Iffy Cold War Nuclear Theory is Only Worse Now

put LRSO in the same bucket as SLCM-N

It looks like we have a perfect companion piece to my Substack from last fall, SLCM-N? Hard Pass, and it comes from an impeccable source, Mark Montgomery, RADM USN (Ret), in his latest, The Pentagon must cut $50B of waste — put this weapon on the chopping block.

For those new here or who need a refresher, let me repeat my nuclear elevator speech.

There is no such thing as a “limited nuclear exchange” or a “tactical nuke.” Nuclear weapons will generate their own logic and momentum. Once one is used, if the receiving end has nuclear weapons too, then they will have to respond not in kind, but harder. The party on the receiving end of that escalated response will have to do the same, and so on, with all these steps will take place 30 to 60 minutes apart. In the course of a single day to a work week, a global nuclear exchange will take place, and the center of human civilization will recenter to the Southern Hemisphere. That being said, that does not mean you cannot have a conventional global war between great powers. There is a better-than-average chance that in the next world war, and there will be another one, nuclear weapons will be to it what chemical weapons were to World War II. Warring powers will have them, but they will not be used.

Both a blessing and a problem when it comes to nuclear weapons policy and planning is that, unlike conventional conflict, we don’t have small-to-medium-sized nuclear wars popping off every half-decade or so to prove what theories and systems work or do not work.

As such, the nuclear war arena is bramble-think with bad theories, weapon design inertia, and Potemkin capabilities that, in the day or two you would have to review their performance before returning to the dust you came from, would in a nuclear war prove to be of little to no use, or worse, more of a danger to your own forces.

…and don’t even get me started on the existential danger of serious people in serious jobs who are convinced that “limited nuclear use” is a possibility.

So, if we assume that my theory is correct—which is usually the smart bet—and we find ourselves in a place where the most likely conflict we will face is a large conventional maritime and aerospace fight in the Pacific against the People’s Republic of China, where do we best invest our limited resources of people, platforms, and money?

Just as taking a pass with the completely unnecessary SLCM-N, there is another weapon system in the nuclear field that even if it existed, would arrive at the target long after the war was over—the nuclear capable Long-Range Standoff missile (LRSO).

Let’s turn the argument over to Mark:

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth announced plans this week to move up to $50 billion of the Pentagon’s budget from “low-impact and low-priority programs” to ones that align with President Trump’s defense strategy — an excellent first step to get the department ready for the threats America faces from China and other adversaries.

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The only way to find that kind of money is to cut weapons programs that no longer meet America’s needs. And the first item on the chopping block should be the Long-Range Standoff missile, which will cost at least $16 billion over the next 10 years.

You can buy a lot of CVN, DDG, B-21, SSN, and stand off conventional weapons—you know, the ones we will actually need in a fight with the PRC—with $16 billion.

The LRSO is a nuclear-capable, air-launched cruise missile intended to be carried by bombers like the B-52, the B-2 and the B-21. The US nuclear arsenal includes a triad of air, land and sea weapons, and the LRSO is part of the air component.

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So what does the air leg of the triad, including bombers with LRSOs, add to our defense?

Not much.

Even the air leg’s most charitable supporters say its role is to “complement land- and sea-based nuclear forces” and provide a “highly visible means to signal US intent.” Bombers are also different, boosters say, because of their “ability to be recalled.”

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There are plenty of ways to “signal” our intent, including bombers carrying conventional weapons, aircraft carriers and subs with SLBMs.

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The money saved should not leave the Air Force’s accounts, but should immediately be put to use building and modernizing the Air Force we need to fight China and Russia — transport aircraft, refueling aircraft, conventional munitions and, most importantly, as many B-21s as we can get our hands on.

Those bombers would help us fight and win a conventional campaign against China and Russia. And the better the odds of winning, the better the odds no one attacks us in the first place.

Spot on and airtight.

Read it all.

h/t ConsWahoo.