Yep, them Chinese are copycats (true) and inferior - look at alibaba (also true)!
Except they can build lots of good stuff, when they need to. And they are not limited to building a lot of a bad class - they build, better, build more. And even when they build only 'good enough', quantity has a quality all it's own.
And anyone who says differently is whistling past the graveyard.
Can't speak directly to the issue of material quality, but when the USSR first put the Riga/Brezhnev/Tbilisi/Kuznetsov in the water, they also set up a land-based training facility for naval aviators.
A decade later, the UFFR ("Union of Fewer and Fewer Republics") still didn't have a cadre of naval aviators who could even trap safely and consistently.
A blue-water navy takes a long time to get going, and while building the ships (and aircraft, and missiles...) figures prominently, much of it is about developing effective tactics, doctrine, and concepts of operations.
Which is not to say we should be complacent by any means.
Our arrogance lies in the fact that no one has seriously challenged us since the Cold War (and likewise, combat operationally, we haven't had our knuckles seriously rapped since WW2). We have fallen into the same dilemma as the Royal Navy on the eve of the First World War. The British had rested on the laurels of Trafalgar, as much as we have rested on ours. We believe in our superiority, while nervously watching a rising naval power gain competency and numbers that could overwhelm us. And yet, we waste time, money, and resources on things that do not equate into effective warfighting. These are the signs of a complacent power who will be unprepared for the ferocity and rapacious appetite of a global conflict. Is the Navy learning from the lessons learned in this current conflict between Russia and Ukraine? Are we squandering all the practical and hard-earned wisdom that we ourselves garnered over generations? The Navy needs to start looking at the inevitable world war that is staring us all in the face, and developing programs that will bear fruit in the next three to five years (if not sooner).
Back in the late 1970s/early 80s, China made a conscious national decision to become a great industrial power. So they educated a couple hundred million people in science and technical skills. And built a continent-scale complex of mines, mills, refineries, factories, ports, and much more. And here we are today, witness to the result.
While at the same time, about 40 yrs ago, the US and West embarked on a cultural-scale program of financialization, deindustrialization and globalization. And while the West still has many and varied legacy industrial capacities, the comparative trajectories are apparent.
Meanwhile, military power is the first derivative of economic and basic industrial power. This used to be taught in American schools, certainly in war colleges. But anymore? I’m not so sure.
Unsophisticated? Sounds like the same thinking that was making the rounds back in the late 30s and early 40s. Why, there was no way an Asian country could match the United States in terms of military planning, tactics, training and hardware. No need to worry about the "inferior" IJN; the battle lines would form somewhere around the Marshall Islands (under War Plan Orange) and we'd make short work of the Japanese fleet. Claims about a world-class Japanese figher plane, expertly employed by skilled (and battle-tested) enemy pilots? Just more misleading reporting from the Chinese (never mind that much of that reporting was coming from western volunteer pilots who discovered how out-matched they were against the Zero.
Sadly, these perceptions ruled our training and perceptions until Pearl Harbor. True, there were exceptions like Jimmy Thach who realized his Grumman F4Fs would be at a serious disadvantage against the Zero and began developing tactics to compensate, and give his pilots a fighting chance. Unfotunately, then-Lt Thach was the rare exception, not the rule. Our perceptions of superiority came crashing down on a Sunday morning in December 1941, and in the dark months that followed. We can't afford to make the same mistake with the PRC
Take a page out of the PRC playbook: reverse engineer the DJI drone from Ukraine, give it to Taiwan to manufacture on island, and get a homebuilt asymmetric ASUW suicide drone to be employed against any amphibious invasion threat.
The key US advantage, for defending the homeland at any rate, is geography, not quality. The quality argument relates to American exceptionalism. Note from this quotation of over 120 years ago that geography was the most "exceptional" thing in this Secretary of State's list of of US advantages:
“The United States is practically sovereign on this continent and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition. Why? It is not because of the pure friendship or good-will for it. It is not simply by reason of its high character as a civilized state, nor because wisdom and equity are the invariable characteristics of the dealings of the United States. It is because in addition to all other grounds its infinite resources combined with its isolated position render it master of the situation and practically invulnerable against any and all other powers.” 1895, Richard Olney, U.S. Secretary of State. Cited in Walter Millis, The Martial Spirit.
Worse, China is focused in on their backyard. We are spread out over Ukraine, Syria, Iran, North Korea and Taiwan and any other place that might erupt. So, China's quantitative edge is far greater in a region that they know quite well and is as far away from us as you can get. Think missiles, planes and cutters and not just ships of the line.
You must believe in the efficacy of strategic bombing.
Besides, US has force, counter-force, and counter-counter force capabilities for PRC and Russia. Which is why we must build Columbia and recapitalize the boomer fleet. Id rather have boomers than CVNs.
While I don't expect to find simplified and unsophisticated items in all aspects of the military, there's a necessity to keeping things simple and uncomplicated. Modernity is fine for electronics and other high-end technology however, when fighting a war, issues and equipment tend to get distilled to their most basic level.
Does it work for its intended purpose?
Is it durable?
Is it easy to use?
I'm reminded of USS Port Royal CG-73, when she ran aground just outside of Pearl. Besides a number of hull and running gear damage, what was striking in the report was her Aegis arrays were out of alignment. This was a brand-new ship, tasked with air defense, how is a combatant supposed to endure the rigors of warfare and all it takes is a simple grounding to throw its main sensors into a mission-kill status? Can a depth charge or, sympathetic mine detonation do the same?
"We took a detonation off the port-bow sir, engineering is working, we're not taking on any water but, our combat system is down and we're unable to track due to the arrays being out of kilter'
Regarding that qualitative edge we enjoy for things like generators. I think these guys are on to something, www.liquidpiston.com.
People are so used to "price-point" Chinese goods, they forget the Chinese CAN make top-shelf stuff when they put their minds (and QC) to it.
All we seem to be left with is to bluff. Ad that takes steady and cool leadership from Pearl to 1600 Penn.
We are so screwed...
Yep, them Chinese are copycats (true) and inferior - look at alibaba (also true)!
Except they can build lots of good stuff, when they need to. And they are not limited to building a lot of a bad class - they build, better, build more. And even when they build only 'good enough', quantity has a quality all it's own.
And anyone who says differently is whistling past the graveyard.
Can't speak directly to the issue of material quality, but when the USSR first put the Riga/Brezhnev/Tbilisi/Kuznetsov in the water, they also set up a land-based training facility for naval aviators.
A decade later, the UFFR ("Union of Fewer and Fewer Republics") still didn't have a cadre of naval aviators who could even trap safely and consistently.
A blue-water navy takes a long time to get going, and while building the ships (and aircraft, and missiles...) figures prominently, much of it is about developing effective tactics, doctrine, and concepts of operations.
Which is not to say we should be complacent by any means.
Our arrogance lies in the fact that no one has seriously challenged us since the Cold War (and likewise, combat operationally, we haven't had our knuckles seriously rapped since WW2). We have fallen into the same dilemma as the Royal Navy on the eve of the First World War. The British had rested on the laurels of Trafalgar, as much as we have rested on ours. We believe in our superiority, while nervously watching a rising naval power gain competency and numbers that could overwhelm us. And yet, we waste time, money, and resources on things that do not equate into effective warfighting. These are the signs of a complacent power who will be unprepared for the ferocity and rapacious appetite of a global conflict. Is the Navy learning from the lessons learned in this current conflict between Russia and Ukraine? Are we squandering all the practical and hard-earned wisdom that we ourselves garnered over generations? The Navy needs to start looking at the inevitable world war that is staring us all in the face, and developing programs that will bear fruit in the next three to five years (if not sooner).
Back in the late 1970s/early 80s, China made a conscious national decision to become a great industrial power. So they educated a couple hundred million people in science and technical skills. And built a continent-scale complex of mines, mills, refineries, factories, ports, and much more. And here we are today, witness to the result.
While at the same time, about 40 yrs ago, the US and West embarked on a cultural-scale program of financialization, deindustrialization and globalization. And while the West still has many and varied legacy industrial capacities, the comparative trajectories are apparent.
Meanwhile, military power is the first derivative of economic and basic industrial power. This used to be taught in American schools, certainly in war colleges. But anymore? I’m not so sure.
Quantity has a quality all its own. Good enough in large numbers will overwhelm the sophisticated but meager.
Unsophisticated? Sounds like the same thinking that was making the rounds back in the late 30s and early 40s. Why, there was no way an Asian country could match the United States in terms of military planning, tactics, training and hardware. No need to worry about the "inferior" IJN; the battle lines would form somewhere around the Marshall Islands (under War Plan Orange) and we'd make short work of the Japanese fleet. Claims about a world-class Japanese figher plane, expertly employed by skilled (and battle-tested) enemy pilots? Just more misleading reporting from the Chinese (never mind that much of that reporting was coming from western volunteer pilots who discovered how out-matched they were against the Zero.
Sadly, these perceptions ruled our training and perceptions until Pearl Harbor. True, there were exceptions like Jimmy Thach who realized his Grumman F4Fs would be at a serious disadvantage against the Zero and began developing tactics to compensate, and give his pilots a fighting chance. Unfotunately, then-Lt Thach was the rare exception, not the rule. Our perceptions of superiority came crashing down on a Sunday morning in December 1941, and in the dark months that followed. We can't afford to make the same mistake with the PRC
Take a page out of the PRC playbook: reverse engineer the DJI drone from Ukraine, give it to Taiwan to manufacture on island, and get a homebuilt asymmetric ASUW suicide drone to be employed against any amphibious invasion threat.
The key US advantage, for defending the homeland at any rate, is geography, not quality. The quality argument relates to American exceptionalism. Note from this quotation of over 120 years ago that geography was the most "exceptional" thing in this Secretary of State's list of of US advantages:
“The United States is practically sovereign on this continent and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition. Why? It is not because of the pure friendship or good-will for it. It is not simply by reason of its high character as a civilized state, nor because wisdom and equity are the invariable characteristics of the dealings of the United States. It is because in addition to all other grounds its infinite resources combined with its isolated position render it master of the situation and practically invulnerable against any and all other powers.” 1895, Richard Olney, U.S. Secretary of State. Cited in Walter Millis, The Martial Spirit.
"...Lisovich’s quote should stick in your craw." I've simply run out of room to fit anything else "in my craw."
Worse, China is focused in on their backyard. We are spread out over Ukraine, Syria, Iran, North Korea and Taiwan and any other place that might erupt. So, China's quantitative edge is far greater in a region that they know quite well and is as far away from us as you can get. Think missiles, planes and cutters and not just ships of the line.
Actually a modification of a very old equation.
You must believe in the efficacy of strategic bombing.
Besides, US has force, counter-force, and counter-counter force capabilities for PRC and Russia. Which is why we must build Columbia and recapitalize the boomer fleet. Id rather have boomers than CVNs.
KISS = Keep It Simple Stupid
While I don't expect to find simplified and unsophisticated items in all aspects of the military, there's a necessity to keeping things simple and uncomplicated. Modernity is fine for electronics and other high-end technology however, when fighting a war, issues and equipment tend to get distilled to their most basic level.
Does it work for its intended purpose?
Is it durable?
Is it easy to use?
I'm reminded of USS Port Royal CG-73, when she ran aground just outside of Pearl. Besides a number of hull and running gear damage, what was striking in the report was her Aegis arrays were out of alignment. This was a brand-new ship, tasked with air defense, how is a combatant supposed to endure the rigors of warfare and all it takes is a simple grounding to throw its main sensors into a mission-kill status? Can a depth charge or, sympathetic mine detonation do the same?
"We took a detonation off the port-bow sir, engineering is working, we're not taking on any water but, our combat system is down and we're unable to track due to the arrays being out of kilter'
"They have poor quality equipment" and "they have poor quality personnel" is pure cope.