Up-arm the Fleet? With What?

To hell with your RCS. I want more weapons topside, now.

One of the many lessons of the modern air threat against surface ships in the last few years is simple: we need more of everything.

It isn’t really a new lesson. It is an old lesson that our peacetime accountants convinced us to pretend we didn’t know.

Since the first war in which the threat from the air targeted the surface fleet, what was a common thread after D+0 from WWII to the Falklands War?

After cursing those responsible for preparing the fleet for the next war, those tasked to fight the war in front of them would, at the first chance, put every possible weapon possible on their warships.

My favorite example is what the U.S. Navy did with its old battleships the first chance after Pearl Harbor.

The picture at the top of the post is the battleship USS Tennessee (BB 43) after the completion of her rebuild, May 12th, 1943.

• The older single 5-inch/25 cal guns were replaced by eight twin 5-inch/38 caliber dual-purpose gun mounts (totaling 16 guns).

• Ten quadruple 40 mm Bofors mounts and 43 single 20 mm Oerlikon guns replaced 1.1-inch and .50 cal machine guns.

Here she was with her “cleaner” deck from the 1930s.

The Royal Navy reached the point in the Falklands War that they resorted to lining the decks with Seamen firing whatever weapons they could find from rifles to crew-served weapons…as they simply did not have the time to up-arm their ships properly.

Like the sudden realization that they did not quite understand the true nature of the threat from the air in the 1930s, here in the mid-2020s we are suddenly realizing that we don’t fully understand—or more likely were comfortable ignoring those warning of the problem—the high/low threat to warships from the air.

The tan, rested, ready, if the not quite battle-tested People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is comfortably unbothered, moisturized, happy, and staying in their lane as we have been emptying out magazines and wearing out Sailors and ships, They continue to be focused on how to defeat the U.S. Navy should it venture west of the International Date Line in response to a future contingency—the very mission the PLAN was built to execute as the world’s largest navy.

I am quite confident, because, especially in the ballistic missile area, they were ahead of everyone, that the PLAN has a whole mix of threats they are ready to throw at our fleet should it be required.

The Houthi who have been providing us unscheduled range time in the Red Sea for over two years, and Iran from Turkey to UAE over the last year. The Houthi are a fourth-rate threat, and the Iranians are on a good day, a second-rate threat. They are throwing everything from slow drones to anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM) at ships.

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is a first-rate threat…and then some. She will do the same, but better and in higher volume. We need to be ready to face that, and we are not.

Let us set aside the burn rate of our inventory of sea-based missile defense. We’ve covered it here for years, even specifically on the WESTPAC fight, as others have. That is a concern for the high-end fight against ASBM and ASCM.

What about the low-end threat? What about our ships that are simply not ready for a dozen attack drones to come in low, slow, and determined.

As French Adm. Pierre Vandier, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, NATO, told Defense One recently,

“Today, you produce one Patriot for 500 Shaheds. … So you will never win a war against Shaheds with Patriots. That doesn’t happen.”

Just substitute Standard Missiles for Patriot there and you get the challenge at sea.

Let’s look at what our options are today, but first, the problem:

1. Our USNS are unarmed. In some ways, they are “configured for, but not fitted with” defensive weapons. For years I have asked where the weapons are and the people to man them should war come, and only get blinks in return. We will have to find something…and then invent new places to put additional weapons. These ships need to be USS and armed to the teeth, like the Neosho was. Again, I’ve given details often in the past, as recently as last year.

2. We have extra space on all of our ships, from LCS to LPD and everything else. Some are designed for weapons to be added someday; others require space to be found. Whatever we have on them right now, it is not enough, especially for the emerging low-end fight. We need engineers to tell us where we can add weapons…more.

3. We do not have the time to develop new weapons systems. That luxury was consumed by GWOT distractions and naval leadership more interested in Kendi.

The Davidson Window is nigh.

Let’s say we have full adoption of #1 and #2 above, how do we address #3?

Let’s look at what we have to address the high end of the threat, ASBM and latest generation anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM). That has to be put in the “let’s put aside” disclaimer above. We are talking SM-3, 6, PAC-3 MSE, ESSM, and heck, throw SeaRAM. We can’t produce enough of them as is to answer the baseline demand.

No, we need other things that are ready, can be built to scale, don’t cost too much, aren’t too big, and can address the lower end threat in the air and other threats with minimal yard time to install and school time to train.

Now.

Just as the 1943 USS Tennessee was not as “pretty” as the 1930s version, she could survive and win. This won’t be pretty either because we have some options, and here we go.

Boxes.

First in line came across my feed earlier this week.

Lockheed Martin … completed both the first integrated HELLFIRE missile live-fire and vertical-launch test from the company’s new containerized GRIZZLY launcher.

… the launcher demonstrated its ability to load and launch a missile from a 10-foot Tricon container. Built in just six months from proven weapon and launcher architectures, including the fielded M299 system, GRIZZLY delivers cost-efficient, rapid-mobility and low-observable distributed expeditionary weapon delivery capability.

Just look at this. Yes, a shape only a Borg would love…but it puts hate downrange. It also speaks my love language.

The launcher uses commercial off-the-shelf materials, reducing logistics footprint and acquisition cost. … a highly transportable launcher, GRIZZLY is command and control and sensor agnostic, providing an affordable and easily relocatable launcher solution to support any service or mission, anywhere.

More info from TWZ,

(Chris Murphy, senior manager of Business Development for Integrated Air and Missile Defense Advanced Programs)…“you might think of a depth of magazine as being a really large magazine,” Murphy explained. “Another way to achieve depth of magazine is to have several launchers. What we’ve tried to do is take a lot of the cost out of those launchers and use containers where possible.”

“But Sal…” I can hear you say, “…these are Hellfire missiles. I thought we were discussing countering the low end threat from the air?”

…the fact that the Integrated Air and Missile Defense Advanced Programs division led the development of Grizzly points to a clear surface-to-air application for the launcher. The millimeter-wave radar-guided AGM-114L variant of the Hellfire has a demonstrated anti-air capability against various types of drones, which is a particular pressing threat. Loaded with AGM-114Ls and linked to air search radars and other sensors, the containerized launch system could offer a way to rapidly boost air defenses,

We already have a few LCS carrying Hellfire at sea, and Israel has been taking them to sea for years. This opens a huge door. It can be self-powered even. I have also been told that it is fully reloadable in the same way you reload the same launcher when it is attached to a helo.

…and if you don’t think Hellfire is sexy enough…

Hellfire might not be the only missile Grizzly can fire, either. Murphy said that the launcher was designed to allow for the ready integration of additional functionality, including other missiles, down the line “without having to change much of anything.” One obvious candidate would be the AGM-179A Joint Air-to-Ground Missile (JAGM), which is derived from the AGM-114R and can already be fired from many of the same launchers, including the M299. Conceivably, the overall concept could be expanded to a launch system in a larger container with more total missiles.

There is one option. What else would I look to bolt onto any deck the engineers say can support it?

Just look to USS Preble (DDG 88),

In a first for naval warfare, the USS Preble, an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, used the HELIOS (High Energy Laser with Integrated Optical-dazzler and Surveillance) system to shoot down multiple Iranian drones. The 60-kilowatt Lockheed Martin–built laser, deployed off Iran’s coast, delivers precision strikes at the speed of light. This marks the transition of HELIOS from years of development and testing into active combat use.

A third option? There are a host of countries that are building proven remote weapons systems in the 20mm to 40mm range.

One is the Australian company EOS.

The system is designed for low-cost operations, reducing reliance on more sophisticated and expensive counter-drone weapons. A single engagement using the Slinger air defense system costs between $100 and $1,000.

The Slinger integrates radar for target detection and tracking, a stabilized 30mm cannon with specialized ammunition, and precision-pointing technology. It can operate as a standalone unit or as part of a broader networked defense system.

Equipped with day and thermal imaging sensors, it can detect targets beyond 12 kilometers (7.4 miles). The day camera enables recognition at up to 5.6 kilometers (3.4 miles) and identification at up to 4.7 kilometers (2.9 miles).

An upgraded Slinger system was recently unveiled, featuring aided target recognition capability and an autonomy suite designed to improve operational efficiency.

Enough of appreciating the problem. Buy the weapons. Using USNR if necessary, assign and train personnel to go with them. Have them ready to go like any other unit in the active reserve.

The next war won’t give us two years to fix the known problem.

Additionally, no more 57mm as the largest caliber main gun on any warship. You need a 76mm as a minimum to be able to access the best options to engage the low-end threats on and above the water and ashore. Replace them all or relegate them to low-threat/rear-area operations.

Yes, additional weapons will make ships more top-heavy. Yes, there will be additional manning required (the Nevada almost doubled her manning after the 1943 modernization), but to be frank, I don’t care.

To not prepare a warship and her Sailors or auxiliaries’ mariners to go in harm’s way against a known threat is not just unprofessional and unethical, it is immoral.