I am sure everyone by now has seen the rather dystopian picture that looks like a scene from Oblivion above from earlier in the year as reported in The Guardian.
There are more places to invade than Taiwan - especially if you can create a multidomain penetration bubble pretty much anywhere you want in the FIC...
Given the seagoing nature of these vessels - which are less barges than ships themselves - I would think anywhere in the First Island Chain. A review of the public record would indicate that Taiwan is not the only place vulnerable in the FIC - especially if one starts thinking in terms of the key maritime terrain necessary to control access to and from the South China Sea.
Would think these "invasion barges" are incredibly vulnerable to extensive mining operations, air drones in the thousands and cluster bombs. Esp if the CCP has not won total air dominance over both the Republic of China AND the US.
To my knowledge, PLA has never executed a large scale amphibious operation under intense real live fire. This is especially true if:
1) No one in the chain of command has EVER led troops onto a contested beach under fire. The experience is beyond the comprehension of every soldier and officer of the PLA
2)They don't even have extensive experience in conventional battle
I'll grant technology has the potential to make battles extremely short. But the battle isn't over until the enemy can no longer fight. Suspect the CCP is not counting on individual initiative and asymmetric counteroffensives
The U.S. pretty much lacked those things prior to WW2 and we seemed to figure it out pretty good on the fly.
Motivation counts for a lot, and PRC/PLA seem highly motivated to "reunify their breakaway province."
Also. we are kind of short of thousands of mines and drones ourselves which indeed might slow them down. However, this would be a "home field" for them, and they are fully capable of interdicting our fragile and irreplaceable logistics train, without which the tip of our spear ceases to function in about 72 hours, or less.
"we seemed to figure it out pretty good on the fly."
Reread your history. Guadalcanal and Operation Torch were both absolute dog's breakfasts, Sicily was a mess, and Salerno and Anzio both came close to being absolute disasters.
Those operations were not models of perfection, but they prepped the landing zones, got troops ashore, held their ground and pushed inland. That pretty much counts as a successful, albeit chaotic and costly operation. I doubt f PRC has as much concern about collateral damage or own force casualties as we did, so their bar for a "successful" landing may be very low indeed.
One thing about Kasserine Pass is that it was the result of pitting green as grass newbies up against veterans.
The combatants in any fight in the Taiwan Straits will be as Lincoln described the armies in mid-1861: “You are green, it is true, but they are green, also; you are all green alike.”
True, and we knew it. It proved the misinterpretation of France's "L'audace, l'audace, toujours l'audace."
From my soda straw view of the world, China will try to take over Taiwan with force- when is anyone's guess. Whatever happens in the Taiwan Straits, it will not be what either side expects.
In Frey's substack article, she notes: "However, this audacity should always come from knowing that you are doing enough to be able to deserve what you want, not from a place of mere conceit." When Patton took command after the Kasserine Pass debacle, he ensured that our troops were properly equipped, trained, and mentally prepared for the next battle. Patton was probably our most audacious combat commander, though he backed it up with troops, training, equipment, and strategy to succeed.
Given the condition of Taiwan's military, we should be deeply concerned. I no longer think we have two years; the trade war has accelerated the timetable.
Key question: Is the population of Taiwan willing to fight? China's focus is clearly on negating the Taiwanese military and any immediate assistance they might get from others. Will the populace rise up weapons in hand, or submit rather than be subjected to destructive bombardment? Fouling their own nest by destroying the chip making facilities is a real threat, but is it in their perceived interest to do so? Is the U.S. a reliable ally? Will the rest of the region rise to their defence? The world wonders...as do we all.
is this why no innovation in US? Disappointed you lack creativity in life, no wonder all the new high tech industry goes to China.
I wish the US people will discover what made the great in the past instead of being so divided and angry at an imaginary foe in China. Think postive about your nations future :D
Look at our own elites' traitor-riddled ranks. We're not located a stone's throw off China's coast, we're not a target for invasion, and few of our citizens look like them or speak their language.
You have nearly half the population voting for a pro-PRC party so I’m guessing the population will not fight hard. The elites and upper middle class will flee to the US. The rest will roll over.
Russia didn’t make the mistake of fighting for the Syrians when they wouldn’t fight for themselves. I hope we don’t make the same mistake.
Even among CDR Sal readers, enthusiasm for defending the ROC seems faint. And the obvious fact that we think of TaIwan as a source of computer chips rather than as an independent Chinese democracy is probably not lost on the Chinese on either side, esp. after our volte-face in Ukraine.
I believe the military will make a hard stand and then to save people and infrastructure along with manufacturing they will have an honorable surrender.
I don't see US Land and sea involvement except for aid.
Great point. But when is the last time a Chinese led military invasion left the Asian continent? Their economic prowess is well known, but military invasion? Other than trying to take over Vietnam, which didn’t go well, they are still insulated by the GREAT WALL!! (Figuratively of course!$
"Key question: Is the population of Taiwan willing to fight?"
Another key question: Is the population of the United States willing to fight for Taiwan? Those expert strategerists in Washington may want to consider that before they commit military forces.
At times I think you are persuadable. We should not have a strong pacific fleet because of China. We should have a strong pacific fleet because we are an island nation dependent on free trade. If China were a lovable stuffed Panda posing no threat the the US, we would still need a strong two-ocean navy.
I'm pretty sure the aboriginal people of Formosa want all the Chinese gone, Communists and Taiwanese both. But who knows for sure, they may decide to go back to cannibalism with all the extra meat available.
There are a couple of things. Having worked from spud barges, they are very susceptible to wave action, especially shifting the sediments where the spuds are anchored. It can really mess up your drill string or other equipment if the barge moves while you're working. The Taiwan Strait, especially the shallow western shelves of Taiwan, has some unique bathymetry that amplifies wave action https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1029/2019JC015377.
So, it is makes it more likely that any invasion would definitely have to happen in the calmer months outside of Typhoon season to use these barges. That gives you a good handle of the time of year when maximum vigilance is necessary. The CCP could take a flier on some other time, but as the "Divine Wind" saved Japan from China's fleet in the past, it might be a disaster for China again.
Beyond that, the concept of operations would need to have a secured beach for these operations. More than even a beach assault, you are limited to a fixed place with a central bridge to the shore. A sitting duck with a narrow funnel. It is really pretty easy to mess that up with a few ATGMs targeting equipment being unloaded along its length. So they'd have to invade and grab some real estate to use these to land troops and avoid getting bottled up on the beach and destroyed. It doesn't take a huge opposing force to really mess this type of operation up pretty badly.
So, these would probably be employed in later stages of an invasion to land follow on forces within a secured perimeter to off load heavy forces - which assumes Taiwan's ports are not available/usable. The reason I mention that is, if we ARE supporting Taiwan militarily, and these are employed after the initial attack, we will likely be involved in the fighting several days into the war. If so, these don't have a chance in hell of withstanding aerial attacks.
I guess this is what the LCACs are for. To secure the beachheads before bringing these self propelled barges in. The barges are for the logistics of the exploitation, not the initial foothold.
“LCACs are required to get to shore not a second early and no later than three minutes late,” said Electronics Technician 2nd Class Levi Rush, LCAC navigator aboard Bonhomme Richard, from Carthage, Mo. “It is essential for LCACs to get to their destination within that window of time during a real combat situation. Studies have shown that it takes the enemy about three minutes to recover from an air raid and we want to be in there before they do that and get our Marines on the ground.”
We have 72 LCACs, soon to be replaced by 72 SSCs, and each can land around 150 troops and their equipment, less if vehicles are embarked. We'd be lucky to land a full company at once, and then you'd still need other landing craft (that the shallow shelf along Taiwan's west coast limits in their approaches). Taiwan has a number of defenses along their coast, many located around landing beaches of course but they do have a mobile defense...and again, it doesn't take many precision tubes (tank or artillery) or missiles to make it a very bad day.
Ok but how many LCACs does the PRC have? And - given that the scenario presupposes sea dominance and at least contested airspace - how much softening up can we expect ahead of an amphibious landing?
While your point about the barges forming a choke point is valid, LCACs (or airborne trips for that matter) can attack on a broad front and will not be canalised. The barges can be deployed once the Taiwanese are pushed out of line of sight of the beach and out of most artillery range.
I think the answer is in the original article - the highways along the shore aren't far from the beach and, while accessible and a target for the landings, will allow mobile forces to transit to the attack point. The Chinese landing can't use highways that they destroy, so it is unlikely they'd hit the roads to limit Taiwan's troop movements as they will want to use it to move THEIR troops. The point about the LCACs is that they can't access the areas that the barges are built for due to the rise in elevation off the shingle - they are limited to pretty much the known landing beaches, again. Now, they could land and mobilize troops to secure a beach head somewhere else along the coast - closer to a harbor or the capitol - for the barges to be employed.
Each side will employ SOFs and try to create blocking forces or ambushes, etc. etc. Dropping airborne troops without immediate support would be a disaster, such as what happened to the Russians at Antonov Airport.
They've got about 40 Type 716/Zubr/724/726 Class LCACS and an unknown number of Type 722 II LCAC. They can always build more, but that is what is known. They've been working on an actual Marine Corps parallel, but all they have is theory of operations of course...not experience of conducting opposed landings.
No, my point was about how they are employed and when. They aren't primary assault craft, so their location doesn't portend the point of attack or center of gravity of any amphibious assault (if they are smart). They probably anticipate Taiwan will hold or sabotage the deep water ports and they won't have access to land heavy equipment there. So these are follow on and will serve like the Mulberry Harbors in WWII along the D-Day beaches
The reason I think that is significant is that there are several failure points for an invasion of Taiwan, from the limited time for movement across the Strait due to weather to the nature of the invasion beaches and defense available to Taiwan. China wants to do it quickly to limit our ability to intercede - presenting us with a fait accompli and the task of retaking the island. Taiwan wants to delay and frustrate the Chinese to allow us time to react and to, hopefully, hold them off and let weather and the ever present Mr. Murphy take a toll on the Chinese.
The Chinese are trying to execute a delicate ballet that they have never done before on a tight timeline - and they don't get a dress rehearsal. Everything has to go nearly perfectly for them to succeed. Meanwhile, Taiwan is going to be throwing marbles on the stage while they try to dance. The Chinese do know how vulnerable their forces are in the Strait once they start the battle. That is the whole point of the A2AD strategy they've been working on for decades - to keep us from killing their ships in the Strait.
The longer it takes, the more likely we are to arrive on scene and intercede...initially likely from subs, drones of various types, gliding mines and the air with stealth aircraft and LRASMs etc. The major center of gravity is the PLAN and its capital ships. Sink them and the invasion is over before it starts. If they do get a beachhead or airhead, they have to support it, which is where the barges would come in. But they know if we are active and have air supremacy or dominance that those barges will never last...so the invasion would die on the vine for lack of supplies.
So what is the plan if they expect us to intervene? They have to attack us first, to keep us off their necks while they try to get as much done as possible before we can recover. The presence of the barges, because of their vulnerability, makes it clear that they think we will not be involved in the fight when they are employed. That gives us a window as to what they have planned for us - not a blockade or any of the other half-measures. If they are serious about USING the barges and they aren't an elaborate feint.
Part and parcel of the mix. Constructing them as RoRos to match up with the barges for off loading. Given their shipbuilding capacity, it would be better if they just built some purpose built ships.
At this point in time they have as much actual experience as we do; experience is not inherited . They can read history and after-action reports as well as we can.
Wow, this really took the convo below off course. LCACs are also not going to be an opening wave and don't react well to bullets. It is what LAAV/ACV are for. China has advanced their forces and can deploy their amphibious vehicles from commercial ferries. Several of their designs can head to shore faster like we'd planed with the expeditionary fighting vehicle. Plus I am sure they will have forces coming in via small boat. They also have LSTs still although those would again likely not be a beach assault connector.
Pray for peace, plan for war. Logistics, logistics, logistics. Fixed platforms are *targets* unless you have air and sea superiority. In Normandy once we secured the beachhead we started building temporary docks and running fuel lines across the Channel. But the beachhead had to be secured first.
Does the PLAN think no one will be shooting at these sitting ducks, or that they have the capacity to defend them from incoming fire, or that like WW2 Liberty Ships, they can build them faster than we can sink them?
To paraphrase Fred Thompson, "The PLAN don't take a dump without a plan."
What would be the consequences of a Chinese takeover of Taiwan?
We were told that if we didn't fight the communists in Vietnam then we would be fighting them in LA. Today, American corporations are all over Vietnam so what was the point of suffering 50,000 casualties?
The Vietnamese didn't have the TSMC (Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company) supplying the West with chips that can't be made elsewhere, currently. The Chinese want that capability, and to deny those chips to us, as we and our allies need the chips for all of our tech. So, yeah, worse comes to worse we blow up all the facilities in Taiwan to keep them away from China...but then we won't have the chips either. We've started to develop the facilities here to produced the chips, but we are years away.
Control of SE Asia at the time did not determine global control of the world ocean. If China has Taiwan their ability to break out by sea will have been achieved. As discussed frequently in the blog.
Sounds like a nautical version of the Domino Theory. I am not trying to be insulting but I grew up with Vietnam and the wars in the Middle East. I am a little gun shy.
What makes you think that China cannot "break out by sea" right now if it wanted to? That claim is frequently made, although no one explains how Taiwan prevents China from controlling the oceans along its approximately 1,500-mile coastline.
I would expect the PLA to deploy these after the initial invasion to quickly resupply their beachhead. These have utility and are capable. I don’t see them being used under direct fire D+ 0
Definitely no use if the beach is still taking fire, but could speed landing equipment until an actual port is taken one the enemy is pushed back from the beach head far enough.
All of this presupposes winning the sea battle and making the airspace at least contested rather than US-dominated. But it is nonetheless an important advantage to be fitted into an overall plan.
I think these are more of a follow-on like the Mulberries in Normandy than a "breaking the door down" system. They'd be hideously vulnerable to mines and suicide drone boats and UAVs, especially the small man-portable ones.
The Taiwan Straits is 81 miles at its narrowest. While that doesn't sound like a lot, it's more than 4 times the distance between the UK and France across the English Channel. Getting a force big enough on the Taiwanese beaches to take a foothold would require a herculean effort that'd make the Normandy invasion look like small potatoes.
The PRC Navy would have to completely clear the Straits of all Taiwanese surface ships (likely wouldn't last that long) and submarines (likely a tougher chore), not to mention maintain air superiority over a huge front.
The goal of the Taiwanese military cannot be to stop the PRC, because eventually an invasion would be a fait accompli due to the PRC's massive disparity in troop, aircraft and ship strength. The end game for Taiwan is to make such an invasion so ruinously expensive in lives and treasure that the PRC would rather not endure. Think the Cold War Sweden or Switzerland model.
The real question is would the PRC sacrifice 100,000 or greater casualties to own the renegade province?
I think all of this is a bluff to get the Taiwanese to the negotiating table. The PRC would much rather reach a deal on the sovereignty of Taiwan via negotiation than a ruinous war that would likely bankrupt the country, destroy Taiwan's semiconductor plants and kill or maim hundreds of thousands.
Grizzled Coastie says> "The real question is would the PRC sacrifice 100,000 or greater casualties to own the renegade province?" My answer?> In a heartbeat...
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I think the real open questions are: (i) whether or not the US gov admin in power at the time of the PLAN invasion is willing to sacrifice 100,000 or more lives of US servicemen to frustrate such an attempt; and (ii) whether or not the sacrifice of 100,000 or more lives of US servicemen in pursuit of that is worth it. I say its not.
Even if, for the sake of argument, we frustrate that invasion this time around, that is just a chapter in their book entitled "China will never give up on reabsorbing Formosa. Even if it takes 1000 years". The CCCP is not going home after taking a wupping. They live there and stare everyday across the Taiwan straits at their "renegade province"... and it grates upon them. That will never change.
I think the real question is Xi willing to bet his life and his family's fortune on the invasion and aftermath working out well. If it fails, he is gone (prison and execution, Chinese justice is swift) as well as what he and his faction has built/stolen/sent to Swiss bank accounts.
The bet changes if Taiwan declares independence. Then he has to move to keep his position.
"is Xi willing to bet his life and his family's fortune on the invasion"
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Historically, Leaders who are directing an economy which is beginning to (or is) circle the drain have gone to war to unify the citizens against an external enemy instead of them focusing on culpability of their leader in their current economic woes.
Xi and the CCP are facing another major problem> a demographic collapse. Put those 2 mega-trends together and what you are left with (IMHO) is the fact that war w Taiwan is a near certainty. Xi is between a rock and a hard place. His least bad alternative (from the perspective of him and the CCP staying in power) is the Taiwan option.
Went to the Korean Air Force Staff College with a Taiwanese AF officer. I was not impressed with his willingness to fight, or lack thereof. Great guy but... There was a Taiwanese Navy officer at the sister Navy school on the base who seemed to have a stiffer spine but I still worry about the ROC's will to fight. Even ours isn't that good given how many Americans admire and envy the CCP's system (Don't believe me? Post something critical of the CCP on Reddit or FB and you'll see, even in US military affiliated subreddits/FB groups).
The Navy sold old, surplus EW Intercept/Search equipment to Taiwan and with it the training to repair it. In the late 80s we trained two Taiwanese Naval Officers sent to us to learn how to maintain the equipment. Two is a small sample, I know. They were there for a fixed amount of time. Didn't matter whether they passed or failed the test on Friday. They moved on to the next week of training. Both got a certificate of completion. If either had been American I would not have allowed them to graduate. Neither were good students. It rubbed my instructors raw but I told them that they could console themselves when those two students failed and shamed themselves in their jobs back on their ships.
There are more places to invade than Taiwan - especially if you can create a multidomain penetration bubble pretty much anywhere you want in the FIC...
"Oil and gas rigs" off Vietnam or Philippines?
Which ones are as close to Taiwan since these monsters are not for small tasks.
Given the seagoing nature of these vessels - which are less barges than ships themselves - I would think anywhere in the First Island Chain. A review of the public record would indicate that Taiwan is not the only place vulnerable in the FIC - especially if one starts thinking in terms of the key maritime terrain necessary to control access to and from the South China Sea.
This new capability removes a major obstacle in Chinese capability for a success invasion of Taiwan.
Would think these "invasion barges" are incredibly vulnerable to extensive mining operations, air drones in the thousands and cluster bombs. Esp if the CCP has not won total air dominance over both the Republic of China AND the US.
To my knowledge, PLA has never executed a large scale amphibious operation under intense real live fire. This is especially true if:
1) No one in the chain of command has EVER led troops onto a contested beach under fire. The experience is beyond the comprehension of every soldier and officer of the PLA
2)They don't even have extensive experience in conventional battle
I'll grant technology has the potential to make battles extremely short. But the battle isn't over until the enemy can no longer fight. Suspect the CCP is not counting on individual initiative and asymmetric counteroffensives
Per my comment above, I think it assumes an uncontested beachhead.
It has too, look at the US barges off Gaza.
The U.S. pretty much lacked those things prior to WW2 and we seemed to figure it out pretty good on the fly.
Motivation counts for a lot, and PRC/PLA seem highly motivated to "reunify their breakaway province."
Also. we are kind of short of thousands of mines and drones ourselves which indeed might slow them down. However, this would be a "home field" for them, and they are fully capable of interdicting our fragile and irreplaceable logistics train, without which the tip of our spear ceases to function in about 72 hours, or less.
We need to avoid making promises we cannot keep.
"we seemed to figure it out pretty good on the fly."
Reread your history. Guadalcanal and Operation Torch were both absolute dog's breakfasts, Sicily was a mess, and Salerno and Anzio both came close to being absolute disasters.
Those operations were not models of perfection, but they prepped the landing zones, got troops ashore, held their ground and pushed inland. That pretty much counts as a successful, albeit chaotic and costly operation. I doubt f PRC has as much concern about collateral damage or own force casualties as we did, so their bar for a "successful" landing may be very low indeed.
True but attrition does have a say in success.
Interdiction on the mainland is the key.
Tarawa. If we are talking cluster flucks.
Another successful invasion.
Well we did win at least, lessons learned the hard way.
Same for Kasserine Pass. Though it did get us Patton.
One thing about Kasserine Pass is that it was the result of pitting green as grass newbies up against veterans.
The combatants in any fight in the Taiwan Straits will be as Lincoln described the armies in mid-1861: “You are green, it is true, but they are green, also; you are all green alike.”
True, and we knew it. It proved the misinterpretation of France's "L'audace, l'audace, toujours l'audace."
From my soda straw view of the world, China will try to take over Taiwan with force- when is anyone's guess. Whatever happens in the Taiwan Straits, it will not be what either side expects.
In Frey's substack article, she notes: "However, this audacity should always come from knowing that you are doing enough to be able to deserve what you want, not from a place of mere conceit." When Patton took command after the Kasserine Pass debacle, he ensured that our troops were properly equipped, trained, and mentally prepared for the next battle. Patton was probably our most audacious combat commander, though he backed it up with troops, training, equipment, and strategy to succeed.
I believe China will try to take Taiwan politically first.
Yet they were successful, and that's what matters. And, both Guadalcanal and Anzio were unopposed landings.
Given the condition of Taiwan's military, we should be deeply concerned. I no longer think we have two years; the trade war has accelerated the timetable.
Key question: Is the population of Taiwan willing to fight? China's focus is clearly on negating the Taiwanese military and any immediate assistance they might get from others. Will the populace rise up weapons in hand, or submit rather than be subjected to destructive bombardment? Fouling their own nest by destroying the chip making facilities is a real threat, but is it in their perceived interest to do so? Is the U.S. a reliable ally? Will the rest of the region rise to their defence? The world wonders...as do we all.
How effective is the 5th column there? How well do we really know?
lol you use words from a western perspective. We are all Chinese, doubt many will fight after seeing what happens to Ukraine/Afgh
You again? Chairman Pooh must still be paying you wumaos.
Cmon be original and at least reply to the the ideas
Anyway I agree with you 🫶🏼
Eat 💩 and 💀
is this why no innovation in US? Disappointed you lack creativity in life, no wonder all the new high tech industry goes to China.
I wish the US people will discover what made the great in the past instead of being so divided and angry at an imaginary foe in China. Think postive about your nations future :D
That is the seminal question. How many are elite captured? How many leaders in the .mil and .pol are compromised by China?
Look at our own elites' traitor-riddled ranks. We're not located a stone's throw off China's coast, we're not a target for invasion, and few of our citizens look like them or speak their language.
Taiwan, though … well …
exactly. if you need to ask the question thats already a porblem lol
You have nearly half the population voting for a pro-PRC party so I’m guessing the population will not fight hard. The elites and upper middle class will flee to the US. The rest will roll over.
Russia didn’t make the mistake of fighting for the Syrians when they wouldn’t fight for themselves. I hope we don’t make the same mistake.
Even among CDR Sal readers, enthusiasm for defending the ROC seems faint. And the obvious fact that we think of TaIwan as a source of computer chips rather than as an independent Chinese democracy is probably not lost on the Chinese on either side, esp. after our volte-face in Ukraine.
An indicator of their willingness to fight is declaring independence.
I believe the military will make a hard stand and then to save people and infrastructure along with manufacturing they will have an honorable surrender.
I don't see US Land and sea involvement except for aid.
Great point. But when is the last time a Chinese led military invasion left the Asian continent? Their economic prowess is well known, but military invasion? Other than trying to take over Vietnam, which didn’t go well, they are still insulated by the GREAT WALL!! (Figuratively of course!$
"Key question: Is the population of Taiwan willing to fight?"
Another key question: Is the population of the United States willing to fight for Taiwan? Those expert strategerists in Washington may want to consider that before they commit military forces.
The governing apparatus in Taipei call themselves Republic of China. Taiwan government prior to US reneging on “One China” was not recognized by U.S.
Republic of China is not recognized so no fight unless congress declare war.
Aboriginal people of Formosa probably don’t care.
Of Chinese on Formosa a slight plurality may still be Nationalists.
I won’t enlist to fight for Taiwan
And the 50-Cent Army magically appears!
But comrade, brother Putin needs a good war between the U.S. and China. A hot trade war isn't enough.
lol. China much?
Nope, but I do recognize that our enemy, Russia, is the party that gains them most from trouble between the U.S. and China. Cui bono?
Not you. The other knuckle head.
At times I think you are persuadable. We should not have a strong pacific fleet because of China. We should have a strong pacific fleet because we are an island nation dependent on free trade. If China were a lovable stuffed Panda posing no threat the the US, we would still need a strong two-ocean navy.
"that our enemy, Russia"
Jeez, leave some punch for the rest of the midwits...
And our enemy, China, is the party that gains most from trouble between Russia and the U.S.
As you say, cui bono?
Thanks for your concern, wumao.
I'm pretty sure the aboriginal people of Formosa want all the Chinese gone, Communists and Taiwanese both. But who knows for sure, they may decide to go back to cannibalism with all the extra meat available.
One day, we won't have to guess. In the meantime, China's shipbuilding is keeping a lot of people busy.
There are a couple of things. Having worked from spud barges, they are very susceptible to wave action, especially shifting the sediments where the spuds are anchored. It can really mess up your drill string or other equipment if the barge moves while you're working. The Taiwan Strait, especially the shallow western shelves of Taiwan, has some unique bathymetry that amplifies wave action https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1029/2019JC015377.
So, it is makes it more likely that any invasion would definitely have to happen in the calmer months outside of Typhoon season to use these barges. That gives you a good handle of the time of year when maximum vigilance is necessary. The CCP could take a flier on some other time, but as the "Divine Wind" saved Japan from China's fleet in the past, it might be a disaster for China again.
Beyond that, the concept of operations would need to have a secured beach for these operations. More than even a beach assault, you are limited to a fixed place with a central bridge to the shore. A sitting duck with a narrow funnel. It is really pretty easy to mess that up with a few ATGMs targeting equipment being unloaded along its length. So they'd have to invade and grab some real estate to use these to land troops and avoid getting bottled up on the beach and destroyed. It doesn't take a huge opposing force to really mess this type of operation up pretty badly.
So, these would probably be employed in later stages of an invasion to land follow on forces within a secured perimeter to off load heavy forces - which assumes Taiwan's ports are not available/usable. The reason I mention that is, if we ARE supporting Taiwan militarily, and these are employed after the initial attack, we will likely be involved in the fighting several days into the war. If so, these don't have a chance in hell of withstanding aerial attacks.
I guess this is what the LCACs are for. To secure the beachheads before bringing these self propelled barges in. The barges are for the logistics of the exploitation, not the initial foothold.
“LCACs are required to get to shore not a second early and no later than three minutes late,” said Electronics Technician 2nd Class Levi Rush, LCAC navigator aboard Bonhomme Richard, from Carthage, Mo. “It is essential for LCACs to get to their destination within that window of time during a real combat situation. Studies have shown that it takes the enemy about three minutes to recover from an air raid and we want to be in there before they do that and get our Marines on the ground.”
We have 72 LCACs, soon to be replaced by 72 SSCs, and each can land around 150 troops and their equipment, less if vehicles are embarked. We'd be lucky to land a full company at once, and then you'd still need other landing craft (that the shallow shelf along Taiwan's west coast limits in their approaches). Taiwan has a number of defenses along their coast, many located around landing beaches of course but they do have a mobile defense...and again, it doesn't take many precision tubes (tank or artillery) or missiles to make it a very bad day.
Ok but how many LCACs does the PRC have? And - given that the scenario presupposes sea dominance and at least contested airspace - how much softening up can we expect ahead of an amphibious landing?
While your point about the barges forming a choke point is valid, LCACs (or airborne trips for that matter) can attack on a broad front and will not be canalised. The barges can be deployed once the Taiwanese are pushed out of line of sight of the beach and out of most artillery range.
I think the answer is in the original article - the highways along the shore aren't far from the beach and, while accessible and a target for the landings, will allow mobile forces to transit to the attack point. The Chinese landing can't use highways that they destroy, so it is unlikely they'd hit the roads to limit Taiwan's troop movements as they will want to use it to move THEIR troops. The point about the LCACs is that they can't access the areas that the barges are built for due to the rise in elevation off the shingle - they are limited to pretty much the known landing beaches, again. Now, they could land and mobilize troops to secure a beach head somewhere else along the coast - closer to a harbor or the capitol - for the barges to be employed.
Each side will employ SOFs and try to create blocking forces or ambushes, etc. etc. Dropping airborne troops without immediate support would be a disaster, such as what happened to the Russians at Antonov Airport.
They've got about 40 Type 716/Zubr/724/726 Class LCACS and an unknown number of Type 722 II LCAC. They can always build more, but that is what is known. They've been working on an actual Marine Corps parallel, but all they have is theory of operations of course...not experience of conducting opposed landings.
Ok good point about lateral movement and interior lines for the Taiwanese. I guess the PRC will try to interdict that lateral movement but yes.
I guess the point is - do you think the PRC would actually be better off without these craft?
No, my point was about how they are employed and when. They aren't primary assault craft, so their location doesn't portend the point of attack or center of gravity of any amphibious assault (if they are smart). They probably anticipate Taiwan will hold or sabotage the deep water ports and they won't have access to land heavy equipment there. So these are follow on and will serve like the Mulberry Harbors in WWII along the D-Day beaches
The reason I think that is significant is that there are several failure points for an invasion of Taiwan, from the limited time for movement across the Strait due to weather to the nature of the invasion beaches and defense available to Taiwan. China wants to do it quickly to limit our ability to intercede - presenting us with a fait accompli and the task of retaking the island. Taiwan wants to delay and frustrate the Chinese to allow us time to react and to, hopefully, hold them off and let weather and the ever present Mr. Murphy take a toll on the Chinese.
The Chinese are trying to execute a delicate ballet that they have never done before on a tight timeline - and they don't get a dress rehearsal. Everything has to go nearly perfectly for them to succeed. Meanwhile, Taiwan is going to be throwing marbles on the stage while they try to dance. The Chinese do know how vulnerable their forces are in the Strait once they start the battle. That is the whole point of the A2AD strategy they've been working on for decades - to keep us from killing their ships in the Strait.
The longer it takes, the more likely we are to arrive on scene and intercede...initially likely from subs, drones of various types, gliding mines and the air with stealth aircraft and LRASMs etc. The major center of gravity is the PLAN and its capital ships. Sink them and the invasion is over before it starts. If they do get a beachhead or airhead, they have to support it, which is where the barges would come in. But they know if we are active and have air supremacy or dominance that those barges will never last...so the invasion would die on the vine for lack of supplies.
So what is the plan if they expect us to intervene? They have to attack us first, to keep us off their necks while they try to get as much done as possible before we can recover. The presence of the barges, because of their vulnerability, makes it clear that they think we will not be involved in the fight when they are employed. That gives us a window as to what they have planned for us - not a blockade or any of the other half-measures. If they are serious about USING the barges and they aren't an elaborate feint.
Don't forget the civilian car ferries.
Part and parcel of the mix. Constructing them as RoRos to match up with the barges for off loading. Given their shipbuilding capacity, it would be better if they just built some purpose built ships.
".not experience of conducting opposed landings"
At this point in time they have as much actual experience as we do; experience is not inherited . They can read history and after-action reports as well as we can.
Wow, this really took the convo below off course. LCACs are also not going to be an opening wave and don't react well to bullets. It is what LAAV/ACV are for. China has advanced their forces and can deploy their amphibious vehicles from commercial ferries. Several of their designs can head to shore faster like we'd planed with the expeditionary fighting vehicle. Plus I am sure they will have forces coming in via small boat. They also have LSTs still although those would again likely not be a beach assault connector.
I mentioned LCACs specifically only because they are in the same photo as the mobile jack up bridges. Your points are sound.
"any invasion would definitely have to happen in the calmer months"
Yep. Some things have not changed since 1944. Chinese Mulberrys. I will bet they have another trick or two up their sleeves as well.
Got to give them credit, that's a clever design.
Pray for peace, plan for war. Logistics, logistics, logistics. Fixed platforms are *targets* unless you have air and sea superiority. In Normandy once we secured the beachhead we started building temporary docks and running fuel lines across the Channel. But the beachhead had to be secured first.
Does the PLAN think no one will be shooting at these sitting ducks, or that they have the capacity to defend them from incoming fire, or that like WW2 Liberty Ships, they can build them faster than we can sink them?
To paraphrase Fred Thompson, "The PLAN don't take a dump without a plan."
Having the best logistics in the world will not matter if you don't have sufficient warships or munitions to win the fight.
What would be the consequences of a Chinese takeover of Taiwan?
We were told that if we didn't fight the communists in Vietnam then we would be fighting them in LA. Today, American corporations are all over Vietnam so what was the point of suffering 50,000 casualties?
The Vietnamese didn't have the TSMC (Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company) supplying the West with chips that can't be made elsewhere, currently. The Chinese want that capability, and to deny those chips to us, as we and our allies need the chips for all of our tech. So, yeah, worse comes to worse we blow up all the facilities in Taiwan to keep them away from China...but then we won't have the chips either. We've started to develop the facilities here to produced the chips, but we are years away.
Let’s make sure we fly out all of Taiwan's scientists, engineers and technicians.
How we gave up the manufacturing of silicon chips is beyond me.
US engineers still excel at chip design. TSMC excels at chip manufacture.
Nice to know but I would feel better if we did both.
I do assume we would. We are working with TSMC to replicate the capabilities here.
Control of SE Asia at the time did not determine global control of the world ocean. If China has Taiwan their ability to break out by sea will have been achieved. As discussed frequently in the blog.
Sounds like a nautical version of the Domino Theory. I am not trying to be insulting but I grew up with Vietnam and the wars in the Middle East. I am a little gun shy.
What makes you think that China cannot "break out by sea" right now if it wanted to? That claim is frequently made, although no one explains how Taiwan prevents China from controlling the oceans along its approximately 1,500-mile coastline.
I would expect the PLA to deploy these after the initial invasion to quickly resupply their beachhead. These have utility and are capable. I don’t see them being used under direct fire D+ 0
mullberry harbors, not a cross channel first day tool
Unless all artillery in range is disabled, those things will be a fat target.
Definitely no use if the beach is still taking fire, but could speed landing equipment until an actual port is taken one the enemy is pushed back from the beach head far enough.
Depend on whether the CCP is willing to throw the PLA as a body sponge to absorb bullets to achieve their goals…
Like they did in Korea?
All of this presupposes winning the sea battle and making the airspace at least contested rather than US-dominated. But it is nonetheless an important advantage to be fitted into an overall plan.
I think the challenge will be on us to take control of that airspace. Distance will firmly be on their side even if we get creative.
Agreed.
Really the only solution is to get the semiconductor fabs up and running somewhere else ASAP.
I think these are more of a follow-on like the Mulberries in Normandy than a "breaking the door down" system. They'd be hideously vulnerable to mines and suicide drone boats and UAVs, especially the small man-portable ones.
The Taiwan Straits is 81 miles at its narrowest. While that doesn't sound like a lot, it's more than 4 times the distance between the UK and France across the English Channel. Getting a force big enough on the Taiwanese beaches to take a foothold would require a herculean effort that'd make the Normandy invasion look like small potatoes.
The PRC Navy would have to completely clear the Straits of all Taiwanese surface ships (likely wouldn't last that long) and submarines (likely a tougher chore), not to mention maintain air superiority over a huge front.
The goal of the Taiwanese military cannot be to stop the PRC, because eventually an invasion would be a fait accompli due to the PRC's massive disparity in troop, aircraft and ship strength. The end game for Taiwan is to make such an invasion so ruinously expensive in lives and treasure that the PRC would rather not endure. Think the Cold War Sweden or Switzerland model.
The real question is would the PRC sacrifice 100,000 or greater casualties to own the renegade province?
I think all of this is a bluff to get the Taiwanese to the negotiating table. The PRC would much rather reach a deal on the sovereignty of Taiwan via negotiation than a ruinous war that would likely bankrupt the country, destroy Taiwan's semiconductor plants and kill or maim hundreds of thousands.
Normandy wasn't 20 miles from UK, it was 120 miles
the rest I agree with
Forgive the pedantry, please.
Taiwan Strait width: 75-145 nm
Dover to Calais: ~ 21 nm
Portsmouth to D Day beaches: ~ 80 nm
https://www.bing.com/search?q=portsmouth+to+normandy+distance&FORM=AWRE
Calais is well over 100 miles from Normandy.
Grizzled Coastie says> "The real question is would the PRC sacrifice 100,000 or greater casualties to own the renegade province?" My answer?> In a heartbeat...
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I think the real open questions are: (i) whether or not the US gov admin in power at the time of the PLAN invasion is willing to sacrifice 100,000 or more lives of US servicemen to frustrate such an attempt; and (ii) whether or not the sacrifice of 100,000 or more lives of US servicemen in pursuit of that is worth it. I say its not.
Even if, for the sake of argument, we frustrate that invasion this time around, that is just a chapter in their book entitled "China will never give up on reabsorbing Formosa. Even if it takes 1000 years". The CCCP is not going home after taking a wupping. They live there and stare everyday across the Taiwan straits at their "renegade province"... and it grates upon them. That will never change.
I think the real question is Xi willing to bet his life and his family's fortune on the invasion and aftermath working out well. If it fails, he is gone (prison and execution, Chinese justice is swift) as well as what he and his faction has built/stolen/sent to Swiss bank accounts.
The bet changes if Taiwan declares independence. Then he has to move to keep his position.
"is Xi willing to bet his life and his family's fortune on the invasion"
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Historically, Leaders who are directing an economy which is beginning to (or is) circle the drain have gone to war to unify the citizens against an external enemy instead of them focusing on culpability of their leader in their current economic woes.
Xi and the CCP are facing another major problem> a demographic collapse. Put those 2 mega-trends together and what you are left with (IMHO) is the fact that war w Taiwan is a near certainty. Xi is between a rock and a hard place. His least bad alternative (from the perspective of him and the CCP staying in power) is the Taiwan option.
China wants Taiwan at least as much as Russia wanted Crimea.
Went to the Korean Air Force Staff College with a Taiwanese AF officer. I was not impressed with his willingness to fight, or lack thereof. Great guy but... There was a Taiwanese Navy officer at the sister Navy school on the base who seemed to have a stiffer spine but I still worry about the ROC's will to fight. Even ours isn't that good given how many Americans admire and envy the CCP's system (Don't believe me? Post something critical of the CCP on Reddit or FB and you'll see, even in US military affiliated subreddits/FB groups).
Reddit is a cesspool of leftist & Marxist. Not a reliable source of US citizen sentiment.
Don't forget the bot brigades.
True but it's still disturbing to see so many Americans openly side with the CCP, especially active duty military. And yes, lots of CCP bots on there.
There is little "normal" about the people on Reddit.
The Navy sold old, surplus EW Intercept/Search equipment to Taiwan and with it the training to repair it. In the late 80s we trained two Taiwanese Naval Officers sent to us to learn how to maintain the equipment. Two is a small sample, I know. They were there for a fixed amount of time. Didn't matter whether they passed or failed the test on Friday. They moved on to the next week of training. Both got a certificate of completion. If either had been American I would not have allowed them to graduate. Neither were good students. It rubbed my instructors raw but I told them that they could console themselves when those two students failed and shamed themselves in their jobs back on their ships.