Mk. XIV was the abysmally ineffective sub launched torpedo which started out the war running deeper than nominal setting, having a mis calibrated magnetic exploder due to the designers "assuming" Earth's magnetic flux in S. Pacific would match that at Newport RI, which both exploded torpedos too far from some magnetic targets for any good effects AND failed to explode when run right under the keel of other ships perfectly, along with a contact pistol that shat the bed if run into the side of a ship at a perfect 90° and full speed due to a trigger part of incorrect hardness which jammed and a nose cap which frequently crumpled too easily and wrecked the exploder mechanism before it could fire the warhead.
Mk. XIII was the aerial torpedo which started the war out wrecking itself from shock of water contact when released at rather low speeds and quite low altitudes, with less than 1/3 dropped performing as designed.
Torpedos were expensive, testing them was cost prohibitive & a LOT of design shortcomings were discovered in combat and remedied slowly & only long after the opening engagements in the Pacific.
I just started to read the linked paper re: Mk. XIV torpedo and immediately found a really glaring error:
(Quote)
"The Japanese, on the other hand, used a fuel of liquid hydrogen peroxide that
yielded much more energy and gave their torpedoes considerably more range than
those of the U.S. or, in the trade-off, much more speed. Because of their more
energetic fuel, the Japanese could trade-off fuel capacity to increase the size (and,
therefore, lethality) of their warheads to about 750 pounds."
----------
BS. The Japanese used straight oxygen for the oxidizer in their torpedo rather than compressed air. If the WWII era Japanese used hydrogen peroxide for a propellant ANYWHERE in their submarine or torpedo programs, it is news to me, that was a German specialty.
I'm amazed that statement was published, this is a very basic and long known engineering detail. The British and US navies experimented with oxygen torpedos but failed to get the technology working, the British then DISREGARDED intelligence reports that the Japanese had got oxygen torpedos to work and were deploying such torpedoes with longer range/higher speed/heavier warheads AND no tell tale bubble wake from the unused nitrogen in compressed air. Plus, working exploders.
----------
(edit)
The author goes on to repeat and expand on the same misinformation:
"Post-WWII analyses found that the Japanese surface-launched, 24-inch,
Long Lance torpedo had double the warhead weight and range of the Mark XIV, and
at a much higher speed—almost double the speed. The Japanese achieved that by
using a more volatile (at least the Bu Ord called it volatile) liquid hydrogen peroxide
fuel. The Navy had repeatedly rejected this as too dangerous because it was
worried about fumes affecting the crew. However, there was no post-WWII record
found of any Japanese incident due to the use of hydrogen peroxide as torpedo fuel."
----------
Darned right, hydrogen peroxide never affected a Japanese submarine crew because it was never USED by them.
The oxygen torpedos WERE quite dangerous, just like any tank of pure oxygen when exposed to fire or explosion, they made it a lot worse. There were several incidents of IJN surface ships taking hits which compromised their loaded torpedo launchers which did a good deal of s condary fire/explosion damage to the ships carrying them.
Jesus, nobody pays me to write. Maybe someone should hire me to edit...
Minor quibble ... I think. My understanding is that the Japanese oxygen torpedoes started on ordinary compressed air and switched to pure oxygen after running a few seconds.
I wrote my post-Masters thesis at AWC in 1996 on China in the SCS. Discussed their arming of islands (just starting), them outbuilding us, and what was affected if they controlled the sea lines of communication. Also discussed the alarming lack of SAR given that we had no sea planes, no diesel boats (it takes a nuke over a minute to submerge) and few surface platforms...so inside the first and second lines SAR would be "iffy".
In the (almost) 30 yrs since then things have not improved much. We have "some" experimentation with pontoons on C-130's, and not much more. Perhaps there is some possibility to use unmanned surface drones, but we need to work the tactics and procedures with the aviation and surface/subsurface communities...and that takes time.
It used to be available on line with Air War College. Haven't looked for it in years, though. Send me your e-mail to navyair@sbcglobal.net and I'll forward a copy. Might take a bit, as I just changed computers (thanks, Microsoft) and need to find it.
There exists a CSAR amphibian that you’ve written about in the past, the Japanese US-2. Good for the entire water covered surface of the planet. Yet the idea of a float equipped C-130 still comes up to fill that role.
Would likely cost between $160 and $190 million in current dollars possibly more per unit. Comparable to a current production E-2D. For the US a viable complement would probably be at least 24 or 4 1/2 billion dollars. Even the Japanese only bought 9 to replace 14 US-1 and just retired the first unit, possibly due to the stress airframes receive from bumpy water landings. It cruises at only 300 mph, too slow for effective escort by any Navy fighter, which it would often likely need in wartime to avoid putting its crew of 11+- in the water in addition to the 1 or 2 pilots it would be attempting to rescue, and protect such a low density unique unit.
The sustainment costs for such a unique, low density aircraft which would have to be forward deployed and maintained and require an entirely new and unique Naval aviation "community" in low numbers would be eye watering.
No other country it has been offered to in the last 2 decades has bought it.
Might as well be vaporware. This is the irrational wish list stuff the Naval community engages in that leads and has led to a decrepit Navy. The same irrationality that has allowed NAVSEA to turn FFG(x) into a failure.
Part of the job. WWII SAR was also performed under direct gun fire. Sometimes you can, sometimes you can't. IMO that's up to the pilot to make that decision.
I don’t say the mission will be difficult and dangerous. I say it will be impossible. Every US-2 you send will die, and then you have 11 more guys in the water.
The pilot is not going to be allowed to put 11 more aircrew in the water trying to rescue 1 or 2. Thats called helping the enemy. Making such tradeoffs will be made above his paygrade, and should be. The few US-2 the Navy might buy in this amphibious plane dream world wouldn't and couldn't be used the way ubiquitous PBYs were used in WW2. Its not the same world. The float plane model only works when they are generally useful, not only niche useful and therefore producible in substantial numbers as in WW2.
Once again, CDR Sal has masterfully used history to illuminate the future unless our Navy makes significant adjustments for the future impending naval conflict.
Connecting history to the now, and near future has me considering some 'compare and contrast' points.
Damage Control. Yorktown survived Coral Sea with good damage control. The focus on essential repairs at Pearl Harbor gave Nimitz a third carrier at the beginning of Midway. And more damage control kept it in the fight an extra day. Recent examples, (Truman, Fitzgerald, McCain) show the crews can still do damage control well. But shipyards today are having a lot of trouble getting repair work done on time.
Aircraft Battle Damage Repair. The battle lasted 3-4-5 days depending on who counts what events. I have never seen anything that says a plane damaged on day one or two at Midway was flying again on day three or four. I have seen claims that in Desert Storm some damaged planes were flying again in a week, but others had to be crated up and sent back to the factory for months of rebuilding.
Rapid Runway Repair. What good is an unsinkable carrier (island) if the runway is cratered? Most histories give a very brief mention of improvised efforts to fill holes and patch the airfield at Midway. But also say that there were planes flying every day of the battle. Now there are many units dedicated to keeping an airbase functioning after an attack. Are there enough? In the right places? With equipment and materials ready?
Could we do what they did back then? Can we do what needs to be done in the future?
Minor point: tanker Akebono Maru was sunk in the channel off Palau by Task Force 58 carrier planes on 30 Mar 44, per your link. It was re-floated post-war and then sunk for good while under tow.
My late father-in-law piloted a variety of Navy aircraft during the war including PBY's. He dropped out of college at age 19 to enlist, as his private pilot's license was in demand. He was quietly proud of his service but never made too much of it, as was common in that generation of heroes.
Please put some thought (and words) on probablity that the survival equipment of the airman in the water is reporting its location to 'the cloud' within minutes. Of course, still need physical assets to go make the rescue. But using those assets for search hopefully is not so necessary.
I know someone who maybe could have answered the question about PBY losses: My father in law, ADC Thomas Layne Jr USN (ret)*. His career was spent with the VPs from his enlistment* in late 1940 or early 1941 until his retirement in the very early 1960s. He seems to have been just about everywhere something was going on, Midway included as well as flying out of Tulagi during the Guadalcanal campaign and duty ferrying one of the marine raider units.
Unfortunately he passed nearly 2 decades ago and while he did tell me a lot of what he did in his career, there are so many questions that I did not think to ask at the time. However, this story seems apropos to the moment at hand:
I'm not sure where this happened, but it was at a time when they were on maritime interdiction duty hunting Japanese shipping. For this purpose they carried torpedoes under the wings. In this instance they found a merchant ship and made a run but the torpedoes failed to drop. So they went back around and made another pass. Again facing anti-aircraft fire from the target. Again the weapons failed to drop. At this point apparently some questions were asked so Tommy, who was the flight engineer whose station was in the ventral pylon that the wing mounted to, looked out his windows to see that the red tags were still in place. Those torpedoes were not going to leave the racks.
The only option at that point was to return to base. Though they did radio ahead to inform them of what had happened. Action was swift. The AO1 who was responsible for the loadout was an AO3 by the time they returned.
*As was not uncommon he joined the Navy to escape the coal mines. It took him two tries. He was underage so had to go back home and get his mother to sign for him. He was on Ford Island 12/7/1941 as either an airman recruit or airman apprentice. He ended the war as a CPO, and stayed at that rank until he retired since SCPO and MCPO ranks had not yet been established.
So...who's putting up the obstacles to buying/licensing the ShinMaywa US-2 ?
We know there's been studies and a number of our boys have done exchanges and ride-alongs with the JMSDF, there's even the harebrained USSOCOM idea of making an amphibious C-130 (good grief). Is this a case of ego and lack of creativity amongst FOGO's?
The flying boat thing has bothered me for decades. If you find yourself adrift 2000 miles from land these days, it's either wait for a ship or ship with helicopter or for the USAF or USCG to show up with a C130 to drop you a bigger raft and in the case of the USAF maybe some PJ's will parachute out to assist you in waiting for a surface asset. Unless of course you happen to be within range of the Japanese to assist with their PS2/US2 amphibious airplane. The USN, USCG and USAF all flew the HU-16. The USCG retired the HU-16 in 1983. There have been turboprop conversions on them in civil use and even a attempt at building new ones. Lockheed drew up a amphibious C-130 way back in the day which would be a pretty fantastic all around airplane for the USN to have. The R3Y tradewind was a amazing flying boat that suffered the fate of every airplane that had the failed Allison engines it was equipped with. A trip to Youtube and you can see how useful that airplane could be in a potential modern Pacific affair these days in a modern configuration. Doesn't need a CVN or runways, can go a long ways and carry a lot of stuff and push up on beach atolls anywhere in the pacific within hours. It's unsexy to say the least. In this day and age of drones we need more craft with long range and high capacity to deliver these things. Also being able to bring stuff to the fleet you can't fly aboard. It's not going to happen but it is pretty clear that the utility of a bigger airplane that doesn't need prepared aviation facilities that can refuel other airplanes, land in the water and rescue people, deliver forces and or materials to unimproved areas. With the latest Ukraine attack on fixed air facilities - cheap and successful, the same thing could happen to us. But if you can move them to any harbor anywhere or tuck them into any cove, they have to detect and find them and then move forces. If you look back at the R3Y Tradewind and the P6M Seamaster you see a couple airplanes by concept if reconceived now and built in some numbers that you can put in numbers to support a Navy at sea or shore. Consider how much good work the PBY did - slow, unattractive. Modern iterations of these 2 as concepts to base them on. Long range and not tethered to runways. Not sexy but can move people, munitions, fuel and even weapons platforms or drone mother ships. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Convair_R3Y_Tradewindhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Martin_P6M_SeaMaster
"A final note". I wonder how many decision makers will get through the final 3 paragraphs of this Full Bore Friday and think, "Well, there are finite funds for infinite wants. That's why I get paid to make the hard decisions". With all the recent revelations by DOGE can these people sleep peacefully at night?
Here is a case study of the troubled early Mark XIV torpedoes.
https://calhoun.nps.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/6f368eb6-4bc3-4651-8d02-6ed990129981/content
@Ed
Mk. XIV was the abysmally ineffective sub launched torpedo which started out the war running deeper than nominal setting, having a mis calibrated magnetic exploder due to the designers "assuming" Earth's magnetic flux in S. Pacific would match that at Newport RI, which both exploded torpedos too far from some magnetic targets for any good effects AND failed to explode when run right under the keel of other ships perfectly, along with a contact pistol that shat the bed if run into the side of a ship at a perfect 90° and full speed due to a trigger part of incorrect hardness which jammed and a nose cap which frequently crumpled too easily and wrecked the exploder mechanism before it could fire the warhead.
Mk. XIII was the aerial torpedo which started the war out wrecking itself from shock of water contact when released at rather low speeds and quite low altitudes, with less than 1/3 dropped performing as designed.
Torpedos were expensive, testing them was cost prohibitive & a LOT of design shortcomings were discovered in combat and remedied slowly & only long after the opening engagements in the Pacific.
@Ed
I just started to read the linked paper re: Mk. XIV torpedo and immediately found a really glaring error:
(Quote)
"The Japanese, on the other hand, used a fuel of liquid hydrogen peroxide that
yielded much more energy and gave their torpedoes considerably more range than
those of the U.S. or, in the trade-off, much more speed. Because of their more
energetic fuel, the Japanese could trade-off fuel capacity to increase the size (and,
therefore, lethality) of their warheads to about 750 pounds."
----------
BS. The Japanese used straight oxygen for the oxidizer in their torpedo rather than compressed air. If the WWII era Japanese used hydrogen peroxide for a propellant ANYWHERE in their submarine or torpedo programs, it is news to me, that was a German specialty.
I'm amazed that statement was published, this is a very basic and long known engineering detail. The British and US navies experimented with oxygen torpedos but failed to get the technology working, the British then DISREGARDED intelligence reports that the Japanese had got oxygen torpedos to work and were deploying such torpedoes with longer range/higher speed/heavier warheads AND no tell tale bubble wake from the unused nitrogen in compressed air. Plus, working exploders.
----------
(edit)
The author goes on to repeat and expand on the same misinformation:
"Post-WWII analyses found that the Japanese surface-launched, 24-inch,
Long Lance torpedo had double the warhead weight and range of the Mark XIV, and
at a much higher speed—almost double the speed. The Japanese achieved that by
using a more volatile (at least the Bu Ord called it volatile) liquid hydrogen peroxide
fuel. The Navy had repeatedly rejected this as too dangerous because it was
worried about fumes affecting the crew. However, there was no post-WWII record
found of any Japanese incident due to the use of hydrogen peroxide as torpedo fuel."
----------
Darned right, hydrogen peroxide never affected a Japanese submarine crew because it was never USED by them.
The oxygen torpedos WERE quite dangerous, just like any tank of pure oxygen when exposed to fire or explosion, they made it a lot worse. There were several incidents of IJN surface ships taking hits which compromised their loaded torpedo launchers which did a good deal of s condary fire/explosion damage to the ships carrying them.
Jesus, nobody pays me to write. Maybe someone should hire me to edit...
Minor quibble ... I think. My understanding is that the Japanese oxygen torpedoes started on ordinary compressed air and switched to pure oxygen after running a few seconds.
Yes, that "soft start" on normal (20% oxygen) air was a wrinkle which the Allied torpedo programs failed to think up.
Your USAF is the executive agent for CSAR
I wrote my post-Masters thesis at AWC in 1996 on China in the SCS. Discussed their arming of islands (just starting), them outbuilding us, and what was affected if they controlled the sea lines of communication. Also discussed the alarming lack of SAR given that we had no sea planes, no diesel boats (it takes a nuke over a minute to submerge) and few surface platforms...so inside the first and second lines SAR would be "iffy".
In the (almost) 30 yrs since then things have not improved much. We have "some" experimentation with pontoons on C-130's, and not much more. Perhaps there is some possibility to use unmanned surface drones, but we need to work the tactics and procedures with the aviation and surface/subsurface communities...and that takes time.
Jim…Joint delende est. Also…is your thesis available online? If not, want to email me a PDF?
It used to be available on line with Air War College. Haven't looked for it in years, though. Send me your e-mail to navyair@sbcglobal.net and I'll forward a copy. Might take a bit, as I just changed computers (thanks, Microsoft) and need to find it.
Best, Jim
There exists a CSAR amphibian that you’ve written about in the past, the Japanese US-2. Good for the entire water covered surface of the planet. Yet the idea of a float equipped C-130 still comes up to fill that role.
I'd hate to land an ad hoc float plane on open ocean. US-2 is well designed for the role.
Would likely cost between $160 and $190 million in current dollars possibly more per unit. Comparable to a current production E-2D. For the US a viable complement would probably be at least 24 or 4 1/2 billion dollars. Even the Japanese only bought 9 to replace 14 US-1 and just retired the first unit, possibly due to the stress airframes receive from bumpy water landings. It cruises at only 300 mph, too slow for effective escort by any Navy fighter, which it would often likely need in wartime to avoid putting its crew of 11+- in the water in addition to the 1 or 2 pilots it would be attempting to rescue, and protect such a low density unique unit.
The sustainment costs for such a unique, low density aircraft which would have to be forward deployed and maintained and require an entirely new and unique Naval aviation "community" in low numbers would be eye watering.
No other country it has been offered to in the last 2 decades has bought it.
Might as well be vaporware. This is the irrational wish list stuff the Naval community engages in that leads and has led to a decrepit Navy. The same irrationality that has allowed NAVSEA to turn FFG(x) into a failure.
I cannot visage the courage of these men.
I stand on the shoulders of giants.
The Pacific war at sea had some absolute heroes in the 2 best modern navies at the time.
The naval tradition is greatly degraded. Keep reminding and teaching.
These men should be remembered and we can learn what a real navy looks like.
still here, 'n we all know what I suggest.
Other good Porch denizens suggest ShinMaywa seaplanes. either/or and/or both would be a step in the right direction
How are you going to do SAR inside the Chinese A2/AD bubble? Large, slow very unstealthy amphibians are going to die.
Part of the job. WWII SAR was also performed under direct gun fire. Sometimes you can, sometimes you can't. IMO that's up to the pilot to make that decision.
Right now? No planes, no decision.
I don’t say the mission will be difficult and dangerous. I say it will be impossible. Every US-2 you send will die, and then you have 11 more guys in the water.
A rescue in Hangzhou Bay is suicide. Halfway from Kagoshima might be a different proposition.
Halfway from Kagoshima to Hangzhou bay is well within the range of hundreds of DOD owned helicopters and V-22.
For illustrative purposes.
The pilot is not going to be allowed to put 11 more aircrew in the water trying to rescue 1 or 2. Thats called helping the enemy. Making such tradeoffs will be made above his paygrade, and should be. The few US-2 the Navy might buy in this amphibious plane dream world wouldn't and couldn't be used the way ubiquitous PBYs were used in WW2. Its not the same world. The float plane model only works when they are generally useful, not only niche useful and therefore producible in substantial numbers as in WW2.
Once again, CDR Sal has masterfully used history to illuminate the future unless our Navy makes significant adjustments for the future impending naval conflict.
Connecting history to the now, and near future has me considering some 'compare and contrast' points.
Damage Control. Yorktown survived Coral Sea with good damage control. The focus on essential repairs at Pearl Harbor gave Nimitz a third carrier at the beginning of Midway. And more damage control kept it in the fight an extra day. Recent examples, (Truman, Fitzgerald, McCain) show the crews can still do damage control well. But shipyards today are having a lot of trouble getting repair work done on time.
Aircraft Battle Damage Repair. The battle lasted 3-4-5 days depending on who counts what events. I have never seen anything that says a plane damaged on day one or two at Midway was flying again on day three or four. I have seen claims that in Desert Storm some damaged planes were flying again in a week, but others had to be crated up and sent back to the factory for months of rebuilding.
Rapid Runway Repair. What good is an unsinkable carrier (island) if the runway is cratered? Most histories give a very brief mention of improvised efforts to fill holes and patch the airfield at Midway. But also say that there were planes flying every day of the battle. Now there are many units dedicated to keeping an airbase functioning after an attack. Are there enough? In the right places? With equipment and materials ready?
Could we do what they did back then? Can we do what needs to be done in the future?
Sal, did you check Midway Roundtable for the data? http://www.midway42.org/Default.aspx
Well done, and we honor them all. Hand Salute.......Two.
Minor point: tanker Akebono Maru was sunk in the channel off Palau by Task Force 58 carrier planes on 30 Mar 44, per your link. It was re-floated post-war and then sunk for good while under tow.
My late father-in-law piloted a variety of Navy aircraft during the war including PBY's. He dropped out of college at age 19 to enlist, as his private pilot's license was in demand. He was quietly proud of his service but never made too much of it, as was common in that generation of heroes.
Please put some thought (and words) on probablity that the survival equipment of the airman in the water is reporting its location to 'the cloud' within minutes. Of course, still need physical assets to go make the rescue. But using those assets for search hopefully is not so necessary.
I know someone who maybe could have answered the question about PBY losses: My father in law, ADC Thomas Layne Jr USN (ret)*. His career was spent with the VPs from his enlistment* in late 1940 or early 1941 until his retirement in the very early 1960s. He seems to have been just about everywhere something was going on, Midway included as well as flying out of Tulagi during the Guadalcanal campaign and duty ferrying one of the marine raider units.
Unfortunately he passed nearly 2 decades ago and while he did tell me a lot of what he did in his career, there are so many questions that I did not think to ask at the time. However, this story seems apropos to the moment at hand:
I'm not sure where this happened, but it was at a time when they were on maritime interdiction duty hunting Japanese shipping. For this purpose they carried torpedoes under the wings. In this instance they found a merchant ship and made a run but the torpedoes failed to drop. So they went back around and made another pass. Again facing anti-aircraft fire from the target. Again the weapons failed to drop. At this point apparently some questions were asked so Tommy, who was the flight engineer whose station was in the ventral pylon that the wing mounted to, looked out his windows to see that the red tags were still in place. Those torpedoes were not going to leave the racks.
The only option at that point was to return to base. Though they did radio ahead to inform them of what had happened. Action was swift. The AO1 who was responsible for the loadout was an AO3 by the time they returned.
*As was not uncommon he joined the Navy to escape the coal mines. It took him two tries. He was underage so had to go back home and get his mother to sign for him. He was on Ford Island 12/7/1941 as either an airman recruit or airman apprentice. He ended the war as a CPO, and stayed at that rank until he retired since SCPO and MCPO ranks had not yet been established.
My Dad was the flight engineer for a PBY of VP-14. I'll always be proud of that.
So...who's putting up the obstacles to buying/licensing the ShinMaywa US-2 ?
We know there's been studies and a number of our boys have done exchanges and ride-alongs with the JMSDF, there's even the harebrained USSOCOM idea of making an amphibious C-130 (good grief). Is this a case of ego and lack of creativity amongst FOGO's?
Lack of build capacity, but license build or accept a slow build rate vs nothing seems fine by me.
Don't let perfect get in the way of good-enough.
The flying boat thing has bothered me for decades. If you find yourself adrift 2000 miles from land these days, it's either wait for a ship or ship with helicopter or for the USAF or USCG to show up with a C130 to drop you a bigger raft and in the case of the USAF maybe some PJ's will parachute out to assist you in waiting for a surface asset. Unless of course you happen to be within range of the Japanese to assist with their PS2/US2 amphibious airplane. The USN, USCG and USAF all flew the HU-16. The USCG retired the HU-16 in 1983. There have been turboprop conversions on them in civil use and even a attempt at building new ones. Lockheed drew up a amphibious C-130 way back in the day which would be a pretty fantastic all around airplane for the USN to have. The R3Y tradewind was a amazing flying boat that suffered the fate of every airplane that had the failed Allison engines it was equipped with. A trip to Youtube and you can see how useful that airplane could be in a potential modern Pacific affair these days in a modern configuration. Doesn't need a CVN or runways, can go a long ways and carry a lot of stuff and push up on beach atolls anywhere in the pacific within hours. It's unsexy to say the least. In this day and age of drones we need more craft with long range and high capacity to deliver these things. Also being able to bring stuff to the fleet you can't fly aboard. It's not going to happen but it is pretty clear that the utility of a bigger airplane that doesn't need prepared aviation facilities that can refuel other airplanes, land in the water and rescue people, deliver forces and or materials to unimproved areas. With the latest Ukraine attack on fixed air facilities - cheap and successful, the same thing could happen to us. But if you can move them to any harbor anywhere or tuck them into any cove, they have to detect and find them and then move forces. If you look back at the R3Y Tradewind and the P6M Seamaster you see a couple airplanes by concept if reconceived now and built in some numbers that you can put in numbers to support a Navy at sea or shore. Consider how much good work the PBY did - slow, unattractive. Modern iterations of these 2 as concepts to base them on. Long range and not tethered to runways. Not sexy but can move people, munitions, fuel and even weapons platforms or drone mother ships. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Convair_R3Y_Tradewind https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Martin_P6M_SeaMaster
"A final note". I wonder how many decision makers will get through the final 3 paragraphs of this Full Bore Friday and think, "Well, there are finite funds for infinite wants. That's why I get paid to make the hard decisions". With all the recent revelations by DOGE can these people sleep peacefully at night?