I&W of the Next Trump Administration's Approach to Russia and Ukraine
go to primary sources
In case you were too busy around Thanksgiving, this significant appointment was made:
President-elect Donald Trump said Wednesday that he has chosen Keith Kellogg, a highly decorated retired three-star general, to serve as his special envoy for Ukraine and Russia.
Kellogg, who is one of the architects of a staunchly conservative policy book that lays out an “America First” national security agenda for the incoming administration, will come into the role as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine enters its third year in February.
In April of this year during the heat of the campaign before President Biden dropped out, General Kellogg and Fred Fleitz published a research report over at the pro-Trump American First Policy Institute titled America First, Russia, & Ukraine.
There is a lot of bad, impatient speculation about what a second Trump administration will have as its policy towards Russia in general, but Ukraine in particular. Many of those critics can’t get their head out of the 2024 election season, or for that matter, the 2016 election. It is best to recognize who those people are and ignore them. The better choice is to go to primary sources. Kellogg and Fleitz’s report fits that bill.
Let’s dive in:
The second bullet is what you should focus on. There are two core points I expect much of the action we will see after January 20th will be anchored to:
“Risk Adverse” means timid delivery and use of American weapons. Expect at least the threat of that no longer being the case, along with the possibility of more on the way, to be a “stick” to convince Russia to be open to talking.
A realist-based diplomatic push will come early with Russia with the aim of convincing Russia to be open to talking. That is the carrot.
In a pattern as old as time: you offer a solution that is partly pleasant and partly unpleasant, but make it clear that if the offer is rejected, only more unpleasantness will follow.
The America First approach also requires a strong military, the prudent use of U.S. military force, and keeping U.S. troops out of unnecessary and unending wars. It means working in alliances and with partners to promote regional security while requiring alliance members and allies to carry their full weight in defending security in the region.
…deterrence and peace through strength.
Those on the left who were trying to scare everyone from Brussels to Berkeley that a Trump administration would result in a rending of our system of alliances are either under-informed or lying. His team wants a stronger system of alliances, mostly by prodding alliance members to increase their capabilities and contribute their fair share.
On Ukraine, Trump has a history of support.
On Ukraine, the Trump Administration promoted a strong deterrent approach by authorizing the first-ever lethal military aid package to Ukraine, equipping its armed forces with advanced Javelin anti-armor missiles, naval vessels, and Mark VI patrol boats. This was a major break from the Obama Administration, which agreed only to provide nonlethal military assistance despite passionate appeals by Ukrainian officials for U.S. arms to fight pro-Russian separatist rebels in the Donbas.1 President Obama refused to send weapons to Ukraine because he feared it would provoke Putin. President Trump disagreed and sent weapons to Ukraine as a sign of American strength and support for a friendly state.
The template should be familiar to the fair-minded and the historically literate.
Trump’s political opponents criticized him for this, but Trump’s approach was no different from how multiple U.S. presidents dealt with Soviet leaders during the Cold War. This was a transactional approach to U.S.-Russia relations in which Trump used his experience as a dealmaker to find ways to coexist and lower tensions with Putin while standing firm on American security interests. Trump spoke with Putin many times during his presidency, including at least five times in person and over 17 phone calls.
Expect talks.
You cannot avoid conflict or resolve existing ones unless you are willing to sit down with those you oppose. You can only more an opponent to a neutral, or a neutral to a friend by keeping open lines of communication. Only those who desire conflict or don’t know how to win will avoid a relationship with even the most pernicious opponents. This has been done in business and national diplomacy from dawn of time with a proven track record of success.
During a February 2024 interview with Putin by journalist Tucker Carlson, Putin provided a long, nonsensical account of Russian and Ukrainian history in which he disputed Ukraine’s nationality and history and repeated his ridiculous claims that Russia invaded Ukraine in part to fight Nazism in the country.
This is not something a team of Russian stooges would write.
While I may have a nit to pick here and there and if you ignore some of the campaign heat, his team has a solid understanding of how the Russo-Ukrainian War took off almost three years ago.
An America First approach could have prevented the invasion.
First, it was in America’s best interests to maintain peace with Putin and not provoke and alienate him with aggressive globalist human rights and pro-democracy campaigns or an effort to promote Ukrainian membership in NATO.
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Second, it was in America’s interest to make a deal with Putin on Ukraine joining NATO, especially by January 2022 when there were signs that a Russian invasion was imminent.
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Third, the United States and its allies should have sent substantial lethal aid to Ukraine in the fall of 2021 to deter a Russian invasion.
All three of these are still valid.
As if you need more proof that Ukraine aid is not destined to dry up:
…Ukraine’s counteroffensive against Russia ran out of steam by the fall of 2022 because the United States and its allies failed to provide the country with the weapons it needed to continue the fight to reclaim its territory.
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To promote American interests and values, President Biden should have provided Ukraine with the weapons it needed to expel Russian forces early in the war and used all forms of statecraft to end the war, including sanctions, diplomatic isolation of Russia, and, ultimately, negotiations.
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Biden was prepared to give up on Ukraine after the February 2022 invasion and offered to evacuate Zelenskyy from Kyiv. Zelenskyy rejected the offer, famously replying: “The fight is here; I need ammunition, not a ride.”
Never forget the last part. The legacy of Blinken and Sullivan are a legacy of weakness.
Later on in the document, two of my favorite things make an appearance, Kurt Schlichter and demographics:
In a February 17, 2024 tweet, national security expert and retired Army Colonel Kurt Schlichter observed: “Ukraine is not losing because America hasn’t given it enough shells. Ukraine is losing because there aren’t enough Ukrainians. And I’m on the side of the Ukrainians. I helped train them.”
Schlichter is right about Ukraine facing a demographic crisis and running out of soldiers. About 200,000 Russian troops have been killed in the war, and 240,000 wounded. The Ukrainian army has suffered about 100,000 dead and up to 120,000 wounded. But Ukraine’s population is much smaller than Russia’s. The population of Ukraine today is estimated at 36.7 million, a significant drop from its February 2022 population of 45 million. Many Ukrainians have fled the conflict. The total population of free Ukraine may be as low as 20 million. On the other hand, Russia’s population is 144 million.
There is an almost criminal neglect in discussions around demographics in our strategic conversations. It will be the primary issue mid-century, but is already a top-5 issue now.
There is nothing that Putin has to feel comfortable about with Trump’s team driving policy. There is a lot more stick than carrot.
…America First leadership where bold diplomacy paves the way to an end-state. What we should not continue to do is to send arms to a stalemate that Ukraine will eventually find difficult to win.
This should start with a formal U.S. policy to bring the war to a conclusion.
Specifically, it would mean a formal U.S. policy to seek a cease-fire and negotiated settlement of the Ukraine conflict. The United States would continue to arm Ukraine and strengthen its defenses to ensure Russia will make no further advances and will not attack again after a cease-fire or peace agreement. Future American military aid, however, will require Ukraine to participate in peace talks with Russia.
To convince Putin to join peace talks, President Biden and other NATO leaders should offer to put off NATO membership for Ukraine for an extended period in exchange for a comprehensive and verifiable peace deal with security guarantees.
In their April 2023 Foreign Affairs article, Richard Haass and Charles Kupchan proposed that in exchange for abiding by a cease-fire, a demilitarized zone, and participating in peace talks, Russia could be offered some limited sanctions relief. Ukraine would not be asked to relinquish the goal of regaining all its territory, but it would agree to use diplomacy, not force, with the understanding that this would require a future diplomatic breakthrough which probably will not occur before Putin leaves office. Until that happens, the United States and its allies would pledge to only fully lift sanctions against Russia and normalize relations after it signs a peace agreement acceptable to Ukraine.38 We also call for placing levies on Russian energy sales to pay for Ukrainian reconstruction.
This will not be a free-ride for Ukraine either. I would expect that if Russia decides to talk, Ukraine will be asked to be willing to be flexible. With a war this long and bitter, this will not be easy.
The Ukrainian government and the Ukrainian people will have trouble accepting a negotiated peace that does not give them back all of their territory or, at least for now, hold Russia responsible for the carnage it inflicted on Ukraine. Their supporters will also. But as Donald Trump said at the CNN town hall in 2023, “I want everyone to stop dying.” That’s our view, too. It is a good first step.
Again, give this document a read while filtering out all the April-centric campaign edge. If you are trying to understand the mindset of those who will be recommending policy to President Trump, this should be on your read list.
Call me ignorant, but seems if we would return to what we SAID we would agree to - that is, repeat that we do not seek to move NATO closer to Putin's borders - tell him it was a buncha lying gimmiecrata bastards who went back on our national promise to him - that maybe he would do his part. Maybe, then, our evolved M-I Complex will have to find other ways to profit from the Uke's mountains of desirable raw materials. After all, it is my understanding that WE are the ones who broke our promises to Putin about not enlarging NATO in his direction.
The Ukrainians are not losing because "there aren't enough Ukrainians." While quantity has a quality of its own, it is not necessarily a good determinant let alone the principal determinant of success or victory. During the Yom Kippur war in '73, the Israelis in the Golan held off a Syrian force 10 time what the Israelis had. It was a near run thing, but the Israelis eventually pushed back into Syria. The difference between the Israelis then and the Ukrainians now is the idiotic policy imposed by the US and Western Europeans on the Ukrainians on how to fight the Russians. Am all for stopping the killing, but it has to stop the killing. It shouldn't be a pause in killings so the Russians can catch a break, regroup, and then resume the killing with the US and Western Europe essentially stepping aside. We are in this war because decades ago, in a reasonable effort to minimize the dangers of nuclear weapons, the US and Britain (yes, and Russia) waffled on assurance vs guarantees of Ukrainian sovereignty in exchange for Ukraine giving up nukes. Fast forward a few decades later, we get into arguments about NATO encroaching into Eastern Europe and "threatening" Russia. It's amazing to me how so many could make that argument even in the face of facts pointing to NATO weakness, disunity, and indecisiveness when facing problems. Apparently 1/6 of Germany's submarines and about 50% or less of German Army tanks being functional was a huge threat to Russia. Then, when Russia actually started becoming a threat the Europeans still twiddled their thumbs. I don't want the US embroiled in a conflict created by the likes of certain "smart" people in the US foreign affairs establishment. I also don't like the idea of asking the Ukrainians to agree to a peace that would lead to more of them getting killed and their nation being conquered later on. I am for American interests. American credibility, including acknowledgement of our strength, is a national interest. We want other nations to be mindful of our strength and resolve - FAFO.
The Russians cannot be trusted with a peace that has little consequence if violated. Would Russia even come to the table? Russia lost this conflict the moment they failed to achieve their main aim of absorbing or setting up a puppet state in Ukraine. Will they accept peace if Ukraine gives up on territories Russia currently occupies? Will Ukraine accept that peace? If I were Ukraine I wouldn't accept "peace" unless there are absolute security guarantees on the part of Europeans at the very least, and ideally on the part of the US. As an American I wouldn't want to provide guarantees, but would like Europeans to provide those guarantees. Would Europeans accept this responsibility? To really secure peace Putin and his supporters must know that future aggression against Ukraine and other NATO countries will have severe consequences - not like Obama "red lines."