I'd settle for 2 SeaRAM, a Mk. 110 optimized for AA defense, and 2 twin NSM. Preferred 4 SeaRAM and 2 quad NSM. "Small arms" to include Mk. 19s and Javelins for small boats.
Mk 19 doesn't have the range you'd need. The Mk 38's are in the Fleet, START there. I love's me some .50's but we need a LOT more. Still the Ma Deuce is always welcome at the party
This a more general notion, am not qualified to comment on the proper armament for these USNS vessels other than to say, yeah it is needed. What's not to like about the acquisition of the Italian Navy's 4,915 Thaon di Revel class offshore patrol vessel? Only don't allow the US Navy to ruin the beauty of the ship with their "add on's and change orders." As is, where is acquisition of the vessel, maybe use english instead of Italian for manuals and nomenclature, and so forth.
1. Get a SecDef that is mean as a rattlesnake on steroids, could give a damn about DIE, and knows their way to a degree around the puzzle palace, aka 5 sided building on the opposite side of DC on the Potomac. To include a review of the value of Goldwater Nichols. Shove problem solving down to the SecNav.
2. Get a blue water sailor with a really bad attitude as SecNav and start firing Navy Admirals and Marine Generals who are useless, examine the Table of Organization top to bottom and get rid of or reassign any one not identified as dead and or otherwise useless.
3. Restore leadership values top to bottom, correcting the the Table of Equipment and Organization solves some of the problem, but the heart of the matter is poor to nonexistent leadership at the senior command level officer and enlisted.
The PPA Evo cuts the front gun to a 76 but ups forward cells to 32 and cuts the crane amidship for another 32 cells. I've really felt we have been building the wrong ship with Connie. PPA has a larger electrical reserve and is faster with a more flexible propulsion plant.
This would be a terrific test for the be Administration to probe SEANAV. Sniff out the can’t doers for the can doers. There a 4-5 folks at SpaceX that I would send in for the initial brief to SEANAV & then have them grind them on the solutions they bring back.
No powerpoints only Solidworks & Ansys designs & engineering allowed to present solutions. 3 week turn from request to options top 2 pursed for detailed design review 3 weeks after. Winning team leads others for execution. Losers go home but can reapply to work under winning team.
Forgot to add once this works then same process for Constellation. Open process to find a team that can cut the bullshit of the biggest mess since the Little Crappy Ship.
Mark my words if there is not a major intervention & national demand to address Constellation NOW, just cancel it because there is major infiltration throughout the program. One that is even worse than LCS.
We are a nation of engineers & doers yet Seanav & our suppliers are not. 10 year delay is a 10 suckling of the treasury’s tit.
For my money, I would rather have CIWS than SeaRAM. The trade-off is range versus reloadability. Or perhaps compromise with 1 CIWS and 1 SeaRAM, plus an aggressive program to make SeaRAM reloadable at sea.
This harkens back to the Hip Pocket program in late-Vietnam era, when we realized that many of our ships in the war zone, especially cruisers and DLGs, were badly under-armed against small threats.
Another great WWSNCSD (What Would Sec Nav CDR Salamander Do) posting. Even my father’s WW2 ship USS Chalcedony (PYc-16), a converted yacht, had a 3” gun mounted on it.
The only change to your nominal Italian configuration? Perhaps substitute C-dome for the ESSM VLS. Loadout increases to forty missiles and cost per warshot decreases by several magnitudes.
Were there not uniformed (Navy, USMC) gun crews on cargo ships during WWII (at least for a bit?)
And I hope the small-arms loadout includes FIM-92 Stingers and something like a FGM-148 Javelin, both in sufficient numbers (IDK, ~12 each?) per mission? Along with the M250 MG (superior to both the M240 and M249), along with the M2. And maybe some 40mm grenades from a launcher
While you're at it, Step 2 is a containerized defensive suite that can be placed on civilian shipping. We will need to do the same defensive work for shuttle tankers and resupply ships taken up from civilian service, as there is not time to build enough additional auxiliaries from scratch.
Our immediate focus ought to be how to get the frocked Lieutenant, and the newly crowed Petty Officer to consider the Navy as a career. We cannot staff a peacetime Navy if we are giving the crews a wartime operations schedule. People wear out from overuse just like machines.
Considering the latest election showed a lot more younger men voting conservative than prior, the manpower is there, it's the marketing and PR that's lacking within Recruiting Command.
Maybe the numbers are down, I have not looked at data, but, the USN does not require a wave of boots like the Marine Corps. A Navy needs young officers, petty and commissioned; they need a life at sea with liberty ports galore. They need meaningful shore duty, which lets them lead a normal life for a while.
When we have invested 4 to 8 years in a kid, it is a shame to see that wasted.
Who replaces the cohort when they age out? Navy has missed its goal 2 years in a row. The navy made goal this year by lowering the goal and recruiting over 17% in the lowest mental group cat 4. The navy is 22,000 sailors short of its manning document and that is 94% in the junior pay grades.
The 2019 and 2020 cohorts are coming up for reenlistment and it doesn’t look good for them due to Covid, forced vaccinations and moral hazards forced on them as well as woke shit and fucked leadership. But enlistments are the problem.
No one coming in to replace the losses. But losses and attrition can be and should be expected.
We need both good retention and good recruiting. The recruiting problem will solve itself if the services become warrior societies once more. The retention problem will solve itself if the men are treated like adults, unlike what I saw when I was in during the end of the Vietnam war and immediately post war.
My father made a career of the USAF, but retired in 1971 because he got fed up with the lousy leadership.
We need to also inculcate the most important ingredient to this: a fighting spirit.
The reason Taffy was so successful was the fighting spirit of those destroyer captains and crews. They were blue water navy through and through. We need a training program pronto for the CIC that will require command authority if we stay with civilian crews. This is low hanging fruit. Let’s get it done.
Agree with the need. My early years in Navy still had most of the auxiliaries as USS and minimally armed. When I started with MSC (2002) the civilian substitution was underway for the remaining Military Detachment (Comms and Ops). Now the entire crew is civilian and active duty folks no longer know how to run auxiliaries. It is going to be a long hard slog to not only get the manpower, but get the manpower up to a sufficient level of competence.
Another major requirement is speed. Enough speed to maintain continuous contact with the carrier battlegroup or the detached surface action group the resupply ship is supporting so that the battle group or the surface action group can maintain full tactical mobility.
And yet another requirements trade-off consideration raises itself relative to modern anti-ship threats.
How much capacity should each new-build supply ship have? And how should each class of stores be distributed among those new-build ships, assuming we build several subsidiary classes of fleet supply train vessels?
I'd settle for 2 SeaRAM, a Mk. 110 optimized for AA defense, and 2 twin NSM. Preferred 4 SeaRAM and 2 quad NSM. "Small arms" to include Mk. 19s and Javelins for small boats.
Mk 19 doesn't have the range you'd need. The Mk 38's are in the Fleet, START there. I love's me some .50's but we need a LOT more. Still the Ma Deuce is always welcome at the party
Mk. 19 are for close-in work against smaller boats and USVs. Love Ma Duece, but 40mm is a bit better at stopping suicide units.
Mk 38 mod IV with the 30mm will work fine and can deck mount more places.
T-AOE were originally built with SeaSparrow and CIWS as they were not built for USNS, they have space and weight for an LSD-size SSDS suite.
The problem is...we only have 2 AOE's service, anybody know the conditions of Rainier and Bridge?
They supposedly are laid up and can be reactivated. Reality?
Where will the requisite bodies to man them come from?
A very robust recruiting that expels CRT, BLM, LGBTQRP.
This a more general notion, am not qualified to comment on the proper armament for these USNS vessels other than to say, yeah it is needed. What's not to like about the acquisition of the Italian Navy's 4,915 Thaon di Revel class offshore patrol vessel? Only don't allow the US Navy to ruin the beauty of the ship with their "add on's and change orders." As is, where is acquisition of the vessel, maybe use english instead of Italian for manuals and nomenclature, and so forth.
1. Get a SecDef that is mean as a rattlesnake on steroids, could give a damn about DIE, and knows their way to a degree around the puzzle palace, aka 5 sided building on the opposite side of DC on the Potomac. To include a review of the value of Goldwater Nichols. Shove problem solving down to the SecNav.
2. Get a blue water sailor with a really bad attitude as SecNav and start firing Navy Admirals and Marine Generals who are useless, examine the Table of Organization top to bottom and get rid of or reassign any one not identified as dead and or otherwise useless.
3. Restore leadership values top to bottom, correcting the the Table of Equipment and Organization solves some of the problem, but the heart of the matter is poor to nonexistent leadership at the senior command level officer and enlisted.
The PPA Evo cuts the front gun to a 76 but ups forward cells to 32 and cuts the crane amidship for another 32 cells. I've really felt we have been building the wrong ship with Connie. PPA has a larger electrical reserve and is faster with a more flexible propulsion plant.
This would be a terrific test for the be Administration to probe SEANAV. Sniff out the can’t doers for the can doers. There a 4-5 folks at SpaceX that I would send in for the initial brief to SEANAV & then have them grind them on the solutions they bring back.
No powerpoints only Solidworks & Ansys designs & engineering allowed to present solutions. 3 week turn from request to options top 2 pursed for detailed design review 3 weeks after. Winning team leads others for execution. Losers go home but can reapply to work under winning team.
oh hell yeah...
Forgot to add once this works then same process for Constellation. Open process to find a team that can cut the bullshit of the biggest mess since the Little Crappy Ship.
Mark my words if there is not a major intervention & national demand to address Constellation NOW, just cancel it because there is major infiltration throughout the program. One that is even worse than LCS.
We are a nation of engineers & doers yet Seanav & our suppliers are not. 10 year delay is a 10 suckling of the treasury’s tit.
Next thought, Sal;
Why aren't our Amphibs screened?
Why in the world would you ever want to bother with screening amphibs?
(ruefully snarks in Slapton Sands...)
https://www.history.navy.mil/browse-by-topic/wars-conflicts-and-operations/world-war-ii/1944/exercise-tiger.html
For my money, I would rather have CIWS than SeaRAM. The trade-off is range versus reloadability. Or perhaps compromise with 1 CIWS and 1 SeaRAM, plus an aggressive program to make SeaRAM reloadable at sea.
I was going to suggest same. It seems to me there are three location variations and two attack scenerios
1. Attacked while with Fleet
2. Attacked in transit (AOE Neosho)
3. Attached in friendly/neutral port while restocking / port visit
A. Tier 1 War aka CCP
B. peacetime / GWOT / Tier 1 kickoff attack
I think CDR S trends to 2A, but I think 3B is the highest threat.
high numbers of UAV or USV by surprise. Is SeaRAM the best fit? reload?
seems like CIWS ought to be in the mix
This harkens back to the Hip Pocket program in late-Vietnam era, when we realized that many of our ships in the war zone, especially cruisers and DLGs, were badly under-armed against small threats.
Nope. The Navy solution is to make areas of the seas and oceans off limits to auxiliaries. They are not serious “warfighters”.
Also when was the last time you saw a USNS FONOP
Another great WWSNCSD (What Would Sec Nav CDR Salamander Do) posting. Even my father’s WW2 ship USS Chalcedony (PYc-16), a converted yacht, had a 3” gun mounted on it.
Interesting to see that ship name. I think my great-grandfather served on (possibly commanded?) the USS Chalcedony.
Not sure when my father took command, but definitely was in command in ‘45 and ‘46 when it was decommissioned. Was your father living in Hawaii?
Beautiful ship. http://www.navsource.org/archives/12/1416.htm
The only change to your nominal Italian configuration? Perhaps substitute C-dome for the ESSM VLS. Loadout increases to forty missiles and cost per warshot decreases by several magnitudes.
PAY ATTENTION SAILOR! WE WILL NOT, I REPEAT NOT, BUY SOMETHING THE JARHEADS BOUGHT FIRST! ARE YOU TRYING TO EMBARRASS NAVY PROCUREMENT?
Were there not uniformed (Navy, USMC) gun crews on cargo ships during WWII (at least for a bit?)
And I hope the small-arms loadout includes FIM-92 Stingers and something like a FGM-148 Javelin, both in sufficient numbers (IDK, ~12 each?) per mission? Along with the M250 MG (superior to both the M240 and M249), along with the M2. And maybe some 40mm grenades from a launcher
cheers for Jav. It's idiot proof. and apparently 8th century goat herders can use Stinger. Can the Navy?
There are vehicle launchers (with CROW?) for the Jav as well: Those might be a better or supplemental option for putting them on merchies.
While you're at it, Step 2 is a containerized defensive suite that can be placed on civilian shipping. We will need to do the same defensive work for shuttle tankers and resupply ships taken up from civilian service, as there is not time to build enough additional auxiliaries from scratch.
Great idea, but . . .
Where are the crews?
Our immediate focus ought to be how to get the frocked Lieutenant, and the newly crowed Petty Officer to consider the Navy as a career. We cannot staff a peacetime Navy if we are giving the crews a wartime operations schedule. People wear out from overuse just like machines.
Considering the latest election showed a lot more younger men voting conservative than prior, the manpower is there, it's the marketing and PR that's lacking within Recruiting Command.
It’s not recruiting that’s the problem; it’s retention.
Bam!
Recruiting is the problem.
Maybe the numbers are down, I have not looked at data, but, the USN does not require a wave of boots like the Marine Corps. A Navy needs young officers, petty and commissioned; they need a life at sea with liberty ports galore. They need meaningful shore duty, which lets them lead a normal life for a while.
When we have invested 4 to 8 years in a kid, it is a shame to see that wasted.
Who replaces the cohort when they age out? Navy has missed its goal 2 years in a row. The navy made goal this year by lowering the goal and recruiting over 17% in the lowest mental group cat 4. The navy is 22,000 sailors short of its manning document and that is 94% in the junior pay grades.
The 2019 and 2020 cohorts are coming up for reenlistment and it doesn’t look good for them due to Covid, forced vaccinations and moral hazards forced on them as well as woke shit and fucked leadership. But enlistments are the problem.
No one coming in to replace the losses. But losses and attrition can be and should be expected.
We need both good retention and good recruiting. The recruiting problem will solve itself if the services become warrior societies once more. The retention problem will solve itself if the men are treated like adults, unlike what I saw when I was in during the end of the Vietnam war and immediately post war.
My father made a career of the USAF, but retired in 1971 because he got fed up with the lousy leadership.
We need to also inculcate the most important ingredient to this: a fighting spirit.
The reason Taffy was so successful was the fighting spirit of those destroyer captains and crews. They were blue water navy through and through. We need a training program pronto for the CIC that will require command authority if we stay with civilian crews. This is low hanging fruit. Let’s get it done.
The leadership was, 100%. Much of the crew was for the duration men, and reservists like LCDR Copleland.
Agree with the need. My early years in Navy still had most of the auxiliaries as USS and minimally armed. When I started with MSC (2002) the civilian substitution was underway for the remaining Military Detachment (Comms and Ops). Now the entire crew is civilian and active duty folks no longer know how to run auxiliaries. It is going to be a long hard slog to not only get the manpower, but get the manpower up to a sufficient level of competence.
Another major requirement is speed. Enough speed to maintain continuous contact with the carrier battlegroup or the detached surface action group the resupply ship is supporting so that the battle group or the surface action group can maintain full tactical mobility.
And yet another requirements trade-off consideration raises itself relative to modern anti-ship threats.
How much capacity should each new-build supply ship have? And how should each class of stores be distributed among those new-build ships, assuming we build several subsidiary classes of fleet supply train vessels?