Squinting at the Iran Decision Brief

back to centerline

To start off with—usual caveats apply. Yes, this is Axios, but Barak Ravid is a serious reporter that I have no evidence that he has a history of making stuff up.

I also know that the Trump administration is pretty good at message control and minimizing leaks…especially on national security issues.

I also know that is DC, which is leaky for both official and unofficial reasons. As such, I’ll put forward an opening bet that this is 51% close to right. If I had to place the odds: 10% this is fake news; 20% chance this is an unofficial leak; 70% it is an official leak. Ambient noise and transmission loss of about 30%…so we’re seeing something—good chance—but not quite what happened…but good enough I think to comment on.

As such, let’s look at what looks like a Cliff’s Notes version of a decision brief as reported by Ravid in Sunday: Top U.S. military commander in Middle East advised halting Hormuz bombing.

The top U.S. military commander in the Middle East, Adm. Brad Cooper, recommended stopping the bombing campaign around the Strait of Hormuz because it has reached the limit of its effectiveness, according to two sources with knowledge of his position.

Admiral Cooper looks to be doing exactly what he is supposed to do from an Operational Planning perspective. He received Higher Direction and Guidance (D&G) and Commander’s Intent (CI) in what looks like a Sequel Plan to whatever started months ago, and worked out a series of Courses of Action (COA) to meet the D&G/CI. You want to give the Principal options, but you also want to make sure you give a clear recommendation of which COA he should pursue.

Sometimes, the Principal will take your recommendation as is. Perhaps with a few minor changes, or direction to—if you’re like me and bring three COA to the briefing—instead go with one of the not-recommended COA, or something between the two. If you’ve done a really bad job, or were not privy to information you should have been known, you’ll be told to go in a completely different direction.

All that is normal and expected. Each COA has its advantages and disadvantages, strengths and weaknesses—more risk in one area, less in others. Some have certain assumptions, others do not. It is an art, not a science.

Earlier in the week, Admiral Cooper gave his recommendation on the way forward to the Pentagon, the joint chiefs and the White House, the sources said.

• He stressed that the two weeks of strikes in the Strait of Hormuz area had significantly degraded Iran’s ability to attack ships.

• Cooper noted that the designated bombing targets had been mostly exhausted.

…

• He stressed that the two weeks of strikes in the Strait of Hormuz area had significantly degraded Iran’s ability to attack ships.

• Cooper noted that the designated bombing targets had been mostly exhausted.

This looks to be part of Cooper’s Commander’s Estimate of the Situation that informs his recommendations. As this is an ongoing operation, this can and should change as facts change on the ground.

• The CENTCOM commander said a possible next step would be to resume major combat operations to finish the 20% of targets the U.S. military designated but didn’t strike during Operation Epic Fury.

• Absent a decision to return to major combat operations, he stressed there was no point in continuing the bombing campaign of the previous two weeks, the sources said.

I’ve seen that “20%” number in a few places and sounds about right. I would hazard a guess that that 20% is nationwide, not limited to the Strait of Hormuz. As such, that other 20% is most likely your 3rd and 4th tier targets not worth taking the risk of losing an aircraft and crew behind enemy lines. We got good/lucky once, no need to try our luck again.

At this point, we just need to let the J2 house cook. Find those military targets that threaten the Strait of Hormuz, take care of them as needed, but otherwise husband resources.

As I’ve made myself clear over the last few months, mostly on the UNCLAS Read Board Podcast, I was supportive of a more limited punitive expedition and cautioned against expanding the initial mission set. It appears we are returning to centerline.

If Ravid’s reporting is correct, then perhaps we are resetting to a more pragmatic and realistic stance towards Iran.

Good.