No, I can't Wait Until the Full NDAA is Out
...just good stuff to report, really...
One day, and that day may never come, there will be an easy search mechanism for the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). Until then, the best a humble citizen from the provinces can do is take a low pass, bite a nibble at the most attractive bits, and then head off to digest what you got.
Speeches, orders, and policy statements from the Executive Branch are important, but if you really want to drive change or correct error, you have to do it through the legislative branch.
Yes, this is not finished and work must be done in the Senate, but let’s take a moment to see what the House has put on the table.
I first got a bit too ambitious when I started digging in, and then pulled myself back to focus on just one part of the NDAA. As we like to focus as much as possible on maritime matters, I decided to scope down to the House Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee.
We’re going to do a “Five and Ten” report.
From their print, there are five items that brought a raised eyebrow.
(1) A firm, “hold your horses” on the battleship:
Sec. 129—Limitation On Construction of Battleship Pending Certification On Technology Readiness Levels
This section would require the Secretary of the Navy to certify that the systems planned for inclusion on the BBG(X) program are at a sufficiently mature technology readiness level before award of a construction contract for the first of class vessel.
The long pole in this tent will be the railgun. As you’ll see later, there is concern on the nuclear side of the house, but I’ve had some knowledgeable people tell me that really this isn’t a problem. Everything else, except for the hull form, already exists well enough for a Flight I.
(2) FF(X) seems to be heading in an approved Salamander direction:
Sec. 130—Strategy for Iterative Development and Flight Modifications for FF(X) Class Frigates
This section would require the Secretary of the Navy to develop a strategy for iterative flight development of the new FF(X) vessel class. The Secretary of the Navy would be required to provide a briefing on the development of the strategy to congressional defense committees.
(3) My punchline about “building Burke DDG until the crack of doom” seems to be policy now:
Sec. 122—Multiyear Procurement Authority for Arleigh Burke Class Destroyers
This section would provide multi-year procurement authority for up to fifteen Arleigh Burke class destroyers.
(4) That is because, DDG(X) is being written out of law:
Sec. 216—Modification to Test Program for Engineering Plant of Certain Vessels
This section would apply previous requirements for DDG(X) land based testing and reserve power to subsequent classes of large surface combatants.
No, I’m not exaggerating. From the text:
(3) in subsection (b), by striking ‘‘Senior Technical Authority for the DDG(X) destroyer class of vessels’’ and inserting ‘‘Senior Technical Authority for the class of vessels involved (as designated pursuant to section 8669b of title 10, United States Code)’’;
(4) in subsection (d), by striking ‘‘for the DDG(X) destroyer class of vessels’’ and inserting ‘‘for the class of vessels involved’’;
(5) in subsection (e), by striking ‘‘by not later than the delivery date of the lead ship in the DDG(X) destroyer class of vessels’’ and inserting ‘‘for a class of vessels by not later than the delivery date of the lead ship in that class of vessels’’;
…and so on. Sigh. I guess my “Three Flights” Plan-B is DOA.
(5) As Senator Sheehy (R-MT) said,
Looks like the House will take one from off yonder there if we build two here.
(b) REQUIREMENT FOR PURCHASE OF TWO NEW UNITED STATES-CONSTRUCTED VESSELS FOR EACH FOREIGN-CONSTRUCTED USED VESSEL PURCHASED IN EXCESS OF 12.—Subparagraph (C) of paragraph (3) of subsection (f) of such section is amended to read as follows:
‘‘(C) For each foreign-constructed vessel purchased by the Secretary under the authority of this paragraph in excess of 12, the Secretary shall contract for the purchase of two new vessels each of which is to be constructed in a shipyard located in the United States.’’.
For the ten items that put a grin on my face, let’s look at the amendments that have passed.
I like the Amendment Tracker, BTW. Nice format.
BZ to Rep. Scott (R-GA), Rep. Kiggans (R-VA), and Rep. Courtney (D-CT) for making the Salamander Top-10 from the Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee En Bloc:
There are some serious items here, and BZ to the subcommittee for what they did not approve. Look at some of the amendments that failed, designed to do little more than give people a chance to grandstand on their pet issues unrelated to seapower.
Now, let’s see what makes it across the finish line.







Editor’s Note: I just realized that I set this up such that only paid subscribers could comment. That was not my intention and will not be the standard going forward. I will correct this later today to open in up for all. Sorry for any frustration this oversight of mine may have caused.
1) I am in full agreement on the “hold your horses” on the battleship”. I do think a common nuclear powered HM&E should be developed for multiple classes of vessels including amphibious, and logistical support. See Also the last Amendment comment.
2) Once U.S. industry begins real development of the Rail Gun things will begin to happen particularly now that we have multiple new players in the mix. They will help keep the costs down via competition, which the MIC has colluded against.
3) For not only the FF(X) development (combat system & HM&E) there should be Land Based Test Sites. This developmental effort should include the nuke plant for item #2.
4) The only RELIABLE AND WORKING Surface Combatant in the fleet should persist . . . until the replacement is out, proven, and produced in numbers by more than one shipyard. The ability to continue that construction as the fleet grows is in question for we have not the shipyards/talent pool at present.
5) It is not just Shipyards, it is the technical population regardless of talent pool to man them. At present that talent pool does not exist. You can have all the shipyards you want, and it means nothing if there is no one to employ in them. Construction of Surface Combatants overseas may be required until this situation changes, and that [creation of the talent pool] is not going to happen quickly.
6) Concerning the ‘build one in the U.S. for every 12 overseas’ is ok . . . IF that shipyard can be determined, contracts awarded, and personnel available to perform the construction. At present that is a pipedream!
7) Concerning Amendments:
a. (5719) I actually like the idea of increased torpedo construction particularly considering the U.S. Navy's Mk58 Compact Rapid Attack Weapon (CRAW), and additional development is required for an extended range ASROC version, and aviation version. I would like to see ANDURIL in that development. It will not cost an arm & leg, and be delivered quickly.
b. (5720) Containerized ‘drop on’ Combat Management Systems (Aegis in a Box) . . . SHOULD BE developed IMHO! Most all the elements already exist.
c. (5783) IMHO the U.S. Navy should have NEVER divested itself of amphibious mono-hull seaplanes. The U.S. Navy no longer has an amphibious helo, and a P-8A Poseidon can find things quickly/efficiently, but it will NEVER land on the water.
d. (5787) Given the massive Chinese influence on Guadalcanal, and across the Solomon Islands I am in agreement with the sentiment of this item, and it should be an Aviation-Centric LHA-6 USS American Class “LIGHTNING CARRIER”.
e. (5788) A CVN-78 Class vessel should be named MIDWAY.
f. (5790) I agree with this amendment.
g. (5819) The result of this study will equal that of the same study for resuming F-22 assembly line, and the elevated cost of same will be much less than a new construction construct as has been demonstrated by the F-47. Perhaps it is time to just scale the Blended Wing Body (BWB) aircraft from C-130 to C-5 sizes, and move out. Jet Zero is working on the prototype.
h. (6311) IMHO is just meddling by the existing MIC. They are NOT producing even with $Billions in advanced/elevated investments, and they do not want to start over with Advanced Modular Reactors (AMRs) and Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) which will be easier to operate, maintain, repair, and cost less to boot. IMHO we SHOULD do this!
Just my 2¢.
TORCH OUT