I am sure everyone by now has seen the rather dystopian picture that looks like a scene from Oblivion above from earlier in the year as reported in The Guardian.
As our friend Andrew Erickson says below, these barges are clearly designed for one thing: Taiwan.
Analysts say these barges can negate that key defence and, potentially, give the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) direct access to any road within about 150 clear metres of the shore. Taiwan has more than 1,500km (930 miles) of coastline which several major roads and highways closely skirt, including as close as 30km to central Taipei.
“These bridge-barges are purpose-built for a Taiwan invasion scenario,” said Andrew Erickson, a professor of strategy at the China Maritime Studies Institute. “They embody the seriousness with which China under Xi is pursuing absorption of Taiwan by any means possible.
“The Shuiqiao barges are not a panacea that can overcome all difficult landing conditions, but they definitely provide PLA planners with more options along far greater stretches of Taiwan’s coastline.”
Presently COMEC appears to have produced four distinct designs tied to the Chinese amphibious bridging system. Three of these are relevant for operational use by PLAN, with the fourth possibly representing a prototype or developmental design. All three designs relevant to this article in the most basic sense can be characterised as “jack-up-barges”. The term refers to self-elevating marine platforms using a set of legs to stand on the seabed. This design intends to provide a stable platform for high-load transfers and operations above the waterline. Jack-up rigs experience significant proliferation in the commercial offshore industry, particularly for resource extraction, such as drilling for oil and gas.
Jack-up rigs require transport by specialised vessels, under tow, or move to an area of operations under their own power. The Chinese designs discussed here appear to be self-propelled. Therefore, despite termed “barges”, they are more accurately seagoing vessels capable of transiting across significant distances unassisted. This aspect carries importance for a notional invasion of the Taiwanese main.
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As noted in analsysis such as by Sal Mercogliano, the designs in question distinguish themselves through a number of features. This includes length, number of legs connecting them to the seabed and elements enabling the berthing of cargo ships. The first variant, termed Type 2 by Tom Shugart, is the most compact design featuring four legs. A newer report by Tom Shugart and J. Michael Dahm via CMSI also refers to this design as “Shuiqiao 110”, in reference to an article by Andrew Erickson on March 13. “Shuiqiao” (水桥) means “water bridge”, with the number referring to its length in metres. The design measures 38 metres in beam, with a 140 metre-extendable ramp. Primary use for Type 2 is as a direct connector of the bridging system to the shore. Type 2 features shorter legs for shallow waters, no extended platforms enabling the berthing of ferries, and possibly waterjet propulsion.
All of these traits combined suggest Type 2 would see use as bridgehead in very shallow waters. The design appears to have limited or no capability facilitating transfer of materiel from transport ships by itself.
The Chinese have proven they can build these rather quickly, but are they a good design?
Less than what they say, watch what your competition is doing.
The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) military is preparing for an invasion of Taiwan. That is clear as the pictures above. Will they invade? Maybe, maybe not…but the wise move is to assume that they will when they finish having the equipment to facilitate it, it is advantageous to them, and the moment is ripe.
Don’t expect we will have much warning, and there is a very good chance that we will try to convince ourselves that we are not seeing what is clearly happening until it is too late. Remember the six months prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine as an example how that very human self-delusion works.
I really hope that we have a whole series of OPLANS written that gives the national command authority a menu of responses. I hope these plans are being updated at least once a year, if not faster.
Is Taiwan worth fighting for? The PRC seems to think so. Do the Taiwanese? Do the Americans? Do any of the American allies?
Pray for peace.
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Key question: Is the population of Taiwan willing to fight? China's focus is clearly on negating the Taiwanese military and any immediate assistance they might get from others. Will the populace rise up weapons in hand, or submit rather than be subjected to destructive bombardment? Fouling their own nest by destroying the chip making facilities is a real threat, but is it in their perceived interest to do so? Is the U.S. a reliable ally? Will the rest of the region rise to their defence? The world wonders...as do we all.
I would expect the PLA to deploy these after the initial invasion to quickly resupply their beachhead. These have utility and are capable. I don’t see them being used under direct fire D+ 0
Key question: Is the population of Taiwan willing to fight? China's focus is clearly on negating the Taiwanese military and any immediate assistance they might get from others. Will the populace rise up weapons in hand, or submit rather than be subjected to destructive bombardment? Fouling their own nest by destroying the chip making facilities is a real threat, but is it in their perceived interest to do so? Is the U.S. a reliable ally? Will the rest of the region rise to their defence? The world wonders...as do we all.
I would expect the PLA to deploy these after the initial invasion to quickly resupply their beachhead. These have utility and are capable. I don’t see them being used under direct fire D+ 0