What Europe Should, Could, and Would do in a Great Pacific War

friends in need...may just have to deal with it

In the half-decade that I spent on the Continent, trying to help prod NATO to help in Afghanistan, I found it helpful when looking at what each troop contributing nation could or would do, to look at three things:

1. Will: Does that nation want to be part of the fight? Do they see this in their national interest? Are they willing to invest the blood, treasure, and risk to get in the fight?

2. Capacity: What can they really contribute? How large is their military? Is it trained for the mission? Do they even have the ability to deploy and sustain themselves in an expeditionary manner?

3. Desire: That may not be the best word for it, but it is as close as I can get. Perhaps the Germans have a word that fits, but what this manifests itself in from an operational point of view is in “national caveats” or just stick-to-itiveness. In it to win, but doing just enough to get your flag on the patch with a quick exit if needed?

Moving from the failed effort in Afghanistan to the events today in the Red Sea, we can see this playing out again. Those three cornerstones apply. Last year, the British did some strikes with us, but the strikes of the last few weeks? No, it is America alone. Even though the vast benefit of an open Red Sea goes to Europe, no European is to be seen.

That little chain of thought hit my mind when I first read the January article in War on the Rocks, Can Europe Fight for Taiwan? by Luis Simón and our friend Toshi Yoshihara.

It is a much broader article, than the small bit I will pull for today’s post, so please give it a full read. It is also a great companion piece to yesterday’s Substack, as it turns the table on the entering argument.

As opposed to what will America do to help Europe should it find itself in a bit of military bother to its east, what could Europe do to help the USA and should it find itself in a shooting war, again, against the People’s Republic of China? I like to call it a Great Pacific War, but good chance it would spread to the Indian Ocean as well.

Beyond the Western Pacific, the mostly likely theater of hostile contact would be the Indian Ocean, where the Chinese navy has kept a rotating naval flotilla since 2008, and where China maintains a permanent military base in Djibouti. The Chinese navy’s globalizing posture and its doctrinal intent to stage a global presence suggest that horizontal escalation that leads to a multi-theater conflict is a distinct possibility. Mike McDevitt suggests that if a cross-strait war involved the United States, the conflict would likely escalate rapidly into a global naval war, with the U.S. Navy and Chinese navy clashing wherever they met around the world. As Aaron Friedberg further observes, the Chinese navy’s relative weakness in the Indian Ocean might tempt it to “get in the first blow” to knock the United States off balance and thereby compel U.S. forces to divert resources from the central front in the Pacific to that secondary theater.

I’m with McDevitt here. Wars have their own logic, and unless one side or the other fails inside 180 days, momentum will draw more parties directly or indirectly into the fight. If it contains itself like the Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022 has so far, we would be lucky.

Even if it does, remember the three cornerstones at the top. Let’s assume that there would even be the Will and Desire to help the USA and her allies in the Pacific by a few nations. Some, like the UK, might feel obligated to do something because most likely her Commonwealth ally Australia—who has done so much to fight the UK’s 20th century wars—would be in the fight. Maybe New Zealand…maybe.

France would send forces into the Pacific as well, but though nice letters would be spent, the smart money would be that she would be focused on keeping her significant Pacific holdings secure. I wouldn’t even bet on USA having access to any of those territories. I’d give the odds at 50/50.

The rest of Europe? No Desire, no Will, and only marginal Capacity. Perhaps a token squadron or bespoke capability? Perhaps.

There is one area that a few could help with, but only the UK and France could offer.

Nuclear submarines.

Among the various exquisite systems that Europe could offer, its undersea capabilities, particularly nuclear-powered attack submarines and, to a lesser extent, diesel-electric attack submarines stand out. European navies boast a combined fleet of 66 submarines, among which are 7 British Astute- and 6 French Barracuda-class nuclear-powered attack submarines. The mobility, range, and endurance of nuclear-powered attack submarines would allow Britain and France to swing the attack boats from European waters to the Indo-Pacific, even if the persistence of the Russian threat in the North Atlantic may limit their availability. It is also worth noting that the weeks it would take for these submarines to reach their stations in Asia, if they began their transits in Europe, mean that the warring sides have likely settled into a protracted war.

A network of homeports and support facilities, especially those located outside the Chinese military’s weapons engagement zone, such as Hawaii and Diego Garcia, would be available to European nuclear-powered attack submarines. Although Guam and Yokosuka would almost certainly come under attack in a widened conflict, they may offer some degree of support in wartime. Moreover, starting in 2027, Australia’s HMAS Stirling will be home to Submarine Rotational Force-West, comprising forward-staged U.S. and U.K. nuclear-powered attack submarines. In other words, leaning more on submarines would build on existing infrastructure and ongoing initiatives, thereby reducing duplication of effort.

The Anglo-French SSN fleet numbers 13 boats. Using the optimistic “it takes three to make one” formula, that gives you four operational boats.

Assuming a Great Pacific War will require the USA to pull almost all its operational forces from Europe to the Pacific, there will be a significant—and smart—argument in Europe that they need to keep their forces at home to cover any threat from their east should it arise, and to secure the Atlantic that has largely been abandoned by the Americans.

As such, any fight in the Pacific would be lucky to get 50% of available operational units. That gives us… two SSN.

Not nothing, but a rounding error in a Great Pacific War. I would give it 2/3 odds that the national caveats would limit them to operations south of Singapore and east of Guam.

So, in the end, with the Great Pacific War, we should not count on much from Europe for this fight. Perhaps some security for Australian airspace and territorial seas, but that would be about it.

America, Japan, Australia would face the blunt of it, odds are over Taiwan, but maybe not. Probably bringing in The Philippines and if we are lucky, Vietnam. Even if the war expands into the Indian Ocean, the smart money would be that India would want nothing to do with it. If it did, you would have a completely different set of variables to examine. Consider India out of the fight as well.

That is what we should plan for.