How to Blunt a PRC Invasion of Taiwan? Operation Swooper

strand them on the beach

Fourteen years since the announced “Pacific Pivot”, the last month we’ve been subjected to a very public debate about how much support for Ukraine in her war with Russia is impacting our ability to prepare for potential war with China in the Pacific. Though history prefers to throw a curveball more often than not, the one scenario that is seen as the most likely trigger for the next Great Pacific War is Taiwan.

Should this war come—and if we prepare properly for it, it very well may not—are we ready to make any attempt to take Taiwan a debacle for People’s Republic of China (PRC) a debacle, or are we under-preparing to the degree that we will slouch our way into a long drawn-out war?

One thing I am sure of, we continue to overlook a key capability not from lack of imagination but from lack of sponsorship to get it through from a small, niche capability to a massive hammer against the enemy at sea.

Nothing needs to be “invented” with unobtainium. It isn’t exquisitely priced. It isn’t reliant on a Tiffany-fragile CONOPS. It has already been developed. It already is at full operational capability. It is already proven at war. It is right there, neglected, underfunded, and unloved.

Mining. I’m talking about mining. One of the most important, deadly, and impactful weapons at sea—but probably one of the ones least respected.

Offensive mining, defensive mining—so much has been lost, forgotten, or just thrown away in this warfare area, that it is almost a crime itself. Mortgaged, sold away, or just plain neglected in pursuit of vanity projects and theories that never leave the PowerPoint.

Some capabilities are so impressive and have such a long track record of success, you wonder why it doesn’t get more attention and funding.

It can make you wonder, “Am I the one missing something?”

Then you realize that this capability you believe is so important is, unfortunately, unsexy.

Yes, you remind yourself, even in national defense, you never really leave the middle school lunchroom.

Nothing will terrify the crew of a ship faster than hearing, “MINES”!

As Tom Wester and Joe Mancini over at WOTR reminded us two years ago,

Of the 19 U.S. ships sunk or severely damaged since 1945, 15 were victims of mines, and yet mine warfare is carelessly neglected while U.S. allies, partners, and adversaries continue to expand their programs’ capability and capacity. During the initial weeks of Russia’s invasion, Ukraine hardened its defenses by laying mines in littoral waters. While the mines helped prevent Russia from mounting an amphibious assault,

If you want to halt a surface force’s momentum, lay mines. You want to cause an operation to be delayed or cancelled altogether, lay mines they don’t know are there. You want to deny access to certain waters, mine them.

Don’t let the enemy assume access to anything you can reach. Destroy their carefully crafted CONOPS. Shatter their timeline. Deny their assumptions. As they move to take what they covet—be the swooper.

LTjg Salamander’s view of the impact—pun intended—of mines date back to the HF TTY message traffic that came in about the USS Tripoli (LPH 10) and USS Princeton (CG 59) striking Iraqi mines in Desert Storm 1991, just three years after USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58) was hit by an Iranian one.

The first few days of any conflict over Taiwan will be critical. The PRC will want its action to absorb Taiwan to be quick, decisive, and as bloodless as possible. They want the facts on the ground to be resolved before the American fleet sails west of the International Date Line.

It is clear that the PRC is trying to build and amphibious capability to bring the number and type of forces ashore that it will need to quickly pacify Taiwan with as little damage as possible. She is worth much more intact than as rubble and ashes.

Amphibious landings have a certain logic to them. They need to gain, keep, and expand momentum. From Gallipoli to Normandy, that transition point of moving inland must take place or the landing will fail.

One of the best ways for the landing to fail is for the defender to interrupt additional supplies, men, and material from coming ashore. If you can prevent that, even the most violently successful invasion at D+0 will fail by D+14.

What is one tool that could blunt a successful invasion of Taiwan that some people in the Pentagon know we need, but don’t seem to be able to get the funding to move it to a critical mass?

It’s mining, of course, but for this scenario our war-hack is a special subset of mining: aerial mining.

In the relatively narrow waters of the Taiwan Strait, surface mine laying is a suicide mission. Submarine-delivered mines can only be delivered by the remaining Los Angeles Class submarines, and you don’t want them prowling in those shallow waters. “Other” options will not be ready in time…if ever.

Long range and even carrier aircraft can deliver in hours or days what other mining assets would take weeks to months to deliver. They don’t need bases on hostile land; they just need to get there.

But wait, if you want to lay even defensive minefields in the Taiwan Strait, you want to keep your aircraft—an F/A-18, P-8, B-1, or B-52, as far east as possible. Right? That is deadly airspace.

Well, there’s an answer to that.

Quickstrike ER (QS-ER).

The QS-ER concept marries an Mk64 underwater mine to the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) Extended Range variant to strike a target precisely from a stand-off range of over 40 miles (64 kilometers).

The JDAM kit comprises a GPS-assisted inertial navigation guidance system that aids a munition in gliding toward the designated target.

The concept allows an aircraft to deliver multiple 2,000-pound (907 kilograms) guided air-launched mines simultaneously in a contested waterway with lower risk.

In comparison, an unguided mine requires launching at multiple intervals, with the aircraft flying at dangerously low altitudes.

“What’s unique about QS-ER is its range and precision,” 49th Test and Evaluation Squadron commander Lt. Col. Matt Spinelli said.

OK. 40 nautical miles. Just for planning purposes, what if aircraft were restricted to releasing weapons overland Taiwan? How far could they lay a minefield? What does that look like between Taiwan and the PRC?

There’s your 40 nautical miles a QS-ER can glide.

Flying from east to west and back “home” wherever that base is. Unlikely the PRC will have air supremacy over Taiwan proper.

That red line is 344 nautical miles long. Depth 500: feet at the end of the lines (that leads to deep water where thar be SSN dragons), but the majority water depth is 100-200’ for most of the Taiwan Strait—a fertile field for sowing mines.

From what I have been able to find in open source, a B-52 can carry 12 QS-ER. A B-1 24, and a B-2 16.

B-2 will have a “higher and best use” in a Great Pacific War, so that leaves the B-1 and B-52 from the USAF.

A lot will depend on range requirements, but I believe the F/A-18 Super Hornet can carry two and the P-8A can carry five 2,000-class weapons like the QS-ER.

Navy can help out, but the USAF will need to be the primary player for any significant mining campaign in defense of Taiwan.

You don’t have to mine it all, just the most likely approaches to where the PRC wants to be, or are most suitable for their special-purpose landing barges. The PRC can have uncomfortable uncertainty on where the rest of the mines are.

Fear is the defender’s ally.

Mines buy time, narrow access. That is what you need to make any invasion, should it take place, have a better likelihood to fail at best, give Taiwan and her allies the time they need to reinforce her at worst.

I know, mining is unsexy, but it is important. Even amongst professionals, it is hard to keep track of

If you would like a bit more about the US Navy’s unclassified mining assets, here’s a nice summary in the below video.

Just in the last century, let’s look at two good benchmarks of the power of American mining.

The Institute for Defense Analysis’s 1997, The 1972 Mining of Haiphong Harbor: A Case Study in Naval Mining and Diplomacy - AKA Operation Pocket Money:

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Thomas Moorer, had long argued for strategic mining of the major ports in North Vietnam. As Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet and as Chief of Naval Operations, he had presented plans and arguments for mining major North Vietnamese ports. His views had repeatedly been ignored or rejected. As the new CJCS, his views were finally accepted in 1972. About 80 percent of the supplies to North Vietnam came in via the sea ports in the Haiphong harbors. All oil came into Hanoi through the harbors.

…

Many mines had been dropped during the entire war, approximately 330.000.18 (Over 11,000 were eventually laid in Haiphong harbors.) But the mining of the strategic harbors had until May 1972 been considered too risky and disproportionate.19 One can only speculate about what might have happened if mining on this scale had been executed earlier in the conflict, as had been argued by Admiral Moorer.

…

The first mines were laid by tactical air from the naval aircraft carrier USS Coral Sea. Immediately, all shipping stopped at Haiphong, even though the mines were not armed until 3 days later. In accordance with international law, a warning to mariners was made, with sufficient lead-time for shipping to clear the area before the minefield became active. No ships entered Haiphong and those there at the beginning of the mining did not leave and were trapped, so dangerous the mine field was perceived to be. Trucks and trains moved along the overland routes that were under attack, but no ships challenged the mine field. The psychological impact of the minefield was clear, even if disproportionate to the actual threat. A major sea supply route to North Vietnam had been severed.

…

As a result of the lengthy delay, the minefields had to be reseeded several times, since the mines were set to sterilize themselves in less than 6 months.27 Also, a serious electromagnetic anomaly from a sunspot detonated a large number of mines. They also were replaced. As noted earlier, over 11,000 mines were eventually laid near Haiphong.

I have a pretty solid idea why Admiral Moorer was such an advocate of mining. As a naval aviator in WWII, Admiral Moorer would have been very familiar with one of the most accurately named operations of the war: Operation Starvation:

More than 1,250,000 tons of shipping was sunk or damaged in the last five months of World War II when Twenty-first Bomber Command executed an aerial mining campaign against Japan known as Operation STARVATION. Despite this outstanding success, the decision to commit the still unproven B-29 to minelaying was a close one that rose to the highest levels of the Services.

The decision to conduct Operation STARVATION was made not only because mining would lead to a Japanese surrender without the need for a costly invasion of the home islands, but also with an eye towards post-war roles and missions for the Air Force. Once the decision was taken, General Curtis LeMay and his Twenty-first Bomber Command threw themselves wholeheartedly into the mission. On January 23, 1945, LeMay issued a general directive to the 313th Bombardment Wing to prepare for minelaying operations and on March 27, the 313th flew the first of over 50 mining missions. Working together on the remote island of Tinian, Air Force and Navy personnel turned a mission that began as an inter-service rivalry into one of the best examples of inter-service cooperation of the Pacific War.

From the same 2002 USAF’s Air War College paper by Gerald A. Mason, Captain, USN linked to above, we need to think carefully about our investment in aerial mining. Do we have enough for peacetime training and exercises, or are we buying enough to make to leverage this capability at D+1?

During Operation STARVATION, more than 1,250,000 tons of shipping was sunk or damaged during the last five months of the war. Approximately 12,000 mines were laid requiring only 5.7 percent of the Twenty-first Bomber Command’s total effort. Out of 1,529 B29 mining sorties, only 15 aircraft failed to return. In the five months prior to the end of hostilities, mines sank or damaged more shipping than any other agent including submarines or direct air attack by both Army and Naval forces.

The Shimonoseki Straits and allimportant industrial ports were almost completely blockaded. Hundreds of ships were delayed, sunk, or damaged and supplies vitally needed in industrial and populated sections were diverted to northern Honshu ports where much of it remained, waiting to be hauled over an already overloaded transportation system to its useful destination.

Now, look back at the summary of the mines we laid in Operations Pocket Money and Starvation. What is our inventory of Quickstrike ER kits?

A strong asset is right there, waiting for us to take advantage of it. Right there. No development cost, just production and storage.