The Australians Give a Sober View of American Naval Decline

...do we really appreciate what we are letting drift away?

Though written from a distinctly Australian perspective, there is a great article from the Australian Naval Institute, Pax Americana to Pax Sinica, that would be a great way to start your week.

What I find most useful is that it efficiently outlines why, from Washington, to Brussels, to Canberra, serious people should not simply shrug their shoulders as the U.S. Navy, foolishly, has allowed itself to become the world’s #2 navy, and fading.

It should give you a few strong point to respond to people who don’t want to take the time to fully understand what it would mean for the People’s Republic of China to put its stamp on the world’s oceans that have been given a uniquely productive status by the firm, but gentle hand of Anglo-Saxon power at sea for the better part of two centuries, first by the United Kingdom, then the United States.

If we could get a copy of Geoffrey Till’s Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, that would help everyone, I believe.

Till’s emphasises the relational character of maritime power^[ii]; he argues the sea is not merely a physical domain but a political medium where the balance of naval capabilities determines the viability of norms. He identifies two conditions that sustain maritime order:

Stable Naval Balances – Naval balance does not necessarily mean parity. Rather, it describes a situation in which the distribution of capabilities discourages unilateral coercion and maintains predictability among actors.^[iii] Stability in naval power relations generates restraint, reducing the risk of escalation.

Freedom of Navigation – Freedom of navigation is the practical expression of the openness of the maritime commons. Till notes that while international law codifies this principle, its enforcement depends upon naval capability^.[iv] The ability to contest blockades, challenge excessive maritime claims, and guarantee passage is therefore central to its preservation.

In Till’s conception, navies thus play a dual role: they are both guarantors of security and arbiters of access. Maritime order emerges when balances are perceived as legitimate and when freedom of navigation is respected in practice. Conversely, disorder ensues when power asymmetries tempt coercion or when norms of access are challenged by restrictive interpretations of law and sovereignty. This framework provides the lens through which the shift from Pax Americana to a potential Pax Sinica should be understood.

This is a point that navalists understand as second nature, but we seem to keep to ourselves. We think it is self-evident, but like we discussed with John Kuehn on yesterday’s Midrats, we have not been selling the largest benefits of American sea power and the fact that it is a strengthening thread woven through everything the West assumes is part of the natural order. Nothing is granted. Each generation must ensure a stewardship of those positive things previous generations have bequeathed to the future. We are failing at that, and I don’t think we fully appreciate the second and third order effects.

The ability to act without fear of maritime challenge reinforced the perception that American hegemony was both natural and enduring. The US Navy became synonymous with American capacity to intervene worldwide, an essential feature of Pax Americana. As Mearsheimer observes, ‘the stopping power of water’^[viii] makes maritime dominance crucial for hegemonic states, and the U.S. Navy’s carrier fleet overcame this barrier by extending airpower globally. The casual presidential question reveals that even at the highest levels, the carrier was seen as the default instrument of U.S. geopolitical leadership.

Unlike Pax Americana, which upheld freedom of navigation as a universal norm, the emergence of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as a major maritime power and the green shoots of Pax Sinica risks privileging selective access and hierarchical arrangements. In this order, China could condition access to sea lanes or regional cooperation on political compliance, undermining the universality of maritime openness perceived by the drafters of UNCLOS.

The rapid modernisation of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA-N) has altered the dynamics of the Indo-Pacific maritime order. Within two decades, China has transformed from a coastal defence force into a blue-water navy. It now boasts the world’s largest fleet by numbers, including aircraft carriers, nuclear and diesel submarines, advanced surface combatants, and amphibious platforms.^[ix]

As the PLA-N expands beyond its near-seas focus to embrace expeditionary operations in the Indian Ocean, the South Pacific, and beyond, Beijing promotes an alternative vision of maritime order—one that privileges sovereignty, restricts access, and increasingly contests the universality of freedom of navigation.

Australia is a large landmass, blessed with riches, with a small population. That gives her a special perspective.

h/t Jennifer Parker.