Nice article and hope the Marine brothers are happy with it. Next question...revived frigate program announced yesterday, supposedly going to start and finish first ship before the legacy Constellations are finished. What is the word (besides several I can think of that aren't polite)?
My point was, that the program was INDUSTRIAL sucsess. It provided a large number of hulls (even of limited use) in reasonable time. So basically it could be relied on to continue pump out LCS-style hulls; the question is how to adapt those hulls to modern Navy demands.
Your choise is between underperforming warships and no warships. Seriously, if USN entered the WW2 with such attitude, the first Essex-class carrier would be finished by 1950s.
The Burkes were the last ships conceived by the old BuShips.
Last Destroyers anyway.
(now you've forced me to break out my Friedman's US Destroyers!!)
Nothing is going to get fixed until Navy Leadership changes the way it thinks about what kind of ships are actually important for the United States Navy.
Not what "I" want.
Keep a close listen. See if CNO Caudle speaks of a new program in the first person...
("I want...")
If you hear that, then you know the USN still has not looked at itself honestly in the mirror.
You continue to do a great job of highlighting the lack of coherence to the USN's vision of the future. Thank you. That lack of coherence highlights the fact that much of the senior leadership has an overinflated sense of their ability to see the future OR (and far more likely) is totally satisfied with the status quo because it benefits them personally. Which highlights the poor quality of the current cohort of USN senior leadership. IMO, YMMV
In my short time in the shipyard, crew size vs automation was always a lively discussion. Stating the obvious: Military requirements for crew are different than a supertanker. Damage control is a major consideration, and obviously weapons employment and endurance during combat operations. Have to point out, the "automated damage control systems" of the early 2000s as tested then were largely ineffective. Not sure if they are better today.
What does that even entail? I don't see R2 units and other cute little droids zipping about stuffing oakum into holes, patching pipes, and welding patches onto the hull.
Seems like the best you could do is counter flood so you sink on an even keel.
Can't go into the details, BUT the conclusion was that the ultimate damage control system was the crew. Also a lot of brow furrowing discussion regarding anti-ship missiles, ship survivability, etc. as one would expect. The ship steel in the Arleigh Burkes is a good design characteristic for many reasons.
I would agree that the ultimate damage control system is the crew.
Anyone who's ever been locked in USS Buttercup with water up to their chest realizes that DC takes lots of people with lots of muscle to get the big holes patched successfully before you have to tread water.
I think the closest we might get at this point is material handling systems that make moving and emplacing the heavy patching and shoring material. Maybe powered exoskeletons, overhead monorails, that type of thing. I can imagine nothing even close to automatic in the foreseeable future.
For decades the courts have ruled on cruel and unusual punishment lawsuits about prison overcrowding, the amount of habitability square footage per inmate. The small crew size will make this new amphib platform not only workable, but humane and equitable, SGT. No more 4 tiered racks with the "top floor" in the steam pipes. Or a 260 lbs Radarman above you who couldn't keep his canvas cinched.
NAVSEA will give us two hull designs made by two shipbuilders which will compete in the field (Yes, "field", but you may infer "sea", Steel City, because you don't get to write the specs) before final acceptance for mass production in a dozen different Congressional districts.
Its actually 18 with 14 other berths so I think 32 is the real number (Also I think the same number as the Benson/Kuroda/ILSV. Plus you have 250 berths for Marines. I am sure those numbers can shift a bit.
The last thing the Navy should do is man the LSM with “main-line” surface warfare officers. This is an ideal MSC manned ship or, alternatively, a Bosun LDO commanded ship. Putting surface warfare officers on this ship that is based on some second island naval base will guarantee the SWOs will get out of the navy after this assignment.
Bosun Warrant or LDO commands, for sure! The Army's General Frank S. Besson class Logistic Support Vessels (LSV) displace 4,200 tons, use a pair of 2,000 hp diesels, make 12 knots, have a range of 6,500 nm, a complement of 31, and are commanded by a W-4.
LDO 612X's and CWO 712X's aplenty too. They all used to come from Deck Group. I'm going to restart my PT program and cross my fingers. I'd do it for just my retirement check.
Who in their right mind wants a j.g. and a couple ensigns, even with a very senior LT in command, running anything with little room for error?
At least not these days. Admittedly, back in WWII you had officers of those ranks in similar positions. But we had a lot more ships, a lot less aversion to accident and combat loss, and a goodly part of the crew, even the senior ratings, didn't have much experience either.
Sure, you may have come from a family of Pensacola Snapper fisherman, but you commission this ship, and immediately take her across the Atlantic to the North African Theater of Operations.
In the grips of a Homeric Mediterranean storm,, a Brit LST, carrying a US Army contingent of Chemical Warfare troops, drags anchor and drifts down into a mine field and finds one. So you take your new ATR with a nearly all green crew, and do your best to lay up alongside the stricken LST in 10 foot seas, to fight the fires, and rescue as many as you can before she sinks.
No sooner than LST-422 sank with heavy loss of life, you get called upon to provide assistance to a Brit Light Cruiser that has been hammered by a Fritz guided bomb. Under air attack, and already damaged from laying alongside the LST, you do what you can, but in the end the effort is futile and you take aboard nearly 500 survivors from the HMS Spartan.
But things are not settling down for you. A merchant, the S.S. Samuel Huntington nearby, has been damaged in the air attack. Her cargo is explosives, but again you bring your yet more damaged tug -now with an astounding number of survivors onboard- to render assistance...Because you are the only assistance to be had.
Its another futile situation, so your ship and another that has arrived evacuate the surviving crew, and stand off getting to a safe distance just as the Huntington's cargo mass detonates, causing yet more damage to your ship and causes more injures among your crew and survivors.
At this point, with the mass of humanity aboard, a now badly damaged ship, you depart the beachhead and head to Naples.
Its a bit of a surprise when you stand into Naples, because you had been reported sunk!
A Lt.jg USNR did all that. And it was not an uncommon feat.
I will submit that only allowing O-5's and above any command authority has actually damaged the US Navy, and is a direct source of the corrosive Zero Defect culture.
As you say, it used to be common. A WWII LSM or LCI was likely a j.g or LT command and there were hundreds.
But I think common people were more...able?...self sufficient? Whatever the word is, could, and did, take responsibility much earlier than we do in our society today.
I'd like to think I could have done command of said LSM 40 years ago as an LT. Certainly there would have had to have been some forbearance for less than master seamanship and other rough edges that a half decade or less at sea hasn't smoothed out.
And I'm sure there are those about now that could do so. But, by and large, as you say, responsibility, and authority, is not pushed upon the current generations as much as it used to be. YMMV, exceptions apply.
Remembering one of Adm. Daniel Gallery’s memoirs, recounting his experiences in command of the Fleet Air Base, Reykjavik. A harbor tug was dispatched to Iceland from Boston in the dead of winter. Gallery said whoever issued the orders should have been court-martialed .
Crew actually kept her afloat by bailing with buckets. Gallery asked the skipper “weren’t they scared stiff?” Skipper replied “They were all pretty green, so I told them bailing ship was a routine maneuver in the Navy!”
That's they way military organizations work. Merchies are basically the same, next guy has to step up if someone is down for some reason. Just not as expected as naval service.
Sadly, we live in a society where zero defects is demanded of all aspects of society. Those of us who do stuff on the business end of the economy know that's not really a thing and have some tolerance. Most folks believe it anymore.
1942, the Marines on Guadalcanal were desperate for resupply. The USS Alchiba was in the roadstead offloading when she was struck by 2 long lances (to be fair the smaller ones on the midget subs)....
When the cargo ship Alchiba (AK-23) fell prey to a Japanese midget sub’s torpedo in 1942, her crew began a relentless campaign— during continuing enemy attacks —to keep her afloat.
Is it legally and internally politically possible to make it an LDO command? The regulations state that command of a commissioned ship must be held by an unrestricted line officer, however, Limited Duty and Warrant Officers can succeed to command of a ship if qualified to perform all deck duties. That's a massive line that would require a great deal of internal political capital to cross.
Second, these ships would be undertaking offensive military operations. Thanks to the attempts to make LCCs MSC ships around 20 years ago, that is not legally possible. Add in any weapons, and MSC will not want to take them.
These ships are transport and logistics ships. They will not conduct “offensive military operations”. LDOs and Warrants are allowed to command ships. How does Army do it? Merchant mariners have always defended themselves during time of war. These ships, if operated by civilian mariners would likely get a military security detachment. The navy cannot afford to man these ships with mainline SWOs. - we do not have enough of them and their current retention rates are bad and will only get worse if you stick a couple hundred JGs and LTs on a bunch of LSMs that sit in a few second island chain ports most of the time when they aren’t transiting at 15 knots to an exercise. We need to find more innovative manning solutions.
Landing troops is the definition of offensive military operations. Are the officers of our existing Amphibious ships somehow less of SWOs because they transit at moderate speeds and lack a heavy armament?
I have doubts that retention will further suffer because officers are given an opportunity to command at sea at a junior grade. Is it the location you have a problem with?
The Army able to officer their LSVs with warrants because they are not part of the Army's core mission set. Shipboard operations are part of the Navy's. Therefore these ships must be under the command of unrestricted line Naval Officers.
You make SWOs do time on these for the same reason you force them to spend time on logistics. So they don't f over the people they're supporting/supposed to be supporting.
CDR S: great summary, I noted the combined CANX of the FFGX and intro of this medium LST, thinking we really can’t get our collective sh*t together on new construction. While the FFGX was also based on a European baseline that we insisted on fiddling with, why is fiddling with this baseline going to be different? Will we fail again? When will we admit we need help and start building some of these in our allies’ yards. I know Congress will have to be persuaded. Maybe with Marines having some say it will slow the gold plating. Thoughts?
* the Navy does not plan to operate combatants initially in the first island chain weapons engagement zone.
* the Marine Corps operating concept under Force Design includes using these ships to place forces in the first island chain.
* the Navy has formal ship construction requirements for survivability. This ship will not meet those requirements.
* So, while the Navy fleet forces, ruggedly built to high survivability standards, do not plan to enter the first island chain on the outbreak of any hostilities, this fragile ship plans to.
* and, while the USMC has reduced the number of littoral regiments which will deploy on these vessels, Marine Corps leadership has not reduced the number of these ships required.
Well, it depends on whether you want to start the war before or after you land on your little island. Given your lack of ability to shoot down a YJ-83, much less a YJ-12, you probably don't want it to go weapons free while you are on your 14 knot transport.
"...."there seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today,"
That quote is and will be applicable to almost every SURFACE warcraft; too soon. A 15 kts will get you killed, quickly. Too quickly. I wrote my first book "Helium Phoenix" 39 years ago; with a chapter titled "Ghost Ships" that suggested a different way to move Marines and material across oceans.
It isn't "Starship Troopers"; but it isn't WWII either. It's real, it's do-able, and it can be NOW, not some ten, seven, five years in the future.
I had already read with interest.... and despair.... about the new Damen 100
I love my good Navy people; and I understand the built-in instant tunnel vision of hulls in the water.........but we need to move past that, or at least be heading that way.
Airships (not glorified balloons) offer incredible advantages.......cheaper to build, faster to build, fewer crew needed, payloads up to 500 tons, no ports or runways needed, 100 kts speeds, no sonar signatures, the same "stealthy" features as B-2 bombers, no concerns over shoals, reefs, mountains, shorelines, beaches.
The DARPA "Walrus" airship program that was intended to create airships capable of carrying "troops from fort to fight in 72 hours"; was mishandled, shortsighted; and cancelled too early.
Navy readers here, bother Marines..........pass the word on to whomever you can; there IS a better way.
Just as you intimate...buoyancy is key. You can build a marine vessel out of 2" thick steel; and it will float on water if it displaces a volume of water greater than it's own weight.
so too an airship. It can also be made of 2" thick steel; and it will float in the air; as long as the volume of air it displaces weighs more than the airship.
this would not be practical, of course.......but an airship made of thinner steel? perhaps. aluminum? certainly.
The last amphib assault was Inchon in 1950. Stop the insanity. We are going to have to use air assets for the last tactical mile in the first island chain. Slow-moving ships will just not survive. Prove me wrong.
Early on, in the early heady days of Force Design 2030 (date since officially Disappeared), there was wistful talk about frugal Littoral Marines living off the land.
Or really fast ships that can get between points inside the enemy's reaction time. Example, 4 CCMs move a platoon in one period of darkness. Stealthy IR and radar signature. Very light amount of men and materiel, but higher odds of getting there. Maybe higher than an unstealthy helo or C-130.
These are not really fast ships. Can we not move men and materiel onto secured or uninhabited islands with V-22s, CH-53s, and/or C-130s? The Marines don’t have tanks anymore. Someone please explain the need?
I think I calculated it would take 57 C-130 sorties to move a Marine anti-ship missile company. Your range if you had all CH-53K which we don't would be 110nm and way more than 57 sorties. Your C-130s would have a 700nm range and still need an air strip. It just doesn't scale.
The proceedings article I am referencing here was looking at it as a way to deploy further from a traditional well deck so as to make the gator more useful at a stand off distance.
" As the Marine Corps considers littoral maneuver inside an adversary’s weapons engagement zone (WEZ), the low signature requirement becomes critical. Current logistics connectors such as the landing craft utility, landing craft air cushion, and MV-22 Osprey do not meet that requirement, especially within the deep battlespace. In addition, positioning amphibious assault ships deep inside a WEZ to launch surface connectors is unrealistic, sacrifices the element of surprise, and exposes the ships to enemy missiles. Given enemy radar and antiair capabilities, the use of assault support aircraft also may not always be an option."
The scale of resupply that will be needed in the post Ukrainian War expenditure world will far outstrip anything the SWCC could deliver.
Besides, as its the JSOC assets that do our heavy lifting these days, they will have their hands full elsewhere (hopefully it won't be with their bloodied backsides...).
If the LST survives NAVSEA, how about a Frigate? Mexico's Naval Shipyard in Salina Cruise Oaxaca built 66% of the Damen designed SIGMA 10514 frigate. The Dutch company supplied the engineering and command modules starting in August 2017 and the Mexican Naval shipyard built the rest. The FFG launched on November 23, 2018, completed sea trials in December 2019.
According to the video there was a 45 meter long gash in the hull. Lack of knowledge and poor DC training contributed to the grounding. The Crew failed to close watertight doors upon evacuation. Perhaps the Norwegian Navy is too small to effectively evaluate ships before a loss, and to train crews adequately. I know that the US Navy had a huge effort on surface ship survivability. DC training was part of everyone's basic training at Great Lakes. Are these two elements still the case? I don't see this as a show stopper for a foreign designed and perhaps foreign built light frigate.
Methinks they were just waved along by the Brits, and puts their FOST in a pretty bad light.
Anyway, the official report is slam full of CYA by Navantia, and the Norwegian Navy. (I have been a party in a NTSB investigation, so I know a little bit about such things work).
Yes, there was a 150 foot gash down the Ingstad's side, but because the engineering spaces ...well space... flooded quickly because the shaft -which was actually hollow with the controls for the variable pitch prop running through it- allowed water past the one bulkhead and water poured inot the engine room with no way of stopping it. They call that lack of bulkhead permeability.
And, because the wide open main space had all the main engine components, and critically, emergency pumps, there was little the crew could do.
Even if they had put up a harder fight to save the ship.
In the reduction gear room, the engine assistant observed that the flexible coupling for the gear was under water on the starboard side and that the water level was rising rapidly.
The personnel made attempts to start pumping and at the same time stop the ingress of water by driving wedges into the crack in the flexible coupling on the port side. Because access was difficult, they were only able to drive in five wedges, which did not appear to help. As the water crept up their legs, the crew realised that it was not possible to stop the leakage. The engine assistant therefore informed the MEO in HQ1 that they would lose the reduction gear room. Two portable FLYGT pumps had been rigged in the reduction gear room, but the water was still rising, so there was nothing more the crew could do.
Problems operating the portable bilge pumps delayed damage control efforts, as cablesand hoses for these pumps had been pulled through doors and hatches between watertight compartments.
The MEO observed at the CCTV that water was entering the reduction gear room through the shafts, however, he did not understand why such amounts of water could come out since the room was not a part of the damaged area.
After receiving confirmation of flooding of the reduction gear room, the MEO was informed that a certain amount of water was also ingressing into the aft main engine room. Water was coming in through the stuffing boxes for the drive shaft from the two diesel-operated main engines. Personnel were therefore sent to the forward main engine room to check the status, where they observed that some water was coming in through thebulkhead feedthrough for the gas turbine shaft. At the time when the forward main engine room was abandoned before evacuation, it was almost empty of water.
Lots of US content in those ships too. I've played with them a lot and I really think if they were used in US service they would still need to grow a smidge. Our comparable gear is just bigger and heavier.
15 Kts? What is this, the Second World War??? Freaking Merchants these days average 20. This thing is a clay pigeon waiting for some light assault ship, PT boat, Submarine, or Maritime patrol aircraft commander to say "pull". And when it takes damage, that corporals guard of a crew isn't going to be able to put the fires out and stop the flooding, so I hope the commandant plans to cross train his Marines in DC.
The Commandant of the Marine Corps has assured everyone that these ships will be able to "hide in plain sight" amongst background ship traffic, and that our intel will perform always flawless I&W to sneak them out of the WEZ before the first shot!!!
They played a bunch of simulated wargames to prove it!!!!!
My question is if the Army is going to jump in with the Navy on this and figure out how to move Tanks/Brads ship to shore or if we were a one hit wonder on D-Day.
They really need to work together and the Marines need someone to tell them their job is to innovate amphibious warfare. Why are we buying LCU-1700 and the army took a crack at innovation with MSVL?
Amphibious warfare was innovated: delivering troops via aircraft.
The next innovation would be some kind of troop carrier sub that could slip through and extend some kind of water-tight umbilical to offload troops to the beach in the night or something.
They can only be the Navy's Army for so long before someone starts asking why we have two separate major ground combatant services.
From working with the MSC, they are all very worried about hull punctures from fairly normal operations, to the point of specifying fendering for port to operate out of. Not a good idea for a boat designed to be banged around carrying heavy cargo.
Pardon my ignorance when it comes to all things floating, but obviously the Marines needed to operate the gear might be a tight squeeze on this ship. Even if they have the space for the Marine drivers, how are the grunts getting on board? Helicopters?
What’s the point in having amphibs if we don’t use them?
During the brawl with the Houthis we made no attempt to seize the islands off of Yemen. Why not?
Not that this matters. I am sure some admiral will change the design of one compartment on the ship which will require a complete redesign. He will retire with a Legion of Merit and the ship will cost twice as much.
Nice article and hope the Marine brothers are happy with it. Next question...revived frigate program announced yesterday, supposedly going to start and finish first ship before the legacy Constellations are finished. What is the word (besides several I can think of that aren't polite)?
Its either Saudi MMSC or Taiwan's International frigate, or both.
MMSC or something like that on basic on LCS hulls seems more promising. After all, LCS program supplied more than 35 ships in about 20 years.
The first LCS wasn't commissioned until 2008.
And six have been decommissioned.
The remaining ones are of little use still.
The LCS supplied paychecks and shareholder value...
And the grist for sad jokes.
But thats about it.
My point was, that the program was INDUSTRIAL sucsess. It provided a large number of hulls (even of limited use) in reasonable time. So basically it could be relied on to continue pump out LCS-style hulls; the question is how to adapt those hulls to modern Navy demands.
Except "pumping out more LCS-type hulls" is adding more garbage in the overflowing pit.
No matter what Lockheed Martin's marketing department may peddle, the MMSC is an overweight pig barge of a hull that won't meet the USN's needs.
The Austal hull is fragile and weight and seastate limited. So its not a big benefit for a purported "Global Navy" either.
As for any type of "INDUSTRIAL" success, neither Austal USA, nor Fincantieri Marinette are coming out of the lost LCS years as economic powerhouses.
We've wasted two decades on this crap, and it needs to cease.
Your choise is between underperforming warships and no warships. Seriously, if USN entered the WW2 with such attitude, the first Essex-class carrier would be finished by 1950s.
I'd rather see the International Frigate but the FMM has proven they can build the MMSC. That counts for a lot these days.
Again, Andy...
Why?
The only reason is because they exist at the moment.
And neither really fits the USN's needs.
You are kind of proving that today's Navy can't see what it needs beyond what the Defense Industry has for sale.
Its not my olan. Ask Phelan.
I am talking about your fondness for the MMSC.
You mistake fondness for playing the cards that have actually been dealt. The international frigate is likely a much more appropriate design.
Still, no reason to play the game with that deck.
If the USN can't formulate a coherent force structure instead of just going to the Military Industrial Store, and buying the glitzy door showcase...
Then give the money to the Air Force.
I sometimes get the impression the Surface Navy doesn't know what it wants other than Burkes.
Quite so...
The Burkes were the last ships conceived by the old BuShips.
Last Destroyers anyway.
(now you've forced me to break out my Friedman's US Destroyers!!)
Nothing is going to get fixed until Navy Leadership changes the way it thinks about what kind of ships are actually important for the United States Navy.
Not what "I" want.
Keep a close listen. See if CNO Caudle speaks of a new program in the first person...
("I want...")
If you hear that, then you know the USN still has not looked at itself honestly in the mirror.
If thats the choice, then just fold 'em and go home.
You continue to do a great job of highlighting the lack of coherence to the USN's vision of the future. Thank you. That lack of coherence highlights the fact that much of the senior leadership has an overinflated sense of their ability to see the future OR (and far more likely) is totally satisfied with the status quo because it benefits them personally. Which highlights the poor quality of the current cohort of USN senior leadership. IMO, YMMV
This kind of waste is saddening.
First reactions...
- how will N95/NAVSEA add bells and whistles to mess this up similar to FFGs?
- we always underestimate crew size.
- if construction starts early next year why will it take 3 years to finish?
In my short time in the shipyard, crew size vs automation was always a lively discussion. Stating the obvious: Military requirements for crew are different than a supertanker. Damage control is a major consideration, and obviously weapons employment and endurance during combat operations. Have to point out, the "automated damage control systems" of the early 2000s as tested then were largely ineffective. Not sure if they are better today.
"automated damage control systems"
What does that even entail? I don't see R2 units and other cute little droids zipping about stuffing oakum into holes, patching pipes, and welding patches onto the hull.
Seems like the best you could do is counter flood so you sink on an even keel.
Can't go into the details, BUT the conclusion was that the ultimate damage control system was the crew. Also a lot of brow furrowing discussion regarding anti-ship missiles, ship survivability, etc. as one would expect. The ship steel in the Arleigh Burkes is a good design characteristic for many reasons.
Is the cabling multi redundant via separate paths and protected?
How about the servers? Are there multiple servers in separated positions and protected. Ditto for cameras and sensors?
For the above, is power supplied at multiple points, and can the network be segregated and remain viable?
I am betting all that is a big fat NO.
The design and construction standards won't go beyond what you see here:
https://maritimeexpert.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/imo-fss-code-international-code-for-fire-safety-systems.pdf
Good questions. If all the items that you addressed were potentially added, any ides of what that would do to the cost?
How much does it cost to lose a battle?
After all, it's just dead sailors. SGLI is a different pot of money, so who cares.
I would agree that the ultimate damage control system is the crew.
Anyone who's ever been locked in USS Buttercup with water up to their chest realizes that DC takes lots of people with lots of muscle to get the big holes patched successfully before you have to tread water.
I think the closest we might get at this point is material handling systems that make moving and emplacing the heavy patching and shoring material. Maybe powered exoskeletons, overhead monorails, that type of thing. I can imagine nothing even close to automatic in the foreseeable future.
O ye of little faith. AI will give us nanobots for that LT Nemo.
Well that's great...
...for nano holes.
LOL!
small crew size makes the LCC workable
I'm having a hard time picturing this ship because my mind defaults to a 1990 LST and LCAC, which obviously are completely different ships.
The Army built these (8) 4000 ton ships with a crew of 31, 40 years ago. Slightly slower. Did the Navy talk to the Army?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_Frank_S._Besson-class_support_vessel
Yes. The Benson's built recently for Israel, ILSV, was the ship being built at Bollinger subsequent to this announcement.
For decades the courts have ruled on cruel and unusual punishment lawsuits about prison overcrowding, the amount of habitability square footage per inmate. The small crew size will make this new amphib platform not only workable, but humane and equitable, SGT. No more 4 tiered racks with the "top floor" in the steam pipes. Or a 260 lbs Radarman above you who couldn't keep his canvas cinched.
NAVSEA will give us two hull designs made by two shipbuilders which will compete in the field (Yes, "field", but you may infer "sea", Steel City, because you don't get to write the specs) before final acceptance for mass production in a dozen different Congressional districts.
To quote the video, the design "will be tailored to each shipbuilder's specific production process."
Its actually 18 with 14 other berths so I think 32 is the real number (Also I think the same number as the Benson/Kuroda/ILSV. Plus you have 250 berths for Marines. I am sure those numbers can shift a bit.
The last thing the Navy should do is man the LSM with “main-line” surface warfare officers. This is an ideal MSC manned ship or, alternatively, a Bosun LDO commanded ship. Putting surface warfare officers on this ship that is based on some second island naval base will guarantee the SWOs will get out of the navy after this assignment.
Bosun Warrant or LDO commands, for sure! The Army's General Frank S. Besson class Logistic Support Vessels (LSV) displace 4,200 tons, use a pair of 2,000 hp diesels, make 12 knots, have a range of 6,500 nm, a complement of 31, and are commanded by a W-4.
LDO 612X's and CWO 712X's aplenty too. They all used to come from Deck Group. I'm going to restart my PT program and cross my fingers. I'd do it for just my retirement check.
Makes good sense.
Who in their right mind wants a j.g. and a couple ensigns, even with a very senior LT in command, running anything with little room for error?
At least not these days. Admittedly, back in WWII you had officers of those ranks in similar positions. But we had a lot more ships, a lot less aversion to accident and combat loss, and a goodly part of the crew, even the senior ratings, didn't have much experience either.
"Who in their right mind wants a j.g. and a couple ensigns, even with a very senior LT in command, running anything with little room for error?"
There was time when this was routine.
And the Navy has suffered from pushing the "edge of Real Responsibility" upward.
A replug of this book.
https://www.amazon.com/are-Sinking-Send-Help-Mediterranean/dp/1888265485
Imagine yourself a Reserve Lt.(jg), the commissioning skipper of the first in class large Salvage Tug.
https://www.shipscribe.com/usnaux/ATR/atr01d-08.jpg
Sure, you may have come from a family of Pensacola Snapper fisherman, but you commission this ship, and immediately take her across the Atlantic to the North African Theater of Operations.
In the grips of a Homeric Mediterranean storm,, a Brit LST, carrying a US Army contingent of Chemical Warfare troops, drags anchor and drifts down into a mine field and finds one. So you take your new ATR with a nearly all green crew, and do your best to lay up alongside the stricken LST in 10 foot seas, to fight the fires, and rescue as many as you can before she sinks.
No sooner than LST-422 sank with heavy loss of life, you get called upon to provide assistance to a Brit Light Cruiser that has been hammered by a Fritz guided bomb. Under air attack, and already damaged from laying alongside the LST, you do what you can, but in the end the effort is futile and you take aboard nearly 500 survivors from the HMS Spartan.
But things are not settling down for you. A merchant, the S.S. Samuel Huntington nearby, has been damaged in the air attack. Her cargo is explosives, but again you bring your yet more damaged tug -now with an astounding number of survivors onboard- to render assistance...Because you are the only assistance to be had.
Its another futile situation, so your ship and another that has arrived evacuate the surviving crew, and stand off getting to a safe distance just as the Huntington's cargo mass detonates, causing yet more damage to your ship and causes more injures among your crew and survivors.
At this point, with the mass of humanity aboard, a now badly damaged ship, you depart the beachhead and head to Naples.
Its a bit of a surprise when you stand into Naples, because you had been reported sunk!
A Lt.jg USNR did all that. And it was not an uncommon feat.
I will submit that only allowing O-5's and above any command authority has actually damaged the US Navy, and is a direct source of the corrosive Zero Defect culture.
USS ATR-1 War Damage Report:
https://catalog.archives.gov/id/78288500
War Diary (last image is first page of document)
https://catalog.archives.gov/id/78301830?objectPage=16#object-thumb--16
As you say, it used to be common. A WWII LSM or LCI was likely a j.g or LT command and there were hundreds.
But I think common people were more...able?...self sufficient? Whatever the word is, could, and did, take responsibility much earlier than we do in our society today.
I'd like to think I could have done command of said LSM 40 years ago as an LT. Certainly there would have had to have been some forbearance for less than master seamanship and other rough edges that a half decade or less at sea hasn't smoothed out.
And I'm sure there are those about now that could do so. But, by and large, as you say, responsibility, and authority, is not pushed upon the current generations as much as it used to be. YMMV, exceptions apply.
It is something that can be remedied.
True. But how long will it take?
You don't school responsibility, you give it. It's amazing what kids can accomplish if the "adults" get out of the way.
Remembering one of Adm. Daniel Gallery’s memoirs, recounting his experiences in command of the Fleet Air Base, Reykjavik. A harbor tug was dispatched to Iceland from Boston in the dead of winter. Gallery said whoever issued the orders should have been court-martialed .
Crew actually kept her afloat by bailing with buckets. Gallery asked the skipper “weren’t they scared stiff?” Skipper replied “They were all pretty green, so I told them bailing ship was a routine maneuver in the Navy!”
Bravo. One might say, “qualifications” are overrated in many cases. A Canoe U grad probably would have run away.
I’m a retired merchie captain, in a family full of long-serving Navy. Surface, submarine, aviation. I get what’s going on.
If I disappeared, every one of my deck and engine officers would step up to the plate and get the job done.
I remind everyone that Nimitz ran aground.
That's they way military organizations work. Merchies are basically the same, next guy has to step up if someone is down for some reason. Just not as expected as naval service.
Sadly, we live in a society where zero defects is demanded of all aspects of society. Those of us who do stuff on the business end of the economy know that's not really a thing and have some tolerance. Most folks believe it anymore.
And, looking at the ATR, it was the same dimensions (but less horsepower) than one of my commands.
Therein lies the problem with the modern, US Navy "Enterprise".
It doesn't much care about Command at Sea, except to check a "joint" box at the O-5 level.
And everyone wonders why the USN (Enterprise) can't build a ship.
As for civilian manning, its a mistake to keep the AO's and last couple AOE''s USNS.
They are not manned to cope with battle damage
And all this cruise ship style "automated damage control" will fail too.
When will we hear about how close to sinking the USNS Bighorn got off Oman?
https://news.usni.org/2024/09/24/oiler-usns-big-horn-damaged-off-the-coast-of-oman-no-fuel-leak-detected
https://www.youtube.com/shorts/Zm8XiyefTQA
Does it matter?
Why yes. It does.
Case in point:
1942, the Marines on Guadalcanal were desperate for resupply. The USS Alchiba was in the roadstead offloading when she was struck by 2 long lances (to be fair the smaller ones on the midget subs)....
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/af/USS_Alchiba_%28AK-23%29_aground_and_afire_off_Lunga_Point_in_November_1942.jpg
Her crew mounted a heroic DC effort, that enabled the ship to stay afloat to complete her offload of surviving supplies, and they also saved the ship.
Oh, and she ate another torpedo during all that effort...
https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/1996/june/only-her-crew-kept-her-afloat
Only Her Crew Kept Her Afloat
When the cargo ship Alchiba (AK-23) fell prey to a Japanese midget sub’s torpedo in 1942, her crew began a relentless campaign— during continuing enemy attacks —to keep her afloat.
The War Damage Report:
https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/rep/WDR/U.S.S.%20ALCHIBA%20(AKA-6),%20TORPEDO%20DAMAGE%20-%20Solomon%20Islands,%20November%2028%20and%20December%207,%201942.pdf
While an 18 crew civil manned, automated damage control ship may sound real spiffy and efficient...
And then buy just enough to meet that bare minimum needed (minus one or two).
Its a great way to, Build To Lose.
Nice ideas, but lots of problems.
Is it legally and internally politically possible to make it an LDO command? The regulations state that command of a commissioned ship must be held by an unrestricted line officer, however, Limited Duty and Warrant Officers can succeed to command of a ship if qualified to perform all deck duties. That's a massive line that would require a great deal of internal political capital to cross.
Second, these ships would be undertaking offensive military operations. Thanks to the attempts to make LCCs MSC ships around 20 years ago, that is not legally possible. Add in any weapons, and MSC will not want to take them.
"Second, these ships would be undertaking offensive military operations. Thanks to the attempts to make LCCs MSC ships around 20 years ago"
That's when I knew the Navy had lost the plot.
So, the Admiral takes an Uber ride to battle at sea.
The Navy couldn't be bothered to man its own Fleet Flagship.
Part of it was the LCC’s are in the tiny number of ships with oil fired steam. Another wage of transformatonalism and “business cases”.
These ships are transport and logistics ships. They will not conduct “offensive military operations”. LDOs and Warrants are allowed to command ships. How does Army do it? Merchant mariners have always defended themselves during time of war. These ships, if operated by civilian mariners would likely get a military security detachment. The navy cannot afford to man these ships with mainline SWOs. - we do not have enough of them and their current retention rates are bad and will only get worse if you stick a couple hundred JGs and LTs on a bunch of LSMs that sit in a few second island chain ports most of the time when they aren’t transiting at 15 knots to an exercise. We need to find more innovative manning solutions.
Landing troops is the definition of offensive military operations. Are the officers of our existing Amphibious ships somehow less of SWOs because they transit at moderate speeds and lack a heavy armament?
I have doubts that retention will further suffer because officers are given an opportunity to command at sea at a junior grade. Is it the location you have a problem with?
The Army able to officer their LSVs with warrants because they are not part of the Army's core mission set. Shipboard operations are part of the Navy's. Therefore these ships must be under the command of unrestricted line Naval Officers.
You make SWOs do time on these for the same reason you force them to spend time on logistics. So they don't f over the people they're supporting/supposed to be supporting.
SWOs don’t serve on logistics ships. There is a small communication detachment that is typically led by a chief petty officer.
Informative, thank you.
My father served on the fast rescue boats during WW2:
https://hellish2050.substack.com/p/imagine-a-non-biased-bbc-imagine
CDR S: great summary, I noted the combined CANX of the FFGX and intro of this medium LST, thinking we really can’t get our collective sh*t together on new construction. While the FFGX was also based on a European baseline that we insisted on fiddling with, why is fiddling with this baseline going to be different? Will we fail again? When will we admit we need help and start building some of these in our allies’ yards. I know Congress will have to be persuaded. Maybe with Marines having some say it will slow the gold plating. Thoughts?
I am counting on the Marines to forcefully oppose attempts to gold plate this ship.
The Marines have their friends in Congress.
For one, they already use U.S. built diesels unlike the Italian Fremm.
Informative, thank you.
My father served on the fast rescue boats during WW2:
https://hellish2050.substack.com/p/imagine-a-non-biased-bbc-imagine
Consider:
* the Navy does not plan to operate combatants initially in the first island chain weapons engagement zone.
* the Marine Corps operating concept under Force Design includes using these ships to place forces in the first island chain.
* the Navy has formal ship construction requirements for survivability. This ship will not meet those requirements.
* So, while the Navy fleet forces, ruggedly built to high survivability standards, do not plan to enter the first island chain on the outbreak of any hostilities, this fragile ship plans to.
* and, while the USMC has reduced the number of littoral regiments which will deploy on these vessels, Marine Corps leadership has not reduced the number of these ships required.
Yep. Not designed to go in harm's way. Moving things to semi prepared / benign environments perhaps.
They will be ...by definition...High Value Targets in the eyes of an opponent.
And they will be dispatched accordingly.
The "hide in plain sight" plan is a joke.
Those maritime militia vessels are not following them, they are just coincidentally on the same course.
That's why there's an accidental over-requisition of Javelins.
Well, it depends on whether you want to start the war before or after you land on your little island. Given your lack of ability to shoot down a YJ-83, much less a YJ-12, you probably don't want it to go weapons free while you are on your 14 knot transport.
I like the practically being shown.
If we can maintain discipline and avoid trying to turn an LST into an DDG, we should be OK.
I don't think the Marines will let that happen.
"...."there seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today,"
That quote is and will be applicable to almost every SURFACE warcraft; too soon. A 15 kts will get you killed, quickly. Too quickly. I wrote my first book "Helium Phoenix" 39 years ago; with a chapter titled "Ghost Ships" that suggested a different way to move Marines and material across oceans.
It isn't "Starship Troopers"; but it isn't WWII either. It's real, it's do-able, and it can be NOW, not some ten, seven, five years in the future.
I had already read with interest.... and despair.... about the new Damen 100
I love my good Navy people; and I understand the built-in instant tunnel vision of hulls in the water.........but we need to move past that, or at least be heading that way.
Airships (not glorified balloons) offer incredible advantages.......cheaper to build, faster to build, fewer crew needed, payloads up to 500 tons, no ports or runways needed, 100 kts speeds, no sonar signatures, the same "stealthy" features as B-2 bombers, no concerns over shoals, reefs, mountains, shorelines, beaches.
The DARPA "Walrus" airship program that was intended to create airships capable of carrying "troops from fort to fight in 72 hours"; was mishandled, shortsighted; and cancelled too early.
Navy readers here, bother Marines..........pass the word on to whomever you can; there IS a better way.
Hmm...gravity vs. buoyancy.
Just as you intimate...buoyancy is key. You can build a marine vessel out of 2" thick steel; and it will float on water if it displaces a volume of water greater than it's own weight.
so too an airship. It can also be made of 2" thick steel; and it will float in the air; as long as the volume of air it displaces weighs more than the airship.
this would not be practical, of course.......but an airship made of thinner steel? perhaps. aluminum? certainly.
(just for fun....do a search for "ZMC-2")
The last amphib assault was Inchon in 1950. Stop the insanity. We are going to have to use air assets for the last tactical mile in the first island chain. Slow-moving ships will just not survive. Prove me wrong.
I don't think they intend to do a beach assault. This is strictly to move heavy equipment onto secured or uninhabited islands.
Watched intently by maritime militia vessels and by PLAN orbital radars.
As the Marine Littoral outposts will be a primary threat to the Chinese, do you think they will just ignore them prior to hostilities?
These bases get pummeled on Day 1, and the idea of C-130 support will be an evaporated dream.
What happens on Day 3 of the war when those isolated and battered Marines need more missiles, food, and fuel?
How will all that get there?
Champagne wishes and caviar dreams.....
And not a small bit of belief in unicorns and rainbows.
....with skittles instead of MRE's....
Can't make it up....
Early on, in the early heady days of Force Design 2030 (date since officially Disappeared), there was wistful talk about frugal Littoral Marines living off the land.
ISYN
https://www.facebook.com/marines/posts/skills-to-surviveofficers-assigned-to-the-basic-school-participate-in-a-foraging/10157908455400194/
Or really fast ships that can get between points inside the enemy's reaction time. Example, 4 CCMs move a platoon in one period of darkness. Stealthy IR and radar signature. Very light amount of men and materiel, but higher odds of getting there. Maybe higher than an unstealthy helo or C-130.
These are not really fast ships. Can we not move men and materiel onto secured or uninhabited islands with V-22s, CH-53s, and/or C-130s? The Marines don’t have tanks anymore. Someone please explain the need?
I think I calculated it would take 57 C-130 sorties to move a Marine anti-ship missile company. Your range if you had all CH-53K which we don't would be 110nm and way more than 57 sorties. Your C-130s would have a 700nm range and still need an air strip. It just doesn't scale.
Are we talking platoons or companies on these islands?
Both. Littoral regiments are something like battalliins and a headquarters company. Idea is 9 lsm move 1 regiment.
Our plan for the next Pacific War is a thousand Wake Islands.
They'll be praying for an old fashion 5" gun and some 30.06 ......
Bullshite.
I can see crew boat wakes in the Gulf 100 miles away at altitude...visually.
Annnd. How will all this fuel be delivered forward and staged?
The proceedings article I am referencing here was looking at it as a way to deploy further from a traditional well deck so as to make the gator more useful at a stand off distance.
Which Proceedings article?
I will fisk it the evening.
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/june/outsource-littoral-maneuver-nsw
I did see that article...
Its just another wistful fever dream.
He sinks his thesis with this:
" As the Marine Corps considers littoral maneuver inside an adversary’s weapons engagement zone (WEZ), the low signature requirement becomes critical. Current logistics connectors such as the landing craft utility, landing craft air cushion, and MV-22 Osprey do not meet that requirement, especially within the deep battlespace. In addition, positioning amphibious assault ships deep inside a WEZ to launch surface connectors is unrealistic, sacrifices the element of surprise, and exposes the ships to enemy missiles. Given enemy radar and antiair capabilities, the use of assault support aircraft also may not always be an option."
The scale of resupply that will be needed in the post Ukrainian War expenditure world will far outstrip anything the SWCC could deliver.
Besides, as its the JSOC assets that do our heavy lifting these days, they will have their hands full elsewhere (hopefully it won't be with their bloodied backsides...).
The LSM's are not intended for opposed beach assault...
Here is official gouge:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=STc-F4H373E&t=131s
Goofy as the plan is.
OK good clarification - but they are still supposed to operate inside the A2/AD zone during hostilities? Sounds…perilous.
If the LST survives NAVSEA, how about a Frigate? Mexico's Naval Shipyard in Salina Cruise Oaxaca built 66% of the Damen designed SIGMA 10514 frigate. The Dutch company supplied the engineering and command modules starting in August 2017 and the Mexican Naval shipyard built the rest. The FFG launched on November 23, 2018, completed sea trials in December 2019.
Spanish F100 already has Aegis and other US systems. Or let the Porch design one.
The Helge Ingstad was the same parent design. Her claim to infamy is how fast she sank...
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cS_gxjl20PE
They need a whole lot more fixes in terms of compartmentalization, and bulkhead permeability.
And the Ingstad's "semi-automated DC systems" were both inadequate and poorly understood by the crew.
According to the video there was a 45 meter long gash in the hull. Lack of knowledge and poor DC training contributed to the grounding. The Crew failed to close watertight doors upon evacuation. Perhaps the Norwegian Navy is too small to effectively evaluate ships before a loss, and to train crews adequately. I know that the US Navy had a huge effort on surface ship survivability. DC training was part of everyone's basic training at Great Lakes. Are these two elements still the case? I don't see this as a show stopper for a foreign designed and perhaps foreign built light frigate.
The cause of the sinking was the gross incompetence of the crew, and a Captain, that is the biggest weasel of CO you could imagine.
The ship was in its home waters on crystal clear night, managed to not see a 1000 ft tanker and ran right into it.
Gobsmakingly inexcusable.
Also, the ships had gone through the Royal Navy's FOST, and passed with flying colors...
https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/locations-and-operations/bases-and-stations/fost
Methinks they were just waved along by the Brits, and puts their FOST in a pretty bad light.
Anyway, the official report is slam full of CYA by Navantia, and the Norwegian Navy. (I have been a party in a NTSB investigation, so I know a little bit about such things work).
Yes, there was a 150 foot gash down the Ingstad's side, but because the engineering spaces ...well space... flooded quickly because the shaft -which was actually hollow with the controls for the variable pitch prop running through it- allowed water past the one bulkhead and water poured inot the engine room with no way of stopping it. They call that lack of bulkhead permeability.
And, because the wide open main space had all the main engine components, and critically, emergency pumps, there was little the crew could do.
Even if they had put up a harder fight to save the ship.
https://msiu.gov.mt/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/PDF-Safety_Investigations_by_Other_Countries-2021_05.pdf
In the reduction gear room, the engine assistant observed that the flexible coupling for the gear was under water on the starboard side and that the water level was rising rapidly.
The personnel made attempts to start pumping and at the same time stop the ingress of water by driving wedges into the crack in the flexible coupling on the port side. Because access was difficult, they were only able to drive in five wedges, which did not appear to help. As the water crept up their legs, the crew realised that it was not possible to stop the leakage. The engine assistant therefore informed the MEO in HQ1 that they would lose the reduction gear room. Two portable FLYGT pumps had been rigged in the reduction gear room, but the water was still rising, so there was nothing more the crew could do.
Problems operating the portable bilge pumps delayed damage control efforts, as cablesand hoses for these pumps had been pulled through doors and hatches between watertight compartments.
The MEO observed at the CCTV that water was entering the reduction gear room through the shafts, however, he did not understand why such amounts of water could come out since the room was not a part of the damaged area.
After receiving confirmation of flooding of the reduction gear room, the MEO was informed that a certain amount of water was also ingressing into the aft main engine room. Water was coming in through the stuffing boxes for the drive shaft from the two diesel-operated main engines. Personnel were therefore sent to the forward main engine room to check the status, where they observed that some water was coming in through thebulkhead feedthrough for the gas turbine shaft. At the time when the forward main engine room was abandoned before evacuation, it was almost empty of water.
Lots of US content in those ships too. I've played with them a lot and I really think if they were used in US service they would still need to grow a smidge. Our comparable gear is just bigger and heavier.
15 Kts? What is this, the Second World War??? Freaking Merchants these days average 20. This thing is a clay pigeon waiting for some light assault ship, PT boat, Submarine, or Maritime patrol aircraft commander to say "pull". And when it takes damage, that corporals guard of a crew isn't going to be able to put the fires out and stop the flooding, so I hope the commandant plans to cross train his Marines in DC.
No. No. Silly!
The Commandant of the Marine Corps has assured everyone that these ships will be able to "hide in plain sight" amongst background ship traffic, and that our intel will perform always flawless I&W to sneak them out of the WEZ before the first shot!!!
They played a bunch of simulated wargames to prove it!!!!!
Ohhhhh Kaaaay, good luck with that, I'ma gonna sit way over here, and eat popcorn.
"amongst background ship traffic,"
Business as usual in a war zone, eh? And absolutely no unfriendly prying eyes on that "background ship traffic" to snitch?
What the hell, the stakes are small (for me), I'll call.
PS
Since there is "background ship traffic" am I to understand that all those operations are to be limited to established shipping lanes?
Do the Houthis have a problem finding their targets?
My question is if the Army is going to jump in with the Navy on this and figure out how to move Tanks/Brads ship to shore or if we were a one hit wonder on D-Day.
given that the USMC seems to be giving up that mission...
They really need to work together and the Marines need someone to tell them their job is to innovate amphibious warfare. Why are we buying LCU-1700 and the army took a crack at innovation with MSVL?
Amphibious warfare was innovated: delivering troops via aircraft.
The next innovation would be some kind of troop carrier sub that could slip through and extend some kind of water-tight umbilical to offload troops to the beach in the night or something.
They can only be the Navy's Army for so long before someone starts asking why we have two separate major ground combatant services.
Because LCU-1700 has a design requirement to fit in a well deck, while MSVL does not.
You could design a tri-hull for a well deck too and then we have something both services can buy instead of a dead program ending at 5 ships.
An aluminum one?
From working with the MSC, they are all very worried about hull punctures from fairly normal operations, to the point of specifying fendering for port to operate out of. Not a good idea for a boat designed to be banged around carrying heavy cargo.
And yet we've had them around for a long time with new ones being built all the time.
Pardon my ignorance when it comes to all things floating, but obviously the Marines needed to operate the gear might be a tight squeeze on this ship. Even if they have the space for the Marine drivers, how are the grunts getting on board? Helicopters?
Specs show berthing for 250 Marines. They walk up the gang plank just like everyone else.
Thanks for the clarification.
What’s the point in having amphibs if we don’t use them?
During the brawl with the Houthis we made no attempt to seize the islands off of Yemen. Why not?
Not that this matters. I am sure some admiral will change the design of one compartment on the ship which will require a complete redesign. He will retire with a Legion of Merit and the ship will cost twice as much.
since the 2030 USMC doesn't need them, maybe we can turn them into cute UAV tanker bases for our short legged Naval Air
"since the 2030 USMC doesn't need them"
Huh?
Generals Smith,Heckle, et al, are adamant the LSM is a centerpiece of Force Design!
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=urFRFRwgccs
I stand corrected.