IMO, institutionalized payback for Nimitz, Leahy, and Radford's opposition to creation of the DoD. When the Army and Army Air Corps (Air Force) see a world of land, that's what you get then, now, and forever.
10 U.S. Code § 526 - Authorized strength: general and flag officers on active duty
(a) Limitations.—The number of general officers on active duty in the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps, and the number of flag officers on active duty in the Navy, may not exceed the number specified for the armed force concerned as follows:
(1) For the Army, 231.
(2) For the Navy, 162.
(3) For the Air Force, 198.
(4) For the Marine Corps, 62.
(b) Limited Exclusion for Joint Duty Requirements.
(1) The Secretary of Defense may designate up to 310 general officer and flag officer positions that are joint duty assignments for purposes of chapter 38 of this title for exclusion from the limitations in subsection (a)....
*edit*
(5) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may designate up to 15 general and flag officer positions in the unified and specified combatant commands, and up to three general and flag officer positions on the Joint Staff, as positions to be held only by reserve component officers...
Not a good idea...you quickly get to span of control problems at the lower levels of the military (e.g., to make such a large cut, you'd basically have to eliminate platoon commanders in the Army--young officers then start their working education on leadership with groups too large for them to know their troops well). The places to cut are probably where you have large clusters of officers with relatively few people to lead...but that's not 75%; more like 10%.
One exception where clusters of officers deliver operational capability is flying units, which rely on officers (commissioned officers in the Air Force, Marine Corps and Navy, warrant officers in the Army) to operate their fabulously expensive equipment. Given the value of that skill set "on the outside" and the time/money required to create those "assets", making them enlisted positions is not plausible.
You want retain a pilot, be they enlisted, Warrant, or Regular Commission you need to compete with civilian market. A bonus doesn't care if the recipient is enlisted or going to the O-Club.
It absolutely wouldn’t. The ratio is roughly 1-4 O for E for all the branches except the USMC is roughly 1-10. An Army platoon needs one OIC (02-03) for about 50 guys. We’d be fine.
The length of time knowing their job in such areas as platoon commanders and other JO slots would be longer, but that’s a good thing in my view. The 2 year rotation model needs to be ended as well in my view.
The Officer corps as it stands currently is woefully outdated in how it’s recruited, assessed, selected and trained. It’s based on an old industrial style military composed of enlisted who mostly don’t have a high school degree.
Greater technical training and leadership education and responsibility can be placed on the enlisted. It would take time, but it’s a better, cheaper and more up to date model.
Joint, within the Pentagon, needs to go away. Nothing but waste, fraud, and abuse. When JFCOM got "disestablished", everything just moved up the Chesapeake and Potomac. Joint jobs are at the COCOMs and if brass wants "joint" credit, they need to serve at the COCOMs.
By my estimates, deleting the "Joint" billets at the Pentagon would avoid over $1B a year in staffing and overhead costs ... which was the point of disestablishing JFCOM in the first place
Think about the beauty of the old division. The constitution requires an Army and a Navy, but, splits the two groups. Recognizing the capital investment required in ships and shipyards, and that the threat of being turned lose on the population is so much less with sailors than soldiers, the framers funded the services differently. All we need is an army and a navy.
The Navy got it's own department. Because you always need a Navy. Pirates always need suppressing; lives often need saving, and the flag must be shown. An island nation needs a strong, active, navy.
When do you need an Army? When there is a war, obviously. Where better to stash your soldiers than in the War Department?
If we wanted efficiency and military effectiveness we'd shut down the silly chair riding branches, fold the Air Force into the Army where it belongs and shunt the Space Force to the Navy, because space is a Navy mission.
Part of the calculus was preventing coups. Separating Army from Navy helped there, natural rivalry preventing coordination. Maybe not efficient from a warfighting perspective, but adding a third branch makes sense from that view.
In the US we ignore the risk of coups, but why do we? Because their methods of preventing them work pretty well.
A sailor is different from a soldier. There is an aspect to a sailor, that of a professional mariner, that does not apply to soldiers. A sailor has to be a warrior and a mariner, and when the bubble goes up, both at the same time.
Even today, going to sea has risks and dangers that life on land does not have. It does not belittle the Army to say that it is different from the Navy.
What protected us against TFG's coup attempt was what are called "the norms." These barriers and guardrails are being eroded. What was normal ten years ago is not normal today.
If we give an authoritarian four years as Chief Magistrate, will the military respect the people's vote?
But why? Coups are a normal part of political life pretty much everywhere and always. Question is why are we (and a few other places) different. Why, and for how long? Our tripartite military is part of the answer. It's a good thing, even if the risks, right now, are low.
Needs to be a one line rule on the extent of jointness. "My stuff works with your stuff." That's it. with the side note of: And one service uniform sure as heck doesn't need to look like someone else's.
An example is batteries - back in the bad old days up until the 80's, almost every piece of portable electronic equipment used a specialized, different, battery...which was only available from the radio manufacturer, at great expense. There was nothing especially remarkable about most of the batteries. The standard squad radio was the PRC-77, which used a battery that was large, heavy, not especially capacious and delivered two different voltages (maybe three) - but it was possible to use standard 1.5 volt batteries to power them.
One of the outliers were the batteries for the PRC-90 radio: Mercury zinc electrochemistry, and pricey as hell: Also a problem disposing of them. One big issue was the PRC-90 and the strobe light in a pilots survival kit used incompatible batteries which was a problem when you needed one but not the other.
In the 80s .mil put an end to that, and more standardized, commercially available batteries got swapped in. These days you can power most of what an infantryman uses from batteries available at a big box store.
Just waving a wand and saying 'make it work' won't work though - because someone with their ax to grind will demand some esoteric functionality that nobody else GAF about. And those ax holders got to get stropped....
The geo-commands may have made sense at one time. We do not have the money to support a worldwide command structure. Too many four stars and staffs to be effective. Decisions need to be made to address the world as it exists now, not 40 years ago. Primarily the current structure just costs too much money we don't have. I worry it may not be effective against current threats as well.
"but there comes a point where there’s so many combatant commanders and so many service chiefs that I wonder at what point does the secretary of defense have a span of control where"
Everyone has their own fiefdom. The COCOMs control the assets while the service chiefs provide the resources. The COCOMs run the equipment and personal into the ground, while the service chiefs are left trying to replace both bodies and materials. Something has to give.
For me it's the junior joint specialist who has memorized every joint regulation and can talk the joint gig like a pro but can't drive a ship or lead a squadron (very well) to save their life. But they are a near automatic select or even an early select when it comes time for promotion boards.
"I hate to be that guy", and I understand that you probably know this and used the common language abbreviation for simplicity sake...but, the proper abbreviation/acronym for a Combatant Command is CCMD. COCOM is the command authority that the Combatant Commander exercises. Thanks for coming to my TED Talk.
One thought could be to replace NORTHCOM with an AMERICASCOM and reduce SOUTHCOM to a sub-unified command. Make Space Force a real space force by rolling in Army Space and Missile Defense Command and disestablishing SPACECOM. Make USSF Space Operations Command a specified command. Maybe merge CENTCOM and AFRICOM since both are purely expeditionary, without permanent bases or permanent in-theater troops.
No one’s designed a coherent global strategy for the Navy in my lifetime. GN has frozen our strategic thinking for so long it’s time has come to end.
Why are the combat commands designed around the land and not the water? Its like the system evolved with no thought about being a naval power firrst.
IMO, institutionalized payback for Nimitz, Leahy, and Radford's opposition to creation of the DoD. When the Army and Army Air Corps (Air Force) see a world of land, that's what you get then, now, and forever.
USINDOPACOM is absolutely a maritime-oriented COCOM, as was the old USACOM before it was ill-advisedly turned into USJFCOM.
Placed here w/o further comment.
***
10 U.S. Code § 526 - Authorized strength: general and flag officers on active duty
(a) Limitations.—The number of general officers on active duty in the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps, and the number of flag officers on active duty in the Navy, may not exceed the number specified for the armed force concerned as follows:
(1) For the Army, 231.
(2) For the Navy, 162.
(3) For the Air Force, 198.
(4) For the Marine Corps, 62.
(b) Limited Exclusion for Joint Duty Requirements.
(1) The Secretary of Defense may designate up to 310 general officer and flag officer positions that are joint duty assignments for purposes of chapter 38 of this title for exclusion from the limitations in subsection (a)....
*edit*
(5) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may designate up to 15 general and flag officer positions in the unified and specified combatant commands, and up to three general and flag officer positions on the Joint Staff, as positions to be held only by reserve component officers...
start by cutting the numbers in half
Good start! I’d argue go for a 75% reduction in the overall Officer corps.
Not a good idea...you quickly get to span of control problems at the lower levels of the military (e.g., to make such a large cut, you'd basically have to eliminate platoon commanders in the Army--young officers then start their working education on leadership with groups too large for them to know their troops well). The places to cut are probably where you have large clusters of officers with relatively few people to lead...but that's not 75%; more like 10%.
One exception where clusters of officers deliver operational capability is flying units, which rely on officers (commissioned officers in the Air Force, Marine Corps and Navy, warrant officers in the Army) to operate their fabulously expensive equipment. Given the value of that skill set "on the outside" and the time/money required to create those "assets", making them enlisted positions is not plausible.
You want retain a pilot, be they enlisted, Warrant, or Regular Commission you need to compete with civilian market. A bonus doesn't care if the recipient is enlisted or going to the O-Club.
It absolutely wouldn’t. The ratio is roughly 1-4 O for E for all the branches except the USMC is roughly 1-10. An Army platoon needs one OIC (02-03) for about 50 guys. We’d be fine.
The length of time knowing their job in such areas as platoon commanders and other JO slots would be longer, but that’s a good thing in my view. The 2 year rotation model needs to be ended as well in my view.
The Officer corps as it stands currently is woefully outdated in how it’s recruited, assessed, selected and trained. It’s based on an old industrial style military composed of enlisted who mostly don’t have a high school degree.
Greater technical training and leadership education and responsibility can be placed on the enlisted. It would take time, but it’s a better, cheaper and more up to date model.
Joint, within the Pentagon, needs to go away. Nothing but waste, fraud, and abuse. When JFCOM got "disestablished", everything just moved up the Chesapeake and Potomac. Joint jobs are at the COCOMs and if brass wants "joint" credit, they need to serve at the COCOMs.
By my estimates, deleting the "Joint" billets at the Pentagon would avoid over $1B a year in staffing and overhead costs ... which was the point of disestablishing JFCOM in the first place
It's a half measure. DOD, and all its bureaucracy, needs to go away.
Bringing back the War Department and Department of the Navy would cause too many vapors.
Think about the beauty of the old division. The constitution requires an Army and a Navy, but, splits the two groups. Recognizing the capital investment required in ships and shipyards, and that the threat of being turned lose on the population is so much less with sailors than soldiers, the framers funded the services differently. All we need is an army and a navy.
The Navy got it's own department. Because you always need a Navy. Pirates always need suppressing; lives often need saving, and the flag must be shown. An island nation needs a strong, active, navy.
When do you need an Army? When there is a war, obviously. Where better to stash your soldiers than in the War Department?
If we wanted efficiency and military effectiveness we'd shut down the silly chair riding branches, fold the Air Force into the Army where it belongs and shunt the Space Force to the Navy, because space is a Navy mission.
Part of the calculus was preventing coups. Separating Army from Navy helped there, natural rivalry preventing coordination. Maybe not efficient from a warfighting perspective, but adding a third branch makes sense from that view.
In the US we ignore the risk of coups, but why do we? Because their methods of preventing them work pretty well.
A sailor is different from a soldier. There is an aspect to a sailor, that of a professional mariner, that does not apply to soldiers. A sailor has to be a warrior and a mariner, and when the bubble goes up, both at the same time.
Even today, going to sea has risks and dangers that life on land does not have. It does not belittle the Army to say that it is different from the Navy.
And yes, we do need to worry about a coup. Cf. Christopher Miller.
Nonsense. Acting like a military coup is a real threat here is more akin to a plot in a fantasy novel than an actual threat.
What protected us against TFG's coup attempt was what are called "the norms." These barriers and guardrails are being eroded. What was normal ten years ago is not normal today.
If we give an authoritarian four years as Chief Magistrate, will the military respect the people's vote?
But why? Coups are a normal part of political life pretty much everywhere and always. Question is why are we (and a few other places) different. Why, and for how long? Our tripartite military is part of the answer. It's a good thing, even if the risks, right now, are low.
“Gentlemen, You Can’t Fight In Here! This is The War Room!” - Dr. Strangelove
;)
But vapors can be good!
Needs to be a one line rule on the extent of jointness. "My stuff works with your stuff." That's it. with the side note of: And one service uniform sure as heck doesn't need to look like someone else's.
It might be just that simple...
An example is batteries - back in the bad old days up until the 80's, almost every piece of portable electronic equipment used a specialized, different, battery...which was only available from the radio manufacturer, at great expense. There was nothing especially remarkable about most of the batteries. The standard squad radio was the PRC-77, which used a battery that was large, heavy, not especially capacious and delivered two different voltages (maybe three) - but it was possible to use standard 1.5 volt batteries to power them.
One of the outliers were the batteries for the PRC-90 radio: Mercury zinc electrochemistry, and pricey as hell: Also a problem disposing of them. One big issue was the PRC-90 and the strobe light in a pilots survival kit used incompatible batteries which was a problem when you needed one but not the other.
In the 80s .mil put an end to that, and more standardized, commercially available batteries got swapped in. These days you can power most of what an infantryman uses from batteries available at a big box store.
Just waving a wand and saying 'make it work' won't work though - because someone with their ax to grind will demand some esoteric functionality that nobody else GAF about. And those ax holders got to get stropped....
Or find them, and use their ax on their necks.
The geo-commands may have made sense at one time. We do not have the money to support a worldwide command structure. Too many four stars and staffs to be effective. Decisions need to be made to address the world as it exists now, not 40 years ago. Primarily the current structure just costs too much money we don't have. I worry it may not be effective against current threats as well.
"but there comes a point where there’s so many combatant commanders and so many service chiefs that I wonder at what point does the secretary of defense have a span of control where"
Everyone has their own fiefdom. The COCOMs control the assets while the service chiefs provide the resources. The COCOMs run the equipment and personal into the ground, while the service chiefs are left trying to replace both bodies and materials. Something has to give.
“It’s his rice bowl.”
"The COCOMs control the assets", they shouldn't IJS.
Separating the check-writers from the check-funders was always a terrible idea.
What are folks primary issues with the Goldwater-Nichols act?
What would you replace it with? Don’t forgets it’s effect on SOF when you’re coming up with a replacement please!
For me it's the junior joint specialist who has memorized every joint regulation and can talk the joint gig like a pro but can't drive a ship or lead a squadron (very well) to save their life. But they are a near automatic select or even an early select when it comes time for promotion boards.
That’s fair, but I worry too often we throw the baby out with the bath water at
How can we reform it?
"I hate to be that guy", and I understand that you probably know this and used the common language abbreviation for simplicity sake...but, the proper abbreviation/acronym for a Combatant Command is CCMD. COCOM is the command authority that the Combatant Commander exercises. Thanks for coming to my TED Talk.
One thought could be to replace NORTHCOM with an AMERICASCOM and reduce SOUTHCOM to a sub-unified command. Make Space Force a real space force by rolling in Army Space and Missile Defense Command and disestablishing SPACECOM. Make USSF Space Operations Command a specified command. Maybe merge CENTCOM and AFRICOM since both are purely expeditionary, without permanent bases or permanent in-theater troops.
Amen. And fix the C2 abomination that exists in the Alaska JOA while you're at it, for God's sake.
Keep dreaming and raving. I have little patience with someone that is willfully ignorant. No further responses will be made.