Measuring & Modeling the Naval Presence Mission with Jerry Hendrix - on Midrats
must be present to win
You're heard people talk - and on occasion argue - about "presence" as a naval mission, but what exactly is it? What does that actually mean for our nation and what role does it have in promoting its national security requirements?
What does our nation need to do to properly resource it?
We're going to dive in deep on the topic with returning guest, Jerry Hendrix, using as a foundation a report he authored recently for the Sagamore Institute, Measuring & Modeling Naval Presence.
Dr. Henry J. “Jerry” Hendrix, PhD is a retired Navy Captain, having served 26 years on active duty following his commissioning through the Navy ROTC program at Purdue University. During his career Hendrix served in a variety of maritime patrol aviation squadrons as well as on supercarriers and light amphibious assault ships. His shore duty assignments were as a strategist on the staffs of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Secretary of the Navy, the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy and within the Office of Net Assessment. Through these tours Dr. Hendrix established a reputation for using history to illuminate current strategic challenges. Following his retirement from the Navy following a standout tour as the Director of the Navy History and Heritage Command, he has worked as a senior fellow the Center for a New American Security and as a vice president at a Washington, DC defense consultancy. Dr. Hendrix holds a bachelor’s degree from Purdue University in political science, a masters in national security affairs from the Naval Postgraduate School, a masters in history from Harvard University, and a PhD in war studies from Kings College, London.
You can get the podcast here or just listen below.
A few comments.
- We only ever had 9 Nuclear Cruisers /Frigates CGN/DLGN spread in 5 classes with no serial production. We switch the need for fuel with the need for a larger crew needing more food. The Coast Guard can supply stores for 60 days, let's work on that first with conventional fueled hulls. We complain about minimal manning, but Japan is now doing their frigates with a crew of 90 and Singapore has done it with their frigates for a long time. Clearly human resource management and retention needs work in the USN. So does ship design. Don't walk away from things which need to happen. We have allies, keep working with them to find and fast implement best practices.
- We need to stop burning the carriers up right now. We need to make sure they can be ready in the fall of 24 through early 25.
- Surging the ability to threaten adversary assets. So getting the ordnance on a target is the key. We should have our targeting network built to be resilient and in place with cheap presence assets on day 1. Let the fleet train and stay well prepared at home. We need JASSM/LRASM on P-8s along with MALD and JSMs. Be ready with rapid Dragon. If having Marines and Army on shore doesn't help as much as at sea assets, this is even more a case for an armed and likely manned version of the MUSV. 16 strike length cells on a 35 million dollar hull. Fast reload with a crane ship or at a container terminal.
Barney Rubel had a snippet: “presence means being there.” (Or something similar)