What is the Shelf Life of Intel Reports?

looks to be about 5 weeks or less

Amazing how fast things can change. Just five weeks ago, the Defense Intelligence Agency published its 2025 Worldwide Threat Assessment.

Read it at the link, but let’s just look at pages 17 and 18, part of the assessment on Iran.

Talk about overcome by events. Light a candle for the Iran team that spent so much time arguing about every word, every clause … trying so hard to get the Ouija board to help them see what people should expect.

Don’t get me wrong, intel assessments and reports are important—but too often you find that people will use them as if they are written by magical beings with unique powers to see the future. They aren’t. They are usually smart people in hard jobs doing the best to find a consensus opinion with the knowledge in hand—and releasable at the classification level of the product.

Never be shy about challenging them.

I’ll bold and italic those things that, as of this Wednesday, are well overcome by events.

IRAN AND ITS PROXY FORCES

Israeli military strikes against Iran’s Axis of Resistance and Islamic Revolutionary Guard CorpsQods Force (IRGC-QF) senior leadership since October 2023 have prompted Iran to directly retaliate against Israel, a departure from its preferred strategy of avoiding direct military confrontation while permitting independent partner- and proxy-led action. Iran has attempted to exploit the Israel-HAMAS conflict to internationally isolate Israel, expand its regional influence, and enhance the capabilities of its Axis of Resistance; these actions continue to threaten sparking protracted regional conflict.

» Iran almost certainly will attempt to rearm Hizballah and continue providing lethal aid to Iraqi Shia militias, Syrian militants, and the Huthis to impose costs on Israel and threaten U.S. interests. The Huthis resumed strikes in March 2025 following Israel’s resumption of combat operations in Gaza.

» In December 2024, Iran withdrew all Iranian personnel from Syria due to the Asad government’s collapse, almost certainly disrupting Iran’s ability to reconstitute Hizballah’s strategic munitions stockpiles. The loss of influence with the Syrian government also diminishes Iran’s regional prestige and will hinder its ability to project influence within Lebanon and Syria-based Shia communities.

Iranian Military Activity

In the next year, the persistent threat of direct attacks against Iran may compel Iran to further pivot from its predominantly reactive military strategy to a more proactive, direct approach in an effort to deter a full-scale conflict and threats to Iranian leadership. Iran’s retaliation in April 2024 for Israeli attacks on Iran’s consulate in Syria marked the first instance of direct Iranian conventional involvement in the crisis. Iran used approximately 300 missiles and UAVs in the attack. In October 2024, Iran conducted a second strike against Israel using approximately 200 missiles, claiming retaliation for a series of attacks against Iranian, Hizballah, and HAMAS senior officials. With each exchange, Iran grappled with how to balance its perceived need to reestablish deterrence against attacks with the risk of escalating the conflict into a broader regional war.

» Iran probably will focus future investments on improving the range, accuracy, lethality, and reliability of its missile and UAVs to deter and respond to others’ actions. During the past year, Iran has also increased cyberattacks, cyberespionage, and information operations against Israel while supporting regional proxies and partners to conduct UAV and missile attacks against Israeli territory.

» Israel’s calibrated airstrikes against Iranian interests have demonstrated Israel’s ability to reach targets anywhere in Iran, and Israeli leaders probably are reserving the option to target more sensitive Iranian targets. Israel will continue to depend on its layered missile defenses to defend against larger barrages of Iranian airstrikes such as those in 2024, but management of interceptor missile stockpiles probably will be required during future attacks. Over the course of the coming year, Iran probably would respond to a U.S.-led “pressure campaign” by authorizing expanded proxy attack campaigns against U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria, pressing Gulf partners to prevent U.S. or Israeli military action from their territory, and targeting U.S.-affiliated shipping in the Persian Gulf. Iran almost certainly will seek to avoid direct conflict with the United States but also will continue assassination plotting against current and former U.S. officials in retaliation for the 2020 death of IRGC-QF Commander Qasem Soleimani, and against Israeli and Jewish targets globally.

WMD Capabilities

Iran almost certainly is not producing nuclear weapons, but Iran has undertaken activities in recent years that better position it to produce them, if it chooses to do so. Since 2019, Iran conducted activities that exceed previous Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) limits, including increasing the size and enrichment levels of its uranium stockpile, producing small quantities of uranium metal, restricting International Atomic Energy Agency monitoring to preJCPOA levels, and expanding uranium enrichment at its Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant. These actions reduce the time required to produce sufficient weapons-grade uranium for a first nuclear device to probably less than one week. Iran also continues to pursue advancements related to its chemical and biological weapons programs.

» Iran senior leaders probably have not decided to restart its pre-2003 nuclear weapons program, but since April 2025, Iranian officials have threatened to revisit their nuclear doctrine if its nuclear facilities were attacked.

» Iran probably is pursuing central nervous system-acting chemicals for offensive purposes and probably has not abandoned its intention to conduct research and development of biological agents and toxins.

A few notes:

• Why insist on spelling “Huthis” when almost everyone else spells it “Houthis”? Same as “Hizballah“ when everyone else in the Anglosphere continues to use “Hezbollah.“ It is embarrassing and a bit arrogant in the same way as during the Obama years when they constantly tried to make ISIL happen instead of ISIS.

• Iran, should its present government survive, will have to spend every cent it has trying to rebuild its own capabilities. It won’t have the time or money to boost its proxies. Their proxies will be an economy of force operation even more than they already were for years—or will simply be left to be destroyed piecemeal.

• Iranian deterrence failed spectacularly.

• Even if the bombing were to stop tomorrow, Iran’s ability to improve quantitatively and qualitatively has been set back at least half a decade.

• It is “put up or shut up” time for Iran. If they were going to make the call to strike the USA, now would be the time. If the present government survives, they will attempt to get some payback, perhaps on their own schedule.

• I am assuming that the ongoing bombing campaign is directed at all of Iran’s chemical, biological, and nuclear capabilities. Again, if the government survives, then I would expect them to regrow them…and possibly be more dangerous as a result…or if you will…as dangerous has they would have been anyway, just at a later date.

Given all the points above, I’m not sure whether the Israeli Air Force can do what needs to be done on its own. American might have to help finish the job should the Iranian leadership remain in power.

Time for a century of air power theory to try, once again, to prove it can work. I’m not sure it can, but it might be worth a try to use the bunker buster bombs the B-2 can carry that were designed just for this. Of course, when we use them, we now show what needs to be done to build to defeat them—but here we are.

Oh, regime change? That is up to the Iranian people.

This is a punitive expedition, nothing more—if we are smart.

GBU-57 for all my aircrew.