If you use pliers as a screwdriver, you just make a mess

...an honest review of airpower and Epic Fury...

One of the great things about today’s information environment in national security is the vast number of voices out there. I know for some this is a frustration—because they desire more control or are simply too lazy to want many choices—but it is by far a net positive.

It was not too long ago that there were but a few regular voices out there that could be found only on a few publications or outlets. It was very hard for new voices to get ideas out there, and established experience was provided to you, not vetted through the marketplace of ideas.

It was also much harder to push back against bad ideas or compromised institutions. It was easier to silence voices simply because there were few places they could be heard. Barriers, gates, agendas…it was not a great time for the marketplace of ideas.

There are still some of these problems, but it is but a shadow of what it once was.

As opposed to having someone else curate your information diet for you from a limited selection, you can instead set things up yourself with a broad spectrum of choices.

I make sure to read broadly. I find reading from people you disagree with to be helpful in honing your own ideas, or even—for the smart and well meaning people I disagree with—you can find common ground or even realize that, hey, not all their ideas are that bad.

One of the people I force myself to read is David A. Deptula, Lt Gen, USAF (Ret.) and now dean of the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies.

As one would assume given his professional background and present paying gig, he is a strong advocate for airpower in general, and the USAF in particular.

He’s had me roll my eyes now and then, and tilt my head more than once, but he also has me nodding my head in respect when he makes a good point.

I passed on reading this the first time it came across my scan, but gave it a try on my second. I’m glad I did.

Over at Forbes about a week and a half ago he put out an article titled, Stop Judging Airpower Against Missions It Was Never Assigned, that was of the “good-David” variety.

You can feel his justified frustration about the nature of a lot of the discussion about the ongoing operations against Iran. Partisans on both sides are doing what you would expect. People keep trying to spot-weld their long-standing hobbyhorses to it. Most frustrating, however, is the weaponized ignorance and just poor professional practice by those you’d expect better of.

Deptula is being patient here, doing exactly what one does when you see disorganized grabassary…you go back to basics.

Staying in his lane, he wants to lay down the fundamentals of airpower…and I have to say, it is an exceptional master class for this purpose.

Let’s dive into a bit.

No serious modern airpower professional argues that bombing, by itself, can solve every military and political problem. Nor does any competent strategist contend that land, sea, air, space, or cyber capabilities should be employed by themselves, independently of the others. Modern warfare is not a contest to determine which military service can claim supremacy. It is the disciplined application of the military capabilities best suited to achieve clearly defined political objectives.

The useful inquiry is not whether aircraft can independently deliver every conceivable form of victory. It is whether the choice made by military and political leaders is appropriate to the objectives defined by political leaders. That distinction matters because different objectives require fundamentally different military contributions.

We’ve spent the last 85 years refining what airpower can and cannot do. The above paragraph is just about perfect. It isn’t airpower supremacist nor is it dismissive. It is balanced and in line with experience.

A campaign designed to replace Iran’s government and assume responsibility for the country would require a major ground component and a far broader political project. Airpower could not occupy Iran, police its cities, or administer its population. Neither could naval, cyber, or space power. Even a successful ground invasion would not guarantee a satisfactory outcome unless political leaders had a credible plan for the post-invasion governance and order.

Those advocating a regime change in Iran have to explain why the U.S. should deploy enough ground power to take a nation of 90 million. Of course, they cannot—and even if they could—the U.S. people would not support it. I don’t know any of us who had experience on the ground in the last quarter century from Afghanistan to Iraq who could sell that point.

You can do some things with airpower alone, just like you can do some things with seapower alone, but you cannot change a government. That requires, at its core, a young man standing on a street corner with a weapon saying, “This is now ours. Not yours.”

Specifically toward Iran, what does the U.S. want?

Let’s go back to what the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Caine, USAF, made it quite clear on March 10: what the goals of the operation were.

1. Destroy missiles/drones
2. Destroy navy
3. Destroy military and industrial base

I have written some about this conflict here, but most of my commentary has been on the UNCLAS Read Board Podcast. Regardless of everything else that has bobbed and weaved around this operation…if we would just stick to Caine’s Three, we’ll be fine. Try to do more? Not recommended.

In summary, this conflict has gone on much longer than I would have wanted, but at its core, I cannot complain about punishing the Iranian government and the IRGC the way they have. Thousands of young men and women of my generation were killed by them during GWOT, tens of thousands injured. They were more than deserving of a punitive expedition for that reason alone, but to buy more time for the international community to address their nuclear program and take the teeth out of their proxies? Just underlines the case for making the rubble bounce.

These recent commentary arguments collapse every military objective into one crude test: Did the adversary’s government surrender, collapse, or disappear? If not, they seem to believe, the military campaign is a failure.

By that standard, virtually every use of force short of total conquest will be unsuccessful by definition. Such a measure ignores the fact that nations frequently employ military power for limited purposes: deterrence, denial, degradation, disruption, coercion, containment, protection, or to buy time and diplomatic leverage.

…

If victory is defined exclusively as seizing territory or overthrowing a government, then ground forces will inevitably appear to be the only force capable of delivering it. But defining success as occupation does not prove that occupation is the appropriate political objective.

Land forces are indispensable when leaders decide that seizure and control of territory, protection of populations, defeat of enemy formations in close combat, or occupation and administration of another country is the necessary course of action. Even as these remain essential military functions, they are not the purpose of every military campaign.

The mission should determine the force—not the other way around.

Exactly correct. I could be on David’s planning staff. My core planning team could work with this. Exceptionally solid.

History also demonstrates that aerospace power can produce decisive strategic effects when assigned objectives suited to its capabilities.

A little too Effects-Based Operations-ish (I am a hardshell to an extreme Conditions Based Planning adherent), but I’ll allow it.

Success should be assessed by the change imposed on the adversary’s behavior and capacity, not by a tally of weapons released or aimpoints hit or “fires” imposed.

The below is a very good elevator speech on Joint, best given to those who are new to the game or poorly experienced/educated in the profession of arms. As a matter of fact, if someone can memorize the below and deliver it with a Transatlantic Accent, then they should be awarded JPME I on the spot.

Joint operations do not require artificial symmetry among the services or an identical share of responsibility for each component. Nor must a land force provide the final act in every campaign simply to validate the effort as joint.

Jointness means employing the capabilities most appropriate to the mission in the right quantities at the right places and in the correct sequence.

Sometimes land forces will dominate. Sometimes naval forces will. In other circumstances, airpower will carry the principal load. Cyber and space capabilities may be central to all of them. The optimal combination will vary according to the adversary, geography, political objective, available forces, acceptable risk, and desired end state.

The purpose of joint operations is not to protect service equities. It is to maximize strategic effectiveness.

The appropriate force package is the one that delivers the required result with the least exposure, casualties, and escalation risk.

…

No military domain possesses an inherent ability to turn tactical accomplishment into political success. Airpower cannot govern a hostile population. Naval power cannot occupy a capital. Land power cannot guarantee political legitimacy. Space and/or Cyber operations cannot by themselves compel every adversary. Even a fully optimized and integrated joint military force cannot rescue an incoherent strategy.

The more productive debate is over the political result being sought, the feasibility of that result, and the combination of diplomatic, economic, informational, and military tools most likely to secure it without disproportionate cost.

Political purpose—not service preference—must govern military campaign design.

Foundational. Too many people are trying to operate at a high strategic level without a baseline understanding of the basics.

Well done, General Deptula. Well done.