Defense is an asymmetric game. The defense has to succeed 100% of the time while the offense has to succeed only once. Apply that to ASMs or cyber attack. It is a daunting thought.
If you're going to be within range of land based air, layered AAW is a fundamental requirement, and that includes EW aircraft. The Brits found this out the hard way. We already knew. In my youth, I was a Glynco trained AIC. Lessons stuck.
Too bad the Brits didn't learn. They built two new CVs without the ability to operate proper AEW aircraft. If they had a couple or three E-2s operating along side some of their old F-4s off Hermes in the Falklands War, it's unlikely they would have lost a single ship. Going cheap by installing ski jumps instead of cats and traps just makes those ships really expensive LPHs.
17min mark when they see the Sheffield was hit: "that's when it hit home, maybe we weren't as good as I thought we were." That gave me chills and a sense of foreboding. I pray we don't have to learn the same hard lesson.
There are so many deep quotes from this. 23min mark: "...the rules and regulations become irrelevant. You are entirely focused on getting at the enemy and surviving."
Great lesson here for the international law scholars and practitioners. When the signal goes up, many of those rules and laws we spend spill so much ink writing about may go right out the window for those pulling the trigger.
We love to look at history (if it reinforces our current strategy). But the fact of the matter is that the US is whofully weakened in their current state. Forget about Woke issues (that is a distraction). The real problem is much deeper. The PEO program is broke. The NAVSEA program is dead. We are waiting for a totoal collapse of the Naval shipbuilding program. That simple. That is coming from retired flags that I correspond with. That simple. r/Karl
It will take a decade of "Right-to-Repair" changes in contracting, recovery of the SIMA system, and get the TYPE COMMANDERS back in the business of maintaining READINESS to recover the fleet. If we cannot fix ourselves we will NOT PERSIST IN COMBAT!
AMEN! All the way back to the late '80's . . . not just since the Fall of the Berlin Wall. Cutting back our gun programs at Dahlgren back in those days (late 80s - early 90s) was a HUGE MISTAKE.
"The PEO program is broke. " . . . and the CNO has no one to fix them.
"NAVSEA program is dead" . . . NAVSEA is an Ivy League Employment Program that does not know its HiStory, and flushed everything that made sense, met BUSHIPS requirements, and met Naval Regulations . . . over 20 years ago!
Agree with most of what you said, but forgetting the woke isn't wise. Woke strikes at the very heart of any organization, its personnel. We could have a 600 ship navy, fully maintained with humming supply chains and ample shipyards to support such ships. But all that is for naught if the ships are manned by poorly trained, disciplined, and led personnel who lack in those areas due to CRT and DEI. Tough, competent crews can go a long way to make up for material and supply issues, but bad crews will never win a battle.
Such an incredible film! Sea tales brought to life. Like the story of the three HMS Hood survivors on film (which includes seeing the water splashes around the Bismarck as she fires her main batteries and then seeing the faded, shadowy images of Hood blowing up on the horizon.
But re CDR's topic about crew-served weapons and bean-counter shortfalls and more weapons and more ammo, I managed the USN's Navy/USMC weapons budget at the SECNAV level from 1986-1991 and this discussion reminded me about a couple things THIS bean-counter did. As I've mentioned in another comment, based on my studying of WW2 munitions consumption rates, I discussed buying MORE missiles, torpedoes, guns and ammo (cutting back on aircraft procurements); that the then-current planned procurement rates budgeted for. Got no support on that. Based on CENTCOM threats at the time, I did increase procurements (without objection) of M242 Bushmaster chain guns which, as they were coming off the production line, were scooped up and flown out to NAVCENT and bolted down to deployed surface ships.
TODAY . . . the M242 should be a Mk38 Mod 4 with programmable ammo . . . on every ship in duplicate. The Advanced hit efficiency and destruction (AHEAD) ammunition have proven effective. Tracking with fixed faced AESA radar is important for tracking and fire control data. There is a lot of potential in Directed Energy Weapons if you can provide the power, and if enough power cannot be generated for outright destruction . . . warming the target up for heat seeking weapons IS very possible. There are multiple IR tracking packages for artillery round and rocket usage.
The real challenge today, Curtis, is how to handle the saturation attacks from drones from a defensive perspective. The 25mm and R2D2 will run out of ammunition well before they can eliminate all the incoming. Again, back in the day when I ran Navy weapons budget, CIWS was modified to increase rate of fire from 3,000 rd burst on three targets (before out of rds) to 6,000 RPM and double ammo box size. But basic tactical was twice as much frag at or in front of target to stop OR handle twice as many incoming targets at half the burst rate. Today's threats require Navy to think differently. You're correct, that means half a dozen CIWS and/or 25mm per ship (every type because the supply ships become highest priority targets) with at least ten times as much ammo.
I see three weapons that can help. For larger drones the APKWS or other IR/laser guided rockets. Need a decent AESA non-rotating radar for that tracking data. Then the Mk38 Mod 4 with programmable ammunition. The AHEAD rounds are very promising and they come in calibers from 35mm to 50mm. Lastly I see Directed Energy Weapons as a good final solution when all else fails. The 150Kw are out and can handle things in close. May need more than one, and in some cases the IR tracker/Laser may be able to heat up a target for the IR seeking rockets.
On a DE these would be primary go-to weapons system for drone control. The USCG could use these weapons very easily, but they do not have a non-rotating AESA radar. LIDAR is a good replacement for things small and in close. There are solutions out there. We just need to test them.
All things considered the trip to the Falklands was a close run thing even before the RN was forced into tactical improvisation.
From a deckplate Repair 1F perspective? Once the ship was hit IMO the crew did pretty well considering they lost DC comms, the location of one hit, and one repair locker was dealing with the mass casualties on a rapidly sinking ship.
Re lessons learned, reading about the history of the Falklands war, one very forgotten thing (again on having enough munitions) is that the Argentine pilots only had THREE French Exocet missiles in their inventory! The rest of their procurement hadn't been delivered yet! Otherwise, given the bravery of the Argentine pilots in pressing their attack (using American and French fighter jets), a what-if scenario would suggest the British combat squadron and support ships could have been wiped out and the reclamation of the Falklands a failure.
I have not heard that the Argies had only 3 Exocets.
I was aware of their very close and low runs at the ships. Slow low and close that some of the bombs didn't have enough time in the air to arm. I think that's what happened to Coventry. The bombs weren't fully armed and essentially dudded when they hit. But as EXO is always dangerous, it seems there was enough residual motion or vibration to finally finish it.
This also points out the fragility of modern warships compared to modern weapons. At most Coventry took 2 bombs. Albeit 1000lb ones, which are nothing to be trifled with. But that was it. One may have done the job. As noted elsewhere, there is no such thing as too much defense. We learned this in WWII but the surface navy seems to have gone the way the air community did in the late 50s/early 60s when they decided fighters didn't need guns.
You're correct about the closeness-to-target and arming problem. My reading of the info about the Argentines also noted that bomb fusing in general was a problem. That the jets basically hit most Brits ships but the bombs failed to explode, adding to my what-if that the Brits were fortunate.
"I have not heard that the Argies had only 3 Exocets."
You haven't heard it because its not true....
They had received 5 air-launched Exocet at the start of the war, but had more surface launched Exocet as well (the missiles were not cross-compatible). All 5 were expended, 2 hit ships (Sheffield and Atlantic Conveyor) the rest were decoyed or potentially shot down (we will never know if HMS Arrow killed one or not). In addition HMS Glamorgan was hit by a surface launched MM38 from an improvised ground mount (which should never have happened as the RN was aware of it, the Captain cut the corner of the danger area to get back to the fleet before daybreak, which given the air threat at the time a pointless shortcut).
A quick and dirty solution is the Aegis DE. Small, fast, and using guns, missiles, and guided rockets. We can build them quickly at a much reduced cost over DDGs.
The Falklands War was the first one the rest of the world got to see in almost real time. I was a new CWO2 at CincPacFlt in a SWO O-4 billet that no one wanted because it was a career dead end (Electronic Warfare). Was able to view the war in the daily brief and message traffic, and at home on CNN. It was riveting and somber. No one cheered when Belgrano sank. It was an altogether different experience from Vietnam, where we found out what was happening via Stars & Stripes, mail from home and AFRTS. Today we are easily numbed by the 24/7 news cycle and the internet, a terrible thing. Thanks for the video.
When I saw the sailors defending their ship with small arms, I thought of Donald Rumsfeld...“You go to war with the army you have, not the army you might want or wish to have at a later time.” I was proud of the RN sailor's fighting spirit and a little angry, in general, at the peacetime bean counters.
I remember my British Dad glued to our little 12 inch TV when the war broke out. I didn't learn until later he had served in a rather elite capacity (he was out by then of course) but he was quite passionate in his interest, and very happy with the outcome.
As I was soon to embark on my career with a four year cruise at Camp Severn it was somewhat sobering to see than even in the modern age warships were still at the same level risk as my grandfather had faced in the western Pacific.
I firmly believe that Osirak (1981) Falklands (1982) and Grenada (1983) sent very messages to the enemies of the West.
Donal Trump just repeated those messages to Iran and Venezuela.
EVIL is EVIL. There is NO NEGOTIATION WITH EVIL. Otherwise . . . you are just Eve in the Garden!
Defense is an asymmetric game. The defense has to succeed 100% of the time while the offense has to succeed only once. Apply that to ASMs or cyber attack. It is a daunting thought.
If you're going to be within range of land based air, layered AAW is a fundamental requirement, and that includes EW aircraft. The Brits found this out the hard way. We already knew. In my youth, I was a Glynco trained AIC. Lessons stuck.
Too bad the Brits didn't learn. They built two new CVs without the ability to operate proper AEW aircraft. If they had a couple or three E-2s operating along side some of their old F-4s off Hermes in the Falklands War, it's unlikely they would have lost a single ship. Going cheap by installing ski jumps instead of cats and traps just makes those ships really expensive LPHs.
In the Army, we have a saying that applies.
"There is no such thing as too much ammo. Only too much ammo to carry."
17min mark when they see the Sheffield was hit: "that's when it hit home, maybe we weren't as good as I thought we were." That gave me chills and a sense of foreboding. I pray we don't have to learn the same hard lesson.
Sobering movie. Thank you for that.
There are so many deep quotes from this. 23min mark: "...the rules and regulations become irrelevant. You are entirely focused on getting at the enemy and surviving."
Great lesson here for the international law scholars and practitioners. When the signal goes up, many of those rules and laws we spend spill so much ink writing about may go right out the window for those pulling the trigger.
We love to look at history (if it reinforces our current strategy). But the fact of the matter is that the US is whofully weakened in their current state. Forget about Woke issues (that is a distraction). The real problem is much deeper. The PEO program is broke. The NAVSEA program is dead. We are waiting for a totoal collapse of the Naval shipbuilding program. That simple. That is coming from retired flags that I correspond with. That simple. r/Karl
Ask people in the industrial supply chain as well. At least, the ones who are still around and haven’t shut the front gates.
It will take a decade of "Right-to-Repair" changes in contracting, recovery of the SIMA system, and get the TYPE COMMANDERS back in the business of maintaining READINESS to recover the fleet. If we cannot fix ourselves we will NOT PERSIST IN COMBAT!
Karl, anyone with anything above a semi-somnolent level of consciousness has seen this coming for decades.
AMEN! All the way back to the late '80's . . . not just since the Fall of the Berlin Wall. Cutting back our gun programs at Dahlgren back in those days (late 80s - early 90s) was a HUGE MISTAKE.
"The PEO program is broke. " . . . and the CNO has no one to fix them.
"NAVSEA program is dead" . . . NAVSEA is an Ivy League Employment Program that does not know its HiStory, and flushed everything that made sense, met BUSHIPS requirements, and met Naval Regulations . . . over 20 years ago!
Agree with most of what you said, but forgetting the woke isn't wise. Woke strikes at the very heart of any organization, its personnel. We could have a 600 ship navy, fully maintained with humming supply chains and ample shipyards to support such ships. But all that is for naught if the ships are manned by poorly trained, disciplined, and led personnel who lack in those areas due to CRT and DEI. Tough, competent crews can go a long way to make up for material and supply issues, but bad crews will never win a battle.
Such an incredible film! Sea tales brought to life. Like the story of the three HMS Hood survivors on film (which includes seeing the water splashes around the Bismarck as she fires her main batteries and then seeing the faded, shadowy images of Hood blowing up on the horizon.
But re CDR's topic about crew-served weapons and bean-counter shortfalls and more weapons and more ammo, I managed the USN's Navy/USMC weapons budget at the SECNAV level from 1986-1991 and this discussion reminded me about a couple things THIS bean-counter did. As I've mentioned in another comment, based on my studying of WW2 munitions consumption rates, I discussed buying MORE missiles, torpedoes, guns and ammo (cutting back on aircraft procurements); that the then-current planned procurement rates budgeted for. Got no support on that. Based on CENTCOM threats at the time, I did increase procurements (without objection) of M242 Bushmaster chain guns which, as they were coming off the production line, were scooped up and flown out to NAVCENT and bolted down to deployed surface ships.
TODAY . . . the M242 should be a Mk38 Mod 4 with programmable ammo . . . on every ship in duplicate. The Advanced hit efficiency and destruction (AHEAD) ammunition have proven effective. Tracking with fixed faced AESA radar is important for tracking and fire control data. There is a lot of potential in Directed Energy Weapons if you can provide the power, and if enough power cannot be generated for outright destruction . . . warming the target up for heat seeking weapons IS very possible. There are multiple IR tracking packages for artillery round and rocket usage.
The real challenge today, Curtis, is how to handle the saturation attacks from drones from a defensive perspective. The 25mm and R2D2 will run out of ammunition well before they can eliminate all the incoming. Again, back in the day when I ran Navy weapons budget, CIWS was modified to increase rate of fire from 3,000 rd burst on three targets (before out of rds) to 6,000 RPM and double ammo box size. But basic tactical was twice as much frag at or in front of target to stop OR handle twice as many incoming targets at half the burst rate. Today's threats require Navy to think differently. You're correct, that means half a dozen CIWS and/or 25mm per ship (every type because the supply ships become highest priority targets) with at least ten times as much ammo.
I see three weapons that can help. For larger drones the APKWS or other IR/laser guided rockets. Need a decent AESA non-rotating radar for that tracking data. Then the Mk38 Mod 4 with programmable ammunition. The AHEAD rounds are very promising and they come in calibers from 35mm to 50mm. Lastly I see Directed Energy Weapons as a good final solution when all else fails. The 150Kw are out and can handle things in close. May need more than one, and in some cases the IR tracker/Laser may be able to heat up a target for the IR seeking rockets.
On a DE these would be primary go-to weapons system for drone control. The USCG could use these weapons very easily, but they do not have a non-rotating AESA radar. LIDAR is a good replacement for things small and in close. There are solutions out there. We just need to test them.
All things considered the trip to the Falklands was a close run thing even before the RN was forced into tactical improvisation.
From a deckplate Repair 1F perspective? Once the ship was hit IMO the crew did pretty well considering they lost DC comms, the location of one hit, and one repair locker was dealing with the mass casualties on a rapidly sinking ship.
Re lessons learned, reading about the history of the Falklands war, one very forgotten thing (again on having enough munitions) is that the Argentine pilots only had THREE French Exocet missiles in their inventory! The rest of their procurement hadn't been delivered yet! Otherwise, given the bravery of the Argentine pilots in pressing their attack (using American and French fighter jets), a what-if scenario would suggest the British combat squadron and support ships could have been wiped out and the reclamation of the Falklands a failure.
I have not heard that the Argies had only 3 Exocets.
I was aware of their very close and low runs at the ships. Slow low and close that some of the bombs didn't have enough time in the air to arm. I think that's what happened to Coventry. The bombs weren't fully armed and essentially dudded when they hit. But as EXO is always dangerous, it seems there was enough residual motion or vibration to finally finish it.
This also points out the fragility of modern warships compared to modern weapons. At most Coventry took 2 bombs. Albeit 1000lb ones, which are nothing to be trifled with. But that was it. One may have done the job. As noted elsewhere, there is no such thing as too much defense. We learned this in WWII but the surface navy seems to have gone the way the air community did in the late 50s/early 60s when they decided fighters didn't need guns.
History is there. We need to thoughtfully use it.
You're correct about the closeness-to-target and arming problem. My reading of the info about the Argentines also noted that bomb fusing in general was a problem. That the jets basically hit most Brits ships but the bombs failed to explode, adding to my what-if that the Brits were fortunate.
"I have not heard that the Argies had only 3 Exocets."
You haven't heard it because its not true....
They had received 5 air-launched Exocet at the start of the war, but had more surface launched Exocet as well (the missiles were not cross-compatible). All 5 were expended, 2 hit ships (Sheffield and Atlantic Conveyor) the rest were decoyed or potentially shot down (we will never know if HMS Arrow killed one or not). In addition HMS Glamorgan was hit by a surface launched MM38 from an improvised ground mount (which should never have happened as the RN was aware of it, the Captain cut the corner of the danger area to get back to the fleet before daybreak, which given the air threat at the time a pointless shortcut).
Good Noontime CDR Salamander!
It’s not my Uncle’s Navy - WWII, everlasting be his memory!
It’s my NAVY! 2025!
So let’s get cracking on our Weapons Systems, on our Air Defense and, believe it or not, below our Ship, or Boat, our Defense Mechanisms.
We have the Submersible Technology!
We have human Navy Qualified Divers!
Oh yes, I’m qualified to snorkel!
As long as our Communications are up and running, we can “Communicate”!
Semaphore and Morse Code! Let’s get trained up!
I passed the word to the USCG last week via my Apple iPhone.
Whatever that “Boat”, about 30 foot long with outboard twin engines, was up to at night, he skedaddled!
We are at War with Drug Terrorists!
Let’s fight the good fight… and Win!
Nurse Jane is “Captain” of her SS Nurse Jane! Blessed on Wednesday by Greek Orthodox Father Kosmas Karavellas.
CDR Salamander, please spread the word, I’m in prayer 24/hours/7-days/365 + 1 for Leap Year!
Nurse Jane prays to Our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ to save us! Amen
A quick and dirty solution is the Aegis DE. Small, fast, and using guns, missiles, and guided rockets. We can build them quickly at a much reduced cost over DDGs.
The Falklands War was the first one the rest of the world got to see in almost real time. I was a new CWO2 at CincPacFlt in a SWO O-4 billet that no one wanted because it was a career dead end (Electronic Warfare). Was able to view the war in the daily brief and message traffic, and at home on CNN. It was riveting and somber. No one cheered when Belgrano sank. It was an altogether different experience from Vietnam, where we found out what was happening via Stars & Stripes, mail from home and AFRTS. Today we are easily numbed by the 24/7 news cycle and the internet, a terrible thing. Thanks for the video.
When I saw the sailors defending their ship with small arms, I thought of Donald Rumsfeld...“You go to war with the army you have, not the army you might want or wish to have at a later time.” I was proud of the RN sailor's fighting spirit and a little angry, in general, at the peacetime bean counters.
I remember my British Dad glued to our little 12 inch TV when the war broke out. I didn't learn until later he had served in a rather elite capacity (he was out by then of course) but he was quite passionate in his interest, and very happy with the outcome.
As I was soon to embark on my career with a four year cruise at Camp Severn it was somewhat sobering to see than even in the modern age warships were still at the same level risk as my grandfather had faced in the western Pacific.
Interesting article: https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/06/world/europe/noway-uk-ship-deal.html?unlocked_article_code=1.j08.kOFM.SPUo4ltbaAqK&smid=url-share
1. “First big takeaway is the well known and proven need for redundancy and defense in depth in AAW.”
a. In a Supersonic Sea Skimming ASCM environment this truth cannot be ignored if you wish to:
i. Be effective
ii. Survive
iii. Live to fight another day
iv. Especially when the weapons are getting cheaper by the day
v. This is what Aegis is all about . . . and when the electrons stop moving your better have a trigger to pull.
b. Stand-alone Crew Service Weapons have their place, but require near perfect employment in a very small window of vulnerability.
2. There is no substitute for Firefighting and Damage Control on a Surface Combatant that is damaged on the ocean fathoms deep:
a. This is why Watertight Integrity, and Compartmentalization are an absolute must on Surface Combatants.
b. This is why redundant communications are required to overcome combat damage.
c. Aluminum ship construction is not a good idea in Surface Combatant ship construction…though I do like Trimarans . . . just NOT out of Aluminum
FIRST there is Situational Awareness
THEN there is the ability to do something about your situation...PERIOD.
Wow. Words fail.