PLAN War College v. Our Naval War College
serious people study serious things
What does the world’s largest navy (and rapidly increasing the gap in front of the world’s #2 navy) want its senior field grade officers and Flag Officers to learn in their war college?
Time is finite. Focus and emphasis will tell you what the service itself sees as important.
In the Autumn edition of the Naval War College Review, WAR WITHOUT SURPRISES: Education for Command in the People’s Liberation Army Navy by Ryan D. Martinson take a look at what the People’s Liberation Army Navy wants its leaders to focus on in its war colleges.
This pull-quote really got my attention. It begs the question: Who is more aligned with the United States Naval War College’s successful program of the 1920s and 1930s: the United States Navy (USN) or the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) of China?
… the USN officers who led the campaign to defeat Japan in the Pacific War—Chester W. Nimitz, William Halsey Jr., Raymond A. Spruance, Richmond K. Turner, and others—leaned heavily on knowledge and experience gained while students at the U.S. Naval War College. The education they received in Newport in the 1920s and 1930s prepared them for leadership by forcing them to grapple with the scenarios, situations, and challenges they later faced in a war with Japan. Repeated simulation of that conflict through strategic- and tactical level war games was a core component of their educational experience.6 In the PLAN, midcareer officers on the path to senior command are required to complete two separate certificate courses at the Naval Command College (海军指挥学院) in Nanjing. These programs respectively prepare officers to command forces at two different levels of warfare: the high-tactical level (i.e., combined arms) and the campaign level (i.e., operational). In the event of a conflict, the success of China’s maritime operations will depend heavily on its naval officers’ leadership acumen. Thus, the type and quality of instruction they received at the Naval Command College will have a direct bearing on China’s wartime performance.
The PLAN has an Intermediate Course and the Senior Course. For the Intermediate Course:
…students enrolled in the intermediate course focus their studies on the theory and practice of combined-arms naval warfare—that is, the employment of forces from two or more service arms (surface, submarine, air, marines, and coastal defense) to achieve operational objectives on or from the sea. The curriculum is intended to prepare them to serve in leadership positions at the high tactical level, such as commanding an operation to degrade or destroy an enemy aircraft carrier strike group.25 Since 2012, the college has required intermediate students to study topics in military and national strategy, in recognition that naval officers—perhaps more so than the officers of any other service—must be prepared to make tactical decisions that could have major strategic consequences. To that end, students take courses such as Strategic Guidance for Maritime Military Operations, taught by Professor Huang Chunyu.26 While in Nanjing, students are almost certainly required to demonstrate proficiency in Chinese Communist Party dogma, especially as reflected in the speeches and writings of party “core” and CMC chairman Xi Jinping.27
In the Senior Course:
…the senior course lasts five months.41 While in Nanjing, the officers study “the theory of joint operational command” (联合作战指挥理论), “familiarize themselves with the employment of forces from other services and service arms” (熟悉军兵种运用), “research joint campaigns and operational methods” (研究联合战役战法), and study historical naval campaigns.42 Students likely master current PLA campaign doctrine and strategic guidelines as promulgated by the CMC, in preparation for their future roles.43 Instructors assign senior students research projects relevant to their warfare foci, such as best approaches to prevailing in a contest over a disputed island.44 Like students in the intermediate course, senior students sometimes are sent out to the fleet to embed in command posts, both Red and Blue, during opposition-force exercises. Given the new emphasis on jointness, students have the option of visiting other PME institutions to learn how different services operate.45 As in the intermediate course, simulation is a major part of the curriculum, with a focus on the operational or campaign level of war.
The last paragraph is perhaps too polite, but you can read between the lines.
Nevertheless, the PLAN’s approach to midcareer officer education should prompt some reflection within U.S. PME institutions—above all, within the U.S. Naval War College. Do existing curricula strike the right balance between strategy and policy studies and the practice of modern naval warfare? Do all graduates depart the College with a solid understanding of the capabilities, doctrines, and organization of the country’s most dangerous potential adversary? How much educational war gaming is needed to give naval officers ample opportunity to apply the knowledge they gain in the classroom? Despite the tendency of USN leaders to glorify the achievements of the War College in the 1920s and 1930s, it is the PLAN—not the U.S. Navy—whose midcareer officer education more closely resembles the practices of that era. Has the College simply evolved a better approach, or might there be elements from the past worth resurrecting?
Well, what is the U.S. Naval War College up to in this same arena?
From the same issue, let’s see what Rear Admiral Darryl Walker, USN, the President of the U.S. Naval War College outlines, (emphasis is mine):
The core teachings at the College provide a framework for military and civilian leaders to understand strategy and operations, think critically, deal with uncertainty and surprise, be proficient in joint matters, and fully comprehend the security environment and all elements of national power. This understanding is achieved through engagement with five core courses: one course each taught by the Joint Military Operations (JMO), National Security Affairs (NSA), and Strat[1]egy and Policy (S&P) Departments, and the Leadership in the Profession of Arms (LPA) and Perspectives on Modern War (PMW) courses. A little more granularity may be helpful:
The JMO curriculum focuses on joint war fighting at the theater-strategic and operational levels of war. This prepares future military and civilian leaders for high-level policy, command, and staff positions requiring joint planning expertise and joint war-fighting skills.
The NSDM curriculum is designed to engage senior-rank students in the cur[1]rent and future complexities of a rapidly evolving national- and international[1]security environment. The course offers a broad interdisciplinary curriculum in contemporary security studies that encompasses a diverse spectrum of global and regional issues and perspectives, but with emphasis on U.S. decision-making challenges and processes at the national strategic level.
The S&P curriculum focuses on teaching students how to think strategi[1]cally while preparing them for positions of strategic leadership. The course is designed to sharpen each student’s ability to assess how alternative strategic courses of action can be used to achieve broad, national-level objectives.
The LPA curriculum is built on the notion of helping leaders engender trust and confidence up and down the chain of command and with the American people they serve. The degree of trust and confidence that ultimately exists rests on a combination of leaders’ competence and character.
The PMW curriculum is designed to challenge students to synthesize lessons from the other core courses, senior-level guest speakers, symposia, course read[1]ing material, and seminar discussions, and to apply them to current events and the most important security challenges of today.”
He goes on to outline a “Return on Investment” (ROI) explanation of what NWC does that, as someone who does this for a living, neither really describes what ROI is, nor whether NWC is effective. I won’t comment further, but will let you read it yourself.
However, let’s dive back into what I emphasized above,
This understanding is achieved through engagement with five core courses…
Two out of five(40%) are:
What is LPA? (emphasis is mine):
The LPA course provides students with the opportunity to focus on themselves as leaders, reflect on past performance, examine personal strengths and weaknesses, develop new competencies and strengthen their personal character to enhance their ability to lead in a complex and dynamic environment.
Primary Objective
The primary objective of the course is to provide a developmental experience through a self-learning journey that combines educational rigor and professional relevance. Focus will be on internal growth in order to be more effective leaders in future roles. The intended outcome of this course is to enhance the ability to self-assess, apply critical thinking, and the strength of character needed by leaders in the profession of arms.
I’m sorry, but if you have reached the point in your career that you are at THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, then you do not need what sounds like something between a therapy session, a New Age self-discovery course, and an Ayahuasca retreat in Latin America somewhere.
What about PMW? (emphasis is mine):
Unlike other Naval War College core courses, Perspectives on Modern War runs throughout the academic year. Students remain with their cohort for all their time at the Naval War College. The course objectives are to:
Integrate core academic concepts across all three trimesters.
Connect the three major symposia to core academic content.
Evaluate senior speaker content and relate it to the overall NWC education.
Address current topics without the need to retool other core content.
Improve student experience with year-long learning communities.
The course uses a seminar-based approach, with students participating in nine seminars throughout the academic year. Additionally, the course incorporates annual symposia and high-level guest lectures, enhancing other core academic material with practical insights from leading experts. Students will attend three major symposia: The Future Warfare Symposium in the fall, The Women, Peace, and Security Symposium in the winter, and The Current Strategy Forum in the spring. High-level lectures from visiting officials and policymakers provide additional perspectives.
This mostly seems solid, though it would be helpful to see the full list of speakers, lectures, etc. It is ripe for a fresh set of eyes. As a great thinker pointed out to me, the word “Halsey” is not mentioned once
It also seems to be a way to justify the expense of one of the least serious exercises at NWC, The Women, Peace, and Security Symposium. We’ve covered that extensively the last few years, click here if it is new to you.
That being said, perhaps we are just benchmarking PLAN best practices?
Remember this from the first pull-quote?
While in Nanjing, students are almost certainly required to demonstrate proficiency in Chinese Communist Party dogma, especially as reflected in the speeches and writings of party “core” and CMC chairman Xi Jinping.
There is plenty of sociopolitical politics woven into NWC’s curricula, and has been for years. It has grown under present leadership unabated, turning some things into a butched-up reflection of Oberlin College.
Today, the yet-to-be-confirmed SECNAV Phelan is having his confirmation hearing. There is a lot to do.
Several years ago as Director of the Naval Academy Museum, I gave a tour to a visiting PLAN flag officer. By serendipity I stopped at the screen in the Spanish-American War section and hit the Battle of Manila Bay just to show how we use it for visitors. At the bottom of the screen that had a graphic showing the course of the fleet was a text box explaining what was unfolding.
He started talking non-stop. Then his translator spoke. I looked at the screen and found that the translator was discussing points in the battle that were about five seconds ahead of the screen's narration which meant the flag was 10 seconds ahead of it. He went into great detail on distances, elevations and actions.
I stopped it and said, through his translator, "the admiral understands the Battle of Manila Bay." Through his translator he said proudly, "yes, I studied it extensively at my war college."
I started using that story at the start of each semester teaching naval history and asked my students if they were willing to learn their own history that their peer competitor knew.
Too much navel gazing and too little naval history.
But, even with naval history, and a good theoretical knowledge, it has a lot more value if it is repeatedly applied through war gaming scenarios. Both tactical and strategic. Decisions need to be made quickly, and in gaming mistakes will be made and scenarios may need to be repeated multiple times to find the best (or least worst) courses of action. Rosy assumptions and sacred cows need to be challenged with blunt facts from the real world such as the relative size, readiness and capabilities of BOTH sides, and any potential allies. Temper the reliance on naval history with possible (but unprecedented) asymmetrical actions- Hostile sleeper cells, EMP effects, disrupted comms, cyber warfare spoofing, plausible deniability for certain events. The next war is unlikely to follow the gentlemanly diplomatic traditions or respect traditional safe spaces or concern for collateral damage- at least by the other guys.
And, in a Pacific scenario, logistics may be the most important consideration of all, absent a massive first strike wiping out all our bases and forces on day one. Not just the "last 1,000 miles"of delivering beans, bullets and fuel, but the sustainability of any such effort from the extraction/growth, processing and distribution aspects, most of which is outside military control.
Lots of vital moving parts and players, both within the naval arena and more so without. I fear we are whistling past the graveyard when contemplating hostilities in the Pacific, if we even deign to open that Pandora's box.
Navel gazing is easier, and has been quite fashionable for at least 4 years, perhaps several decades.
It is past time to get serious again.