You are spot on about how we must transition much of the US Army from the active duty to the Army Reserve and Army National Guard to affect massive cost savings and reflect the Founding Father's distaste for large standing armies. By doing this, we could not only save money but actually increase the number of overall Army personnel who are trained and available for activation in the event of a national emergency. We no longer have to worry about the Soviet Union surging a mass mechanized blitzkrieg through the Fulda Gap any longer. So we don't need a large active duty Army force. We do need a smaller elite expeditionary force for contingencies. But first and foremost, we must defend the homeland against unconventional threats while using the US Navy, USAF and USMC to deal with the distant threats. I was a military intelligence analyst who served in both active duty and reserve components for 30 years, in two different services and deployed for Desert Storm, OEF and OIF. You are saying exactly what I have thought for many years on this matter.
Just to add to my comments, the citizen-soldier should not be merely a slogan, but a reflection on the role of the citizen in defending our nation. By making the US Army primarily a reserve component force, we make the political act of declaring war also a decision and responsibility of the American people. Instead of war being waged by a small group of professional soldiers that American society has lost touch with, war will instead be the responsibility and the burden of our neighbors, our fathers, mothers, sons and daughters. War will be something that we wage with our society's full support because our full society will be assuming the full and terrible burden of what war is all about. But by the same token, our enemies will know what a terrible foe that they face if they choose to wage war upon America and its citizens for there is no greater foe than a furious American people.
We had this model during the many years that we had without conscription. We can still have it now without conscription with a properly funded and managed reserve component. My recommendation also that under a primarily reserve component Army (and to a less degree, Air Force) that the annual training period be three weeks instead of just two. This would ensure an effective annual training for our Reservists/Guardsmen with more to the time actually devoted to training rather than just admin requirements. This would ensure a better trained and more combat-ready reserve component while still saving tens of billions of dollars.
Bringing up the Fulda Gap is a distraction—it has nothing to do with today’s force structure debate. The issue isn’t whether we’re still facing Soviet tanks in Germany. The issue is whether we have ready ground forces who can respond immediately and sustain operations in a contested environment.
I'm a retired ARNG officer with three mobilizations. The Reserve Component is a *strategic reserve*—not a bullpen of full-time soldiers waiting for the call. These are civilians with jobs, families, and obligations. Mobilization isn’t automatic; it requires time, legal authority, coordination with employers, and political will. Readiness levels vary, and availability isn’t guaranteed. That’s not a knock on the Guard or Reserve—it’s just the nature of the system.
*You don’t save money by pretending part-time forces can do a full-time job on demand. You just increase risk and hope we get enough warning next time.*
And invoking the Founding Fathers to justify gutting the active-duty Army is a textbook fallacy. They lived in the 18th century. Their views on standing armies were shaped by redcoats quartering in people's homes, not near-peer competitors with drones, satellites, and hypersonic weapons. We should respect their principles—but not misapply them to 21st-century military realities.
We still can't afford a large active duty force. You simply do not want to say the quiet part out loud. We also do not need a large active duty force to fight another Desert Storm battle either. Those days are long gone. I've served in both the Active Duty Army as well as the Army National Guard (and the Air Force Reserves). There are far too many officers in the Army who still think in terms of refighting WW2 and maintaining the force structure for that purpose. If the very remote possibility occurs and we do need to put multiple combat divisions into the fight, we WILL have the time to train up our reserve component troops to fight, especially if we are not going out to fight another land war in Asia as the world's policeman. Let's face it. We need to worry about protecting America, not fighting other peoples' battles. NATO nations need to carry their own load. If we need an expeditionary land force, that's what the Marines and the RDF is for. Otherwise, our real battles are the venue of the US Navy and the USAF, NOT Big Green. Another thing, having a largely reserve component Army forces our political leaders to take a step back and think 'Do we really need to send hundreds of thousands of our citizens into this fight?' and 'Will the American people support this in the long run?' We have too often failed to look before we leap into a war. This will FORCE us to look first for alternatives before we expend unaffordable blood and treasure once again. You should see what Erik Prince has to say about this as well. And don't forget, Ukraine was a largely reserve-based military at the time of the Russian invasion. The most important thing that they did was to open up their armories, hand out AKs/RPG's and turn many thousands of their citizens into ad hoc citizen-soldiers. Yes, a lot of them died, but they kept the Russians from overrunning the country long enough to get soldiers trained. We would do a lot better because of how our culture is structured. Add to that having a MUCH larger reserve component where for every one active duty soldier that we remove, we add two or three trained reservists/Guardmen.
Your reserve-heavy Army proposal isn’t just risky—it’s built on your fundamental misunderstanding of how the Reserve Component actually works in practice.
This idea that we can “train them up when we need them” ignores:
• legal and bureaucratic delays
• medical readiness gaps
• equipment shortfalls
• and the fact that these are civilians with jobs, families, and full lives.
The Reserve is a *strategic reserve*, not a rapid-response force. They’re not full-timers sitting in a bullpen. Pretending they are is operational malpractice.
The “citizen-soldier” concept you’re leaning on is familiar—and nostalgic—but it’s not a strategy.
It’s a holdover from a time when:
• wars moved slower
• we thought threats were predictable (and were still wrong anyway)
• and we had the blood-expensive luxury of learning on the fly
That world is gone.
We don’t need a million-person standing Army to fight land wars, but we do need trained, ready, active-duty ground forces—because not having them invites the very crisis you think you’re avoiding.
And finally—using the Reserve as a brake to “force Washington to think twice” isn’t smart policy, it’s a self-imposed vulnerability.
What you’re really saying is this:
If the *crisis comes anyway*, it’s the citizen-soldier and their community who will pay the price for your fantasy. Maybe in blood.
We can accept legal and bureaucratic delays because we do not need to rush multiple divisions to Europe in two weeks like had been the case during the Cold War.
If you double or triple the size of the reserve component, a 10% loss rate due to medical readiness issues is acceptable because you will still have a substantially larger force.
Equipment shortfalls should not be an issue since we will not be fielding a massive armor force. We will be fielding a reserve component that will be lighter in nature with larger numbers of support and infantry units. Large amounts of anti-armor weapons can be produced and stored at a relatively inexpensive cost. The upcoming trend towards armed FPV drones make this even easier. Again, we are not pushing this force overseas two weeks after the balloon goes up in the Fulda Gap anymore.
Yes, they are civilians with jobs, families and full lives. The decision to go to war will not be one made by an imperial Presidency with legions of professional soldiers to achieve some nebulous political goal. The decision to go to war will then be one made by the AMERICAN PEOPLE. When the American people are making that decision and fully behind it, it is a force that no nation can take lightly nor will be defeated.
Thanks for being a voice of reason. If only the Navy were as interested in fighting America's enemies as it is in fighting its own enemy- the U.S. Army.
We need a bunch of amphibs and we have shipyards in the Great Lakes. Here are the limits for vessels that can squeeze through the St Lawrence Seaway ("SeawayMax") and reach the ocean:
Length 740 ft (225.6 m)
Beam 78 ft (23.8 m)
Height 116.5 ft (35.5 m)
Draft 26.51 ft (8.1 m)
America has done this kind of thing before, when we're willing to build a lot of hulls fast for a war, and when we don't care whether the ships last for fifty years or only five. Remember the Liberty Ships?
Perhaps the Great Lakes shipyards can be goosed to churn out smaller amphibs. I don't think we want our Marines packed together into one or two hulking monsters when we can distribute them among a dozen per invasion beach, to complicate the enemy's task of stopping them.
We should be at least as creative as our enemy is:
Let's not forget the capabilities on the Mississippi and Ohio rivers. Several opportunities to produce relatively shallow draft vessels with up to a 60 foot beam still in operation.
Something max beam, really shallow draft, relatively short isn't what you'd want for cruising from West Coast to Taiwan. But from island to island would be pretty good. An if it's just a jarheads/supplies carrier, wouldn't need that much disbursement of talent.
Lock sizes are generally 600' x 110' with 9 foot draft. Figure move them at light draft and you could potentially move corvette size ships like Singapore Littoral Mission Vessel or Taiwan's Tuo Chiang classes. I mention them as they use MTU 20V 4000 M93 which are also the most powerful engine size certified to use on LUSV. All the Overlord ships and MDUSVs also easily move at this draft along with Fast Response Cutters. And of course, landing ships.
The Manitowoc yard that built fleet subs (and floated them down the Miss to New Orleans) in WWII is sadly gone, replaced by housing development (of course). But Lakes Michigan and Huron may offer more opportunities to (re)build shipyard capacity than the Atlantic or Pacific coasts, especially in terms of property cost, eminent domain, and NIMBYism.
(Lovely town, Manitowoc. Nice little maritime museum. And a plaque set in the middle of the street where they were "bombed" by Sputnik debris in the 1950s....)
Hm... I don't recall seeing any mention of DEs at the local museum, but I could have missed it. The Balaos and Gatos were the primary stars.
Wikipedia lists subs, LCTs, and fuel barges.
Oddly enough, the subs are listed as having 15ft draft, but were barged down the Mississippi rather than taken through the St Lawrence. The Soo Locks should have been able to handle one, IIRC.
To my eye, looking at the upper right quadrant of the photo, up and left and across the bridge from the Gato in the floating drydock, there appears to be three or four vessels tied up side-by-side. Having watched Drachinifel's video on the USS Slater he posted yesterday and then looking up the length of a Cannon-class DE, they were almost identical in length to a Gato. With the submarine in the floating drydock as a reference, I now see that the ships I mistook for DEs were not. Maybe sub chasers though.
Being kind of tight there with your navigational draft aren’t you? The Saint Lawrence Seaway has a mean navigational draft of ~27-feet, and your ~26.51-feet gives you a mean navigational draft depth clearance of less than 6” to work with…
Yup. But the more you push up against the Seawaymax limits, the better your seakeeping on that looooooooong trip down to Panama and then up to the WESTPAC area of operations.
There are plans to deepen the Saint Lawrence Seaway by ~12-feet, but at only 3-inches at a time for it’s nearly 2,200-mile length! But at 3”/year, it will take nearly 48-years to complete its additional from its existing ~27’ to its projected ~39’ sometime around 2063…
How many of those “poor buggers” pilot a ship weighing 8,000-tons or more, have to contend with swells in the water that could potentially dip the ship into the bottom of the seaways resulting in damaging the ship, just to send the ship back to the shipyard it just came from for needed repairs! Or the career ender for the PCU ship’s captain and/or pilot to have allowed the ship to be damaged in the first place! The navigational draft of the Constitution class Frigate is only a mere ~16’…
If built low enough, the 1960's amphibs easily fit in that box. In fact, they used to send one on a cruise of the Great Lakes, and occasionally conduct an amphibious demonstration in a public place.
Why haven’t the Marines been used in the ongoing war against the Houthis? They could seize the islands off the coast of Yemen. They could occupy the piece of land that juts toward Djibouti. They could seize ports. Etc.
Either we aren’t serious about fighting or the Marines are incapable of ambitious assaults.
They haven't because U.S. leadership hasn't issued the order. Let's not forget that Perim Island in the middle of the Bab-el Mandeb (cheers!) was a UK holding until the late 60's when they gave it back and South Yemen then immediately turned it over to the Soviets (as those in the UK parliament opposing it, said would happen.) https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1967/jun/19/aden-perim-and-kuria-muria-islands-bill
The UK forgot their maritime roots, and the U.S. political class has been trying like heck to ignore that we are a maritime republic.
We haven't done that because we don't have the capability to do so. I'm sorry to say my Corps just can't deploy, employ & maintain a forward deployed MEU.
Good article, except I would argue that we need at least active duty one corps-level mechanized formation because, like it or not, we have to be ready to fight in Europe or the Middle East for the foreseeable future. We also need a couple of lighter divisions for the Pacific/Korea and a rapid response division. That still allows for a smaller active-duty Army (18 brigades down from our current 31). Any saved funds go to the Navy.
As much as it pains me to say this as an Army guy, your assessment is spot on. Maintain one active duty Army corps (XVIII Airborne Corps) for land-based overseas contingencies, the rest of the force is transferred to the reserve components. Navy and USMC must remain the priority and need to be expanded and modernized. On an aside, the Navy should reopen Roosevelt Roads Naval Base to expand U.S. ability to respond to contingencies in the Caribbean Basin, defend the Panama Canal, and counter PRC activities in the Western Hemisphere.
I think you need one large (division?) sized mechanized force in order to keep those skill sets current and have some form of cadre in the event of large scale combat breaking out. If the navy is going to get the savings they should prove that they have improved their procurement process. We can't afford more Zumwalts and LCS, but I'm preaching to the choir.
We also need to adjust our allies expectations of what American help will look like. It ain't going to be REFORGER.
Sadly, this will never happen... In probabilistic terms, the likelihood of downsizing the army in this fashion is near zero. The MIC would NEVER stand by and let that happen. And every manufacturer - large and small - supplying bits and pieces to the Pentagon would have a conniption fit. That is a multi-headed hydra will not accept defeat and will enjoy broad-based congressional opposition of such efforts from every state.
Don't be so sure. If you reduce the personnel line and operating line it opens up the equipment line in the budget. If I'm selling new IFVs I don't care how much or if you use them, I just care that you buy them.
Reserve gear gets kept at Equipment Concentration Sites. Like say at Camp Grayling. If your SP artillery BN is in Lansing or your tank BN in Benton Harbor the maintenance and equipment exercising is not being done by the unit, it's being done by either contractors or a dedicated unit staffed by full-time mechanics.
It could make sense to continue to build enough equipment that it is available for mobilization in 6 months to a year, cycling the few active duty troops through it to ensure it's not shadow ware.
"The USMC projecting power ashore is a lot more than a floaty thingy. Perhaps if critics protested with more flecked foam it might be a more effective argument, but I will stick with the wisdom of experience." Best Salamander quote. Drink to the foam!
Spot on, however our senior naval leadership has to acknowledge this and advocate for this first. They continue to resource the amphibious asset the least and last.
Joint dies if the Army transitions to primarily reserve forces and you roll the Air Force and Space Force into the Navy. It originally pained me, an Army guy, to think this way, but the more I think about it, the more it makes sense.
As a Marine, I fully endorse the content and thrust of this post. The lack of proper amphibious craft is a real hurdle; and the time needed to create the traditional types of vessels is much, much, much too long.
Time to change up. (yep, you're going to read it here once again) Build AMPHIBIOUS AIRSHIPS!
as I wrote years ago in "Ghost Ships"; modern airships
(NOT BLIMPS OR DIRIGIBLES!)
can become phenomenal additions to the fleet and provide capabilities that are unmatched.
Last I heard, it was two Marine officers at Naval War College who were looking into using a form of airship (the "Airlander", alas) for logistics. There is a world of advantage to fielding airships; not the least of which is their lower cost to create and the speed of doing so.
(addendum: If anyone emails me direct; I'll happily send em a PDF of "Ghost Ships"; a chapter detailing use of military airships taken from my book "Helium Phoenix")
You need to have some of the board members of your company to have connections within the Florida GOP. Considering how many FL politicos are finding there way into the Administration, that may be your best bet.
Transitioning more land forces into the Reserve and National Guard and beefing up expeditionary capability sounds logical and doable, so, we must kill the idea right now.
100% agree with the argument for the unique USMC capability (thoughts on the current USMC Commandant?). The now (short), mid and long term actions required to make this happen face physical (ship building, logisitics) challenges that are daunting. Worst challenge to overcome is the DoD leadership (below recent political appointees) and their approach to priorities. Start with the POM...the current 30-30-30-10 budgetary allocation will have to change...and that change will NOT be welcomed by the Iron Triangle (DoD, Military Industrial Complex (TM), and congress). A case where the traditional Road Map, Implementation Plan, and POM might actually work if done with vision and conviction vice the usual rice bowl protection strategy of the last four decades. Perhaps...we'll see.
Before the USMC can "deter aggression, contain conflicts, evacuate noncombatants, and respond quickly and effectively..." they need to have strong champions in the DoN and Congress.
And frankly, "There seems to be something wrong with our bloody leadership today."
I think we need serious consideration to why our smallest amphib needs to weigh more than the largest cruiser ever built. I'm pretty sold on the cheap idea for LSM, but I could live with a larger LST just for the potential to grow numbers. We should also look at throughput from amphibious ships and logistics/MPF/Sealift.
Well said, and completely agree. It does seem that our last two Commandants have been focused upon changing the traditional Marine ability to go ashore and fight to something else (no tanks, no tube artillery) which at best would be a light infantry expeditionary force. That's not a MEU (much less a ARG) in my book.
Although actually the Maginot line was not a bad strategic concept. It was not actually penetrated in 1940. The failure was French dispositions of tactical forces and airpower.
You are spot on about how we must transition much of the US Army from the active duty to the Army Reserve and Army National Guard to affect massive cost savings and reflect the Founding Father's distaste for large standing armies. By doing this, we could not only save money but actually increase the number of overall Army personnel who are trained and available for activation in the event of a national emergency. We no longer have to worry about the Soviet Union surging a mass mechanized blitzkrieg through the Fulda Gap any longer. So we don't need a large active duty Army force. We do need a smaller elite expeditionary force for contingencies. But first and foremost, we must defend the homeland against unconventional threats while using the US Navy, USAF and USMC to deal with the distant threats. I was a military intelligence analyst who served in both active duty and reserve components for 30 years, in two different services and deployed for Desert Storm, OEF and OIF. You are saying exactly what I have thought for many years on this matter.
Just to add to my comments, the citizen-soldier should not be merely a slogan, but a reflection on the role of the citizen in defending our nation. By making the US Army primarily a reserve component force, we make the political act of declaring war also a decision and responsibility of the American people. Instead of war being waged by a small group of professional soldiers that American society has lost touch with, war will instead be the responsibility and the burden of our neighbors, our fathers, mothers, sons and daughters. War will be something that we wage with our society's full support because our full society will be assuming the full and terrible burden of what war is all about. But by the same token, our enemies will know what a terrible foe that they face if they choose to wage war upon America and its citizens for there is no greater foe than a furious American people.
You are dead on. I will be surprised of the FY26 defense budget reflects this.
"our full society will be assuming the full and terrible burden of what war is all about."
Not without conscription. A volunteer military pretty much by definition avoids making our full society assume the burden of war.
We had this model during the many years that we had without conscription. We can still have it now without conscription with a properly funded and managed reserve component. My recommendation also that under a primarily reserve component Army (and to a less degree, Air Force) that the annual training period be three weeks instead of just two. This would ensure an effective annual training for our Reservists/Guardsmen with more to the time actually devoted to training rather than just admin requirements. This would ensure a better trained and more combat-ready reserve component while still saving tens of billions of dollars.
Bringing up the Fulda Gap is a distraction—it has nothing to do with today’s force structure debate. The issue isn’t whether we’re still facing Soviet tanks in Germany. The issue is whether we have ready ground forces who can respond immediately and sustain operations in a contested environment.
I'm a retired ARNG officer with three mobilizations. The Reserve Component is a *strategic reserve*—not a bullpen of full-time soldiers waiting for the call. These are civilians with jobs, families, and obligations. Mobilization isn’t automatic; it requires time, legal authority, coordination with employers, and political will. Readiness levels vary, and availability isn’t guaranteed. That’s not a knock on the Guard or Reserve—it’s just the nature of the system.
*You don’t save money by pretending part-time forces can do a full-time job on demand. You just increase risk and hope we get enough warning next time.*
And invoking the Founding Fathers to justify gutting the active-duty Army is a textbook fallacy. They lived in the 18th century. Their views on standing armies were shaped by redcoats quartering in people's homes, not near-peer competitors with drones, satellites, and hypersonic weapons. We should respect their principles—but not misapply them to 21st-century military realities.
We still can't afford a large active duty force. You simply do not want to say the quiet part out loud. We also do not need a large active duty force to fight another Desert Storm battle either. Those days are long gone. I've served in both the Active Duty Army as well as the Army National Guard (and the Air Force Reserves). There are far too many officers in the Army who still think in terms of refighting WW2 and maintaining the force structure for that purpose. If the very remote possibility occurs and we do need to put multiple combat divisions into the fight, we WILL have the time to train up our reserve component troops to fight, especially if we are not going out to fight another land war in Asia as the world's policeman. Let's face it. We need to worry about protecting America, not fighting other peoples' battles. NATO nations need to carry their own load. If we need an expeditionary land force, that's what the Marines and the RDF is for. Otherwise, our real battles are the venue of the US Navy and the USAF, NOT Big Green. Another thing, having a largely reserve component Army forces our political leaders to take a step back and think 'Do we really need to send hundreds of thousands of our citizens into this fight?' and 'Will the American people support this in the long run?' We have too often failed to look before we leap into a war. This will FORCE us to look first for alternatives before we expend unaffordable blood and treasure once again. You should see what Erik Prince has to say about this as well. And don't forget, Ukraine was a largely reserve-based military at the time of the Russian invasion. The most important thing that they did was to open up their armories, hand out AKs/RPG's and turn many thousands of their citizens into ad hoc citizen-soldiers. Yes, a lot of them died, but they kept the Russians from overrunning the country long enough to get soldiers trained. We would do a lot better because of how our culture is structured. Add to that having a MUCH larger reserve component where for every one active duty soldier that we remove, we add two or three trained reservists/Guardmen.
Your reserve-heavy Army proposal isn’t just risky—it’s built on your fundamental misunderstanding of how the Reserve Component actually works in practice.
This idea that we can “train them up when we need them” ignores:
• legal and bureaucratic delays
• medical readiness gaps
• equipment shortfalls
• and the fact that these are civilians with jobs, families, and full lives.
The Reserve is a *strategic reserve*, not a rapid-response force. They’re not full-timers sitting in a bullpen. Pretending they are is operational malpractice.
The “citizen-soldier” concept you’re leaning on is familiar—and nostalgic—but it’s not a strategy.
It’s a holdover from a time when:
• wars moved slower
• we thought threats were predictable (and were still wrong anyway)
• and we had the blood-expensive luxury of learning on the fly
That world is gone.
We don’t need a million-person standing Army to fight land wars, but we do need trained, ready, active-duty ground forces—because not having them invites the very crisis you think you’re avoiding.
And finally—using the Reserve as a brake to “force Washington to think twice” isn’t smart policy, it’s a self-imposed vulnerability.
What you’re really saying is this:
If the *crisis comes anyway*, it’s the citizen-soldier and their community who will pay the price for your fantasy. Maybe in blood.
I don't think "maybe" enters the equation at all. The price will always be paid in blood.
We can accept legal and bureaucratic delays because we do not need to rush multiple divisions to Europe in two weeks like had been the case during the Cold War.
If you double or triple the size of the reserve component, a 10% loss rate due to medical readiness issues is acceptable because you will still have a substantially larger force.
Equipment shortfalls should not be an issue since we will not be fielding a massive armor force. We will be fielding a reserve component that will be lighter in nature with larger numbers of support and infantry units. Large amounts of anti-armor weapons can be produced and stored at a relatively inexpensive cost. The upcoming trend towards armed FPV drones make this even easier. Again, we are not pushing this force overseas two weeks after the balloon goes up in the Fulda Gap anymore.
Yes, they are civilians with jobs, families and full lives. The decision to go to war will not be one made by an imperial Presidency with legions of professional soldiers to achieve some nebulous political goal. The decision to go to war will then be one made by the AMERICAN PEOPLE. When the American people are making that decision and fully behind it, it is a force that no nation can take lightly nor will be defeated.
Thanks for being a voice of reason. If only the Navy were as interested in fighting America's enemies as it is in fighting its own enemy- the U.S. Army.
We need a bunch of amphibs and we have shipyards in the Great Lakes. Here are the limits for vessels that can squeeze through the St Lawrence Seaway ("SeawayMax") and reach the ocean:
Length 740 ft (225.6 m)
Beam 78 ft (23.8 m)
Height 116.5 ft (35.5 m)
Draft 26.51 ft (8.1 m)
America has done this kind of thing before, when we're willing to build a lot of hulls fast for a war, and when we don't care whether the ships last for fifty years or only five. Remember the Liberty Ships?
Perhaps the Great Lakes shipyards can be goosed to churn out smaller amphibs. I don't think we want our Marines packed together into one or two hulking monsters when we can distribute them among a dozen per invasion beach, to complicate the enemy's task of stopping them.
We should be at least as creative as our enemy is:
https://x.com/clashreport/status/1900454822844747778
Let's not forget the capabilities on the Mississippi and Ohio rivers. Several opportunities to produce relatively shallow draft vessels with up to a 60 foot beam still in operation.
https://yesterdaysamerica.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/image.png
The last deep water port on the Ohio is only a couple miles from the Pennsylvania line. So yep, lots of shipbuilding potential.
Tennessee too. But it will take a lot of higher level coordination for the disbursed talent to make a ship of relevant size.
Something max beam, really shallow draft, relatively short isn't what you'd want for cruising from West Coast to Taiwan. But from island to island would be pretty good. An if it's just a jarheads/supplies carrier, wouldn't need that much disbursement of talent.
G'Pa Jud served in the Pacific during WW2 on one of those river-made LSTs. Certainly not perfect but they worked.
Lock sizes are generally 600' x 110' with 9 foot draft. Figure move them at light draft and you could potentially move corvette size ships like Singapore Littoral Mission Vessel or Taiwan's Tuo Chiang classes. I mention them as they use MTU 20V 4000 M93 which are also the most powerful engine size certified to use on LUSV. All the Overlord ships and MDUSVs also easily move at this draft along with Fast Response Cutters. And of course, landing ships.
The Manitowoc yard that built fleet subs (and floated them down the Miss to New Orleans) in WWII is sadly gone, replaced by housing development (of course). But Lakes Michigan and Huron may offer more opportunities to (re)build shipyard capacity than the Atlantic or Pacific coasts, especially in terms of property cost, eminent domain, and NIMBYism.
(Lovely town, Manitowoc. Nice little maritime museum. And a plaque set in the middle of the street where they were "bombed" by Sputnik debris in the 1950s....)
From this WW2 aerial photo, it looks like they did either sub chaser or DE contruction asa well. https://asset.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/LM6KSC4WN2DUZ8X/M/h1380-79db6.jpg
Hm... I don't recall seeing any mention of DEs at the local museum, but I could have missed it. The Balaos and Gatos were the primary stars.
Wikipedia lists subs, LCTs, and fuel barges.
Oddly enough, the subs are listed as having 15ft draft, but were barged down the Mississippi rather than taken through the St Lawrence. The Soo Locks should have been able to handle one, IIRC.
ST. Lawrence Seaway didn't open for deep draft until 1959.
To my eye, looking at the upper right quadrant of the photo, up and left and across the bridge from the Gato in the floating drydock, there appears to be three or four vessels tied up side-by-side. Having watched Drachinifel's video on the USS Slater he posted yesterday and then looking up the length of a Cannon-class DE, they were almost identical in length to a Gato. With the submarine in the floating drydock as a reference, I now see that the ships I mistook for DEs were not. Maybe sub chasers though.
Being kind of tight there with your navigational draft aren’t you? The Saint Lawrence Seaway has a mean navigational draft of ~27-feet, and your ~26.51-feet gives you a mean navigational draft depth clearance of less than 6” to work with…
Yup. But the more you push up against the Seawaymax limits, the better your seakeeping on that looooooooong trip down to Panama and then up to the WESTPAC area of operations.
There are plans to deepen the Saint Lawrence Seaway by ~12-feet, but at only 3-inches at a time for it’s nearly 2,200-mile length! But at 3”/year, it will take nearly 48-years to complete its additional from its existing ~27’ to its projected ~39’ sometime around 2063…
We go to war with the waterways we have. Bummer.
I've heard some people have to get to work with less than 6", poor buggers.
How many of those “poor buggers” pilot a ship weighing 8,000-tons or more, have to contend with swells in the water that could potentially dip the ship into the bottom of the seaways resulting in damaging the ship, just to send the ship back to the shipyard it just came from for needed repairs! Or the career ender for the PCU ship’s captain and/or pilot to have allowed the ship to be damaged in the first place! The navigational draft of the Constitution class Frigate is only a mere ~16’…
:) a sad attempt at lockerroom humor ...
If built low enough, the 1960's amphibs easily fit in that box. In fact, they used to send one on a cruise of the Great Lakes, and occasionally conduct an amphibious demonstration in a public place.
From your lips to the Pentagon's ears.
Why haven’t the Marines been used in the ongoing war against the Houthis? They could seize the islands off the coast of Yemen. They could occupy the piece of land that juts toward Djibouti. They could seize ports. Etc.
Either we aren’t serious about fighting or the Marines are incapable of ambitious assaults.
In either case we have a serious problem.
They haven't because U.S. leadership hasn't issued the order. Let's not forget that Perim Island in the middle of the Bab-el Mandeb (cheers!) was a UK holding until the late 60's when they gave it back and South Yemen then immediately turned it over to the Soviets (as those in the UK parliament opposing it, said would happen.) https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1967/jun/19/aden-perim-and-kuria-muria-islands-bill
The UK forgot their maritime roots, and the U.S. political class has been trying like heck to ignore that we are a maritime republic.
Harold Wilson was PM. If he was not a Soviet agent he was at least a useful idiot.
Duncan Sandys was Churchill’s son in law.
We haven't done that because we don't have the capability to do so. I'm sorry to say my Corps just can't deploy, employ & maintain a forward deployed MEU.
How sad.
We have really sunk low.
Good article, except I would argue that we need at least active duty one corps-level mechanized formation because, like it or not, we have to be ready to fight in Europe or the Middle East for the foreseeable future. We also need a couple of lighter divisions for the Pacific/Korea and a rapid response division. That still allows for a smaller active-duty Army (18 brigades down from our current 31). Any saved funds go to the Navy.
As much as it pains me to say this as an Army guy, your assessment is spot on. Maintain one active duty Army corps (XVIII Airborne Corps) for land-based overseas contingencies, the rest of the force is transferred to the reserve components. Navy and USMC must remain the priority and need to be expanded and modernized. On an aside, the Navy should reopen Roosevelt Roads Naval Base to expand U.S. ability to respond to contingencies in the Caribbean Basin, defend the Panama Canal, and counter PRC activities in the Western Hemisphere.
I think you need one large (division?) sized mechanized force in order to keep those skill sets current and have some form of cadre in the event of large scale combat breaking out. If the navy is going to get the savings they should prove that they have improved their procurement process. We can't afford more Zumwalts and LCS, but I'm preaching to the choir.
We also need to adjust our allies expectations of what American help will look like. It ain't going to be REFORGER.
Sadly, this will never happen... In probabilistic terms, the likelihood of downsizing the army in this fashion is near zero. The MIC would NEVER stand by and let that happen. And every manufacturer - large and small - supplying bits and pieces to the Pentagon would have a conniption fit. That is a multi-headed hydra will not accept defeat and will enjoy broad-based congressional opposition of such efforts from every state.
Don't be so sure. If you reduce the personnel line and operating line it opens up the equipment line in the budget. If I'm selling new IFVs I don't care how much or if you use them, I just care that you buy them.
Maintenance contracts.
Reserve gear gets kept at Equipment Concentration Sites. Like say at Camp Grayling. If your SP artillery BN is in Lansing or your tank BN in Benton Harbor the maintenance and equipment exercising is not being done by the unit, it's being done by either contractors or a dedicated unit staffed by full-time mechanics.
It could make sense to continue to build enough equipment that it is available for mobilization in 6 months to a year, cycling the few active duty troops through it to ensure it's not shadow ware.
"The USMC projecting power ashore is a lot more than a floaty thingy. Perhaps if critics protested with more flecked foam it might be a more effective argument, but I will stick with the wisdom of experience." Best Salamander quote. Drink to the foam!
Spot on, however our senior naval leadership has to acknowledge this and advocate for this first. They continue to resource the amphibious asset the least and last.
Their slavish devotion to Joint prevents them.
Joint dies if the Army transitions to primarily reserve forces and you roll the Air Force and Space Force into the Navy. It originally pained me, an Army guy, to think this way, but the more I think about it, the more it makes sense.
Amphibious warfare strategy and capability was at least 3 rungs below DEI under the previous CNO, NWC President and current USNA administration.
Speaking of USNA why hasn’t Hegseth fired the superintendents of all five service academies?
As a Marine, I fully endorse the content and thrust of this post. The lack of proper amphibious craft is a real hurdle; and the time needed to create the traditional types of vessels is much, much, much too long.
Time to change up. (yep, you're going to read it here once again) Build AMPHIBIOUS AIRSHIPS!
as I wrote years ago in "Ghost Ships"; modern airships
(NOT BLIMPS OR DIRIGIBLES!)
can become phenomenal additions to the fleet and provide capabilities that are unmatched.
Last I heard, it was two Marine officers at Naval War College who were looking into using a form of airship (the "Airlander", alas) for logistics. There is a world of advantage to fielding airships; not the least of which is their lower cost to create and the speed of doing so.
(addendum: If anyone emails me direct; I'll happily send em a PDF of "Ghost Ships"; a chapter detailing use of military airships taken from my book "Helium Phoenix")
Got my vote... perhaps one day...
thankyou, yes, "perhaps one day"
Rather like picking the best time to plant an apple tree, neh?
You need to have some of the board members of your company to have connections within the Florida GOP. Considering how many FL politicos are finding there way into the Administration, that may be your best bet.
thankyou. airship related efforts in Florida have definitely been on my radar recently
Transitioning more land forces into the Reserve and National Guard and beefing up expeditionary capability sounds logical and doable, so, we must kill the idea right now.
Yep
Reactivate the fourth Marine Division. Make the Corp a four division unit.
4th MARDIV is the HQ for MARFORRES Land Component units.
Would be good to consider standing up the 24th Marines again, and the 3rd BN. The other two battalions are subordiante to the 23rd and 25th Marines.
3rd MARDIV should be brought up to the same strength as 1st and 2nd, though.
That is a better idea! Back in the old days the 2d was undermanned everything and everyone was going to 1st and 3rd.
I am a bit out of touch with the units it has been 54 years LOL.
100% agree with the argument for the unique USMC capability (thoughts on the current USMC Commandant?). The now (short), mid and long term actions required to make this happen face physical (ship building, logisitics) challenges that are daunting. Worst challenge to overcome is the DoD leadership (below recent political appointees) and their approach to priorities. Start with the POM...the current 30-30-30-10 budgetary allocation will have to change...and that change will NOT be welcomed by the Iron Triangle (DoD, Military Industrial Complex (TM), and congress). A case where the traditional Road Map, Implementation Plan, and POM might actually work if done with vision and conviction vice the usual rice bowl protection strategy of the last four decades. Perhaps...we'll see.
Before the USMC can "deter aggression, contain conflicts, evacuate noncombatants, and respond quickly and effectively..." they need to have strong champions in the DoN and Congress.
And frankly, "There seems to be something wrong with our bloody leadership today."
So, a few more of the smaller well-deck gator Navy combatants down the ways ahead of the next America-class baby-CV, then?
I think we need serious consideration to why our smallest amphib needs to weigh more than the largest cruiser ever built. I'm pretty sold on the cheap idea for LSM, but I could live with a larger LST just for the potential to grow numbers. We should also look at throughput from amphibious ships and logistics/MPF/Sealift.
Well said, and completely agree. It does seem that our last two Commandants have been focused upon changing the traditional Marine ability to go ashore and fight to something else (no tanks, no tube artillery) which at best would be a light infantry expeditionary force. That's not a MEU (much less a ARG) in my book.
I fail to understand why they at least didn't stand up reserve units at the bases where the Army trains it's armor and artillery troops.
Alas, I fear that answer rhymes with "Transformational".
Just like the Maginot Line.
Although actually the Maginot line was not a bad strategic concept. It was not actually penetrated in 1940. The failure was French dispositions of tactical forces and airpower.
Well, you know, the forrest is impassable.
"We only have to kick in the door and the whole rotten structure will come crashing down"
Right on the mark.