I've written 2-3 negative comments in 10+ years and they were likely about the LCS program. How is it possible that NAVSEA could design this ship for $8.5B when they can't design a DDX, LCS, FFG, etc. that provides value to the Navy at a reasonable cost.
And a new deputy. The DC cronies are none too happy about SECNAV Phelan last week cancelling the lucrative real estate swap of 15 acres of the DC Navy Yard for a M Street location to house a half billion dollar construction of a new National Museum of the United States Navy. Much hate to go around.
I'd like us to switch over to the 127/64 Italian and a ship that is a double ender, but we need a new VLS structure. I like the 2 big cells in the place of 1 Mk 41 8 cell where it can fit 8 cells larger than the current Mk 41 via quad pack.
We have a supply and training chain that’s well established for the Mk 45 and the automated handling room has been proven. Why go with the different design?
Rate of fire, additional feeds. And I really only care about it if we get real about HVP and guided rounds. I have really little to no interest in it for NGFS.
Hard not to like the Italian 127/64 and 76/62. I'd like a 76 superfiring each 127mm as the next layer in on air defense. HELIOS and SeaRAM in each broadside.
I'm not sure those are reasons to introduce that kind of change at this point. It's going to require a new training pipeline, and support. On the training side, there would need to be a separate NEC for the 5" techs working on the Italian design. Currently, there are two 5" NECs (V62B and V63B), with a shorter conversion course to learn the 5"/62 from the older system. Could it be a conversion course, or is it different enough to require the full course for all personnel requiring it?
Support from both contractors and the parts perspective is the other problem. Every part NIN is a cost to have and carry aboard. What happens when the mount goes down, and there is no way to cannibalize another or cross-deck it from an in area asset? Adding a new weapon system that does not offer that much of an improvement seems like making more of a Tiffany Fleet of exquisite, but fragile warships.
Thinking about the need for more ammo ... that type of cell would perhaps allow a smaller ASCM/land attack CM to be packed 3 x 6. Maybe pack 19 in a VPM or SSGN tube. Not everything rates a 1000 lb warhead. 2-3 VLS, 16 of these big cells each.
When the balloon goes up, we want the Chinese fleet, especially amphibious ships and transports, to be more worried about damage control, limping back to port, and CSAR than landing troops on a beach.
Land-based long-range missiles on island chains (Army/USMC) could help mitigate risk. Industry ship-building capacity is sorely lacking. The US Navy will need to balance the cost/schedule of replacing old ships while maintaining the readiness of existing ships (logistics and sailors).
Ed, Army I agree 100%. The Marine Corps absolutely not. The Corps’s strength is its ability to provide a task organized combined arms Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) anywhere and anytime. Now if you’re talking about AUGMENTING a MAGTF with a missile capability such as HIMARS with PrSM then I might agree with you depending on operational concept employment.
The current Commandant of the Corps, Gen. Smith and his predecessor, Gen. Berger, have stripped the Corps of its ability to provide the nation with a credible 911 force in readiness by stripping it of its ability to project combat power worldwide.
If you’re interested in learning more on this subject I suggest you take a look on Substack for the Compass Points discussion blog (is that even a word anymore?)
The weapons system doesn’t so much matter to me as the Corps’s operational employment strategy.
Under the Force Design concept currently envisioned by the Corps would be to place small (Co - (reinforced)) on small islands within China’s First Island Chain. These units would be designated and designed to be sensor nodes in a “kill chain”. The problem with that is twofold.
First is the Table of Organization (TO) and the Table of Equipment (TE). The current TO is top heavy in Master Sgts. and Master GySgts. These highly competent and rare SNCOs (20+ yrs. TIS) are being misused and the pipeline is long to replace them. The TE is naked of supporting arms. The heaviest organic weapons system in a Marine infantry company is a 60mm mortar and at best would be reinforced with a few 81mm mortars. No tubed artillery, no naval gunfire, and no rotary or fixed wing close air support. The primary weapons system is currently the NSM, a short range (< 110 NM), subsonic missile.
The second and even bigger problem is the inability for these units to be logistically supported. The Navy is not going to send the few and precious resupply ships into the Chinese WEZ. Bottom line is these units will “die on the vine” like the Japanese units during WW II.
Note re low observable, as I understand it there’s a thing with wake radar returns vs long range radars that would be a concern for conventional hull forms being completely undetectable, especially from above (i.e. orbit - does PLAN have any radar sats?), but stealth to the freqs used for seeker head final targeting only makes sense.
If nuclear. I hope they don’t make the mistakes of the 1970’s when they built nuclear surface ships faster than they could increase the pipeline of nuclear-trained officers and enlisted. (I’m not advocating for slower construction, rather for anticipatory staffing.)
Improvements in design helps. Commonality of systems as well. The Ford class requires fewer nucs per MW that the Nimitz class. I am assuming it is the same with the Columbias. If not, it should be.
"The new fleet would comprise a number of large warships outfitted with more powerful long-range missiles, along with smaller ships such as corvettes, the people said." - Sounds like Zumwalt High-Low
The idea is the corvettes are out there day to day managing unmanned ships holding the deterrent line like South China Sea or GIUK gap. Then the big surface combatants come out with the carriers. It really plays into their area of influence, secure the Americas strategy which seems to be at play.
At the rate we're going, the Navy is going to have one huge CVN/BB/SSN about the size of a Death Star captained by the CNO, with flags as department heads.
Two thumbs up, CDR Sal! I do love it. My only hesitation would be if we could get the same bang for the buck out of the two Virginia class subs we could build for each BB at $8B cost (assuming we could increase production, which is not a given at all)? Water is the stealth and armor and they already have the design in production.
Utah, the last Blk IV and I think next ship to be delivered went for 3.5B in 2014. So a new order this year would be 4.8B is shipbuilding inflation met overall inflation which would be optimistic. Not sure why that matters if we are comparing a CPS ship to a CPS sub which would be Blk Vs with VPM.
Really like the heavy hitter part. Really don't like the first cut timeline or costing. One will slide to the right, and the cost will go hyperbolic. Also, it's one big beautiful target. Is "armor" a thing anymore? Asking the ship architects out there. Is integrated air defense and SAMs / CIGS the only reasonable approach? OBTW, how's our dance card look for this evening in the Pacific?
I do not believe we'll see armor in way Jackie Fisher understood it. Some things like a citadel will probably survive. But otherwise specific design philosophies influenced by new weapon technologies and newer types of "armor" technologies will undoubtedly shape the final design.
Hopefully there was a payoff in knowledge from pumping the America full of ordnance twenty years ago.
Open source notes added layered Kevlar “armor” around spaces on the Ford class as part of their survivability features.
Armor which could take hits and let a BB stay in the fight would probably be pretty technically advanced spaced and layered stuff these days, especially vs. ballistic-velocity warheads, and strategically located rather than in “armored belts.” But any armor would definitely need to be designed in from scratch rather than some sketchy weight-and-balance-destroying backfit stuff, which leads one to wonder about the current state of materials research on suitably maritime armor.
There may not be a knowledge base let alone a current state of materials research for the level of protection that will be needed. It maybe a start from scratch proposition. We'll have to see.
Are these notional heavily armored ships reloadable at sea? Is it a typical VLS system of one and done?
What about a converted civilian hull design, with a LOT of missiles, and not much armor? Essentially a disposable ship that stays back, can fire their missiles, with sufficient protection and systems for the crew to get away?
Oh, and BTW: Where are these missiles coming from?
NAVSEA would f it up, but I always figured we could do a multi-purpose cargo hull. Variant 1: Liberty Ship 2000, relatively shallow interior, most cargo in on deck containers, 2 cranes, 2 Goalkeeper for self-defense. Variant 2: Powered Missile Barge. Remove the cranes, 64-128 Mk.41 Strike length cells, 2 Goalkeeper. Variant 3: ASW Helicopter Carrier. 4 SH-60, Towed Array, 2 trainable torpedo launchers, 2 Goalkeeper. Finding missiles for 2 might be problematic.
But what about a slightly modified containership, with missiles launched from the containers - hoist them (the modified part), launch, toss the empty can over the side, hoist another, rinse, repeat...
Or use a container feeder to load small, fast, LO ships further back. OUSV-3 Vanguard moving back and forth 25 knots loaded, 38 unloaded bringing up 16 fresh rounds. 50 million a ship, the basket with the most eggs stays away from the action.
Yeah, I'm not sure why they are focused on multi thousand mile missiles that cost millions of dollars, put on the ship that costs the most per ton aside from a submarine. The strike missiles should be on the adjunct, cheap, fast, unmanned ship. The large combatant will still be large even if its job is to be the AAW ship with great sensors and an energy dense, dense, close in defense architecture.
You're putting the cart before the horse. Before taking on the challenge of reloading VLS at sea, we have to build up the industrial capacity to have something to reload with.
I take your point, but it's a problem that requires parallel development. We need more capacity to build missiles now! and a method to reload them.
In a Pacific war, there may not be any bases more forward than Bremerton and San Diego. It doesn't require a tactician to figure out how to block Pearl Harbor.
Cruisers as they evolved at the end of the 1800s were built in a range of displacement, armament, and gun caliber, generally grouped as first, second, and third class. The USN began using a letter - hull number designation system in 1895. By WWI this system had become somewhat ad-hoc so in 1920 the second CNO, Adm Coontz, established the current sequence of lettering.
The armored cruisers which had been designated "ACR" were redesignated "CA" in the system. After the ratification of the naval arms limitation treaties in the 1920s, CA was used for the so-called "treaty cruisers" built to the maximum allowed 10,000 ton displacement and 8" main gun. These came to be referred to as "heavy cruisers".
After WWII as ship-launched anti-air missile technology was developed, two Baltimore class Heavy Cruisers (CA) were given Terrier missile systems, and redesignated CAG. In the post-war period CA/CL distinction became unimportant so CG was subsequently used for missile cruisers.
Why are we keeping the second gun on the Zumwalts anyway? Should be either more CPS cells or Mk41s there is we are not going to buy the ammo for those guns. Waste of space and tonnage unless there is a replacement in the works that just isn’t in public yet. The Zumwalts with that space filled with more missile cells would really fill some of the gaps.
That is what I am talking about, a heavy hitter with armor.
I am really looking for a buoyancy / stability. Insofar as armor helps that, great.
Good Idea!
$8.5B. The last CG(X) was projected at $8B about 20 years ago. More likely $15B minimum. Don't see this happening.
"Always the negative waves!"
I've written 2-3 negative comments in 10+ years and they were likely about the LCS program. How is it possible that NAVSEA could design this ship for $8.5B when they can't design a DDX, LCS, FFG, etc. that provides value to the Navy at a reasonable cost.
There is a new sheriff in DC so that gives us a little hope.
Makes Jim Traficant look like an angel.
Just as well. The LA Angels did not have a good year.
And a new deputy. The DC cronies are none too happy about SECNAV Phelan last week cancelling the lucrative real estate swap of 15 acres of the DC Navy Yard for a M Street location to house a half billion dollar construction of a new National Museum of the United States Navy. Much hate to go around.
Correct, the negatively you hear from many here is because we are utterly baffled by this...
Excellent Oddball quote! Hey, Moriarty, why don't you say something righteous and hopeful for a change? It's a big ship! It's a mother beautiful ship!
Well, NavSea has the hopium and copium supplies locked up
We're borrowing $2T per year. We should borrow $2.1T and build 5 per year.
At this point we should be buying tangible objects; nuclear power plants, aircraft and cruisers
Bingo, It will be north of SSBN which may actually cost more than a CVN. IF they bother to tell us what things cost by then.
I'd lean towards multiple Mk.54s for NGFS, as well as plenty of Mk. 41s for TLAM and AD missiles, but this'll work.
I'd like us to switch over to the 127/64 Italian and a ship that is a double ender, but we need a new VLS structure. I like the 2 big cells in the place of 1 Mk 41 8 cell where it can fit 8 cells larger than the current Mk 41 via quad pack.
We have a supply and training chain that’s well established for the Mk 45 and the automated handling room has been proven. Why go with the different design?
Rate of fire, additional feeds. And I really only care about it if we get real about HVP and guided rounds. I have really little to no interest in it for NGFS.
Hard not to like the Italian 127/64 and 76/62. I'd like a 76 superfiring each 127mm as the next layer in on air defense. HELIOS and SeaRAM in each broadside.
The postwar ships like Northampton with the all 5 inch and 76mm gun scheme.
I'm not sure those are reasons to introduce that kind of change at this point. It's going to require a new training pipeline, and support. On the training side, there would need to be a separate NEC for the 5" techs working on the Italian design. Currently, there are two 5" NECs (V62B and V63B), with a shorter conversion course to learn the 5"/62 from the older system. Could it be a conversion course, or is it different enough to require the full course for all personnel requiring it?
Support from both contractors and the parts perspective is the other problem. Every part NIN is a cost to have and carry aboard. What happens when the mount goes down, and there is no way to cannibalize another or cross-deck it from an in area asset? Adding a new weapon system that does not offer that much of an improvement seems like making more of a Tiffany Fleet of exquisite, but fragile warships.
Thinking about the need for more ammo ... that type of cell would perhaps allow a smaller ASCM/land attack CM to be packed 3 x 6. Maybe pack 19 in a VPM or SSGN tube. Not everything rates a 1000 lb warhead. 2-3 VLS, 16 of these big cells each.
When the balloon goes up, we want the Chinese fleet, especially amphibious ships and transports, to be more worried about damage control, limping back to port, and CSAR than landing troops on a beach.
Land-based long-range missiles on island chains (Army/USMC) could help mitigate risk. Industry ship-building capacity is sorely lacking. The US Navy will need to balance the cost/schedule of replacing old ships while maintaining the readiness of existing ships (logistics and sailors).
Ed, Army I agree 100%. The Marine Corps absolutely not. The Corps’s strength is its ability to provide a task organized combined arms Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) anywhere and anytime. Now if you’re talking about AUGMENTING a MAGTF with a missile capability such as HIMARS with PrSM then I might agree with you depending on operational concept employment.
The current Commandant of the Corps, Gen. Smith and his predecessor, Gen. Berger, have stripped the Corps of its ability to provide the nation with a credible 911 force in readiness by stripping it of its ability to project combat power worldwide.
If you’re interested in learning more on this subject I suggest you take a look on Substack for the Compass Points discussion blog (is that even a word anymore?)
Coast Watcher 2030
I think Rogue Fires with the ability to launch PRSM seals the deal.
The weapons system doesn’t so much matter to me as the Corps’s operational employment strategy.
Under the Force Design concept currently envisioned by the Corps would be to place small (Co - (reinforced)) on small islands within China’s First Island Chain. These units would be designated and designed to be sensor nodes in a “kill chain”. The problem with that is twofold.
First is the Table of Organization (TO) and the Table of Equipment (TE). The current TO is top heavy in Master Sgts. and Master GySgts. These highly competent and rare SNCOs (20+ yrs. TIS) are being misused and the pipeline is long to replace them. The TE is naked of supporting arms. The heaviest organic weapons system in a Marine infantry company is a 60mm mortar and at best would be reinforced with a few 81mm mortars. No tubed artillery, no naval gunfire, and no rotary or fixed wing close air support. The primary weapons system is currently the NSM, a short range (< 110 NM), subsonic missile.
The second and even bigger problem is the inability for these units to be logistically supported. The Navy is not going to send the few and precious resupply ships into the Chinese WEZ. Bottom line is these units will “die on the vine” like the Japanese units during WW II.
Nothing says they can't be on the water with their logistics on shore on on ships of opportunity.
grrrr. yeah, or....limit to 150 tons. no armor, but stealthy as B-2, 120 kts. maybe 20 missiles? unlimited range.
so what? this........cost less than $300 Million a pop. launch 6 in 2026, 6 in 2027, six in 2028, six more in 2029, six more in........
warm regards to SURFACE and subsurface folk.....but costs and time and reason argue for something a bit different, now.
Note re low observable, as I understand it there’s a thing with wake radar returns vs long range radars that would be a concern for conventional hull forms being completely undetectable, especially from above (i.e. orbit - does PLAN have any radar sats?), but stealth to the freqs used for seeker head final targeting only makes sense.
He is talking airships.
indeed. but note....NOT blimps or dirigibles.
As far as wake's go there are ways to minimize wakes. Not sure whether the wakes are minimized period, or minimized for certain speeds.
Unconventional thinking is not exactly a "go to skill" for those of the 'we've always done it this way' persuasion.
If nuclear. I hope they don’t make the mistakes of the 1970’s when they built nuclear surface ships faster than they could increase the pipeline of nuclear-trained officers and enlisted. (I’m not advocating for slower construction, rather for anticipatory staffing.)
The 70s were a bad time for pay.
The 70s were terrible for nuclear staffing because so many chose the Navy to avoid the draft and when they did not reenlist, no one came behind them.
If this ship ever delivers more than one a year we will be wildly lucky.
Improvements in design helps. Commonality of systems as well. The Ford class requires fewer nucs per MW that the Nimitz class. I am assuming it is the same with the Columbias. If not, it should be.
"The new fleet would comprise a number of large warships outfitted with more powerful long-range missiles, along with smaller ships such as corvettes, the people said." - Sounds like Zumwalt High-Low
The idea is the corvettes are out there day to day managing unmanned ships holding the deterrent line like South China Sea or GIUK gap. Then the big surface combatants come out with the carriers. It really plays into their area of influence, secure the Americas strategy which seems to be at play.
At the rate we're going, the Navy is going to have one huge CVN/BB/SSN about the size of a Death Star captained by the CNO, with flags as department heads.
Two thumbs up, CDR Sal! I do love it. My only hesitation would be if we could get the same bang for the buck out of the two Virginia class subs we could build for each BB at $8B cost (assuming we could increase production, which is not a given at all)? Water is the stealth and armor and they already have the design in production.
You haven't been watching what an SSN costs these days.
Au contraire mon frere! A standard Virginia-class sub costs around $3.2 billion, while a VPM model can cost about $4.3 billion.
Utah, the last Blk IV and I think next ship to be delivered went for 3.5B in 2014. So a new order this year would be 4.8B is shipbuilding inflation met overall inflation which would be optimistic. Not sure why that matters if we are comparing a CPS ship to a CPS sub which would be Blk Vs with VPM.
Son of strike cruiser.
Really like the heavy hitter part. Really don't like the first cut timeline or costing. One will slide to the right, and the cost will go hyperbolic. Also, it's one big beautiful target. Is "armor" a thing anymore? Asking the ship architects out there. Is integrated air defense and SAMs / CIGS the only reasonable approach? OBTW, how's our dance card look for this evening in the Pacific?
I do not believe we'll see armor in way Jackie Fisher understood it. Some things like a citadel will probably survive. But otherwise specific design philosophies influenced by new weapon technologies and newer types of "armor" technologies will undoubtedly shape the final design.
Hopefully there was a payoff in knowledge from pumping the America full of ordnance twenty years ago.
Open source notes added layered Kevlar “armor” around spaces on the Ford class as part of their survivability features.
Armor which could take hits and let a BB stay in the fight would probably be pretty technically advanced spaced and layered stuff these days, especially vs. ballistic-velocity warheads, and strategically located rather than in “armored belts.” But any armor would definitely need to be designed in from scratch rather than some sketchy weight-and-balance-destroying backfit stuff, which leads one to wonder about the current state of materials research on suitably maritime armor.
There may not be a knowledge base let alone a current state of materials research for the level of protection that will be needed. It maybe a start from scratch proposition. We'll have to see.
Zumwalts have armor behind the PVLS. Aside from the usual 1 inch Kevlar we put over vital spaces.
Look at it as splinter protection. Easily see a 100% interception rate on enemy missiles, but debris shredding an unarmored ship.
Still need logistics, and reloading ports or at sea capabilities. I have gotten way more interested in producing as many subs as possible.
All in CDR Sal. The excitement in your text just jumps out.
All we need are modern day versions of Jackie Fisher Hyman Rickover and Henry Kaiser and we are in business.
Are these notional heavily armored ships reloadable at sea? Is it a typical VLS system of one and done?
What about a converted civilian hull design, with a LOT of missiles, and not much armor? Essentially a disposable ship that stays back, can fire their missiles, with sufficient protection and systems for the crew to get away?
Oh, and BTW: Where are these missiles coming from?
NAVSEA would f it up, but I always figured we could do a multi-purpose cargo hull. Variant 1: Liberty Ship 2000, relatively shallow interior, most cargo in on deck containers, 2 cranes, 2 Goalkeeper for self-defense. Variant 2: Powered Missile Barge. Remove the cranes, 64-128 Mk.41 Strike length cells, 2 Goalkeeper. Variant 3: ASW Helicopter Carrier. 4 SH-60, Towed Array, 2 trainable torpedo launchers, 2 Goalkeeper. Finding missiles for 2 might be problematic.
NAVSEA will f-up getting laid in Bangkok....
But what about a slightly modified containership, with missiles launched from the containers - hoist them (the modified part), launch, toss the empty can over the side, hoist another, rinse, repeat...
Or use a container feeder to load small, fast, LO ships further back. OUSV-3 Vanguard moving back and forth 25 knots loaded, 38 unloaded bringing up 16 fresh rounds. 50 million a ship, the basket with the most eggs stays away from the action.
Yeah, I'm not sure why they are focused on multi thousand mile missiles that cost millions of dollars, put on the ship that costs the most per ton aside from a submarine. The strike missiles should be on the adjunct, cheap, fast, unmanned ship. The large combatant will still be large even if its job is to be the AAW ship with great sensors and an energy dense, dense, close in defense architecture.
You're putting the cart before the horse. Before taking on the challenge of reloading VLS at sea, we have to build up the industrial capacity to have something to reload with.
I take your point, but it's a problem that requires parallel development. We need more capacity to build missiles now! and a method to reload them.
In a Pacific war, there may not be any bases more forward than Bremerton and San Diego. It doesn't require a tactician to figure out how to block Pearl Harbor.
That's a lot to ask, nowadays...
The only thing worse than fighting a war, is losing a war
Help me out (I’m not a shoe): CAG to me is Commander Air Group. What’s a shoe CAG?
Cruiser, Attack, Guided Missile. That is what we called the gun cruisers we modified into guided missile cruisers in the Cold War
Thank you, Sal! 🫡
Cruisers as they evolved at the end of the 1800s were built in a range of displacement, armament, and gun caliber, generally grouped as first, second, and third class. The USN began using a letter - hull number designation system in 1895. By WWI this system had become somewhat ad-hoc so in 1920 the second CNO, Adm Coontz, established the current sequence of lettering.
The armored cruisers which had been designated "ACR" were redesignated "CA" in the system. After the ratification of the naval arms limitation treaties in the 1920s, CA was used for the so-called "treaty cruisers" built to the maximum allowed 10,000 ton displacement and 8" main gun. These came to be referred to as "heavy cruisers".
After WWII as ship-launched anti-air missile technology was developed, two Baltimore class Heavy Cruisers (CA) were given Terrier missile systems, and redesignated CAG. In the post-war period CA/CL distinction became unimportant so CG was subsequently used for missile cruisers.
Excellent info. Thanks much!
v/r,
Sluggo
https://chuckhillscgblog.net/2013/08/19/ship-type-designations/
Why are we keeping the second gun on the Zumwalts anyway? Should be either more CPS cells or Mk41s there is we are not going to buy the ammo for those guns. Waste of space and tonnage unless there is a replacement in the works that just isn’t in public yet. The Zumwalts with that space filled with more missile cells would really fill some of the gaps.
The magazine is one deck lower and is deeper than the missile installation. I think the gun is gone and the casing is what remains at this point.
If so, great, but it was my understanding of everything I have read that only one gun is being pulled.
In terms of below deck, correct.