NATO Has a New Alliance Maritime Strategy
...it's been 14 years...
NATO last month, to absolutely no fanfare, published a revision to the Alliance Maritime Strategy.
Don’t feel bad if you’re finding out about it first here—you’re not alone. You can search NATO’s website, but you can’t find it—at least I couldn’t. Head over to my friends at NATO’s Maritime Command in Northwood, nothing there either.
If it weren’t for the friendly hippies at Human Rights at Sea, we wouldn’t have the copy you can download here.
I’m not sure who is responsible for action in para 2, but Shipmate…it’s been a month. This is a solid, compact briefing document that we should be handing out like pamphlets at the church door on Sunday.
Someone needs a closed door counseling session over this. Bad enough that—as any NATO staff officer will tell you—the decision was made to publish this in the middle of summer. Absolutely nothing gets done in NATO from July 1 to September 15th, and again from December 15 through January 15th. Perhaps that is why, but come on…no excuses.
Enough of that, let’s move on.
This is a revision to a standing document, so there is some overlap. The previous Maritime Strategy, even more compact, was—and I am not kidding here—promulgated 11 MAR 2011, well over 14 years ago.
The world has changed a bit? Maybe. Anyway, I asked AI (specifically Grok) how much of the 2025 revision was copy-n-paste from 2011. I’m not being snarky, it is just that I used to do things like this for NATO, I know how this goes, and it’s OK.
A significant portion of the 2025 Alliance Maritime Strategy—approximately 30-40% based on a comparative analysis of structure, phrasing, and content—appears to be roughly lifted from the 2011 version, with minor modifications for modernization, rephrasing, or integration of contemporary elements like emerging disruptive technologies (EDTs), multi-domain operations, and updated policy references. This is most evident in the sections detailing the contributions to core tasks (deterrence and defence, crisis prevention and management, cooperative security), which closely mirror the 2011 strategy's articulation of roles (deterrence and collective defence, crisis management, cooperative security, maritime security). For example:
The "Cooperative Security" section in the 2025 document (paragraphs 21-23) is nearly verbatim from the 2011's "Cooperative Security: Outreach through Partnerships, Dialogue and Cooperation" (paragraphs 13-14), with small tweaks such as removing "prevent conflicts and" or changing "what nations conduct themselves and have the added value" to "the actions Allies conduct themselves, while adding the value."
The "Crisis Prevention and Management" section (paragraphs 19-20) heavily draws from the 2011's "Crisis Management" (paragraphs 11-12), including similar lists of operations (e.g., demonstrations of force, maritime interdiction, counter-terrorism, non-combatant evacuation) and descriptions of maritime force capabilities (e.g., "maintain credible, rapid response maritime forces able to operate in littoral environments often with degraded conditions" vs. "continuing to maintain modern, credible, rapid response joint forces able to operate in environments with degraded communications").
The "Deterrence and Defence" section (paragraphs 15-18) includes several lifted or closely adapted phrases from the 2011's "Deterrence and Collective Defence" (paragraphs 9-10), such as emphasizing superior naval, amphibious, and strike forces for rapid and decisive effects, control of sea lines/lanes, force entry, projecting striking power from the sea, and sea-based missile defence contributions.
The 2011's separate "Maritime Security" role (paragraph 15) seems integrated into the 2025's crisis and deterrence sections, with overlapping ideas like maritime interdiction, protection of freedom of navigation, countering terrorism/piracy, and safeguarding critical infrastructure/sea lines of communication.
The "Implementing the Alliance Maritime Strategy" section (paragraphs 24-30) echoes the 2011's "Implementing the maritime strategy through continued alliance transformation" (paragraphs 17-18), starting with nearly identical opening phrasing ("To meet the challenges set out above...") and stressing the NATO Defence Planning Process for transforming capabilities, though expanded with 2025-specific focuses like warfighting readiness and industrial capacity.
The "Conclusion" (paragraphs 31-33) shares conceptual parallels with the 2011's conclusion (paragraphs 19-20), including steering transformation via the Defence Planning Process and evolving capabilities, but is more concise and forward-looking without directly listing roles.
In contrast, the 2025 strategy's "Introduction" (paragraphs 1-5), "The Strategic Environment" (paragraphs 6-13), and "Vision" (paragraph 14) are substantially revised and show little direct lifting. These sections incorporate updated geopolitical realities (e.g., explicit threats from Russia, terrorism, China, authoritarian alignments, climate change as a threat multiplier) absent from the 2011 document's more general descriptions of global interdependence, economic vulnerabilities, and transnational crimes.Overall, the 2025 version updates the 2011 framework to align with NATO's 2022 Strategic Concept and current priorities, but retains core operational language and structure, suggesting a deliberate evolution rather than a complete rewrite.
AI is pretty good, but I have a few things I want to add to it.
As regulars know, I like word counts as they tell stories. So, let’s compare 2025 to 2011.
2025
Atlantic: 10
Russia: 9
Crisis: 8
Terrorism/ist: 7
Nuclear: 7
China: 3
Climate: 3
Humanitarian: 2
Mine: 1
Iran: 1
Korea: 1
Migration: 1
Arctic: 0
2011
Atlantic: 3
Russia: 0
Crisis: 11
Terrorism/ist: 3
Nuclear: 2
China: 0
Climate: 1
Humanitarian: 2
Mine: 2
Iran: 0
Korea: 0
Migration: 0
Arctic: 0
Pacific: 0
India/Indian Ocean: 0
Americas: 0
You can see right off the bat that 2025 is a much more serious document. Russia, China, Atlantic, and nuclear are all break outs. Sadly, "climate” also is a soft-breakout we’ll quote later for general mockery because …. WHERE IS ARCTIC!?!?!?! “High North” does get one mention, but that is about it.
Let’s get some pull-quotes from the 2025 revision. Read the 2011 if you’d like, but it’s not required.
From the introduction:
Strong and direct. Not bad for a NATO document and a firm departure from the 2011 edition.
Excellent description of sea power. As a matter of fact, I think everyone should use this as an elevator-speech benchmark, if not steal verbatim.
Not a fan of the “360-degree approach” that keeps popping up. NATO really does not have such a thing. Sure, it says it does, but does it, really? What about the areas to the west of the North American members of the alliance, into the Pacific? I don’t see that posture in the 270° direction from Brussels as we see in the 090° into the Eurasian landmass.
I remain firmly to the proposition that this 360-degree approach is simply a self-contradictory cope to distract from what is the clear purpose of NATO, to counter the Russian Federation’s threat to Central and Western Europe. Don’t get me wrong, I’d love to see a Standing NATO Maritime Group 3 created to roam the northern Pacific, but we don’t live in the Salamander-modified alliance, so we will simply have to accept that all other missions that are not directed contra-Russia are secondary missions and, at best, the Pacific is tertiary.
Again, for NATO this is solid. I bet more than a few of you are wondering where the mention is of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) who in the last 14 years have emerged as a malign influence on alliance security…but wait. She’ll show up.
Concise. To the point. Well done.
(NB: if you want to hear more about Russia, make sure and listen to the latest Midrats Podcast with Dmitry Gorenburg from last Sunday).
It is important to remember that when the 2011 document was written, the war in Afghanistan still had tens of thousands of non-USA NATO forces in place. In Europe, terrorism is much more common than in North America (for now). I’m glad this remains a top-tier concern in this document.
Well, look who makes an appearance.
Less strange than the “0” of Russia in the 2011 document, it is amazing how much the PRC threat has emerged in the international mind since then. Especially in Europe, in 2011, the China Doves, now almost an extinct species especially in North America, were still the driving force in areas controlled by The Smartest People in the Room™.
Welcome to the party, folks.
NATO is the sword and shield of The Enlightenment. We should look at it as such. There is a clash of civilizations going on. Acknowledge and embrace it. Imperfections and all, would you want the future defined by the ideals of Europe and North America, or by China or Muscovy with their allies?
It’s easy to forget that Europe’s neo-pagan Green parties still have the impact they do. With governmental bureaucracies riddled with them and their fellow travelers, this isn’t unexpected. It is also, with the mention of the “High North”, the closest we got to having the Arctic mentioned…we’ll call it a draw.
“By increasing maritime…mass…” translates to, “We all need larger navies.” For an alliance that has an ocean in its name, this should be a given, but when you look at the threadbare navies in the alliance, I guess we do need to push the point.
To finish things up, I want to pull paras 17 and 23, as they are something everyone should feel comfortable stealing and reusing. Solid staff work here.
There is a lot more there. It isn’t a long document, and really doesn’t have to be.
I’d just like to leave this pebble in everyone’s shoe to close. Look at what was left out of the 2011 document that is front and center in the 2025 revision. 14 years from now is 2039. It will be here sooner than you think. What challenge will be facing the alliance in 2039 that isn’t front and center in 2025?
I have an idea…look south.
I take any NATO document with a grain of salt having been in Naples and Bavaria - great duty stations if you can get them.
NATO was known as - and for good reason -as Not at The Office or Not After Two O'clock. Don't you dare contact anyone while they were on vacation.
The greatest threat to Europe is not Saracen fleets, but small boats filled with refugees looking for handouts and waiting to recreate the Third World upon the ruins of Western nations.
What's missing here that will be front and center in 14 years? Just spitballing, but schmaybe the takeover of at least one NATO government by a Muslim-majority party, with allll the downstream effects and implications inherent thereof, including the possible splintering and even breakup of the alliance itself? Just a wild-hare guess.