Long-term members of the Front Porch know I have been banging this drum on my blog for almost 20 years; Riverine. Why Riverine? Well, simple. We are a maritime and aerospace power with global reach. Projecting power from the sea is our comparative advantage. As the planet’s geography is as diverse as its people and from time immortal rivers and nearshore archipelagic waters have been critical logistics and mercantile assets, we have to be ready on Day-1 to contest and control those waters. If we are going to ask our men and women to put their lives on the line for international adventures, then the only moral thing to to make sure we have a diverse enough toolset to give them what they need should the unexpected arrive. Given our inability to get most of the future threats right, expect the unexpected.
We all know that Phib is a heretic of the first order. He expects the Navy to effectively defend the country, instead of helping with climate change and DIE.
Range. No tube artillery piece currently in existence can match the range of a GMLRS M30 or M31 rocket, much less an ATACMS missile or the Precision Ranged Strike Missile that is currently being deployed to MLRS/HIMARS units. Infantry mortars can cover indirect fire needs within the minimum range of the rocket artillery. Excalibur rounds for a 155mm still have a shorter range than an M26A2 rocket. A South African G-6 155mm - one of the finest produced - has a maximum range with rocket-assisted rounds of 60km - the M30 and M31 series rounds can reach 90+km, the EM-GMLRS rockets can reach 150km, and M48/57 ATACMS fired from an MLRS system have a range of up to 300km, with GPS guidance systems (with a 500 pound charge instead of the 24 pound M795 bursting charge (and DPICM rounds carry proportionally more submunitions). The rockets have a greater range and charge than the 175mm M107, 240mm M1, the Mark 71 8'55 caliber naval gun, the 203mm M110 with a rocket assisted projectile, the Russian 152mm 2A65, the 152mm 2A36, or the 180mm S-3. The Hyundai WIA CN98, like the G-6, with a rocket-assisted round can approach the range of an M26-series rocket with a smaller charge, but can't match the more modern rockets.
Between mortars and guns, you have a tradeoff- the mortar has a larger bursting charge because lower muzzle velocity allows thinner shell walls, but the higher velocity of the gun gives greater range. With rockets, you get even greater range than the gun but a higher charge than the mortar. The launcher and mount are far lighter than any gun system with comparable range would be,
My opinion is that this would not make it into the 2030 USMC Inf Bn. Their MLR (Marine Litoral Rgt) is 1/3 the size of today's Rgt, with emphasis on observation, long range missiles, anti-air and stay behind. Very few riflemen. The Rgt has 1, not 3 Inf Bn and it loses 200 troops
It worked very well at Midway. In truth, it worked well at Wake. A mere 399 ground troops and 50 airmen held off a force of 2 CVs, 2 CAs. 3 CLs, 6DDs, 2 PGs, 2500 SNLF landing troops, one AS, three SS, and ground-based air out of Guam for 15 days, sinking two destroyers and two patrol boats, destroying 31 aircraft, and inflicting over 1,000 casualties. Had a relief force been available without excessive risk after the Pearl Harbor attack, it likely could have held. The Wake garrison was had only 18 out of 144 M2.50 MGs on their TOE and 30 out of 48 authorized M1917 .30 MGs. They had only a single fire director for their 3" AA guns instead of the authorized 4, and were short a battery of 2 of the guns. The riflemen carried bolt Action 1903 Springfields, having not yet transitioned to semiautomatic M1 Garands and M1 carbines. The support company did not have the air search radar it was authorized, nor enough men to man all of the weapons it DID ship with - the handful of navy personnel and civilians with Pan-American Airways and Morrison-Knudsen Engineering (construction crews) were given a hurried familiarization and sued to flesh out gun crews. The half of VMF-211 present had just arrived on the island, had yet to zero in the guns on their Wildcat fighters, and were short of ammo and spare parts.
Wake Island had NO garrison in 1938. The 1st MDFB first arrived in August,1945 and was, as noted, understrength.
Seize? Is that actually part of the doctrinal mission set? Do they actually practice making opposed amphibious assaults with their spiffy new units?
My understanding is that they were supposed to. before the war starts, have their 14 knot mini-freighters sneak onto some island conveniently located and set up camp where the PLA will never expect them. Exactly how they plan to sink the PLA Maritime Militia that is following them around and also shoot down the geosynchronous SARSat that is tracking them without starting a war is part of the "then the magic happens" phase.
They could have the LCUs quickly if Navy Sea Systems would pull out the old WW2 LCU or LST designs - or the modern Army designs - and order units based on those proven models. THAT, however, would not justify jobs for marine engineers the way drawing up brand new designs and specifications would.
In real options, VT completted 2 additional Kurooda-type Bessons for Israel before starting the Icebreakers.
The Navy literally can't get their simple LCU-1700s built. They ordered Swiftships to stop work as he delays and project management were so bad. Now Austal is picking up the work, but they are already behind on their new steel line.
I say get crafty with ESD/ESB and EPF for starters.
It is a return to the pre-WW2 Marine Defense Battalion concept, such as the forces that garrisoned Midway, Wake, Johnston Atoll, American Samoa, Guantanamo Bay, New Caledonia, Iceland, Pearl Harbor, and forward bases throughout the war. Their standard organization was an HQ company, a service company of six platoons with searchlights and radar/sound locating gear, three batteries of two 5"/51 caliber dual purpose guns, 4 batteries of 3" AA guns, six companies of 24 M2 machine guns on AA mounts, and two beach defense companies each with 24 M1917 water cooled .30 machine guns. It WAS an effective organization, as the 6th MDB at Midway and the 1st MDB at Wake Island proved.
It is NOT an organization designed to assault Pelilieu or Iwo Jima. It is one more optimized to use a forward island as a point to control nearby seaways without risking a large force - or to spread a large force out across an island chain to deny an enemy access to a large area of ocean. It really makes sense in terms of a conflict with the PRC- it basically reflects their strategy of building small bases around the China Sea to extend their control. The appropriate criticism is not that it won't work for the mission it is designed for, but that the extent that the commandant is seeking to reorganize the WHOLE Corps around it is myopic and costs the Corps the operational flexibility it has established a well-deserved reputation for having that the Army lacks.
Even worse, that single Inf. Bn. is tasked to provide troops for "multiple platoon-reinforced-size expeditionary advanced base sites" and, no doubt, security for the MLR's logistic *Battalion* and the "robust regimental headquarters with enhanced signals and human intelligence, reconnaissance, communications, logistics planning, civil affairs, cyber, and information operations capabilities. "
And even if the USMC somehow managed to get some, what would they mount it on! The ACV 2.0 could probably sustain the weight of the Turret, but probably not the 120mm mortar projectiles without drowning the four man crew of the ACV…
We could have a boat that could move it and the men for less than the ACV. Less land maneuver in favor of more water maneuver and speed. From the sea......
Autoloader for the NEMO is located in the Hull, not in the Turret! Other than the three man crew just for the mortar alone and the driver, there isn’t enough room for the additional support marines…
Nemo is available in a 20' shipping container. I am talking about dropping that on a landing boat. Let other boats have a troop module to move them under protection.
I worked with a retired LDO LCDR SeaBee a decade after I retired from the Navy. When he was a CE1 in Vietnam his team built bases for the Marines. He said that an Ontos vehicle would often escort them en route to a job and that there was no shortage of young SeaBees who wanted to ride on the vehicle and act as loader or just sit topside with an M-14. Though it had other missions, he said the Ontos was most often used to fire fleshette rounds into the jungle to suppress any incoming gunfire. He kind of thought of it as a morale weapon, good for us, bad for whoever they shot at.
The chose some bizarre French mortar that uses ammo not compatible with Army 120mm mortars (which are Israeli Soltam K6 mortars) and than figured out a way to pay $200,000 for a custom golf cart (growler) to tow it on and off the V22. Except the golf carts kept breaking and the mortar couldn't apparently be towed onto the V22 and apparently needed to be man-handled by the crew onto and off the V22. It seems like a tale of fail reminiscent of the little crappy ship, except that they didn't keep buying them a decade after they admitted it was an unworkable disaster. And cost far less.
Probably to the great relief of the poor devils assigned to operate it. From the pictures I have seen, the muzzle was so high off the ground the loader needed a 3 ft. platform to stand on as he dropped the round down the tube. That might be okay as long as the opposing force didn't shoot back, but it seems to me you would go through loaders pretty fast if anybody actually shot back.
The history of the Corps is sucking hind tit to the Army on new equipment. Only in Korea were the Marines better equipped than the Army. At the end of WW2, Commandant Archie Vandegrift used funds to create warehouses at MCB Camp Pendleton and grabbed all the surplus gear he could when the Army began disposing of it. As a result, when the Army had to fall back before the North Koreans because their old 75mm Sherman tanks, M20 75mm recoilless rifles, and 2.75" bazookas were ineffective against NK T-34/85 tanks, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade entered the war with M26 Pershings, 3.5" Superbazookas, M4A3R8 flamethrower Shermans, LVT-4 amtrac armored personnel carriers, selective fire M2 carbines, and M29 Weasels for forward logistics,
I don’t know if it’s simply sucking hind tit or simply not being interested! The U.S. Army has been interest in the AMOS twin 120mm auto mortar since at least 2006 and the NEMO since at least 2018, whereas the USMC seemed to have developed absolutely no interest in either in the same timeframe! The only 120mm mortar the USMC seems to be interested in is the lightweight 120mm EFSS (Expeditionary Fire Support System) which is light enough to be air transportable by a helicopter and/or towed by an M1161 Growler or Polaris Utility Task Vehicle…
The jarheads abandoned the 120mm first, alas. Now, a small "boat" with one of these, some RAM and ESSM, would be a great little armed transport for moving littoral units around....
Yeah, I think manned MUSV or similar. Look at Arialah class from the UAE. Swap that Mk 110 for one of these 120s, use our 30mm Mk 38s instead of Marlin's. Ditch the boats for Mk 70 launchers or ADL launchers quad packed with GMLRS. Ditch the lilly pad and there is room for plenty more. Keep the RAM launcher.
Yep - lightweight ATGMS are reaching the point Jerry Pournelle predicted 40 years ago in "The Mercenary." At least on the defensive, you get more bang for the buck with a bunch of Javelins distributed across your infantry.
Any river is a "strait". Riverine craft must be able to avoid being hit or, failing that, able to survive hits. They are easier to see and range on than tanks; and tanks haven't been doing all that well against modern AT weapons and FPV drones.
Tanks used by militaries that even outdo the USN in terms of bad maintenance. 120mm mortar will be the big gun; but a couple .50 Gatlings will be very useful for slicing up drones and AT crews, causing command-guided missiles to well, miss.
Kornet and it's knockoffs aren't fire and forget. Everyone wants FaF, but they often end up command-guided, or unguided. RPG-X is pretty deniable support for locals, TOW and Milan as well. Javelin types, not so much.
The ultimate goal of sea control is so that you can control all the waters up to the enemy's shore and into his rivers and hit him from any direction where there is water flowing to the sea. If you don't build the shallow water stuff, we may have spent a lot of money, but never taken full advantage of the control purchased so dearly.
You need it to deny the enemy maneuverability and the logistics support that rivers provide - as Grant and Foote so successfully demonstrated in the Civil War.
Don't forget this mortar can also be delivered in a 20' container system. Plus that Finnish boat is just a pretty normal landing boat with a composite top dropped on. If we had smaller, high-speed landing boats they could potentially step in to a variety of roles. Well deck size creates some limitations here. We really need a flat area to load boats by crane or submersion like the ESDs offer.
The mistake you make is in not understanding the goal of the government when sending our best & brightest to combat. (NOT “war,” which is the use of all national assets to alter the behavior of an adversary, bending them to our will, but combat without war, than which nothing is more immoral.)
Anyway, by not grasping the goal - not understanding the problem - the methods defined (tactics, strategy, weapons systems) will not, because they cannot, be adopted by those setting policy.
Simply, America’s national goal on the battlefield since 1950 has been to not win. To not defeat an adversary our goal-setters demand to engage.
While Korea can be ambiguous, the annual costs of our small tripwire that, in no case would initiate a mobilization to victory, are tremendous. That we rejected an easily-attainable victory across 20 years in each of Vietnam and Afghanistan is not ambiguous in the least.
(That our entire chain of command, from SecDef to platoon leader willingly sends our kids out to kill and die knowing they would not be allowed to win, that their deaths and injuries would be in vain, is grossly immoral and inexcusable, but that’s another subject.)
What have we accomplished in ref: weapons systems?
A single-screw destroyer that had to be towed back into port.
A single-engine fighter now projected at $1.7T, with less than a 30% Op readiness that’s of absolutely no use in fighting illiterates in sandals and pajamas.
The best CAS aircraft in the world - that USAF keeps trying to retire because fighter jocks run the AF - it should belong to the Army & Marines, but that would require tossing Key West, which is long overdue.
Rotting ICBMs and their W88 payloads, when any real war on the horizon will be encouraged by our increasing lack of ability to respond. If deterrence, isn’t, then it doesn’t, and won’t.
Anyway. Because our policy goal of the past 80 years is funding the Complex, the longer we are able to keep our wars going, the harder we try to NOT defeat our adversaries, the more money the Complex makes, and the more money those in congress make on insider trading from which laws they have exempted themselves.
Your knowledge and suggestions would, in a sane country that valued its men and women, be relevant.
But we don’t want to win. Do your ideas are counterproductive to our leadership.
Oops. The Z is two-screw.I recall reading - years ago - of a new class of DD with a single screw. Can't find it today. Perhaps another on this page knows...?
Wrong decision after wrong decision, or at least decisions clearly impacted by blindness, there must be something rotten at the core for so many "accidental" mistakes. What is actually happening to end up with a 300-or-so Navy, with no real littoral or riverine assets? What the heck?
Well, we have an admiral for each ship, and who wants to get 100 ton boat covered with guns instead of a 3000 ton basically unarmed water skiing platform?
"Not all naval requirements demand a CVN or SSN."
There you go again! Thinkin' your heretical thoughts!
BTW, the picture of that boat with its 'elevated' weapon is much too masculine.
That picture probably triggered a Karen or two... lol
We all know that Phib is a heretic of the first order. He expects the Navy to effectively defend the country, instead of helping with climate change and DIE.
I want one.
120 mm smoothbore? hmmmm.
Corps is leaving tanks behind. this seems a nice fit to replace em.
and dropping 3/4 of their tube arty, but adding rockets
And what is all this rocket? I'm a simple old fat 46 driver but to me it is inconceivable that rockets can replace artillery.
anti ship stuff. 100-300km, harpoon, tlam, NSM, etc
Range. No tube artillery piece currently in existence can match the range of a GMLRS M30 or M31 rocket, much less an ATACMS missile or the Precision Ranged Strike Missile that is currently being deployed to MLRS/HIMARS units. Infantry mortars can cover indirect fire needs within the minimum range of the rocket artillery. Excalibur rounds for a 155mm still have a shorter range than an M26A2 rocket. A South African G-6 155mm - one of the finest produced - has a maximum range with rocket-assisted rounds of 60km - the M30 and M31 series rounds can reach 90+km, the EM-GMLRS rockets can reach 150km, and M48/57 ATACMS fired from an MLRS system have a range of up to 300km, with GPS guidance systems (with a 500 pound charge instead of the 24 pound M795 bursting charge (and DPICM rounds carry proportionally more submunitions). The rockets have a greater range and charge than the 175mm M107, 240mm M1, the Mark 71 8'55 caliber naval gun, the 203mm M110 with a rocket assisted projectile, the Russian 152mm 2A65, the 152mm 2A36, or the 180mm S-3. The Hyundai WIA CN98, like the G-6, with a rocket-assisted round can approach the range of an M26-series rocket with a smaller charge, but can't match the more modern rockets.
Between mortars and guns, you have a tradeoff- the mortar has a larger bursting charge because lower muzzle velocity allows thinner shell walls, but the higher velocity of the gun gives greater range. With rockets, you get even greater range than the gun but a higher charge than the mortar. The launcher and mount are far lighter than any gun system with comparable range would be,
My opinion is that this would not make it into the 2030 USMC Inf Bn. Their MLR (Marine Litoral Rgt) is 1/3 the size of today's Rgt, with emphasis on observation, long range missiles, anti-air and stay behind. Very few riflemen. The Rgt has 1, not 3 Inf Bn and it loses 200 troops
"Very few riflemen" ?
m'god; where did my Corps go? shameful, tragic, pointless to the nth degree
(gonna take my M-14 off in a huff, and pout)
Oh, it's got a point. That's the problem - it's a point design intended to seize mini-islands in the South China Sea. And do nothing else.
Right. Like Wake Island in 1938. Remember how that worked out for us?
It worked very well at Midway. In truth, it worked well at Wake. A mere 399 ground troops and 50 airmen held off a force of 2 CVs, 2 CAs. 3 CLs, 6DDs, 2 PGs, 2500 SNLF landing troops, one AS, three SS, and ground-based air out of Guam for 15 days, sinking two destroyers and two patrol boats, destroying 31 aircraft, and inflicting over 1,000 casualties. Had a relief force been available without excessive risk after the Pearl Harbor attack, it likely could have held. The Wake garrison was had only 18 out of 144 M2.50 MGs on their TOE and 30 out of 48 authorized M1917 .30 MGs. They had only a single fire director for their 3" AA guns instead of the authorized 4, and were short a battery of 2 of the guns. The riflemen carried bolt Action 1903 Springfields, having not yet transitioned to semiautomatic M1 Garands and M1 carbines. The support company did not have the air search radar it was authorized, nor enough men to man all of the weapons it DID ship with - the handful of navy personnel and civilians with Pan-American Airways and Morrison-Knudsen Engineering (construction crews) were given a hurried familiarization and sued to flesh out gun crews. The half of VMF-211 present had just arrived on the island, had yet to zero in the guns on their Wildcat fighters, and were short of ammo and spare parts.
Wake Island had NO garrison in 1938. The 1st MDFB first arrived in August,1945 and was, as noted, understrength.
Seize? Is that actually part of the doctrinal mission set? Do they actually practice making opposed amphibious assaults with their spiffy new units?
My understanding is that they were supposed to. before the war starts, have their 14 knot mini-freighters sneak onto some island conveniently located and set up camp where the PLA will never expect them. Exactly how they plan to sink the PLA Maritime Militia that is following them around and also shoot down the geosynchronous SARSat that is tracking them without starting a war is part of the "then the magic happens" phase.
They could have the LCUs quickly if Navy Sea Systems would pull out the old WW2 LCU or LST designs - or the modern Army designs - and order units based on those proven models. THAT, however, would not justify jobs for marine engineers the way drawing up brand new designs and specifications would.
And spend five years in acquisitions, OPTs and PowerPoint wranglings.
In real options, VT completted 2 additional Kurooda-type Bessons for Israel before starting the Icebreakers.
The Navy literally can't get their simple LCU-1700s built. They ordered Swiftships to stop work as he delays and project management were so bad. Now Austal is picking up the work, but they are already behind on their new steel line.
I say get crafty with ESD/ESB and EPF for starters.
It is a return to the pre-WW2 Marine Defense Battalion concept, such as the forces that garrisoned Midway, Wake, Johnston Atoll, American Samoa, Guantanamo Bay, New Caledonia, Iceland, Pearl Harbor, and forward bases throughout the war. Their standard organization was an HQ company, a service company of six platoons with searchlights and radar/sound locating gear, three batteries of two 5"/51 caliber dual purpose guns, 4 batteries of 3" AA guns, six companies of 24 M2 machine guns on AA mounts, and two beach defense companies each with 24 M1917 water cooled .30 machine guns. It WAS an effective organization, as the 6th MDB at Midway and the 1st MDB at Wake Island proved.
It is NOT an organization designed to assault Pelilieu or Iwo Jima. It is one more optimized to use a forward island as a point to control nearby seaways without risking a large force - or to spread a large force out across an island chain to deny an enemy access to a large area of ocean. It really makes sense in terms of a conflict with the PRC- it basically reflects their strategy of building small bases around the China Sea to extend their control. The appropriate criticism is not that it won't work for the mission it is designed for, but that the extent that the commandant is seeking to reorganize the WHOLE Corps around it is myopic and costs the Corps the operational flexibility it has established a well-deserved reputation for having that the Army lacks.
Sits in the corner pouting in 7.62X51 NATO
I thought all Marines were riflemen, with some having sub specialties like fighter pilot.
Even worse, that single Inf. Bn. is tasked to provide troops for "multiple platoon-reinforced-size expeditionary advanced base sites" and, no doubt, security for the MLR's logistic *Battalion* and the "robust regimental headquarters with enhanced signals and human intelligence, reconnaissance, communications, logistics planning, civil affairs, cyber, and information operations capabilities. "
https://www.marines.mil/News/News-Display/Article/2708146/marine-littoral-regiment-mlr/
In Texas, I believe they call that "All hat and no cattle".
If the USMC even gets them! So far the only US customer for the NEMO 120mm mortar is the U.S. Army…
Jarheads abandoned the 120 several years ago.
And even if the USMC somehow managed to get some, what would they mount it on! The ACV 2.0 could probably sustain the weight of the Turret, but probably not the 120mm mortar projectiles without drowning the four man crew of the ACV…
We could have a boat that could move it and the men for less than the ACV. Less land maneuver in favor of more water maneuver and speed. From the sea......
Autoloader for the NEMO is located in the Hull, not in the Turret! Other than the three man crew just for the mortar alone and the driver, there isn’t enough room for the additional support marines…
Nemo is available in a 20' shipping container. I am talking about dropping that on a landing boat. Let other boats have a troop module to move them under protection.
Bring back the Ontos
I worked with a retired LDO LCDR SeaBee a decade after I retired from the Navy. When he was a CE1 in Vietnam his team built bases for the Marines. He said that an Ontos vehicle would often escort them en route to a job and that there was no shortage of young SeaBees who wanted to ride on the vehicle and act as loader or just sit topside with an M-14. Though it had other missions, he said the Ontos was most often used to fire fleshette rounds into the jungle to suppress any incoming gunfire. He kind of thought of it as a morale weapon, good for us, bad for whoever they shot at.
I'm old enough to have seen them in combat. They were wicked cool but the drawback was you had to hop out the back to reload those 106s.
I think every last one was destroyed in country. or at least that's what I heard.
Everybody loved them except maybe the loaders (who dreamed of a boring job typing away in the rear with the gear).
With the static defense doctrine, you would use it from hardened mortar pits.
The chose some bizarre French mortar that uses ammo not compatible with Army 120mm mortars (which are Israeli Soltam K6 mortars) and than figured out a way to pay $200,000 for a custom golf cart (growler) to tow it on and off the V22. Except the golf carts kept breaking and the mortar couldn't apparently be towed onto the V22 and apparently needed to be man-handled by the crew onto and off the V22. It seems like a tale of fail reminiscent of the little crappy ship, except that they didn't keep buying them a decade after they admitted it was an unworkable disaster. And cost far less.
Probably to the great relief of the poor devils assigned to operate it. From the pictures I have seen, the muzzle was so high off the ground the loader needed a 3 ft. platform to stand on as he dropped the round down the tube. That might be okay as long as the opposing force didn't shoot back, but it seems to me you would go through loaders pretty fast if anybody actually shot back.
The history of the Corps is sucking hind tit to the Army on new equipment. Only in Korea were the Marines better equipped than the Army. At the end of WW2, Commandant Archie Vandegrift used funds to create warehouses at MCB Camp Pendleton and grabbed all the surplus gear he could when the Army began disposing of it. As a result, when the Army had to fall back before the North Koreans because their old 75mm Sherman tanks, M20 75mm recoilless rifles, and 2.75" bazookas were ineffective against NK T-34/85 tanks, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade entered the war with M26 Pershings, 3.5" Superbazookas, M4A3R8 flamethrower Shermans, LVT-4 amtrac armored personnel carriers, selective fire M2 carbines, and M29 Weasels for forward logistics,
I don’t know if it’s simply sucking hind tit or simply not being interested! The U.S. Army has been interest in the AMOS twin 120mm auto mortar since at least 2006 and the NEMO since at least 2018, whereas the USMC seemed to have developed absolutely no interest in either in the same timeframe! The only 120mm mortar the USMC seems to be interested in is the lightweight 120mm EFSS (Expeditionary Fire Support System) which is light enough to be air transportable by a helicopter and/or towed by an M1161 Growler or Polaris Utility Task Vehicle…
The jarheads abandoned the 120mm first, alas. Now, a small "boat" with one of these, some RAM and ESSM, would be a great little armed transport for moving littoral units around....
You just defined something radically larger, likely slower, and more expensive. Cheap, fast, many........
I'd prefer cheap fast many; but if Navy can't spare a frigate, something for close shore support and some better than Stinger AD would be useful.
Yeah, I think manned MUSV or similar. Look at Arialah class from the UAE. Swap that Mk 110 for one of these 120s, use our 30mm Mk 38s instead of Marlin's. Ditch the boats for Mk 70 launchers or ADL launchers quad packed with GMLRS. Ditch the lilly pad and there is room for plenty more. Keep the RAM launcher.
They are going to regret dropping tanks.
I am less and less convinced of that. Just keep inventing light. I agree all the gaps aren't filled yet, but I think we have the ability to get there.
Yep - lightweight ATGMS are reaching the point Jerry Pournelle predicted 40 years ago in "The Mercenary." At least on the defensive, you get more bang for the buck with a bunch of Javelins distributed across your infantry.
“A 120mm mortar for you. A 120mm mortar for you. A 120mm mortar for you. A 120mm mortar for everybody!”
CDR “Oprah” Salamander
Great idea, which is exactly why the USN will pass.
Surely someone could figure out a way to grift off this and become a proponent?
Any river is a "strait". Riverine craft must be able to avoid being hit or, failing that, able to survive hits. They are easier to see and range on than tanks; and tanks haven't been doing all that well against modern AT weapons and FPV drones.
Tanks used by militaries that even outdo the USN in terms of bad maintenance. 120mm mortar will be the big gun; but a couple .50 Gatlings will be very useful for slicing up drones and AT crews, causing command-guided missiles to well, miss.
RPS-42 w 30 x 113mm M230LFs on an XM918 RWS (Kongsberg RWS-6). Also mounts 2 stinger or 1 Javelin with a 7.62 coax.
command-guided is so 20th century. Javelin, for instance, is fire-and-forget.
Kornet and it's knockoffs aren't fire and forget. Everyone wants FaF, but they often end up command-guided, or unguided. RPG-X is pretty deniable support for locals, TOW and Milan as well. Javelin types, not so much.
Put a Trophy system on the boat. We are going to need a bigger boat. Look at the Finnish Jehu.
very nice. The Army is shopping
take a look
https://youtu.be/jrZYl9_DdiQ
Shoot and scoot!
The ultimate goal of sea control is so that you can control all the waters up to the enemy's shore and into his rivers and hit him from any direction where there is water flowing to the sea. If you don't build the shallow water stuff, we may have spent a lot of money, but never taken full advantage of the control purchased so dearly.
You need it to deny the enemy maneuverability and the logistics support that rivers provide - as Grant and Foote so successfully demonstrated in the Civil War.
I like the way you think... Look what was done with river forces back in, oh I don't know..... 1860-1865???
Urey Patrick: Yeah! Ironclads!
Don't forget this mortar can also be delivered in a 20' container system. Plus that Finnish boat is just a pretty normal landing boat with a composite top dropped on. If we had smaller, high-speed landing boats they could potentially step in to a variety of roles. Well deck size creates some limitations here. We really need a flat area to load boats by crane or submersion like the ESDs offer.
The mistake you make is in not understanding the goal of the government when sending our best & brightest to combat. (NOT “war,” which is the use of all national assets to alter the behavior of an adversary, bending them to our will, but combat without war, than which nothing is more immoral.)
Anyway, by not grasping the goal - not understanding the problem - the methods defined (tactics, strategy, weapons systems) will not, because they cannot, be adopted by those setting policy.
Simply, America’s national goal on the battlefield since 1950 has been to not win. To not defeat an adversary our goal-setters demand to engage.
While Korea can be ambiguous, the annual costs of our small tripwire that, in no case would initiate a mobilization to victory, are tremendous. That we rejected an easily-attainable victory across 20 years in each of Vietnam and Afghanistan is not ambiguous in the least.
(That our entire chain of command, from SecDef to platoon leader willingly sends our kids out to kill and die knowing they would not be allowed to win, that their deaths and injuries would be in vain, is grossly immoral and inexcusable, but that’s another subject.)
What have we accomplished in ref: weapons systems?
A single-screw destroyer that had to be towed back into port.
A single-engine fighter now projected at $1.7T, with less than a 30% Op readiness that’s of absolutely no use in fighting illiterates in sandals and pajamas.
The best CAS aircraft in the world - that USAF keeps trying to retire because fighter jocks run the AF - it should belong to the Army & Marines, but that would require tossing Key West, which is long overdue.
Rotting ICBMs and their W88 payloads, when any real war on the horizon will be encouraged by our increasing lack of ability to respond. If deterrence, isn’t, then it doesn’t, and won’t.
Anyway. Because our policy goal of the past 80 years is funding the Complex, the longer we are able to keep our wars going, the harder we try to NOT defeat our adversaries, the more money the Complex makes, and the more money those in congress make on insider trading from which laws they have exempted themselves.
Your knowledge and suggestions would, in a sane country that valued its men and women, be relevant.
But we don’t want to win. Do your ideas are counterproductive to our leadership.
It’s the leadership, not the weapons.
A single-screw destroyer that had to be towed back into port?
https://news.sky.com/story/us-navys-most-advanced-destroyer-uss-zumwalt-breaks-down-again-10668546
Oops. The Z is two-screw.I recall reading - years ago - of a new class of DD with a single screw. Can't find it today. Perhaps another on this page knows...?
I probably was thinking of the Knox class frigate, single screw...
But, but, but.....Our LCS's!
which are too big for most riparine operations.
That's OK: They're not big enough to get their on their own bottoms, anyway
Riverine? I'm upping to a 700 ship navy.
Not with this regime
Git some!
Wrong decision after wrong decision, or at least decisions clearly impacted by blindness, there must be something rotten at the core for so many "accidental" mistakes. What is actually happening to end up with a 300-or-so Navy, with no real littoral or riverine assets? What the heck?
Well, we have an admiral for each ship, and who wants to get 100 ton boat covered with guns instead of a 3000 ton basically unarmed water skiing platform?