Midnight Hammer Quicklook

Making Punitive Expeditions Great Again

Ian’s graphic at the top of this post is a great way to pick up from yesterday’s Midrats Podcast on the superbly executed strike over the weekend on Iran’s nuclear facilities.

With time, there will be a lot more to learn from this strike, but here are my Top 7:

• No other nation can do this.

  • Not the Russians. Unquestionably not the Chinese. This was a 37 hour round trip bombing run to the other side of the planet, with no losses and no mechanical failures. They were supported by over a hundred aircraft for everything from refueling to suppression of enemy air defenses. They dropped weapons no other nation is even close to having. In a supporting strike, an SSGN launched 30 of its 154 TLAM.

• Exquisite capabilities are thin.

  • While we smile at a generally flawless execution, we should pause to realize that the strike package went east with 7 B-2s. Early word was that another group of bombers went west as a diversion, but it appears that they were all the same package. Of the 21 B-2 that were built, only 20 remain. The last one came off the production line a quarter century ago. How many fully mission capable and not in maintenance of some kind? Don’t know, but it isn’t 20. There is a very good chance that somewhere near half the combat ready B-2 we have were in the air.

• Time to start the design of a B-21B?

  • As we discussed on yesterday’s Midrats, the open source bomb load of a B-2 is 40,000 pounds. However, we know that each B-2 in the strike carried two GBU-57, each weighing 30,000 pounds, for a total of 60,000 pounds. So, update your webpages. There are ways with waivers and fuel loads at takeoff etc…but year. 40,000 my Aunt Fanny.

  • The B-21A in open source is said to have a bomb load of 20,000 pounds. That isn’t even enough for one GBU-57, much less two. Let’s assume whatever additional waivers/disinformation that got the B-2 to carry two GBU-57 would be made to let the B-21 carry one GBU-57. What we’ve learned this weekend is that for deep targets, you need more than one bunker buster. OK, fine. We have the B-21A, perhaps it is time, if not already, to have the design team put together a B-21B with an expanded bomb capacity. We’ve done this with aircraft for a century. Why stop now.

• Deception works both ways.

  • We think we had good intel. We think we hit the right targets in the right place. We think we know all the places that needed our attention. We think. History is thick with incomplete intel resulting in misplaced euphoria leading to disaster. We may not have accomplished what we intended. Either by our overlooking details or Iran being more clever than we give them credit for, there might be an unpleasant surprise. Nothing, especially at war, is perfect.

• All we have bought is time.

  • You can’t hide mid-1940s theory, math, and physics. If the Iranian government wants to restart their nuclear program, they can. What we have is more time and more opportunities for action or fate to prevent them from getting nuclear weapons. We have bought time for the Iranian people to rise up for their own freedom.

• There are no magic beans.

  • Look at the weapons and capabilities used in the attack on Iran. Flexible, multi-mission, and in number. Proven and robust. No company or person is going to make war easy, cheaper, or bloodless. Buy, train, and support accordingly.

• None of this could have happened without Israel—and the world owes them thanks.

  • That’s it. That is the cold truth.