First 100 Days for Seapower

Hendrix and Sadler have the entering argument

In the marketplace of ideas, if you are one of the merchants, there are a few things you need to keep in mind.

1. No one owes you a living. Your superior product does not deserve to be the preferred product by the consumer. You have to earn that support.

2. Just when you are sick of saying something, that is the moment people are just starting to listen to you.

Everyone advocating for the Navy our nation requires should remember that. Talk to anyone anywhere. Always return to the central part of our argument. Repeat and loop back. Be not tired.

In that light, when two of the best thinkers in the navalist arena join together to give everyone a starting point to boost naval power regardless of who wins in November, and those two thinkers are our friends Jerry Hendrix and Brent Sadler, then we have the perfect start for the week.

Fundamentals. Realistic proposals. Accountability.

Over at National Review at the end of last week their article, Restoring Our Maritime Strength, rolled with a well-reasoned starting point for a first 100-days agenda.

The problems they are offering solutions to are not new ones, but festering sores decades in the making. We’ve discussed Jerry’s ideas here for well over a decade, and he’s been a regular guest on Midrats over the years. Same with Brent Sadler. Neither of these gentlemen are new to this topic area and they did not come up with their proposals in the last few week. Their proposals have already run the gauntlet of the marketplace of ideas.

Few people are content with what has been done so far this century and know there must be change, but on an individual and organizational level, the system gets vapor locked from there. We seem to have trouble getting traction on what to do next.

There is a plan, and Jerry and Brent outline how to get started.

By now, regulars at CDR Salamander are familiar with how we ended up here in 2024, so there's no need to rehash those details. Yes, the hour is late, but that is not a constructive argument. There is an old phrase in forestry that applies here;

So, with that boldly in our face, let’s dive in to Jerry and Brent’s article, or at least the juicy bits. You really need to read it all, but here are the pull quotes;

First, let’s set the table.

The next administration, in its first hundred days, will face an urgent problem: the need to rebuild the U.S. Navy to deter China, which, in its global push for dominance, is backed by a rapidly expanding modern navy, maritime constabulary, and commercial fleet. But an effective effort will involve more than just the Navy. It will also require investing in the broader maritime industry and ensuring that the nation has adequate shipping in peacetime to prevent China from dictating our terms of trade and subordinating our economic interests to its own.

Economic coercion and vulnerability is a very real thing. If you didn’t finally accept that reality after COVID, I’m not sure what more could be said to you.

Change doesn’t happen in isolation. Ideas don’t execute themselves.

People. It starts with people.

It should begin well before the president takes office. The first thing that a president-elect must consider is the national-security team. As is often said, personnel is policy: Without the right people, good ideas remain just ideas.

It isn’t just having bodies on a list. The people you bring into leadership and staff positions need to be already known quantities. They don’t just need to know which hymnal higher direction and guidance is bringing to the revival, they already know the greatest hits by heart. They won’t need constant supervision and a kick in the tail to execute priorities, but if you’re lucky, they’ll have to be held back by their belt.

The day after winning the election, the next president should begin building a national-security team supportive of his or her overall policy goals, possessed of the knowledge and experience to drive required changes through, and able to be confirmed by the Senate. A second priority during the transition should be to review all the Biden executive orders to ascertain whether they impeded the operational or material readiness of the fleet.

I cannot understate the requirement to review the Executive Orders.

None of this is magic thinking. Much of what is offered here is generally known to those who track it, but as it is not discussed enough, probably due to political, ego, or pick the worst reason you can think of. Change for the better simply has not been a priority for those who hold levers of power. We cannot continue like that.

The response to the below will be a good indication on who needs to be career adjusted or not.

…on Day One, the president should order a review, to be completed within 60 days, of the material readiness of the current fleet, its supporting shipyards, and the associated industrial base.

60 days is very doable. The data is out there, it is just well hidden/suppressed.

I would be remiss if I didn’t pull out one of my hobby horses: unit INSURV reports to be made unclassified again. Bring back open accountability that we had until the mistake 15 years ago, but let’s not get diverted too much.

So, numbers.

350? 355? Are those even realistic numbers any more? No. That ship sailed long ago. A near-term number north of 290 is doable though.

…the next president should call for a battle force of 333 warships before the end of his or her term in January 2029—a goal achievable through investments in the nation’s commercial-shipbuilding capacity.

Currently, much of the fleet is sidelined because of backlogs in maintenance. Surface ships are deploying with many weapons systems operating in degraded modes. Over a third of the force of submarines, with higher “sub-safe” requirements imposed by their use of nuclear reactors, cannot leave the pier because of a nearly three-year backlog in maintenance.

It is a very fair critique that the Navy should not demand more ships when it cannot take care of the ones it already has. Yes, I am sympathetic to that, but we are running out of time and need to do both in parallel.

To get a larger battle ready force, we need money—money for maintenance—money to flesh out our barren VLS tubes and magazines.

Today the Navy requires at least three, but more realistically five, additional dry docks. …

…

The Navy also does not have enough ordnance—missiles, shells, and torpedoes—to arm every ship in the fleet. The next administration must therefore make a significant investment in the ordnance-manufacturing industrial base by authorizing overtime and additional factory shifts and by directing, through a dispersal policy, the establishment of new production capacity in currently underused parts of the nation.

With the shadow of a shipbuilding industry we have right now, we can’t build our way to the fleet we need should we find ourselves in a Great Pacific War China seems to want to have before the end of the decade. No, we need to boost up maintenance not just for the ship we have…but to keep ships we should be keeping from the breakers a few years longer.

No, keeping old ships going for another 5+ years is not cheap, but it is less expensive than losing a war against China.

The most important step for the Navy to take immediately is to stop retiring ships. In March 2024, the Navy announced that it planned to decommission 19 ships, including ten that would be retired ahead of schedule. The next secretary of the Navy should stop all decommissioning of ships before their end of service life and should request supplemental funding from Congress to cover repairs, operating expenses, and activation of naval reservists to serve on the ships being retained. These new monies should facilitate the signing of contracts with ship-repair yards around the country capable of extending ships’ service lives and modernizing older vessels.

OK, let’s say you get your higher direction and guidance and the right people in place in the Executive Branch, OPNAV, and Congress…how do you make sure that what you are doing is actually making progress?

To monitor all of these initiatives, the secretary of the Navy and his subordinates should establish a war room within the offices of the civilian secretariat, where reports of progress or regress can be gathered and assessed on a daily basis. Every aspect of the first-hundred-days plan should be reported on to the secretary each week, and the secretary should issue a monthly report to the secretary of defense, who, in turn, should report to the president.

Accountability and metrics? Crazy concept, I know. It just better come with teeth, claws, and a few people issued with pliers and blow torches.

This next step is where some might be concerned: the selection of your General and Flag Officers (GOFO). I’m sorry, but what we are doing now is not working, and the selection process is not producing the right people in the right place at the right time.

In my view, expecting the Potomac Flotilla's uniformed leadership to supply honest information without tough questions and demands for hard data is wishful thinking. If you do have confidence in that, then I have a fleet of Spruance Class DDs to sell you.

What about the Admiralty? Time to change that landscape wholesale. Regulars here and on Midrats recall my often mentioned “Burke Option.” Well, here we go.

Accordingly, the next Navy secretary and undersecretary should undertake a series of one-on-one interviews of current three- and fourstar admirals to determine their potential as wartime commanders and their readiness to execute an aggressive program of national maritime rejuvenation. If some are found wanting, they should be offered reassignment or retirement in grade without prejudice. Simultaneously, the five assistant secretaries of the Navy should survey the warfighting character of the Navy’s current two- or one-star admirals, as well as its senior captains, with an eye toward their potential for promotion to senior roles. When, in 1955, Secretary of the Navy Charles Thomas found Admiral Robert “Mick” Carney lacking in support for innovation and modernization, Thomas forced him into early retirement and selected Rear Admiral Arleigh Burke for promotion to admiral, naming him chief of naval operations (CNO) over the heads of 100 more-senior admirals. Burke ended up serving six years as CNO and was instrumental in helping the Eisenhower administration ready the Navy for a long-haul Cold War.

People are policy. Want new policies? You’re going to need new people, including GOFO who are aligned with the direction you want to go. The uniformed leadership who are mostly only where they are today because they knew how to respond to the previous incentives and disincentives may not be the ones we need. That skillset may not align with what is needed in this new direction.

None of this will go anywhere without money.

As elections approach, U.S. citizens must heed the lessons of the past to prevent sea blindness from turning into a national calamity. We must pick leaders committed to returning our nation to maritime viability through both the building of commercial ships and their operation under the U.S. flag. Many in Congress are beginning this process, and it should be championed in the next administration. A bicameral and bipartisan effort has been launched by Senators Mark Kelly (D., Ariz.) and Marco Rubio (R., Fla.) and Representatives Mike Waltz (R., Fla.) and John Garamendi (D., Calif.) to begin the revitalization of our nation’s maritime sector. It has been supported by the current secretary of the Navy but inadequately by the White House. Their bill, which has been named the “Ships for America Act,” would modernize U.S. commercial shipyards, create industrial-job-training programs, and provide incentives to once again make it profitable to move goods on U.S. ships. Ushering in a revolution in shipping could allow the U.S. to realize comparative advantage and enjoy a renaissance in the maritime sector that protects American security and economic interests put at risk by China.

Again, this should be bipartisan. Really, I can think of few things that is better suited for bipartisanship than a strong Navy and maritime industrial base. We are a maritime power, regardless of how we neglect it—our geography and economy demonstrate it every day.

I have not seen a better plan out there for a first 100 days. Jerry and Brent have a turnkey program. Take 80%, adjust 20%, and whoever the new team is, get to work.