Israel Buys Itself, the World, and Iranians More Time
the inevitable battle and its initial lessons
After a national security requirement is properly defined by the National Command Authority with Commander’s Intent and Higher Direction and Guidance delivered, all military operations rely on answers to a series of questions:
Have we properly and realistically defined our Goals and End State (Ends)?
Do we have a viable way to execute this mission (Ways)?
Do we have the capability to successfully execute this mission (Means)?
Israel has waited for decades for the international community to find a way to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of the mullahs in Iran for the theocracy to fall or for anyone to find some way to eliminate it short of a full war that no one wanted to see. War was always an option.
Through some incredible feats of espionage, with an assist from the USA here and there, Israel did more to buy time for a peaceful resolution to a nuclear-armed Iran than all the international commissions created this century, typified by the E3 of a bit more than two decades ago.
Iran was not just waiting for their scientists to succeed. They surrounded Israel with proxies. These proxies did all they could to weaken the Jewish state from Lebanon, the Palestinian areas, and Yemen. Weaken Israel, fool the international busybodies, let their scientists continue to cook.
In October of 2024 after Israel created the conditions that it could prowl the airspace over Iran with impunity, some significant changes in planning assumptions took place with regard to the ability of Israel’s first-tier air force to do what has been discussed since I was a JO in the 1990s: strike Iran’s nuclear power facilities with a decisive blow.
As Matthew Savill and Burcu Ozcelik over at RUSI put it last fall,
The picture that is emerging is one of significant damage to Iranian air defences as well as missile launch facilities, both of which would be intended to show the Iranians that they are vulnerable to further strikes if they attempt retaliation. There is some speculation that all of Iran’s S-300 batteries have now been struck and possibly destroyed. These have hardly performed well to date, but if they have been stripped away entirely – leaving Iran with only domestically produced systems – this will increase the sense of vulnerability the regime feels.
With Hamas in its death rattle, Hezbollah worried for its own survival, and one of the most pro-Israel administrations curently in power in the USA, all those decision points turned green. Still firm following the attacks of October 2023, the Israeli people were ready.
Without decisive action and with time, Iran would only get stronger and closer to having nuclear weapons. The time was ripe for action now.
With an incredible display of power projection at range, and special operations actions that have echoes of recent Ukrainian actions, we are already days into an extended Israeli operation into Iran that will be ongoing as long as Israel wants it to.
Regardless of what might be said in the open, behind closed doors everyone with a mind bounded by reason and not warped by Jew hate, is breathing a sigh of relief with the success so far being enjoyed by Israel.
On day one, Israel obtained air supremacy. Iran is striking back with ballistic missiles. Since their War of the Cities in the Iran-Iraq War—and including their attack on a US base in Iraq a few years ago, this is one of Iran’s preferred tactics. They are getting better, but with each strike, they simply add more target sets to the Israeli air force. The effect of missile strikes on Israel’s civilian population is no more than the London Blitz was on the British people. Kills civilians, but does little to impact the conflict.
Meanwhile, the skies over Iran are owned by Israel. How humiliating to the mullahs.
Is this an opening for the Iranian people to throw off their theocracy? Only if they want to do that, but I don’t think Israel sees this as anything but a possible positive secondary effect. It isn’t a goal, just a possible positive secondary effect.
What Israel does see is that they—right now—own the airspace over Iran. This was never a given, but a Decision Point reached that must trigger a Branch Plan. Israel may never have another chance to buy a few more decades if needed—regardless of the political landscape of Iran mid-century.
How long can this air campaign go on? As long as Israel wants it to, and resupply continues. No one is coming to Iran’s aid. Iran has no friends, only proxies.
This is a rapidly changing story, but for now let’s put forward a few of the obvious top-shelf lessons of this conflict so far.
In many ways, these just underline many of the lessons from the Russo-Ukrainian War. These are not really lessons, all these are well-known by those that study the practice of future-war as opposed to those who think about the theory of future-war. Gods of the Copybook Headings type of things, but if you read and listen enough to many in the defense space, it is not what they want to talk about.
We need to master and be ready for these, because even if our decision makers are not interested in them, at war, they will be interested in us.
Conventional precision long-range strike by missiles (of all types) has been normalized for everyday use. The days of, “We can’t do that, they may think they are nukes.” has long passed. The People’s Republic of China realized that over two decades ago and built a force to reflect that. We have a lot of catching up to do. Expect St. Louis to be as valid a target as Guam.
While on the ground the defensive is on the ascendancy, in the aerospace domain, the offensive reigns supreme. If your defensive systems are too few and exquisite, you will run out. If they are too primitive—regardless of type—they will be blind, mute, and eliminated. Numbers are too few, magazine depth is too shallow, sensors of vulnerable to kinetic attack or spoofing. Today, there is no easy answer. The enemy is inbound, in number, and you will be hit. Whatever our inventory of defensive weapons, it isn’t enough. Whatever the scalability of our industry to produce them in 2025, it is insufficient.
Range, by both manned and unmanned systems, must be a primary factor in program design. If you have any inclination to project power, or eliminate your enemy’s long range power, you need significant numbers of long-range assets with enablers that will ensure air dominance, control of the electromagnetic spectrum, and will have the dino-juice to get you there and back.
Do not ask if there are sabotage teams and enemy special forces with freedom of movement deep in your homeland, assume it. Plan for it. As in the first bullet, St. Louis is as valid a target as Guam. Expect it.
There are more lessons that will reveal themselves in time.
Here’s our future. Plan for it.
Wow. I’m a military enthusiast. I know very little about tactics.
To assume we have enemy tactical teams in the US is smart. To not have a strategy to ‘resolve’ and respond would be silly.
Especially after watching military age men come across the border en masse during the Biden administration.
I’ll say it - whoever was actually running the Biden administration is guilty of being the most lawless administration in our nation’s history.
They absolutely worked to destroy our nation from within
Range! Range! Always should be a primary concern in a weapon system. We had a strike fighter path with long range sensors and extensive fuel fraction thirty years ago, that was just waiting for a buy request to start a program.
And yes, all “Confucius Institutes” and PRC student visas must be ended ASAP. There’s enough to assume there are goats hidden among the sheep, as well as information from the sheep.