The CNO's Top-5, but About #2...

...BA, NMP, & BSC...

If you haven’t had a chance to read the new Chief of Naval Operations’ (CNO) opening comments upon taking the job earlier this week, take a moment to give it a read.

We all like bulleted lists, so let me pull this out of the middle

By the time my tenure ends, I want to be judged by the results we achieve together, plain and simple.

• Platforms delivered and repaired on time.

• Fully manned and combat ready ships.

• Ordnance production meeting contracted demand.

• Backlogs in repair parts eliminated.

• Sailors trained to the highest levels of mastery.

I’d like to focus on the second bullet, “Fully manned and combat ready ships“.

The CNO’s duties are defined in 10 U.S. Code § 8032 - Chief of Naval Operations.

Specifically, look to para (b)(1) of the above.

(b) Under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the Navy, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations shall—

(1) subject to subsections (c) and (d) of section 8014 of this title, prepare for such employment of the Navy, and for such recruiting, organizing, supplying, equipping (including those aspects of research and development assigned by the Secretary of the Navy), training, servicing, mobilizing, demobilizing, administering, and maintaining of the Navy, as will assist in the execution of any power, duty, or function of the Secretary or the Chief of Naval Operations;

So, yes, the buck on “fully manned …” falls squarely in his lap.

Let’s be clear and honest with each other—the events of the summer of 2017 were just one example, but we have accepted poorly manned ships—really institutional Sailor abuse—for the entire time I’ve been associated with the US Navy—roughly four decades.

The LCS Manning CONOPS. “Optimal Manning.” 100-hour work weeks. etc, etc. We all know the drill of the little tricks we play with each other and ourselves to explain away why we refuse to man our ships so they cannot just take care of themselves and not be a danger to themselves and others, but also not degenerate into eyesores and floating retention issues.

Can we properly man our Navy? Sure. It just takes honesty and will.

I had a great exchange with a reader I’ve been exchanging notes with for a VERY long time, and much of the below, with his permission, came from him. He is a much more efficient writer and knows the manpower wrinkles better than anyone.

If the CNO and those on his staff want to attack “fully manned”, they should digest the below…as should we all.

A lot of entities, both inside OPNAV (N1, N8 and N9) and outside OPNAV (OSD Comptroller, CAPE (hissss…booooo), SECNAV, and Fleet Forces Command) have significant influence on the funding of the Military Personnel, Navy (MPN) account.

In theory, the CNO should have heft inside the OPNAV lifelines. Outside, notsomuch.

What about the final number of what our ships, squadrons, submarines, and other misc commands need to properly serve their nation? The Navy Manpower Analysis Center (NAVMAC) has an excellent process for determining the manpower requirements—a precise number by rate, rating, and NECs driven by the Required Operational Capability and Projected Operational Environment (ROC/POE) as issued by SECNAV.

So, what it takes to fully man a ship, squadron or submarine is KNOWN. This isn’t a secret. This isn’t something we need a commission and a POM cycle to research.

CNO said one of his metrics for success is "fully manned and combat ready ships." Well, we can get there if, again, we have the easy part, the will. The hard part will be honesty. Honesty about how we had been doing manning in the past, and why.

Yes, that is needed. Just “moving on” will not do. If not exposed to fresh air and light, the bad habits of old will only bloom again when a new leader comes on the scene who desires to rise on the backs of institutional Sailor abuse, as was once, “The way we’ve always done things.”

He’s the CNO. He can rise no further. This is his run. If I may Admiral Caudle, “Go Pack Go!”

First, define our terms. What's needed is CNO's definition of "fully manned". Is it:

1. Fully funding the known requirement?

2. Fully funding what is necessary to meet the current FIT/FILL goals by deployment (which add up to significantly less than fully manned to the NAVMAC determined requirement)?

Can we find a case in the last 30 years when OPNAV submitted a budget that fully funded the MPN account (total #s by paygrade - Top 6) to reflect the NAVMAC determined afloat manpower requirement?

I don't believe we have. Ever.

When a ship gets their "fair share" (# by rate and rating) of the available pool of Sailors, many will say that the ship is fully manned - after all, they got their fair share of what's available; that is, of what's been funded.

A key factor is that NAVMAC's ship manning documents are UNCLAS and available to all. If I'm a Work Center Supervisor on a Flight II DDG, I can, in effect, read in great detail what the Navy has stated is the right number of Sailors who should be assigned to my ship and what skill sets/experience they should have.

You know what you actually have, but you also know what you should have...and yet you are being told you are “fully manned.” Is that a mistake, spin, or a lie?

We say that people are our #1 asset—our comparative advantage—and they are, but are we putting our money where our PR is? If not, why?

If you do the math, to fully fund the MPN requirement in a Navy budget with a fixed topline, you will likely have to fund a great deal less of many other requirements out there which seem to be higher ranked in importance than “our #1” (or to be fair, #2 on the CNO’s list above).

CNO stated on Day 1 that he wants fully manned ships; the OPNAV budget does not currently reflect CNO's metric for success if fully manned means manned to the Ship Manpower Document (SMD)-determined requirement.

How, and defined by what, will the CNO and his staff—with the top-cover from the SECNAV one would hope—focus money and effort towards “fully manned?”

We will find out in the next few months.