If F/A-XX Can't do This, We Don't Need It
yes, actually, I am the good idea fairy
This post has expanded far beyond what I thought it would be when I picked the title. I was just going to focus on F/A-XX as an avenue to argue, again, that it must be a two-seat heavy fighter with an ability to do what the MiG-31s above are doing. I think that is self-evident, but we are talking about NAVAIR here.
So, as I dug around on the topic, I opened the aperture a bit to look at options that might work for the existing air wing as well. What I will do is focus on a specific capability that has proven its utility at war recently. Remember, you can get an idea of what will be needed in the next big war, and a big war will always come as they have for thousands of years, by looking at what has revealed itself in medium-sized wars actively going on. Those who do this prosper in the next big war. Those who do not, have their future determined by those who did.
Below, we dive into a capability we simply don’t have but must. We need it sooner rather than later, and well before the F/A-XX makes a shadow on the ramp. This is a long post, but stick with me.
Hypersonics.
The challenge of carrying the fight to the enemy in a war in the Pacific is, as all hard problems are, multifaceted. There is no CONOPS or weapon that will make the hard easy. Multiple lines of operation must be invested in, informed by the latest lessons of other conflicts and flexible enough to react as the truth changes.
However, there are some fundamentals that should inform every point along those lines of operation.
Range. Range. Range: This has always been the core requirement for any fight in the Pacific. Your ships (endurance, resupply, weapons), your aircraft, and the weapons—they all must have range. Other things should be sacrificed, warhead size etc, in order to get the range you need.
There is a fetish for large explosives, but at hypersonic speed, F=MA combined with the relatively unarmored modern ship does a lot of the work for you. Industrial infrastructure above ground also does not react well to a hypersonic impact, especially if they hit the right spot. Modern warheads’ CEP can do that.
The Pacific’s vastness demands range from you, but that vastness also grants you more security. The nearer your launching platforms have to close to your enemy’s Asian bases of operation you are targeting, the greater the danger to you. Why we ever sacrificed range is a question we know the answers to…and those responsible should not sleep well at night.
We should also mention that once we approach the Asian landmass from the east, geography is in a way our friend. One advantage we have over China is that all their bases and almost all their industrial capacity are on one coast facing east and southeast over the Pacific, while America has naval bases and maritime industrial capability on our east, west, and gulf coasts … and well inland on the Great Lakes and Mississippi watershed. Yes, China is across the great Pacific, but once you’re there, the target set is a simpler problem to address.
Numbers and Capacity. In both static and mobile, the size of target set that must be hit early and often if you want your fleet to survive west of the International Date Line is humbling. You have to attrit the Chinese advantage in numbers early or their mass will simply develop an irresistible inertia against any set of few and exquisite weapons you throw against it.
Any war with the People’s Republic of China will not be a 72-hr war. It will not be a 12-day war. It will be a war measured in years. The Russians thought their February 2022 war with Ukraine would be a short one. Don’t fall into that trap.
So, what do we have today to meet that challenge? The USAF can at any one time count on no more than the fingers on two hands the fully mission capable B-2 bombers it could put into the fight. We have B-1 and B-2 as well…but none of these are in production, or have been for decades. The B-21 is still a promise. Their conventional strike capabilities are…limited in the face of a modern counter-air enemy.
Strike Eagles and other land-based TACAIR aircraft suffer the same “get there” problem their heavier sisters will have: all of them rely on land-based refueling assets to reach the Western Pacific. Almost all our airbases in the Western Pacific are under the Chinese rocket force’s weapons. There is no way to sustain any substantial campaign from CONUS. By D+7, there won’t be much land-based air flying west of Guam…or even from Guam.
That leaves the Navy. Our conventional offensive capability are to be found in TLAM and the air wing (a few bespoke other options as well, but they are a rounding error).
TLAM are carried into the fight by our surface ships and their VLS cells. Any TLAM sitting in a VLS cell west of the International Date Line will be expended by D+30. We still have not mastered how to reload VLS forward, so, again, this is not a way to bring a sustained fight to the enemy. As we cannot reload them forward, they would have to head back east to reload, but I don’t think they would be going anywhere. Our TLAM shooters, except for our four SSGN, are also our air defense ships. If the carriers are coming out to play, which they will, all AAW ships are staying until Winchester or sunk. Heck, even if we could get them east to reload, they wouldn’t do it too often. We’d run out of TLAM very quickly, especially if we kept a reserve of any amount for European/Southwest Asia contingencies.
I’d also like to mention, don’t even bother going into comments saying that one of our three Zumwalts converted to carry hypersonics would be available if they are ready by 20XX. That is a bespoke weapon on a bespoke ship that will simply be a nice to have, little more. Simply not enough warheads to offer. Might be fun to feed to the Three Gorges Dam, but besides that, rounding error.
That leaves us with our aircraft carriers and their air wings. As we have discussed often here, for the worst of reasons promoted by people over-promoted into jobs they should not have been given, our air wing has incredibly short legs and no organic tanking capability (remember, buddy tanking does not count). As such, our carriers have to close the enemy to get in range…and we have precious few modern land attack weapons to launch. Note the “modern” there. The AGM-158 JASSM-ER/LRASM, big and slow, just are not sufficient for the fight to come. Helpful, but limited.
Range. Numbers. Capacity.
Let’s stick to simple things. Three is a good simple number that focuses the mind.
We need solutions now to a well-known shortage of stand off weapons suited to a Pacific conflict.
The weapon needs to not only extend the range of our air wing, but must be available in volume, and stock replenished/rearmed forward.
It needs to be usable in multiple aircraft type/model/series.
It needs to reflect the lessons of medium wars we’ve seen in the Russo-Ukrainian and Israeli-Iranian War of the last few years.
All the above points in one direction: our carrier air wing needs to have the capability to deliver long-range, air-launched ballistic missiles. We need something turnkey now that is good enough, and we need to seriously look at what can be done to F/A-XX to make it even better to support this.
Let’s set the table first. While ballistic missiles are hypersonic, they are not hypersonic glide vehicles.
This is what we are looking at. Why, yes, it would be nice to have more of our legacy air-launched land attack missiles and surface launched land attack cruise missiles; however, they are limited in a whole host of ways and countered by existing defense systems that grew up with them.
The message is clear in Ukraine and Iran—the USA needs this capability.
We don’t have time to start from scratch. Sure, we can do that, but it must be done in parallel with an effort to get the “good enough” to the fleet.
What are the benchmarks and options?
The benchmarks are Russian and Israeli.
Russia: the Kh-47M2 Kinzhal (NATO reporting name: AS-24 Killjoy) as seen in the picture underneath a MiG-31.
Mass: 4,300 kg (9,500 lb)
Length: 7.2 m (23 ft 7 in)
Diameter: 1,200 mm (47 in)
Warhead: 500 kg (1,100 lbs)
Range: 1,500-2,000 km (800-1,080 nm) from a MiG-31. Longer if delivered by Backfire bombers.
Israel: the Air LORA.
Mass: 1,600 kg (3,527 lbs)
Length: 5.2 meters (18 feet)
Diameter: 624 mm (25.5 in)
Warhead: 570-800 kg (1,256-1,763 lbs)
Range: 400 km+ (216 nm)
The Air LORA brings a lot more to the table simply because of its more manageable size than the beefy Killjoy (yes, we are supporters of NATO naming conventions). The below video explainer is … good.
In that video, did you catch this?
That’s right kiddies…and you can find it in their literature. That right there is the P-8A. I know the TACAIR bubbas would hate it…but having P-8A carrying this weapon offers the theater commander’s targeteers all sorts of options. Anyway, Navy needs a long-range bomber again...even if it suffers from the requirement being land-based the USAF aircraft.
Israel has a solution already on the shelf, but are there others? Two Air LORAs can be carried by an F-16, so there should be no problem having it carried by F-18/F-35 and whatever F/A-XX winds up being called.
That’s our benchmark. If for whatever reason we can’t/won’t license-build Air LORA, that’s OK. We have other options already under production, or on the edge of production, made in the USA.
Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS)
Mass: 1,670 kg (3,690 pounds)
Length: 4 m (13 feet)
Diameter: 610 mm (24 inches)
Warhead: 230 kg (507 lbs)
Range: 300 km+ (162 nm) (perhaps much greater)
Fun details. The Navy looked a few times at adopting ATACMS.
NATACMS – a ship-launched ATACMS variant for the U.S. Navy, was under development in the 1990s and was tested twice in early 1995: first from the ground at the White Sands Missile Range, and then from the flight deck of USS Mount Vernon (LSD-39) using a modified Army M270 tracked vehicle at a target 75 nautical miles (86 mi) distant on San Clemente Island off Southern California. The last testing missile carried 730 Mk 74 (probably meaning M74 munition) submunitions. Despite all test objectives being met, or even exceeded, development was later cancelled for unknown reasons.[61][62][63]
SLATACMS – a projected Sea-Launched ATACMS variant of the Army Block IA missile for undersea operations with a maximum launch depth limit of 175 feet, identical warhead,[64] same diameter and only dimensional changes of length from 156.5" to 199", for fins to be folded within a smaller envelope and the addition of a fin module, which had to be jettisoned after broach and before motor ignition, behind the boattail for stability during underwater flight, – to fit primarily within the most advanced (688i, FLTIII/Flight III) design of Los Angeles-class submarine vertical launching system (VLS) capsules, having 12 of such ones onboard. Its history began when USN Strategic System Program Office authorized a study in June 1995[64] to evaluate undersea cold launch capability of MGM-140A from submarines. However, on the Hearings on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 held on March, 1996, become known that USN plan to use not only APAM but also a BAT (Brilliant Anti-Tank) munitions payload,[44] and when Lockheed Martin presented SLATACMS press-release at August, 1996, there was already described Block IA missile as a base modification specimen for the SLATACMS. Choosing a submarine VLS as the appropriate launcher, that was designed by default for Tomahawk missile, which have ~x1,5 length of SLATACMS, exclusively, had led to the creation of a unique combined missile and launch capsule as an all-up-round (AUR) or SLATACMS AUR, which with SLATACMS inside fits the submarine's Tomahawk-designed VLS.[65]
This looks like it is similar to Air LORA, but there are better options.
Good news is that there is a replacement for ATACMS on the way, the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM), and it comes in a tidier package.
Exact specifics are slightly different depending on your source, but here is what I have.
Mass: 816 kg (1,798 lbs)
Length: 4 m (13 ft)
Diameter: 430 mm (17 in)
Warhead: 91 kg (200 lb)
Range: 500-1,000 km (270-540 nm)
The range is sexy as well.
Increment One
Increment One is the current missile in use by the United States Army. It has a treaty-bound range of 310 mi (500 km), and does not contain a multi-mode seeker. It is gradually replacing the MGM-140 ATACMS tactical ballistic missiles. Australia operates this variant as of July 2025.
Land Based Anti-Ship Missile (Inc 2)
Increment Two of the PrSM is known officially as the Land Based Anti-Ship Missile (LBASM). LBASM features a multi-mode seeker, unlike Increment One, enabling it to traverse area denied areas with more ease. As LBASM was in development following the US withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 2019, its range is to be increased beyond the previous 310 mi (500 km) threshold, up to an expected 620 mi (1,000 km) range, as well as increasing the speed of the missile. As the name suggests, the LBASM will be an anti-ship ballistic missile, and in collaboration with the multi-mode seeker will have the ability to engage moving targets. It is understood that the first procurement of the missile is to be completed in FY2028, with the United States Marine Corps then receiving them.
A primary concern of mine is time. Even fully developed land-based missiles will have a fair bit of work to be done to convert them to being launched by aircraft (extra benefit is increased range when launched by aircraft v. ground launched). If you could find a system where that work is already done, you save yourself a lot of time and engineering/program risk.
We can get to where we need inside the Navy’s lifelines. We’ve done it before.
Remember how we quickly converted the RIM-66 SM-1 to an air-launched anti-radiation missile during the Vietnam War, the AGM-78 Standard ARM? We got it from surface to air launched in a year, and had a really good update a couple of years later.
Remember how cool we thought it was that the RIM-174 SM-6 wasn’t just a solid replacement for the SM-2, but like the SM-1, it also had a surface attack capability against ships?
Remember how happy we were recently when we found out that we have modified the SM-6 for an air-launched configuration as the AIM-174B Gunslinger?
Well, it ain’t a Killjoy or an Air LORA, but … what about taking the SM-6 off the shelf, and just…making the AIM-174B Gunslinger an AGM-174C ground attack air launched ballistic missile?
Mass: 860 kg (1,900 lb)
Length: 4.7 m (15.5 ft)
Diameter: 340 mm (13.5 in)
Warhead: 64 kg (140 lb)
Range: 400-500+ km (216-270 nm)
Again, ignore the warhead size. That mass going that speed at impact will do the job well enough. That’s OK.
This would appear to be the shortest path to an acceptable weapon…if we can scale production. I’d run that in parallel with air-launched PrSM.
I forget who the original author was of the quote, so I’ll call it my own.
Give me the third best option. The best option will never make it past the design stage, the second best will show up late. The third will get here at the last possible moment. Give me the third.
(UPDATE: Thanks to the good Dr. Phil Weir, we know know the quote is,
“I declare the overall pattern to be the product of a then unconscious ‘Cult of the Imperfect.’ The cult became explicit in my too oft-quoted slogan for radar development. ‘Give them the third best to go on with; the second best comes too late, the best never comes.’” - Robert Watson-Watt, The Pulse of Radar (New York: The Dial Press, 1959), p. 46.
I was close.
Speaking of which, as I was writing this, Mackenzie Eaglen and Todd Harrison over at The National Interest are banging on one of the most important drums out there.
In the twelve days of fighting between Israel and Iran, over 150 THAAD interceptors were launched at Iran’s more advanced ballistic missiles. This is over three times the average annual procurement of around 40 interceptors since 2010. At $15.5 million per interceptor, this puts the armed forces on an unsustainable trajectory. Even if the Pentagon increases current orders beyond the meager 12 funded in the 2025 budget, it still takes 3 years between the date a contract is awarded and when the interceptors are delivered.
The shortage of THAAD interceptors is not unique. American ships in the region also launched over 80 Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptors to help defeat Iranian missiles during the 12-day conflict. The only version of this missile in production is the SM-3 Block IIA, and the Defense Department is still waiting on the first delivery of these upgraded missiles from a contract awarded in 2019.
…
If the Iranians can deplete 25 percent of America’s THAAD stocks and a significant portion of our SM-3 magazines in a few days, the Chinese can and will exhaust them in a few hours. Multi-million-dollar missiles, only produced in the dozens per year, are no match for far cheaper and more plentiful threats.
Give it a full read.
Extra Added Attraction
Not hypersonic … but speaking of good enough, affordable enough, and can be carried in bulk.
I’ll take a few thousand.
Special Operations Black Arrow Small Cruise Missile
Black Arrow is a small, lightweight cruise missile that can be fired from a variety of platforms, including palletized drop, ramp launch tubes, or conventionally launched from a stores pylon on a fixed-wing aircraft.[2] It is envisioned as a "service-common 'bus'" that can be employed by a variety of platforms.[3] It weighs approximately 200 pounds.[3] Black Arrow was designed to be a low-cost “mission-adaptable delivery platform” capable of carrying out a variety of missions, including utilizing both warheads and non-kinetic payloads.[2] It is designed to be produced at scale, in large quantities.[2]
…
Leidos uses model-based system engineering practices as well as open system architecture to reduce Black Arrow's costs and allow it to be built rapidly at scale.[2] Leidos cited their experience with rapidly fielding the GBU-69 Small Glide Munition (SGM) and demonstrating the Dynetics X-61 Gremlins with enabling them to meet several important milestones with the small cruise missile program.[7][5] Black Arrow's intended scalability utilizes the same open system architecture and modular airframe practices as the GBU-69, of which Leidos has delivered 4,000 units to date as of April 2025.
Since you are the good idea fairy, I've always wondered how many times you can wear a pair of tights before they get a run.
All kidding aside, production of hi-tech weapons is a problem that needs to be solved forthwith. The lessons of Ukraine are not being taken to heart.
We have forgotten about mass and attrition, and we're on the wrong end of them. We won't need to reload VLS cells if we can't produce enough weapons to reload them. We won't need munitions for aircraft if the squadrons have been attritted to nothing in the first week. We don't have enough shipping to keep the Navy and Air Force in action west of Pearl. It's not enough to have long-range weapons and aircraft; we need the logistics to sustain them, week after week, month after month.