One can only imagine the INSURV reports for the LCS, DDG 1000, and CVN 78 class ships, if the INSURV for these ships were conducted with the same rigor as in the past.
Yeah well, they still won't have the guts to say "We don't have enough people for what you want us to do, so we're mothballing some ships" like the Coast Guard and MSC.
CDR Sal, as usual, 100% correct. I sound like a broken record, but DoD must create an "incentive structure" that encourages people to increase lethality to advance in the system. Not continue to do whatever CYA, social engineering direction that has been in place for...quite some time. A Herculean task, will require years to change the direction of the current "incentive structure", and require harsh actions (firings, prosecutions) to "encourager les autres" to adopt a different mindset. We've seen hopeful beginnings. Fingers crossed that SECDEF continues on and accelerates down the path of desperately needed reform. Time and resources are both in short supply.
I think you are off base here. There is a fundamental difference between the Navy and the other branches. Like the Coast Guard, your naval personal are mariners. Safely steaming a ship at sea is a complicated and demanding occupation. Being a capable mariner is kind of the opposite of lethality; so much of what the Navy does is done in a “safety first” environment. Consider UNREP; a deckhand can lose his life in an instant, even in the most peaceful of eras.
My point is that so much of what our navy needs not “lethality,” but fundamental seamanship. Our engineering plants need maintaining, our hulls need painting, and our crew need training. Obviously, having a warship “shipshape and Bristol fashion,” increases lethality, but if your focus is on killing, you may neglect the chipping of paint and the polishing of brass.
Back at you. As a pilot, if I crash on takeoff, the only person I'm "lethal" to is myself (and crew, gulp). As a "lethal mariner" if I collide with a sister ship or drop my F18 into the briny sea, I'm awarded zero "lethality" points. The warrior must become proficient in interdependent tasks and skills to close with and destroy the enemy. Recent history shows all the services have eroding, "interdependent" skill sets that define "lethality". Mariner skills are necessary, but NOT sufficient to be lethal to the level required. At least that's my opinion, obviously, your mileage may vary.
I think about that F/A-18 going over the side every day as the dad of a newly minted AMAN who just qualified as a brake rider. I told him to practice getting the hell out of a cockpit in a hurry w/o busting his ass. Amongst many other situational awareness lessons I preach to him.
I agree with you Tom. People should have enough self-interest to make sure you don't die going from here to there and back again. Even w/out an opposing threat. Stuff happens: merchants and carriers doing crazy crap and cutting you off, fires, casualties of all types, parting lines, replenishment at sea, and an assortment of other dangerous crap.
I saw a BM3 step on a line that was paying out after coming free from a bit out at sea preparing to come into port before anyone could stop him. That line wrapped around his leg in two seconds, through the scuttle he went, and down into Davy Jones' locker.
Competency at the basics and the systems that support that are more than a matter of should this ship stay in commission.
I agree. No-one will take a risk if there in no incentive to do so, and likely a whole lot of downside if it doesn't go as expected.
The Navy has preached command by negation forever, but I don't know how for that extends above an internal ship or squadron level role. The style of the commander matters as well. If they are a screamer, forget it.
Everyone should read David Hackworth's autobiography "About Face". Yeah, he's an Army puke but he speaks to these issues very well and in detail. These problems are endemic.
Careerists are more worried about their next fitrep more than people dying down the road. People respond to the incentives placed before them. They must change.
Too late now. We’ve got a new wall via DOD 5200.48 CUI. No need-to-know (like CMI) but instead “must have a lawful governmental purpose” for access and obligatuon to safeguard.
And yeah, 1.2.c: “Information will not be designated CUI in order to (1) conceal violation of law, inefficiency, or administrative error, or (2) prevent embarrassment to a person, organization or agency”.
Even if declassified, INSURV will never be Dist A - Public Release.
The one suggestion I would add is to make these “no notice” inspections. This would preclude the gamesmanship associated with the inspection, such as “borrowing” equipment from other ships at the pier in order to hide deficiencies and shortfalls.
It can be done. The nukes have "surprise" ORSEs for a few platforms. Knowing that the NPEB could show up on your doorstep on short notice helps to keep things from going off the rails (unless they already are).
Most ships, even if they somehow found out a month ahead of time, would be under prepared, since they typically know 6-12 months in advance (and even then, they're probably hurting).
There are work-arounds. My picture - establish a small dedicated red team, isolated from the normal chain of command, that defines the targets and shows up at o'dark thirty to secure the ship from equipment transfers. This goup would also have to secure all computing resources so that the exact version and updates could be confirmed without someone being able to do so on the fly. The red team would have a larger list of personnel they could call in for a more detailed look into things.
There is a common theme among all federal agencies: Hiding information. The Feds think they can get away with it, but AI is going to make hiding information more difficult. The Feds will go back to putting paper records in safes.
Think about fax machines. Unlike e-mail, the old fashioned fax machine does not leave a trail where the substance of a message can be tracked. Send a fax, shred the documents at each end and what was said can never be recovered.
If the info is going over a wire or through the air waves you can count on it that it is being batch recorded by the spooks and can be later accessed for retrieval. It's been that way for 4+ decades.
Uhm, except for that pesky 44 USC 3401 federal records bit. Oh, and ask those Miramar fighter pilots who sent Senator Boxer the offensive fax back in the day how that worked out. : )
The shame of it is, it won't be those responsible who will pay for this malfeasance. It will be a lot of young men and women dying unnecessarily if we have a war with China.
Amen. Enough of wasting our tax dollars on foreign (mis)adventures. Bring that money home for OUR defense…and the sooner, the better. Time is flat-out of the essence.
That would likely result in too much self-reporting for some people's comfort. OTOH, if SECDEF and SECNAV were really clever, they would use some of the officially-disbanded DOGE team to descend on the most recent "open and inspect" work orders issued to all of the overhaul shipyards. (I think that's where you will find a lot of the problem.) Then - push for a resolution of the current scandal all of Sal's subscribers already know about.
Basic seamanship applies to all vessels. We grow good sailors from the ground up, and load them with responsibility early. If we keep babying them, they will never have a reason to see themselves as valuable or part of the mission.
Frankly I'm not surprised in the zero defect Navy they are hiding every single thing they can. The plan to keep a ship for 40 years is likely not helped by an INSURV report that casts doubt on that proposition.
It makes me think of when I joined the reserves in the 90's after finishing my four years on active duty as an Atlantic Fleet Combat Systems/EMO and 2nd DIVO before that. I was assigned as a Combat Systems Officer on PHIBRON 3 staff.
Four months later, we went to San Diego for AT during a FLEETEX. The staff was on USS WASP, did not have enough room, so three of us reservists were cross decked to USS JUNEAU (LPD-10) to get us out of their hair. I was shuffled off to help out their deck department before getting underway. The DIVO asked if I would do a couple PMS Spot Checks. I said, not a problem. Happy to help you out.
Now us LANTFLT guys used to joke about "The California Navy", but I had thought that was just regular competitive stuff. Not from what I saw. I was just looking at a PMS check done on a UB (Utility Boat) that the sailor supposedly had done three days prior on this same damn boat. It seemed brain dead easy to me reading the card, but it was obvious the kid had not done it. When I questioned the LPO and DIVO, they blamed me for pointing out the issue. I questioned the First LT about it w/o naming names, and he did not seem alarmed. I thought WHOA.
Then we got underway and I was assigned to the watch bill. No problem. The OOD was a LTJG who was the Combat Systems Officer and JOOD an Ensign. We were doing OPS w/ the SEALS dropping them off and some LCU stuff. I asked the OOD what he would do in the event of a threat. What area of the ship's CIWS was masked? What was true wind? What was the threat axis? You'd have thought I was speaking Greek. Double whoa. I spent hours teaching them. The Captain came over and from that moment I was teaching all the watch sections.
So when FITZGERALD and McCAIN happened, I was not shocked. I couldn't imagine the situation has improved over the years.
I was part of a CSAT and then after that joy, went through INSURV w a flock of inspectors climbing up your ass w/ a pair of tweezers. If those reports say what I would expect, I would think the powers that be would not want anything disseminated any further than was absolutely necessary.
I'll go back to what I have said for two decades now. Huge entities like Navies have changed forced on them from outside. That means the loss of ships and sailors. The Navy has continually performed worse over the decades. Material condition, seamanship, ship design, the GOFO mafia, LCS, DDG-1000. It is also an organization that instantly squelches any Jackie Fishers with ideas that are heretical. I just don't see any sunshine.
There are many significant issues with the US Navy and this is endemic across the services but the INSURV classification regime is an end-run around responsibility and accountability.
The LCS, DDG-1000 and Ford are Exhibits A, B and C why INSURV classification leads to poor decisions and worthless naval combat vessels. Cylinders of excellence atrophy innovation, strangle feedback loops in performance and bury AAR data that can save lives in the future.
Surprise and unannounced inspections would go a long way to rectifying this along with a culture that incentivized learning from mistakes. Ships are in a complex balance in an intricate choreographed dance between safety and lethality. All the time. Peace and war.
This also calls for a complete overhaul of the IG function across all the services. The IG should have complete access and the ability to call balls and strikes on incompetence, malfeasance and malicious sabotage. I often look at the ships the Navy has commissioned since the Burke hulls touched the ocean (the last successful surface combat class) and wonder if this is institutional sabotage at the wholesale level.
The deception is enough to make a person puke. What's next interchangeable hull and side numbers ala the Soviets? It will take great resolve to unring this bell.
One can only imagine the INSURV reports for the LCS, DDG 1000, and CVN 78 class ships, if the INSURV for these ships were conducted with the same rigor as in the past.
Amen. The rust is shameful and is just covering everything else.
Any chance that PDT, SecDef, SecNav, CinC, etc are reading these posts? If not, someone near them needs to casually leave copies in their inboxes.
Yeah well, they still won't have the guts to say "We don't have enough people for what you want us to do, so we're mothballing some ships" like the Coast Guard and MSC.
If we had the right system of incentives and disincentives that promoted people with that mindset, we would.
CDR Sal, as usual, 100% correct. I sound like a broken record, but DoD must create an "incentive structure" that encourages people to increase lethality to advance in the system. Not continue to do whatever CYA, social engineering direction that has been in place for...quite some time. A Herculean task, will require years to change the direction of the current "incentive structure", and require harsh actions (firings, prosecutions) to "encourager les autres" to adopt a different mindset. We've seen hopeful beginnings. Fingers crossed that SECDEF continues on and accelerates down the path of desperately needed reform. Time and resources are both in short supply.
I think you are off base here. There is a fundamental difference between the Navy and the other branches. Like the Coast Guard, your naval personal are mariners. Safely steaming a ship at sea is a complicated and demanding occupation. Being a capable mariner is kind of the opposite of lethality; so much of what the Navy does is done in a “safety first” environment. Consider UNREP; a deckhand can lose his life in an instant, even in the most peaceful of eras.
My point is that so much of what our navy needs not “lethality,” but fundamental seamanship. Our engineering plants need maintaining, our hulls need painting, and our crew need training. Obviously, having a warship “shipshape and Bristol fashion,” increases lethality, but if your focus is on killing, you may neglect the chipping of paint and the polishing of brass.
Back at you. As a pilot, if I crash on takeoff, the only person I'm "lethal" to is myself (and crew, gulp). As a "lethal mariner" if I collide with a sister ship or drop my F18 into the briny sea, I'm awarded zero "lethality" points. The warrior must become proficient in interdependent tasks and skills to close with and destroy the enemy. Recent history shows all the services have eroding, "interdependent" skill sets that define "lethality". Mariner skills are necessary, but NOT sufficient to be lethal to the level required. At least that's my opinion, obviously, your mileage may vary.
I think we agree. If you are not, what John Paul Jones described as "a seaman both in theory and practice," you won't make it to the fight.
Forget China, the ocean can kill you too. And, she doesn't declare war before killing you.
I think about that F/A-18 going over the side every day as the dad of a newly minted AMAN who just qualified as a brake rider. I told him to practice getting the hell out of a cockpit in a hurry w/o busting his ass. Amongst many other situational awareness lessons I preach to him.
I agree with you Tom. People should have enough self-interest to make sure you don't die going from here to there and back again. Even w/out an opposing threat. Stuff happens: merchants and carriers doing crazy crap and cutting you off, fires, casualties of all types, parting lines, replenishment at sea, and an assortment of other dangerous crap.
I saw a BM3 step on a line that was paying out after coming free from a bit out at sea preparing to come into port before anyone could stop him. That line wrapped around his leg in two seconds, through the scuttle he went, and down into Davy Jones' locker.
Competency at the basics and the systems that support that are more than a matter of should this ship stay in commission.
I agree. No-one will take a risk if there in no incentive to do so, and likely a whole lot of downside if it doesn't go as expected.
The Navy has preached command by negation forever, but I don't know how for that extends above an internal ship or squadron level role. The style of the commander matters as well. If they are a screamer, forget it.
Everyone should read David Hackworth's autobiography "About Face". Yeah, he's an Army puke but he speaks to these issues very well and in detail. These problems are endemic.
Careerists are more worried about their next fitrep more than people dying down the road. People respond to the incentives placed before them. They must change.
Too late now. We’ve got a new wall via DOD 5200.48 CUI. No need-to-know (like CMI) but instead “must have a lawful governmental purpose” for access and obligatuon to safeguard.
And yeah, 1.2.c: “Information will not be designated CUI in order to (1) conceal violation of law, inefficiency, or administrative error, or (2) prevent embarrassment to a person, organization or agency”.
Even if declassified, INSURV will never be Dist A - Public Release.
💯
The one suggestion I would add is to make these “no notice” inspections. This would preclude the gamesmanship associated with the inspection, such as “borrowing” equipment from other ships at the pier in order to hide deficiencies and shortfalls.
I suspect we would be in for a rude awakening.
Sadly, no-notice is impossible. Too many opportunists; the party to be “no-notice” inspected would get tipped off.
It can be done. The nukes have "surprise" ORSEs for a few platforms. Knowing that the NPEB could show up on your doorstep on short notice helps to keep things from going off the rails (unless they already are).
Most ships, even if they somehow found out a month ahead of time, would be under prepared, since they typically know 6-12 months in advance (and even then, they're probably hurting).
Try it for one platform from each TYCOM.
There are work-arounds. My picture - establish a small dedicated red team, isolated from the normal chain of command, that defines the targets and shows up at o'dark thirty to secure the ship from equipment transfers. This goup would also have to secure all computing resources so that the exact version and updates could be confirmed without someone being able to do so on the fly. The red team would have a larger list of personnel they could call in for a more detailed look into things.
There is a common theme among all federal agencies: Hiding information. The Feds think they can get away with it, but AI is going to make hiding information more difficult. The Feds will go back to putting paper records in safes.
Think about fax machines. Unlike e-mail, the old fashioned fax machine does not leave a trail where the substance of a message can be tracked. Send a fax, shred the documents at each end and what was said can never be recovered.
If the info is going over a wire or through the air waves you can count on it that it is being batch recorded by the spooks and can be later accessed for retrieval. It's been that way for 4+ decades.
Uhm, except for that pesky 44 USC 3401 federal records bit. Oh, and ask those Miramar fighter pilots who sent Senator Boxer the offensive fax back in the day how that worked out. : )
The shame of it is, it won't be those responsible who will pay for this malfeasance. It will be a lot of young men and women dying unnecessarily if we have a war with China.
Citizens in a republic deserve to know the material condition of their weapons of self-defense.
If our current leadership was smart they'd leverage this into a congressional scandal and use it to get the money for yards and repairs.
Amen. Enough of wasting our tax dollars on foreign (mis)adventures. Bring that money home for OUR defense…and the sooner, the better. Time is flat-out of the essence.
That would likely result in too much self-reporting for some people's comfort. OTOH, if SECDEF and SECNAV were really clever, they would use some of the officially-disbanded DOGE team to descend on the most recent "open and inspect" work orders issued to all of the overhaul shipyards. (I think that's where you will find a lot of the problem.) Then - push for a resolution of the current scandal all of Sal's subscribers already know about.
Basic seamanship applies to all vessels. We grow good sailors from the ground up, and load them with responsibility early. If we keep babying them, they will never have a reason to see themselves as valuable or part of the mission.
Frankly I'm not surprised in the zero defect Navy they are hiding every single thing they can. The plan to keep a ship for 40 years is likely not helped by an INSURV report that casts doubt on that proposition.
It makes me think of when I joined the reserves in the 90's after finishing my four years on active duty as an Atlantic Fleet Combat Systems/EMO and 2nd DIVO before that. I was assigned as a Combat Systems Officer on PHIBRON 3 staff.
Four months later, we went to San Diego for AT during a FLEETEX. The staff was on USS WASP, did not have enough room, so three of us reservists were cross decked to USS JUNEAU (LPD-10) to get us out of their hair. I was shuffled off to help out their deck department before getting underway. The DIVO asked if I would do a couple PMS Spot Checks. I said, not a problem. Happy to help you out.
Now us LANTFLT guys used to joke about "The California Navy", but I had thought that was just regular competitive stuff. Not from what I saw. I was just looking at a PMS check done on a UB (Utility Boat) that the sailor supposedly had done three days prior on this same damn boat. It seemed brain dead easy to me reading the card, but it was obvious the kid had not done it. When I questioned the LPO and DIVO, they blamed me for pointing out the issue. I questioned the First LT about it w/o naming names, and he did not seem alarmed. I thought WHOA.
Then we got underway and I was assigned to the watch bill. No problem. The OOD was a LTJG who was the Combat Systems Officer and JOOD an Ensign. We were doing OPS w/ the SEALS dropping them off and some LCU stuff. I asked the OOD what he would do in the event of a threat. What area of the ship's CIWS was masked? What was true wind? What was the threat axis? You'd have thought I was speaking Greek. Double whoa. I spent hours teaching them. The Captain came over and from that moment I was teaching all the watch sections.
So when FITZGERALD and McCAIN happened, I was not shocked. I couldn't imagine the situation has improved over the years.
I was part of a CSAT and then after that joy, went through INSURV w a flock of inspectors climbing up your ass w/ a pair of tweezers. If those reports say what I would expect, I would think the powers that be would not want anything disseminated any further than was absolutely necessary.
I'll go back to what I have said for two decades now. Huge entities like Navies have changed forced on them from outside. That means the loss of ships and sailors. The Navy has continually performed worse over the decades. Material condition, seamanship, ship design, the GOFO mafia, LCS, DDG-1000. It is also an organization that instantly squelches any Jackie Fishers with ideas that are heretical. I just don't see any sunshine.
Almost 30 years ago, I encouraged both my kids to join the navy. I wouldn't do that today.
I have discouraged enlistment since Clinton was elected. The left always tries to destroy the military.
There are many significant issues with the US Navy and this is endemic across the services but the INSURV classification regime is an end-run around responsibility and accountability.
The LCS, DDG-1000 and Ford are Exhibits A, B and C why INSURV classification leads to poor decisions and worthless naval combat vessels. Cylinders of excellence atrophy innovation, strangle feedback loops in performance and bury AAR data that can save lives in the future.
Surprise and unannounced inspections would go a long way to rectifying this along with a culture that incentivized learning from mistakes. Ships are in a complex balance in an intricate choreographed dance between safety and lethality. All the time. Peace and war.
This also calls for a complete overhaul of the IG function across all the services. The IG should have complete access and the ability to call balls and strikes on incompetence, malfeasance and malicious sabotage. I often look at the ships the Navy has commissioned since the Burke hulls touched the ocean (the last successful surface combat class) and wonder if this is institutional sabotage at the wholesale level.
The deception is enough to make a person puke. What's next interchangeable hull and side numbers ala the Soviets? It will take great resolve to unring this bell.