I Have Our Next Cruiser, if You're Smart Enough to Take it

the easy answer is often the best answer

On Monday, the Congressional Research Service came out with its latest, Navy DDG(X) Next-Generation Destroyer Program: Background and Issues for Congress.

This is worth your time, as we need to get this right.

We have to get this right because we have yet to cut steel on a successfully designed surface warship since Ronaldus Magnus was CINC.

The same organizations, processes—and in some cases people—that failed on DDG-1000, LCS, CG(X), and are doing their best to scupper FFG-62, are working on DDG(X), so keep a weather eye on the program. I’m trying to be an optimist, but concerns have been growing roots for years.

Low-trust is well-deserved.

At first read, I thought we had some good news. If you can judge by the picture in the report, contrary to the concerns I had in January, it looked like the general purpose 5” main gun is back, but note the source…they’re using Sam’s January 2024 image.

The image from my January linked to above is newer…so…yeah.

Sigh.

Also, no gun is mentioned in the report…in spite of every actual combat experience of the post-WWII naval combat—especially the last few years in the Red Sea—show the absolute essential nature of the general purpose gun in real world combat situations…but let’s move on.

Let’s review some basics from the report for new readers,

The Navy states that the baseline DDG(X) design, like the Fight III DDG-51 design, is to include 96 standard Vertical Launch System (VLS) cells, with an ability to incorporate 12 large missile launch cells in place of 32 of the 96 standard VLS cells. It is also to include two 21-cell Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) launchers, and possibly also an ability to be built with an additional mid-body hull section, called the Destroyer Payload Module, that would provide additional payload capacity. The Navy states that

Note the bold underline I added to the above. I’ll get back to that at the end of today’s post.

In the same paragraph, they share the respectful but simple truth of the great Cold War (modified) Burkes.

…the requirement for future large surface combatants (LSCs) to be capable of hosting directed energy (DE) weapons, larger missiles for increased range and speed, increased magazine depth, growth in organic sensors, and an efficient integrated power system to manage the dynamic loads. DDG 51 is highly capable, but after over 40 years in production and 30 years of upgrades the hull form does not provide sufficient space and center of gravity margin to host future capabilities.

… studies concluded that DDG(X) is required to deliver the necessary margins and flexibility to succeed the DDG 51 Class as the next enduring LSC combining the DDG 51 FLT III combat system elements with new hull form, an efficient Integrated Power System (IPS) and greater endurance, reducing the Fleet logistics burden....

We’ve reached the limits of her design.

So far, aligning with Salamander direction and guidance about minimizing technology and program risk as much as possible so to not create FORD CVN type problems…but, what about the IPS?

Oh, no.

The Navy plans to model the IPS at a land-based test site, but the results may not be available to fully inform the ship’s design prior to detailed design. The second critical technology is the ship’s hull form. The program continues to conduct risk reduction activities for both critical technologies.

OK, full stop. What part of the ship’s design is driven by the go-nogo of IPS?

Have we learned nothing? As IPS is what will make or break the entire concept of DDG(X) as it is being put forward, it is gobsmacking we still don’t know if it can work. We should put everything else that relies on its performance on hold and throw money at the IPS testing site, figure out how to make it happen, and then pick things up from there. We cannot, again, start cutting steel on an incomplete design. LCS/NLOS, FREMM-to-FFG-62, and other similar goat-ropes the last few decades should explain to everyone why the program should go tools-down until we know if IPS is a go.

I think that is clear.

Now, let’s look at the “Issues for Congress.”

(1) Would a new LSC larger than the Flight III DDG-51 design be consistent with the Navy’s desire to shift to a more distributed fleet architecture that includes a larger number of smaller ships?

(2) The Navy in the past has studied options for a lengthened version of the DDG-51 design. Would the DDG(X) be more cost-effective than a lengthened DDG-51?

(3) Has the Navy accurately identified the DDG(X)’s required operational capabilities?

(4) Why is there a 33% difference between the CBO and Navy estimates of the DDG(X)’s average procurement cost?

(5) Would future Navy budgets permit the procurement of DDG(X)s in desired numbers while adequately funding other Navy priorities?

(6) Is the Navy taking adequate steps to mitigate technical, schedule, and cost risk in the program?

(7) Is the Navy planning adequately for the transition from DDG-51 procurement to DDG(X) procurement?

Let me try to answer these, in order.

1. Yes, as a balanced fleet requires large surface combatants, destroyers and cruisers, and smaller warships like frigates. We are morphing our FFG into a DDLG, so … build both.

2. As much as I would enjoy my prophecy that we will build Arleigh Burke DDG until the crack-of-doom to be made true, really the hull has done its duty. We need to advance.

3. You cannot predict the future. If anything, recent history tells us we are bad at even trying. I doubt the “requirements” are all that valid. Heck, these are the people who expected us to believe the 57mm for FFG-62 was based on anything but the most base Beltway blobish slimy reasons. Build for flexibility so our Navy can adjust as the future reveals itself.

4. Because no one really knows. Just assume the higher estimate is closer.

5. Only if we fundamentally change how we allocate the defense budget.

6. No. They haven’t yet, and without firm, hard, and direct leadership—it will repeat the same mistakes because we are using the same system, programs, processes, and people who bought this century’s shipbuilding debacles.

7. I doubt it. We have not done so in decades.

Let’s go back to the opening of the paragraph quoted above about IPS from the June 2025 GAO report,

The Navy approved changes to the operational requirements for the [DDG(X)] program in August 2024. The program is assessing how the changes affect its schedule and cost estimates and officials did not provide a time frame for when they will update these estimates.

OK. Stop. No more letting this guy in the room.

Freeze the design. Tell the Good Idea Fairy that time is up. Let’s make sure IPS works, and then start to cut steel.

Again, authorize and build more Burkes for a few years until testing is done if that is what is needed. We could always use more.

We can’t screw DDG(X) up. We can start by giving the class a proper name, for starters. I have a suggestion, rename the expected DDG-141 and take that name and make it the first ship in the class, USS Ernest E. Evans (DDG-XX).

While we are at it, we can rename the also authorized but not yet started Danzig, Mullen, and Mabus.

Now, let’s return to the bold italics at the top of the post.

In my SEPT 2022 Substack on DDG(X) I stated the following,

PS: we still need a cruiser.

How do we do that? A successful path to the future is to follow the successes of the past.

The Ticonderoga class, using the highly successful Spruance hull,

…

The greater size and equipment on the CG-47-class cruisers increased displacement from 6,900 tons of the DD-963-class destroyers to 9,600 tons of displacement for the heavier cruisers.

…and what did we highlight from Monday’s CRS report?

possibly also an ability to be built with an additional mid-body hull section, called the Destroyer Payload Module

Bollocks to “possibly”—no, grab a multi-generational design team and tell them, “This ‘Destroyer Payload Module’ is the ‘cruiser module’. We’re building a CG-74 Class cruiser in parallel with the DDG(X). At least for Flight I of this new cruiser, that module will be dedicated to air and space defense weapons. I want people to need an abacus to count the number of VLS cells. Throw in additional space for it to be a flagship if needed. Get to work. Don't argue the matter. The difficulties will argue for themselves.”

More. Faster.