CDR Sal, on target. Unfortunately, depressingly so. As you say, "Decline is a choice. Decaying readiness for war is a choice as well." Agree, but have to ask, WHO chose to decline, and perhaps more (most) importantly why? INSURV provides analysis of the "what" activities requiring accomplishment. "Someone" has chosen to give little credence and / or ignore those findings / recommendation(s). Would note that tendency to "be ignored or belittled" extends to analysis organizations across ALL parts of DoD (intel, manpower, logistics supply, etc ad nauseum). As a result our ability to actually do analysis and identify problems to be "fixed" has declined (that word again) as well. I guess if the "boss" doesn't want to hear bad news, well, we just won't give it to him because if we give him bad news, I'll get fired. Hence the ORSA's lament: "What do you want the data to say, general / admiral / Mr. Secretary?". The old "who, what, when, how and why" questions are always useful. Listen to what they say, watch what they do, and follow the money provide useful information occasionally as well.
I think I opined here once before that the worst-case scenario for "why" is that someone intended that, come Der Tag™, capitulation be presented as a _fait accompli_.
It may be a coincidence, but the report became classified shortly after I released a UNCLASS message that explained how many TEMADD people were required to augment the crew to get CG 56 through her INSURV in 2009. Landed on the cover of Navy Times under the headline “Cruiser would have failed INSURV without outside help, Captain Says”.
Since that dark day we classified them, I have - when offered the chance - mentioned that Congress must act to force the return to UNCLAS reports. We can have classified annex where in a very few places that is needed, but the American people deserve to see how our Navy is maintaining their investment...and clearly the Navy needs the public shame to be motivated. $.02
Senator Tom Cotton commissioned a report and delivered it congress in July of 2021. “A report on the fighting culture of the US Navy Surface Fleet” was stunning in its rather short but succinct conclusions. The surface navy has leadership problems. Go figure. Add this report in with today’s post and one gets the picture of a demoralized poorly lead Navy. As a Marine Infantry Officer (1978-82) I ought to be busting the buttons on my dress blue blouse, but wait, we suck more! Plus our wounds have been self inflicted by two of the worst commandants in the history of the Corps, in fact they are the worst. We are tied at the hip with our brothers and sisters in arms of the naval service, if it is bad for you, it is bad for us. (Besides who the Hell can we tease when gallows humor is the order of the day?) the report which was led by two retired flag officers, one a Marine and the other Navy, was stunning in highlighting just how badly the “Culture” has become, as former SecNav John Lehman opines for the report, “if zero tolerance were in place when I was in the Navy, I wouldn’t have made it past Lieutenant J. G.” That for sure would have been the case for this Marine, counting basketballs in special services would have been lucky, a couple of NJP’s and or worse more likely. But we all flourished in a very different environment. If one couples this micromanagement style (150 flag officers?) with the 10,000 mile screw driver, with the ineptitude and or corruption, it isn’t hard to see that we need more than lead paint to support a robust surface fleet. But beyond that, this culture of mistrust and Diversity, Inclusion and Equity (DIE) will lead to defeat in detail, as the fleet is run to its limits, the Corps stretched on reduced capability due to “divest to invest” and so on and so forth.
At some point it has to stop, the prudent way forward would be to sack a bunch of flag officers for laziness and stupidity, force out some generals in the Corps for being traitors to the Eagle, Globe and Anchor and bring in some young fresh blood. We start start with asking Jim Webb to come back as SecNav for two years…do what you will Secretary Webb, but start with kicking ass and taking names.
Thanks again CDR Salamander for a great post. Now where is my P38, my can of beef and rocks needs opening.
Yes, read it when it dropped. Oddly it took an Army Officer to commission the report. Recall Senator Cotton was (I believe) Infantry maybe has a Ranger tab. Here in the greater Portsmouth NH seacoast we have the shipyard that refits the Virginia Class Attack submarines. The big unspoken word is that the Navy is impossible to work with, in terms of the planned refits and the number of change orders that cost major overruns in time “ashore” and labor to get the change orders implemented. It all needs fixing.
I had the honor of meeting VADM Bulkeley twice when he led inspection parties aboard ships I served in. The first time was as an Ensign communications officer. Based on his rank and position, I probably should have been full of “Yes, sir” and “No,sir” and not much else, but he treated me as part of the solution rather than the problem. Later, as a LCDR, I saw him when I worked at NAVSEA, holding school call on people who out-ranked him, on the subject of proper ship design. Immediately after his death, I was proud to add my voice to those advocating for a ship to be named after him.
Amen, he WAS Insurv when I was flag aide at NavSea and I often got the unfiltered comments as he waited to debrief the VADM. One particular ship - that shall remain nameless - pretty much had a "clean sweep" - literally. So after he went in to NavSea 00's office I got buzzed to bring in coffee black. I walked in with a cup in one hand a broom in the other. He had a good laugh at that and I left to the words "smart assed aviator you got there Earl". We need that moral spirit reborn.
My two cents as a father who speaks to his “tip of the spear“ warfighter on a daily basis: those senior officers who have transitioned from an operational command to a staff billet have forgotten that they need to operate at the speed of the fleet. When they operate at the sycophantic “yes boss, what would you like for it to say, sir?“ tempo it’s smacks of decrepit leadership, and has negative impact on the ability of the fleet to go to war.
Given the culture, this unfortunately unsurprising. Return to standards when "Flunking" an INSURV was often followed by relief for cause. Yes. the people who pay for it should know what shape their Navy is in--disheartening though that may be. I also had an INSURV by JDB. Wore only 3 ribbons, but they were the big three!! Passed with flying colors, I might add.
How honest is the classified INSURV report? How much papered over with "it'll work more or less" when we know that really means "it'll fail when the chips are down?" With current problems in other areas, I don't have much faith that the report hasn't been gundecked.
Since we don't get to see the classified version, we will have to trust the eyes and experiences of veterans serving as Senators and Representatives (which is vanishingly few Sn-18% and Rp-17%).
"You cannot send money and resources to correct problems unless you identify what those problems are. We can agree with that, yes?" "Cannot"? They have proven they can. Only looking at one of the 4 figures in the post (Fig 5.1 Surface) there are 21 categories listed. 3 are above a 5-year average, 9 are below, 8 are neutral, 1 is N/A. That 2023 INSURV is a good template for end of tour awards: 3 Legion of Merit medals, 8 Meritorious Service Medals, 1 Navy Commendation Medal...perhaps 9 Honorable Mentions. We have only to look at pictures of North Korean FOGO's to know we have a Medal Gap. Time to get crackin', Gents. Because, by Gar, if an MM2(ESWS) recruiter in Omaha can get an annual NCM for making quota, so should a Flag officer.
Our fleet may be falling apart but we have exceeded all expectations when it comes to diversity, which as we have been told is the ultimate force multiplier.
The classification of INSURV reports served one purpose, and that was to protect those making bad decisions and destroying our Navy's ability to fix itself. Covering for MALFEASANCE is what it was all about pure and simple. We now have a decade of results that proves it. The U.S. Navy cannot even manage a program to maintain the fleet because we no longer have anyone who is responsible, understands the system, can make a difference in the system, and all the experts . . . ARE GONE ! . . BY DESIGN. How's them apples? Just my 2ȼ.
The entire government from dog catcher to the presidency is full of greedy, lazy and incompetent people selected for the agenda of woke. Not merit, not for the people or the job but for their political stance.
As CDR Sal and others have--directly and indirectly--alluded to, war is a come-as-you-are party.
I wholeheartedly concur with the CDR's assessment that "Our Navy suffers from the cancer of untruth. . ." I would expand on this by noting that at a certain point, untruths point to either a lack of competence (i.e., inability to recognize the untruth), a lack of integrity (i.e., the untruth is recognized, but no action is taken to correct it effectively and its underlying cause[s]), or a combination of both. Given a lack of integrity, at some point, a culture that encourages coverups begins to exist with the culture of untruth. It's time for a cultural change that motivates the highest standards of competence and integrity.
I can't speak (at least effectively) as to how to correct these cultures, except to suggest they are likely to exist so long as politicians continue to select military leaders more concerned with their post-service jobs (and remuneration) instead of those whose foremost priority is service to the nation. The Senate must embrace its codified responsibility to ensure that our leaders are selected based on their commitment to service, not personal gain.
As for INSURV, as long as it--and other inspections, such as the ORSE--remain dog and pony shows, they will serve only to identify symptoms instead of the underlying illness(es). Of course, this will continue to feed into the culture of untruth and exacerbate the death spiral into which fleet material condition (and hence, readiness) finds itself.
For these inspections to have their maximum effectiveness and identify the true status of readiness (warts and all), they should be scheduled just as war would be. That is, with little or no warning. Give the TYCOM, ISIC, and CO notice sufficient to arrange for the appropriate inspection team to embark, then let the chips fall where they may. This should eliminate most--if not all--of the practices intended to elevate style over substance (e.g., borrowing DC gear from the ship across the pier to make up for missing or damaged inventory). It's crucial that we are fully informed about the true status of our readiness, including the areas that need improvement.
Ships that fail the inspection or to achieve a predetermined passing score should be ineligible for the Battle E and associated awards (e.g., red E, red DC, etc.), the Battenberg Cup, the Marjorie Sterrett Battleship Fund Award, and similar readiness awards for one year past the ending date of the inspection. Additionally, COs, XOs, CMCs, and applicable DHs should have this substandard performance (i.e., failure to maintain the warfighting readiness of a US naval vessel) noted explicitly in their FITREPs.
One final observation: if the CDRs recommendation to recode DEI billets to the INSURV UICs to make up for staffing shortfalls is implemented, care should be that the individuals filling these billets are not automatically assigned to the INSURV team. I suspect there are one or more reasons why these individuals are filling these billets, including a lack of technical or leadership competence to perform effectively at sea or in more demanding shore duty assignments. Having them on the INSURV team will only make the problem worse. Sometimes, having a gapped billet or two is better than having billets filled with incompetent individuals.
Our so-called ruling elites seem to have no problem with the US becoming a PRC satrapy. They seem oblivious what will happen once they outlive their usefulness.
Where's the problem? We shall sail to Tsushima and the incumbent Administration will blame the last previous Administration of the opposing party, admirals promoted by that party will be censured and the party will continue.
CDR Sal, on target. Unfortunately, depressingly so. As you say, "Decline is a choice. Decaying readiness for war is a choice as well." Agree, but have to ask, WHO chose to decline, and perhaps more (most) importantly why? INSURV provides analysis of the "what" activities requiring accomplishment. "Someone" has chosen to give little credence and / or ignore those findings / recommendation(s). Would note that tendency to "be ignored or belittled" extends to analysis organizations across ALL parts of DoD (intel, manpower, logistics supply, etc ad nauseum). As a result our ability to actually do analysis and identify problems to be "fixed" has declined (that word again) as well. I guess if the "boss" doesn't want to hear bad news, well, we just won't give it to him because if we give him bad news, I'll get fired. Hence the ORSA's lament: "What do you want the data to say, general / admiral / Mr. Secretary?". The old "who, what, when, how and why" questions are always useful. Listen to what they say, watch what they do, and follow the money provide useful information occasionally as well.
True.
I think I opined here once before that the worst-case scenario for "why" is that someone intended that, come Der Tag™, capitulation be presented as a _fait accompli_.
aw, c'mon.......if you leave out all that stuff about being ready/able to fight a war..... points for "livability"!
Fewer urinals, more squat toilets. That is totally in the win column. Right you are, Campbell.
https://blog.usni.org/posts/2009/10/08/system-coaches-and-inflexible-playbooks
It may be a coincidence, but the report became classified shortly after I released a UNCLASS message that explained how many TEMADD people were required to augment the crew to get CG 56 through her INSURV in 2009. Landed on the cover of Navy Times under the headline “Cruiser would have failed INSURV without outside help, Captain Says”.
Since that dark day we classified them, I have - when offered the chance - mentioned that Congress must act to force the return to UNCLAS reports. We can have classified annex where in a very few places that is needed, but the American people deserve to see how our Navy is maintaining their investment...and clearly the Navy needs the public shame to be motivated. $.02
NDAA!
Senator Tom Cotton commissioned a report and delivered it congress in July of 2021. “A report on the fighting culture of the US Navy Surface Fleet” was stunning in its rather short but succinct conclusions. The surface navy has leadership problems. Go figure. Add this report in with today’s post and one gets the picture of a demoralized poorly lead Navy. As a Marine Infantry Officer (1978-82) I ought to be busting the buttons on my dress blue blouse, but wait, we suck more! Plus our wounds have been self inflicted by two of the worst commandants in the history of the Corps, in fact they are the worst. We are tied at the hip with our brothers and sisters in arms of the naval service, if it is bad for you, it is bad for us. (Besides who the Hell can we tease when gallows humor is the order of the day?) the report which was led by two retired flag officers, one a Marine and the other Navy, was stunning in highlighting just how badly the “Culture” has become, as former SecNav John Lehman opines for the report, “if zero tolerance were in place when I was in the Navy, I wouldn’t have made it past Lieutenant J. G.” That for sure would have been the case for this Marine, counting basketballs in special services would have been lucky, a couple of NJP’s and or worse more likely. But we all flourished in a very different environment. If one couples this micromanagement style (150 flag officers?) with the 10,000 mile screw driver, with the ineptitude and or corruption, it isn’t hard to see that we need more than lead paint to support a robust surface fleet. But beyond that, this culture of mistrust and Diversity, Inclusion and Equity (DIE) will lead to defeat in detail, as the fleet is run to its limits, the Corps stretched on reduced capability due to “divest to invest” and so on and so forth.
At some point it has to stop, the prudent way forward would be to sack a bunch of flag officers for laziness and stupidity, force out some generals in the Corps for being traitors to the Eagle, Globe and Anchor and bring in some young fresh blood. We start start with asking Jim Webb to come back as SecNav for two years…do what you will Secretary Webb, but start with kicking ass and taking names.
Thanks again CDR Salamander for a great post. Now where is my P38, my can of beef and rocks needs opening.
https://www.cotton.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/navy_report.pdf
Yes, read it when it dropped. Oddly it took an Army Officer to commission the report. Recall Senator Cotton was (I believe) Infantry maybe has a Ranger tab. Here in the greater Portsmouth NH seacoast we have the shipyard that refits the Virginia Class Attack submarines. The big unspoken word is that the Navy is impossible to work with, in terms of the planned refits and the number of change orders that cost major overruns in time “ashore” and labor to get the change orders implemented. It all needs fixing.
VADM John Bulkeley is rolling in his grave. Dishonesty in the upper ranks? Who wudda thunk?
I had the honor of meeting VADM Bulkeley twice when he led inspection parties aboard ships I served in. The first time was as an Ensign communications officer. Based on his rank and position, I probably should have been full of “Yes, sir” and “No,sir” and not much else, but he treated me as part of the solution rather than the problem. Later, as a LCDR, I saw him when I worked at NAVSEA, holding school call on people who out-ranked him, on the subject of proper ship design. Immediately after his death, I was proud to add my voice to those advocating for a ship to be named after him.
Amen, he WAS Insurv when I was flag aide at NavSea and I often got the unfiltered comments as he waited to debrief the VADM. One particular ship - that shall remain nameless - pretty much had a "clean sweep" - literally. So after he went in to NavSea 00's office I got buzzed to bring in coffee black. I walked in with a cup in one hand a broom in the other. He had a good laugh at that and I left to the words "smart assed aviator you got there Earl". We need that moral spirit reborn.
My two cents as a father who speaks to his “tip of the spear“ warfighter on a daily basis: those senior officers who have transitioned from an operational command to a staff billet have forgotten that they need to operate at the speed of the fleet. When they operate at the sycophantic “yes boss, what would you like for it to say, sir?“ tempo it’s smacks of decrepit leadership, and has negative impact on the ability of the fleet to go to war.
OK, identify for me how many DEI-related billets are in the fleet in those same +/-1 paygrades.
Unfortunately none of the people in DEI billets are qualified. count on it. Hire some retiring (from sea duty) CPO's
I don't want them, I want their funded BSC.
Given the culture, this unfortunately unsurprising. Return to standards when "Flunking" an INSURV was often followed by relief for cause. Yes. the people who pay for it should know what shape their Navy is in--disheartening though that may be. I also had an INSURV by JDB. Wore only 3 ribbons, but they were the big three!! Passed with flying colors, I might add.
How honest is the classified INSURV report? How much papered over with "it'll work more or less" when we know that really means "it'll fail when the chips are down?" With current problems in other areas, I don't have much faith that the report hasn't been gundecked.
Since we don't get to see the classified version, we will have to trust the eyes and experiences of veterans serving as Senators and Representatives (which is vanishingly few Sn-18% and Rp-17%).
https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/20/2022/12/FT_22.12.05_VeteransCongress1.png
For historical context, in the 1st Congress 48% of the Senators were veterans and 60% or Representatives.
Priorities....it comes down to priorities.
"You cannot send money and resources to correct problems unless you identify what those problems are. We can agree with that, yes?" "Cannot"? They have proven they can. Only looking at one of the 4 figures in the post (Fig 5.1 Surface) there are 21 categories listed. 3 are above a 5-year average, 9 are below, 8 are neutral, 1 is N/A. That 2023 INSURV is a good template for end of tour awards: 3 Legion of Merit medals, 8 Meritorious Service Medals, 1 Navy Commendation Medal...perhaps 9 Honorable Mentions. We have only to look at pictures of North Korean FOGO's to know we have a Medal Gap. Time to get crackin', Gents. Because, by Gar, if an MM2(ESWS) recruiter in Omaha can get an annual NCM for making quota, so should a Flag officer.
Our fleet may be falling apart but we have exceeded all expectations when it comes to diversity, which as we have been told is the ultimate force multiplier.
The classification of INSURV reports served one purpose, and that was to protect those making bad decisions and destroying our Navy's ability to fix itself. Covering for MALFEASANCE is what it was all about pure and simple. We now have a decade of results that proves it. The U.S. Navy cannot even manage a program to maintain the fleet because we no longer have anyone who is responsible, understands the system, can make a difference in the system, and all the experts . . . ARE GONE ! . . BY DESIGN. How's them apples? Just my 2ȼ.
The entire government from dog catcher to the presidency is full of greedy, lazy and incompetent people selected for the agenda of woke. Not merit, not for the people or the job but for their political stance.
As CDR Sal and others have--directly and indirectly--alluded to, war is a come-as-you-are party.
I wholeheartedly concur with the CDR's assessment that "Our Navy suffers from the cancer of untruth. . ." I would expand on this by noting that at a certain point, untruths point to either a lack of competence (i.e., inability to recognize the untruth), a lack of integrity (i.e., the untruth is recognized, but no action is taken to correct it effectively and its underlying cause[s]), or a combination of both. Given a lack of integrity, at some point, a culture that encourages coverups begins to exist with the culture of untruth. It's time for a cultural change that motivates the highest standards of competence and integrity.
I can't speak (at least effectively) as to how to correct these cultures, except to suggest they are likely to exist so long as politicians continue to select military leaders more concerned with their post-service jobs (and remuneration) instead of those whose foremost priority is service to the nation. The Senate must embrace its codified responsibility to ensure that our leaders are selected based on their commitment to service, not personal gain.
As for INSURV, as long as it--and other inspections, such as the ORSE--remain dog and pony shows, they will serve only to identify symptoms instead of the underlying illness(es). Of course, this will continue to feed into the culture of untruth and exacerbate the death spiral into which fleet material condition (and hence, readiness) finds itself.
For these inspections to have their maximum effectiveness and identify the true status of readiness (warts and all), they should be scheduled just as war would be. That is, with little or no warning. Give the TYCOM, ISIC, and CO notice sufficient to arrange for the appropriate inspection team to embark, then let the chips fall where they may. This should eliminate most--if not all--of the practices intended to elevate style over substance (e.g., borrowing DC gear from the ship across the pier to make up for missing or damaged inventory). It's crucial that we are fully informed about the true status of our readiness, including the areas that need improvement.
Ships that fail the inspection or to achieve a predetermined passing score should be ineligible for the Battle E and associated awards (e.g., red E, red DC, etc.), the Battenberg Cup, the Marjorie Sterrett Battleship Fund Award, and similar readiness awards for one year past the ending date of the inspection. Additionally, COs, XOs, CMCs, and applicable DHs should have this substandard performance (i.e., failure to maintain the warfighting readiness of a US naval vessel) noted explicitly in their FITREPs.
One final observation: if the CDRs recommendation to recode DEI billets to the INSURV UICs to make up for staffing shortfalls is implemented, care should be that the individuals filling these billets are not automatically assigned to the INSURV team. I suspect there are one or more reasons why these individuals are filling these billets, including a lack of technical or leadership competence to perform effectively at sea or in more demanding shore duty assignments. Having them on the INSURV team will only make the problem worse. Sometimes, having a gapped billet or two is better than having billets filled with incompetent individuals.
Our so-called ruling elites seem to have no problem with the US becoming a PRC satrapy. They seem oblivious what will happen once they outlive their usefulness.
Where's the problem? We shall sail to Tsushima and the incumbent Administration will blame the last previous Administration of the opposing party, admirals promoted by that party will be censured and the party will continue.