The Persistence of History
...Kabul Edition...
As some of you are aware, I am forcing myself to finish General Kenneth McKenzie, USMC (Ret.)’s book on his tour as the Commander at CENTCOM, The Melting Point: High Command and War in the 21st Century. My opinion of his performance at CENTCOM is well known to readers.
However, Tom Ricks subtly challenged me to read the book. I’ve compromised and checked it out as an audiobook. (spoiler: my opinion of his performance gets worse with each minute of the book).
Anyway, in order to get through this before it ruins my early fall, I’ve sped the audio up to 1.25X speed to get through the remaining 2+ hours I have left. I’m at the point right before the Abbey Gate attack, and it only darkens my mood on the way home. Mrs. Salamander has noticed.
As I sat in the truck for a bit when I got home last night, I remembered a brief I gave in Kabul in December of 2008. I think it was on Fridays. In my branch, someone would be assigned to give a short “fun brief”, not directly related to what we were doing, but tangentially connected. It was usually historical, but not always.
It was my turn, and knowing my Hopkirk, I decided to make this as personal as possible for my fellow staff weenies at HQ ISAF.
First of all, of course, let’s go to the chartroom.
Here is an overhead of part of downtown Kabul. The former HQ ISAF is highlighted roughly in the center, and the Kabul River is at the bottom. Note the shape of the Kabul River, this will come in handy later.
Look at the street layout and the different neighborhoods. Anything stand out to you, a little off-kilter?
Go ahead, study the above. I’ll wait for you here.
Did you note the Wazir Akbar Khan neighborhood northwest of HQ ISAF? Let’s zoom in.
See that abrupt outline of…something?
That, my friends, is the Sherpur Cantonment in 1879, the 23rd of December, 1879 to be exact, right at the pivot point of the Second Anglo-Afghan War and the Battle of Kabul.
Yep, NATO’s Kabul compound was right outside the Sherpur Cantonment.
Salamander Constant: geography does not change. Urban design tells stories. It gives warnings. The Afghans knew their history, we should know it too.
…50,000 Afghans, headed by white clothed Ghazis, fanatical religious leaders, rushed the cantonment fortifications. The garrison guns illuminated the area with star shells as the defending infantry poured volleys into the attacking tribesmen.
By dawn on 23rd December 1879, the attack was in full flood against the west, south and east walls, with the emphasis on the east side and Bimaru village. Only in the north-east corner did the Afghans make any lodgement. The hard-pressed Guides were reinforced by companies of Sikhs from the neighbouring heights which had not been attacked.
After reaching a peak of ferocity between 10am and 11am, the attack generally slackened, the Afghans returning to the assault many times, but with diminishing enthusiasm.
At around 11am, Roberts sent a force of guns and cavalry through the gap in the Bimaru Heights, to open a bombardment on the right flank of the Afghans attacking the village. Under this fire, the attackers withdrew.
At around midday, the British and Indian cavalry issued from the cantonment and began the work of dispersing the remaining Afghan forces and pursuing the retreating tribesmen, while the infantry cleared the villages around the cantonment. No quarter was given to Afghans found with weapons.
On the morning of the 24th December 1879, Roberts was preparing to eject the Afghan tribesmen from Kabul city, when he received news that Mohammed Jan’s enormous army had completely dispersed.
Despite pursuit by the British and Indian cavalry, Mohammed Jan and his entourage escaped to Ghuznee.
Casualties at the Battle of Kabul 1879:
British and Indian casualties were 33. General Roberts estimated that the Afghan casualties, almost all killed, were 3,000.
Let’s go back to the name of the neighborhood, Wazir Akbar Khan.
Who was he that was so honored to have the development made out of the former British base named after him? You have to go back an additional 37 years to 1842 and the First Anglo-Afghan War.
…a Barakzai prince and military commander who served as emir of Afghanistan from 1842 to 1843. He also served as vizier and heir apparent to his father, Emir Dost Mohammad Khan (r. 1826–1839, 1843–1863), until his death in 1847.
Wazir Akbar Khan’s fame began with the 1837 Battle of Jamrud. He was militarily active in the First Anglo-Afghan War, which lasted from 1839 to 1842. He is prominent for his leadership of the national party in Kabul from 1841 to 1842, and his massacre of Elphinstone’s army at the Gandamak pass before the only survivor, the assistant surgeon William Brydon, reached the besieged garrison at Jalalabad on 13 January 1842. Wazir Akbar Khan became the emir of Afghanistan in May 1842, and ruled until Dost Mohammad Khan’s return in 1843. In 1847 Wazir Akbar Khan died of cholera.
You see, the Sherpur Cantonment of the Second Anglo-Afghan War was built on what was created by British forces in the First Anglo-Afghan War.
At the beginning of the conflict, British and East India Company forces had defeated the forces of Afghan Emir Dost Mohammad Barakzai and in 1839 occupied Kabul, restoring the former ruler, Shah Shujah Durrani, as emir. However a deteriorating situation made their position more and more precarious, until an uprising in Kabul forced Maj. Gen. Elphinstone to withdraw. To this end he negotiated an agreement with Wazir Akbar Khan, one of the sons of Dost Mohammad Barakzai, by which Elphinstone’s army was to be guaranteed security as they fell back to the Jalalabad garrison, more than 140 kilometres (90 mi) away.
No sooner had the British left Kabul than Afghans loyal to Akbar launched attacks against the column, continuing to harry it as it made slow progress through the winter snows along the route that is now the Kabul–Jalalabad Road. In total the British army lost 4,500 troops, along with about 12,000 civilians: the latter comprising both the families of Indian and British soldiers, plus workmen, servants and other Indian camp followers. The final stand was made just outside a village called Gandamak on 13 January.
Out of more than 16,000 people from the column commanded by Elphinstone, only one European (Assistant Surgeon William Brydon) and a few Indian sepoys reached Jalalabad. Over one hundred British prisoners and civilian hostages were later released. An uncertain number of the Indians, many of whom were maimed by frostbite, survived and returned to Kabul to exist as beggars or to be sold into slavery elsewhere. About 2,000 sepoys returned to India after another British invasion of Kabul several months later, but others remained behind in Afghanistan.
In 2013, a writer for The Economist called the retreat “the worst British military disaster until the fall of Singapore exactly a century later.
The fall of Kabul could have been much worse.
Final note: my 21 AUG 2021 wargaming of the fall of Kabul aged pretty well.
Sigh. What we learn from history, is that we don't fucking learn from history.
History does not "repeat", but patterns of human behavior, and the rise and decline of nations, most certainly does. The Soviets had a land route out, leading to the now famous bridge. We had an "air bridge" but elected to surrender security for one end of that "bridge" to...untrustworthy "partners" during the withdrawal. During my embassy tour, my office was responsible for evacuation planning (which was used twice in five years). DoS and DoD violated every tenet of NEO during this cluster. Those tenant violations occurred before, during (Donohue should have been court-martialed IMO) and after (Mckenzie's testimony is shameless). To paraphrase someone else here, while it could have been worse, it should have been so much better. Saigon, and now Kabul are days to remember so they are NOT repeated.