FF(X) Flight II: In the Works
...more, faster, distributed, spiraled, scattered, smothered, covered...
It is well past time that we had a frigate SITREP, specifically the gray-hulled version of the Legend-class Cutter we are going to build for our Navy.
No reason to rehash my concerns and assumptions—click the frigate hypertext above if you need to catch up, but…let me just say…though I’m glad she’s on the way and we’ll find good use for her, I hope Flight I is a short run.
I know hope is not a plan, but back in December, I had this little bit of hope:
I suspect that already there is work being done on a Flight II, which will incorporate the multi-mission capability of the patrol frigate proposed over a dozen years ago …
While looking over the FY27 budget request, it appears that my hope is well placed.
Here’s the important bit if it is too much to read the fine print above.
Frigate will take the same validated flight-upgrade approach as our Arleigh Burke DDG-51 program - incorporating improvements over successive flights to evolve the ship’s capabilities over time. Flight I Frigates will have minimal adaptations from the existing NSC to start production as quickly as possible. The limited modifications of the NSC baseline to the Flight I Frigate requirements incorporate Navy weapons, combat systems, and communications programs of record, add a flexible weapons station in lieu of the NSC stern boat ramp, add a port-mid-ships boat davit, incorporate shipbuilder recommended producibility enhancements, and change to standard Navy grey paint. Studies for future flights will consider expanded capabilities including Vertical Launch Systems, and Anti-Submarine Warfare systems. FF(X) RAS C2 is enabled through use of Navy warfare system programs of record including the FF(X) combat system and eventually Aegis based Integrated Combat System (ICS), communications systems, and design reservations dedicated to future RAS C2 systems.
Yes. As we were hoping, smart people in hard jobs have looked at the last successful surface ship program, the Arleigh Burke, and said, “Yes, that process worked. Let’s do that.”
This isn’t easy work, but it’s not hard to benchmark success.
When will we see Flight I, Hull-1?
Looks like 30 June 2030, 1,531 days from now. Using our patented unit of time when looking at Navy programs, the WorldWar™, it will be 1.12 WorldWars™ from today until we have that ship delivered…at the earliest.
This is already a mature design, already delivered, so that should not be delayed.
Yes, I know.
OK, that goes at the speed of smell, but at least it’s moving. When will we see Flight II? Looks like it will still be in the design phase through 30 SEP 2031.
Sigh. 5 years too late. We should give the FF(X) Flight II project to Mike Gallagher’s band of merry engineers and move that timeline to 30 SEP 2026, but that’s just me.
Sidebar: The last FF in the USN was USS Moinester (FF 1097). DE-1098 through 1107 were planned, but canceled.
So, are we going to have FF(X) Hull-1 be FF-1098 or FF-1108?
This is the most encouraging FF(X) piece you’ve written—not because the ship suddenly looks formidable, but because the Navy has finally recommitted to a process that has actually worked. The FY27 language matters less for what it promises and more for what it acknowledges: that the DDG‑51 flight model, not a frozen baseline or a PowerPoint‑perfect design, is how you build enduring combat power.
Your discomfort with Flight I is still exactly right. A minimally adapted NSC is useful, but only briefly. If Flight I lingers, the program will quietly fail while meeting every bureaucratic milestone. The difference today is that Flight II is no longer hypothetical—it exists in the budget and in explicit references to VLS, ASW, and Aegis‑based integration. That’s a real line crossed.
But invoking the Burke model comes with an obligation many forget. DDG‑51 didn’t succeed because Flight I was great; it succeeded because Wayne Meyer’s philosophy was enforced without mercy: build a little, test a little, learn a lot. Capability was inserted early, tested at sea, corrected fast, and then iterated again. Long design pauses weren’t a feature—they were the enemy.
That’s where the timeline still fails the smell test. A Flight II stuck in design well into the 2030s isn’t evolution—it’s drift. Meyer didn’t win by waiting for perfection; he won by forcing real capability into real ships and letting testing, not studies, drive the next step. If FF(X) follows the form of the Burke model without its tempo, the comparison is just ceremonial.
Your hull‑number question isn’t trivia. If the Navy really believes this is the return of the frigate, it should claim that lineage openly. Programs that hedge their identity tend to hedge their ambition, too.
So, here’s the hard test: if FF(X) is to matter, Flight II must arrive by 2032 with integrated VLS, real ASW, Aegis‑level combat system integration, protected growth margins, disciplined manning, and a faster build rhythm than Flight I. Miss that window, and we’ll have built another pause disguised as progress.
The irony is this: by your own WorldWar™ clock, we’re measuring years again—exactly what Meyer spent his career trying to kill. Ships don’t get better by waiting. They get better by being built, tested, broken, fixed, and sent back out—before the next WorldWar™ starts.
How did the Navy lose its way so badly?
How did the bureaucracy become the driver of the Navy?
How did our admirals become so incompetent?