Arm the Auxiliaries
just make it happen
The greatest dysfunction of the Potomac Flotilla is “problem appreciation.”
Due to program management that progresses at the speed of smell and creates more board seats for recently retired four-stars than actual assets that displace water, we've run out of time for theoretical 'offsets' or the latest flavor of magic beans.
Nope. Time to walk away from the intellectual habits that painted us in this corner and look at what we can do to take action NOW to enhance the combat utility of what we have, with what we have.
We don’t have to look far. One of the first steps we must take is to arm the auxiliaries. In the generations after the Vietnam War, we were lulled into accepting the 'green-eyeshade' logic of saving money by converting former USS ships to USNS, leaving them unarmed. What pennies we may save in peace from that mindset will cost of bricks of gold at war.
The seas are no longer ours, if they ever really were. Our few replenishment ships have always been High Value Unit, it is time to start treating them like one. We cannot afford to lose any of the few that we have—but we seem to be inviting that exact event.
History will only give us so many warnings.
As we have outlined here and in our Midrats discussions with John Konrad and Sal Mercogliano for over a decade, the US Navy has told our USNS and merchant mariners that we do not have enough warships to escort them.
The events in the Red Sea the last 13-months show that no ship is safe from everything from low-speed attack drones to anti-ship ballistic missiles and a few nightmares in-between.
We could not have conducted the operations we have in the Eastern Mediterranean and Red Sea without the epic performance of our few replenishment ships who made constant trips from ports to replenish their supplies and then transport them to the fleet. They are generally unarmed.
Does anyone remember what happened to RFA Sir Galahad and RFA Sir Tristram at Fitzroy?
Let’s look at the armament of the four workhorse classes that keep our fleet forward:
Supply-class fast combat support ship (T-AOE)
Multiple .50-caliber machine guns
Small arms
Henry J. Kaiser-class replenishment oiler (T-AO)
Multiple .50 caliber machine guns
Space, weight, and power reservations for 2 Phalanx Close-In Weapons Systems
Lewis and Clark-class dry cargo ship (T-AKE)\
Multiple .50 caliber machine guns
Space, weight, and power reservations for Phalanx close-in weapons systems or SeaRAM
John Lewis-class replenishment oiler (T-AO)\
Multiple .50 caliber machine guns
Space, weight, and power reservations for close-in weapon systems
'Reservations' here represent the U.S. Navy’s version of the Royal Navy’s 'designed for but not fitted with' Potemkin capability.
On the short list for a future SECNAV must be to get these “space, weight, and power” vacuums filled. If that means making them USS instead of USNS, then so be it. The change should be made no later than the end of FY2025.
No reason to go over the manning challenges, they will reveal themselves along the way and will be solved with proper leadership. Perhaps some imagination with the USNR would be in order.
That is step 1, but really needs to be done is to recognize that they are still underarmed for the reality of war at sea.
What kind of armament should they have? Well, let’s monernize a solid benchmark.
One of the best Fullbore Fridays here was the story of the USS Neosho (AO 23). What was her armament in WWII?
four 5"/38 caliber dual purpose gun mounts
four twin 40mm AA gun mounts
four twin 20mm AA gun mounts
Was she somehow unusual for her time? Well, no. Let’s look at the Dixie Class destroyer tender, USS Piedmont (AD-13).
four 5"/38 caliber dual purpose gun mounts
four twin 40 mm AA gun mounts
23 single 20 mm AA gun mounts
I think that is enough. One common aspect, once war started, all auxiliaries increased the number and caliber of their armament—something that is almost a universal constant.
The question at this point: how does the experience 80 years ago translate to today?
Well, let’s look at the John C. Butler-class destroyer escorts (DE) who put up such a great fight as part of Taffy-3 with her Fletcher Class destroyer (DD) big sisters in the Battle off Samar 80 years and two weeks ago.
What anti-air and multipurpose armament did the John C. Butler DEs have?
two × 5”/38 caliber dual purpose gun mounts
ten × 40 mm AA guns (1×4, 3×2) mounts
ten × 20 mm AA gun mounts
How about the Fletcher DD?
five 5”/38 gun mounts
five twin 40 mm AA gun mounts
seven single 20 mm AA gun mounts
So, in contested seas and skies, those with actual experience with war at sea decided their auxiliaries needed to be armed against surface and air threats somewhere between a destroyer escort and a destroyer.
Well.
What is a “destroyer escort” today? It is a frigate of course. Our frigates are really light destroyers and our Flight III Arleigh Burke destroyers are really light cruisers…so where could we find a modern version of a destroyer escort that would be a good benchmark.
I know. How about the Italian Navy’s 4,915 ton Thaon di Revel-class offshore patrol vessel. Yes. That will do nicely. How is she armed against surface and air threats?
One Oto Melara 127 mm/64 Vulcano multipurpose gun
One Oto Melara 76 mm/62 Strales Sovraponte anti-aircraft gun
Two Oto Melara Oerlikon KBA B06, 25mm
Anti-air missiles:
Two 8-cell DCNS SYLVER A50 VLS for 16 Aster 30 Block 1NT
Eight Teseo\Otomat MK2/E anti-ship and land attack missiles
OK, let me do a little cocktail-napkin Americanizing this while negotiating/compromising with myself. You want a solution that is doable? I’ve got that for you.
Some modification required, but our auxiliaries need to be armed with:
one 5”/54 Mk 45 Mod 1/2 gun (or Oto Melara 76mm/62)
four MK41 VLS cells quad packed with ESSM for 16 total missiles
two × SeaRAM
two 25 mm Mk 38 guns
This will, of course, require more “space, weight, and power reservations“—but that is why NAVSEA has tens of thousands of employees. Do what you can, and then modify future construction to take the full bit of kit. If you can move up to eight MK41 cells, even better.
Tell me how you’ll make it happen and then get to work. Compromises will be necessary, but these are easier problems to solve today than replacing auxiliaries lost due to a lack of self-defense in the next Great Pacific War tomorrow.
Give me three options for a decision brief the Monday after Thanksgiving.
T-AOE were originally built with SeaSparrow and CIWS as they were not built for USNS, they have space and weight for an LSD-size SSDS suite.
We need to also inculcate the most important ingredient to this: a fighting spirit.
The reason Taffy was so successful was the fighting spirit of those destroyer captains and crews. They were blue water navy through and through. We need a training program pronto for the CIC that will require command authority if we stay with civilian crews. This is low hanging fruit. Let’s get it done.