The Lessons of Pearl Harbor at 84, with John Keuhn - on Midrats
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History isn’t just about the past; it’s a guide for today!
On this episode, we unravel the myths surrounding Pearl Harbor and what they teach us about current global tensions with returning guest, John Keuhn.
Dr. John T. Kuehn is Professor of Military History at the Army Command and General Staff College. He served in the US Navy as a naval flight officer flying in EP-3s and ES-3s, retiring in 2004. He has authored or co-authored seven books and was awarded a Vandevort Prize from the Society for Military History in 2023 for his article “Zumwalt, Holloway, and the Soviet Navy Threat Leadership in a Time of Strategic, Social, and Cultural Change.”
His latest book from is Strategy in Crisis (Naval Institute, 2023).
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Summary
In this episode, Sal, Mark and guest John Kuehn discuss the historical significance of the Pearl Harbor attack, exploring its lessons for modern military strategy and the importance of public support in warfare. They analyze the complexities of the attack, the role of logistics in sustaining naval forces, and the geopolitical implications of sea lines of communication. The conversation also touches on the current state of the U.S. Navy and the strategic calculations of China in the context of potential conflict over Taiwan.
Chapters
00:00: Introduction and Context of Pearl Harbor
04:22: Understanding the Surprise Attack
10:41: Lessons from Pearl Harbor for Modern Warfare
17:27: The Role of Public Support in War
25:12: The Importance of Selling Naval Power
31:08: Logistics and Sustaining Naval Forces
39:42: Geopolitical Implications of Sea Lines of Communication
46:00: China’s Strategic Calculations and Modern Warfare
56:40: Conclusion and Future Considerations
The lessons from Bataan, the ABDA Fleet, and the backdoor smear campaign to remove Admiral Tommy Hart who conducted hit and run tactics to preserve his force against a far superior Imperial Japanese Navy, only to replace him with "deskbound staff officer" Admiral Conrad Helfrich, are stronger and more on-point. Bataan was logistically unprepared for the defense because preparations weren't executed early enough. Helfrich's only objective was to defend Java at all costs; it wasn't defend, and he lost almost the entire combined fleet that was significantly outnumbered and out gunned in the hopeless effort. Furthermore, 1942 logistics at sea were thin and underwhelming. Sadly, the logistics afloat in 1941/2 were far better than we have today. The Army pushed most all logistics to the Reserves, and the Navy eliminated its Combat Logistics Force replacing it with a smaller civilian manned 'nowhere near combat' smattering of logistic ships. A Cold War expeditionary repair capability of numerous tenders is now only two or three that the submariners fought to keep. Obviously they remember history and the USS CANOPUS at the tip of Bataan Peninsula tending subs by night and disguising itself as a smoking hulk by day up to the day of surrender. That history should highlight the fantasy of the 2025 panacea of using commercial shipyards in the region during a hot war...
Not a 'fleet in being' at all. A fleet not sitting anywhere. Look how the Germans employed it's Pacific Fleet in WWI. Only EMDEN was successful because of it's opportunity to conduct independent engagements of opportunity. The rest of the fleet under von Spee had but one victory at the Battle of Coronel. The hopeless head-to-head engagements were as useless as the ABDA fleet at the Battle of the Java Sea in 1942. Tho fine ships accomplished nothing and would have remained a big threat and thorn in the side of Japanese planning if operated out of Darwin in nonperminant surface action groups when intelligence supported the engagement.