
History does not reward procrastination. Math does not like to be ignored.





Reflecting back on the Obama Era approach to national security and national defense: What would you have done differently if you were trying to uplift our enemies (especially Iran, thanks so much, Ms. Valerie Jarrett) and destroy our ACTUAL capability to wage and SUSTAIN conflict? All of the three Obama administration terms (including Biden's admin, check the names) were degrading, not enhancing capability. OBTW, this includes the foreign policy approach AND DoD...and especially the active-duty senior SES and flag officers of all services. IMO, YMMV
Spot on Sal! LOGISTICS!!!