What Happened to Command Accountability and Responsibility?

Guest post by John C. Harvey, Jr, Admiral, USN (Ret)

Where have we as an organization drifted in the last quarter century when it comes to addressing command accountability and responsibility in our newly structured “Enterprise” components and the focus on a static understanding of “efficiency” in an organization that exists, ultimately, for combat “effectiveness.”

Today we have the pleasure of a guest post on just this topic from John C. Harvey, Jr., Admiral, USN (Ret).

Admiral, over to you.

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In his recent post discussing SecNav’s actions in Guam after seeing first-hand the unacceptable conditions in the Palau Hall barracks for the Sailors and Marines billeted there, CDR Salamander touched on a number of issues that collectively point to two closely related areas of supreme importance to the Navy - first, the dilution of command accountability and responsibility and second, chains of command lacking clear lines of authority, accountability and well-defined reporting relationships.

Indeed, as reported in the Task & Purpose Newsletter, in a 5 May email followup to SecNav’s actions in Guam, VADM Scott Gray, Commander Navy Installations Command, “... called the conditions of the Guam barracks a “failure of leadership” across multiple commands, stating that the barracks are “clearly way outside any reasonable standard” and “clearly lack any sense of ownership.”

When the investigation is completed regarding the decision to place our Sailors and Marines in grossly substandard barracks, I suspect it may be difficult to either clearly identify the “decision-owner” or find evidence of a strong, sustained response by the unit commanders involved standing up for the welfare of their people.

These same issues of lack of clear leadership and accountability and blurred lines of responsibility, authority, and accountability within the relevant command structures figured prominently in the 2021 Red Hill fuel leak disaster, the July 2020 BONHOMME RICHARD fire and the 2017 FITZGERALD/MCCAIN collisions.

Given that the Navy is an organization that, since its establishment on 13 October, 1775, has taken great pride in its tradition of clear and absolute command accountability accompanied by strong and unambiguous chains of command, should these recent events that have cost the Navy so dearly in lives, resources and reputation be taken as warning signs that something fundamental may be amiss in how the Navy applies time-tested and combat-proven command and control principles across a wide range of operational and administrative issues?

My concern over this issue, significant command and control flaws that may have been “baked into” the Navy’s organization over the past 25 years, is not a new one. Indeed, it was foremost in my mind when I took command of US Fleet Forces in July 2009 and I worked the problem hard with my Pacific Fleet counterparts throughout my tour.

And the problem needed to be worked, and worked hard. Fundamental to mission accomplishment is a commander’s ability to command and control assigned forces. Effective C2 enables prompt and unambiguous communication of the commander’s intent and direction to subordinates, so that they may be able to execute assigned missions and be held accountable for the results. Because a breakdown in C2 puts lives and mission at risk, its effectiveness must be the focus for every commander. And when competing priorities overshadow effective C2, commanders must make timely course corrections or risk mission failure.

In March, 2012, I co-authored, along with Capt David Grogan, JAGC, USN and Cdr Anthony Mazzeo, JAGC, USN (Ret), an article in Proceedings that told the story of our most excellent C2 adventure, a story that started with a sweeping realignment of the Navy’s Fleet organizations and the OPNAV staff initiated by Admiral Vern Clark shortly after he became CNO in July, 2000.

Admiral Clark’s vision was bold - he believed a single, unified Fleet commander was the most effective and efficient means for overseeing the manning, training and equipping of the Navy’s Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. With this realignment, the establishment of US Fleet Forces to coordinate, establish and implement integrated requirements and policies for both Atlantic and Pacific Fleet units and the designation of COMNAVAIRPAC, COMNAVSURFPAC and COMNAVSUBLANT as both the “lead TYCOMs” and their respective warfare community leaders, sought to shift the Navy’s center of gravity from Washington, DC to the Fleet.

Admiral Clark’s goal was “a highly unified Fleet that, although deploying from different coasts, draws upon a shared and streamlined organization to complete the same training; executes common tactics, techniques, and procedures ; and operates seamlessly around the world.”

In a parallel effort with the movement toward a unified Fleet commander and significantly empowered lead TYCOMs was the promulgation in 2002 of the Sea Enterprise component of Sea Power 21 with its focus on the business efficiencies of the Navy, harvesting savings and reinvesting them in the systems and platforms that would provide the foundation of the 21st century Navy.

A major roadblock in achieving Admiral Clark’s goals came after the initial major organizational changes discussed above were made in the Fleet and on the OPNAV staff when the FY 2004 Defense Appropriations Act prohibited the expenditure of funds to transfer ADCON or operational control of Navy forces from COMPACFLT to CUSFFC.

And here’s where fundamental C2 problems for the Navy began to develop - although this Congressional action effectively took the unified Fleet commander option off the table, the organizational constructs established to achieve that goal remained in place. Crucially, the absence of clearly defined boundaries allowed the warfare community Enterprises to expand their behavior far beyond the collaborative behavior originally intended to facilitate cooperation and integration. The Navy’s chains of command began to erode in ways large and small that affected both Fleets and all the warfare communities.

It was this insidious erosion of our C2 structures and chains of command that I sought to reverse during my tour at Fleet Forces. The full story of our efforts is told in the article linked earlier, Course Corrections in Command and Control. I wish I could say that we solved all the C2 problems we found, but it’s now clear to me that we did not.

While a great deal was accomplished, I believe a bias has been developed in our Navy over the past 25 years against taking the time and making the effort to ensure that command relationships and practices inconsistent with core C2 principles are identified and corrected and that the absolute requirement for clear and unambiguous C2 is front and center for commanders at every level.

The warfare community Enterprises that exist today essentially employ consensus-driven decision-making in pursuit of greater efficiencies. At times, how this consensus was achieved and then implemented across many organizational C2 boundaries to achieve the hoped-for efficiencies is neither clear or unambiguous. And for a Fleet commander, the ultimate bottom-line is effectiveness, mission accomplishment, not necessarily efficiency. The inherent tension between the results of Enterprise cross-organizational collaborative behavior driving policy and controlling resources and the singular accountability of a commander for assigned missions can be significant.

In addition to the possible institutional lack of focus and the below-the-radar impact of the long-standing Fleet organizational mis-match - a Fleet that is neither fully unified or fully separated - that either yields or overlooks sloppy C2 (a key contributor to the mission failures mentioned earlier - the Red Hill fuel leaks, the BONHOMME RICHARD fire and the FITZGERALD/JOHN S MCCAIN collisions), there also appears to be an accompanying issue of eroding command accountability.

These two issues go hand-in-hand - if you can’t clearly identify who is responsible for the mission, then neither can you identify who is accountable for accomplishing, or failing to accomplish, the mission. And how can you assign or delegate authority if you cannot determine responsibility?

I need to acknowledge that it's been a few years since I retired and now I’m just one more guy up in the cheap seats cheering myself hoarse for the team that wears Navy blue.

But at one time I held some senior positions “down on the field” and was privileged to see many of these issues from the inside. And now, from my observations since I retired, even from a distance, I believe I see evidence that work is necessary to refocus on the fundamental C2 issues that are absolutely crucial for mission accomplishment.

On 13 October, 1775, the Continental Congress adopted a resolution establishing the US Navy,

“Resolved, That a swift sailing vessel, to carry ten carriage guns, and a proportionable number of swivels, with eighty men, be fitted, with all possible despatch, for a cruise of three months, and that the commander be instructed to cruize eastward, for intercepting such transports as may be laden with warlike stores and other supplies for our enemies, and for such other purposes as the Congress shall direct.

That a Committee of three be appointed to prepare an estimate of the expence, and lay the same before the Congress, and to contract with proper persons to fit out the vessel.

Resolved, that another vessel be fitted out for the same purposes, and that the said committee report their opinion of a proper vessel, and also an estimate of the expence."

Clear direction was given to the commander - he was told to get underway, seek out and either capture or destroy enemy transports of the most powerful navy in the world - and his accountability for mission accomplishment was to the Congress.

The requirement for clear, unambiguous C2 and absolute command accountability are no less in the Navy of 2025 than in the Navy of 1775.