One of these sitting off Oahu just prior to hostilities could put enough cruise missiles into the PACAF, MARFORPAC, USARPAC, JICPAC, and INDOPAC facilities so as to achieve a decapitation strike. Most of the C2 for a response to a Taiwan contingency is there and I shudder to think what such an attack would do to our response ability.
Interesting take. Am I reading correctly that you are framing this as a modern auxiliary cruiser, more “missile magazine on a civilian hull” than a deception-first Q-ship, and that the real lesson is that the PRC is looking for cheap ways to add salvo mass while the U.S. still has no credible forward reload or surge VLS plan?
Asking partially because I am writing about the same underlying method from the container angle: the container is camouflage because it is designed to be ignored, and once “effects” fit in a standard box, deterrence starts to look like inventory moving through a supply chain. My framing is Platform / Payload / Story: a civilian silhouette, modular launcher-style payloads, and procedural language that delays consensus long enough to reshape habits. Zhong Da 79 is my case study not because I claim loadout certainty, but because plausibility alone can change behavior, raise escort demand, widen standoff, and make passage feel conditional.
Basically yes, because this ship have its own fire control system - it could detect enemy targets, track them (over-the-horizon too - its side radars seems to be export vesion of our Russian "Mineral" system with OTH capability) and illuminate them for missile seekers. So it could operate idependently from "proper" warships.
You could leave port looking like a merchant vessel and then use cranes to unbox and mount all the radars and defensive systems en-route. Or, if it is first strike, you don't really need defensive systems if your plan is to abandon ship and flee to Isla Coronado after you blow up SDNB, North Island, Mugu and Lemoore with 400 cruise missiles at 2am.
This idea makes so much sense the puzzle palace will have heart attacks and brain seizures trying to grapple with the concept of inexpensive, doable (fast) and lethal. Old JPJ said something about going into harms way…the old boy was on to something!
It in a way it is perversely funny that we old Marines and Sailors get the notion clear as a bell and know the NAVSEA people appear to be totally unable to do something this simple. Imagine what they would do to an Andrew Jackson Higgins when he showed up with his shallow-water “Eureka” boat, Or, to Lieutenant Victoria Krulak for having the temerity to suggest adding a bow forward ramp that drop down…
In fairness I must give NAVSEA credit when it is due (which is rarely). They managed to the get Expeditionary Sea Bases designed and built at a reasonable price point ($500M-ish) and in a timely fashion. And both the Navy and the Marines like them and want more.
The missile boat platform could be built based upon the same tried and true Alaska Class Tanker. Just cover the deck in shipping container based VLS. Give it the Aegis Combat System, bolt on some CIWS and some intermediate range defensive systems (take your pick) and you are basically good to go.
CNO should give the admiral in charge of Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), Vice Admiral (VADM) James P. Downey, who assumed command in January 2024, 48 hours to show cause why he should not be fired.
OK, before we get too far ahead of ourselves this is much like the failed missile barge idea. Question #1: how many empty VLS tubes are currently in the underway fleet? Putting more empty missile tubes underway does not add to fire power. We don't have enough missiles of every type and getting less all the time as we continue to blast shore targets (and cheap enemy drones). It would be a better arguement if we had so many missiles that we can't deploy them for lack of launch tubes. In my Naval underway experience on four ships I don't recall ever deploying with a full complement of missiles. Maybe there are missile factories out there just waiting for orders to build, but I doubt that is the case. Building and deploying more empty missile launchers is a waste of time. r/Karl
Well, it's the same situation as with artillery shells - the ones who retained the factories (Russia, China and North Korea) are congratulating themselves for wisdom, while those who dismantled them "ah, who needs shells anyway?" (like USA and EU) are cursing themselves for short-sightness.
The missile barge idea is separate from the missile. You need both: (i) an inexpensive platform for the VLS to reside in; and the missiles to load (hopefully while underway) into the VLS. Lack of missiles does not nullify the fact that missile barges are cost effective platforms which can be rolled out relatively quickly (that is if we can keep [by some small miracle] NAVSEA from screwing up this simple solution).
We need to replace our MSC/Ready Reserve ships. This is known. So start building a few freighters and tankers per year. Equip with a pair of Phalanx or better yet, Goalkeeper. If they're sailing, put the necessary MILDETs on so they can enter ports and keep their self-defense capability.
Take some of the freighter hulls, stick 96 VLS cells in. Sail alongside a Burke as support, shoot it dry. Either return to port or use as missile/torpedo sponge.
Also, this might be a Chinese export item; "Guided Missile Destroyer for Small Navy".
Just buy container ships on market. Used container ships could go as cheap as 2-3 millions per hull. You could buy several dozens and just mothball them till needed.
Yes, but we want to help build up the industrial base. Buying new helps that.
And while the cheapest ships are probably better (GULP!) than a lot of what we have in "Ready" Reserve, they might not be much better in a little bit of time.
But this is a case where the government demand is there. What did the The Other Sal estimate, we need a 100 medium-sized tankers? Plus freighters and RO-ROs. 30-year life span, we could keep a smaller yard busy doing that, no problem.
I like the idea, but think the manning estimates are a bit low. It would be prudent to study the old Project Araphoe plans…or dust that whole project off and revive it with modern hardware. Berthing containers, weapons containers, sensor containers, etc.
But the biggest headache is mindset. Back in the 1980s, the Navy was thinking about war constantly. 35 years of Hot Peace and the unending Operation USELESS DIRT treadmill have worn all that away. We need to revive the Fleet Problems of the 1930s. And hold simulated Fleet Problems to get Admirals and their command staffs proficient. Which means having enough people to have some of them constantly training - remember that in World War 2, the Pacific Fleet could execute faster than staffs could plan…so Halsey and Spruance wound up alternating command to buy planning time.
We're not serious in any way about getting ready for China.
Just shot off a bunch of Tomahawks into Nowhere, Nigeria. Some of which were duds.
The crew of the USS Gerald R. Ford had a reasonable expectation of being home for Christmas when they left Norfolk on June 24, 2025. They're going back and forth with their escorts south of Hispaniola. I think most of us here will be able to imagine the deckplate sentiments of the crew. Morale and resulting retention is important.
Finally, Netanyahu has ordered his servant to get ready to bomb Iran again. Open sources say we're already flying Patriot batteries in.
Royal Navy's auxilary anti-aircraft cruisers; basically warships, rebuild from avaliable ferry hulls. They have "proper" turrets, fire control systems, even some armor.
Chinese "car ferries" are stressed to support decks full of MBTs. This isn't apparently a common design feature of most non-Chinese car ferries. Nor is being able to roll vessels in and out of the water.
At the more spectacular, but might lead to uncontrolled escalation:Some of these have sailed well in advance, these being normal freighters that routinely sail the same route, and at some hour of the night they all pop the lids on their containers and fire. The targets are ships anchored at docks, docking facilities, and nearby transport, e.g., rail hubs, in American harbors. oil storage facilities and fuel tanker loading facilities are also good. These are all targets on our west, east, and south coasts. --we have a Navy, but no way to resupply it, at least short-term, from CONUS.
More spectacular, but a greater likelihood of uncontrolled escalation: Using longer range missiles, target the distillation and hydrogenation towers of every oil refinery in the US, and if you think NATO will ride to the rescue, in NATO. The American economy collapses.
And then the four hundred Minutemen speak their final word, and China is sorry they woke up that morning. Or that flight of B-2s or B-21s evaluates just how overbuilt the Three Gorges Dam really is. In any case that won't save them from starvation when their entire coastline becomes a Highway of Death.
China would do much better to look at Russia for gains.
Our DoD leadership (for decades not just current) suffers from a lack of ingenuity and imagination. There are some there, they buck-trends and 'think-outside-the-box' but they have to simultaneously navigate their way around all the pitfalls of maintaining a career that requires conformity until they can achieve a decision-making position/rank. These people need to be elevated and those working to crush and subdue them need to be exposed & ousted.
I would ask you this simple question: do we promote for “ingenuity and imagination”? Where are the incentives and disincentives for such personnel? Likewise, especially for the US Navy, where has it prioritized combat experience and overseas experience over CONUS staff and DC duty? Which career milestones are briefed, and which are not? What do selection boards tell us?
I think that's the crux. For senior leadership looking to advance such individuals, they're going to have to start looking at the promotion boards, who man's & administers them and what benchmarks are absolute in order to be up for selection; particularly around the O-4, -5 & -6 boards where the up-or-out mantra is ever present.
Wasn't too long ago that scuttlebutt was rampant regarding the career-path of a SWO in light of the many ship navigation errors. This officer's career would have more shore-duty & post-department head time than sea tour time, resulting in an individual who was more prepared to navigate the bureaucratic challenges instead of being able to successfully run a ship and her crew.
When it comes to weapons development and how to employ them, we've had the Red Sea and all the fun that region has, and Ukraine with the introduction of the high-value, small-scale, persistent threat environment where imagination and ingenuity has been the rule. For the Army guys, the field-expedient solution is the solution, leadership and initiative is pushed down the chain. For the Navy the lack of small-boys and the fleet architecture centered solely around the CVBG and its network, inherently prevents innovation and ingenuity because of the overwhelming demand to network & integrate.
Bonus points for the Honor Harrington reference. I'd say we need more of the Navy brass reading David Weber, but I'm afraid they'd just take the wrong ideas from it. We're not Manticore with technology that's so good it can completely outclass a navy that's twice its own size. (In fact, we might not have the technical edge at all these days.)
More than merely arsenal ship - this gal have full radar suit of frigate. She could provide both area air defense and self-defense against multiple targets.
The American version of this is to grab our offshore opvs and especially FSVs. The actual planned manning of Mariner and Ranger OUSV has 16 berths. They can also be configured for an extra room to support a crew if 18 like those just built in Singapore. That would be the best type to use but any that have multiple similar hulls would be a good start. The. Feed them from LMSR or container feeders that have their own cranes or any container terminal. Flood the zone.
It reminds this civilian of pictures of the Soviet rocket artillery mounted on trucks, or the American Calliope (think it was called that - it was a rack of rockets on top of a tank in WW2).
I suppose the idea is "quantity is a quality in its own right"?
Now, one thing to consider would be China's submarine force, wouldn't it? Here in Sweden, submarines have been a cornerstone of being prepared for Soviet/Russian aggression since the 1950s at least, since they are so cost effective - in our case at least, there not being all that many of us.
One of these sitting off Oahu just prior to hostilities could put enough cruise missiles into the PACAF, MARFORPAC, USARPAC, JICPAC, and INDOPAC facilities so as to achieve a decapitation strike. Most of the C2 for a response to a Taiwan contingency is there and I shudder to think what such an attack would do to our response ability.
One at Long Beach, 1 in oeuget Sound. Doesn’t take much to make Pearl Harbor look small by comparison.
Norfolk, DC and Jax.
Skip DC. Boston, though I would flip a coin on whether priority is BIW or Electric Boat.
I agree DC would probably be empty nothing to hit but the Pentagon, I'd say electric boat.
Interesting take. Am I reading correctly that you are framing this as a modern auxiliary cruiser, more “missile magazine on a civilian hull” than a deception-first Q-ship, and that the real lesson is that the PRC is looking for cheap ways to add salvo mass while the U.S. still has no credible forward reload or surge VLS plan?
Asking partially because I am writing about the same underlying method from the container angle: the container is camouflage because it is designed to be ignored, and once “effects” fit in a standard box, deterrence starts to look like inventory moving through a supply chain. My framing is Platform / Payload / Story: a civilian silhouette, modular launcher-style payloads, and procedural language that delays consensus long enough to reshape habits. Zhong Da 79 is my case study not because I claim loadout certainty, but because plausibility alone can change behavior, raise escort demand, widen standoff, and make passage feel conditional.
Basically yes, because this ship have its own fire control system - it could detect enemy targets, track them (over-the-horizon too - its side radars seems to be export vesion of our Russian "Mineral" system with OTH capability) and illuminate them for missile seekers. So it could operate idependently from "proper" warships.
Correct…but it could be used for either.
You could leave port looking like a merchant vessel and then use cranes to unbox and mount all the radars and defensive systems en-route. Or, if it is first strike, you don't really need defensive systems if your plan is to abandon ship and flee to Isla Coronado after you blow up SDNB, North Island, Mugu and Lemoore with 400 cruise missiles at 2am.
This idea makes so much sense the puzzle palace will have heart attacks and brain seizures trying to grapple with the concept of inexpensive, doable (fast) and lethal. Old JPJ said something about going into harms way…the old boy was on to something!
"This idea makes so much sense"
--------
... This idea makes too much sense:
> too easy to bring online
> too inexpensive
> too little bureaucratic burden
> too fast to implement
Given the cancerous disfunction at NAVSEA (as well as the perverse incentives that reward bespoke designs) the odds of this happening are low.
It in a way it is perversely funny that we old Marines and Sailors get the notion clear as a bell and know the NAVSEA people appear to be totally unable to do something this simple. Imagine what they would do to an Andrew Jackson Higgins when he showed up with his shallow-water “Eureka” boat, Or, to Lieutenant Victoria Krulak for having the temerity to suggest adding a bow forward ramp that drop down…
In fairness I must give NAVSEA credit when it is due (which is rarely). They managed to the get Expeditionary Sea Bases designed and built at a reasonable price point ($500M-ish) and in a timely fashion. And both the Navy and the Marines like them and want more.
The missile boat platform could be built based upon the same tried and true Alaska Class Tanker. Just cover the deck in shipping container based VLS. Give it the Aegis Combat System, bolt on some CIWS and some intermediate range defensive systems (take your pick) and you are basically good to go.
80% optimal performance at 35% price point.
CNO should give the admiral in charge of Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), Vice Admiral (VADM) James P. Downey, who assumed command in January 2024, 48 hours to show cause why he should not be fired.
OK, before we get too far ahead of ourselves this is much like the failed missile barge idea. Question #1: how many empty VLS tubes are currently in the underway fleet? Putting more empty missile tubes underway does not add to fire power. We don't have enough missiles of every type and getting less all the time as we continue to blast shore targets (and cheap enemy drones). It would be a better arguement if we had so many missiles that we can't deploy them for lack of launch tubes. In my Naval underway experience on four ships I don't recall ever deploying with a full complement of missiles. Maybe there are missile factories out there just waiting for orders to build, but I doubt that is the case. Building and deploying more empty missile launchers is a waste of time. r/Karl
Well, it's the same situation as with artillery shells - the ones who retained the factories (Russia, China and North Korea) are congratulating themselves for wisdom, while those who dismantled them "ah, who needs shells anyway?" (like USA and EU) are cursing themselves for short-sightness.
"this is much like the failed missile barge idea"
----------
The missile barge idea is separate from the missile. You need both: (i) an inexpensive platform for the VLS to reside in; and the missiles to load (hopefully while underway) into the VLS. Lack of missiles does not nullify the fact that missile barges are cost effective platforms which can be rolled out relatively quickly (that is if we can keep [by some small miracle] NAVSEA from screwing up this simple solution).
We need to replace our MSC/Ready Reserve ships. This is known. So start building a few freighters and tankers per year. Equip with a pair of Phalanx or better yet, Goalkeeper. If they're sailing, put the necessary MILDETs on so they can enter ports and keep their self-defense capability.
Take some of the freighter hulls, stick 96 VLS cells in. Sail alongside a Burke as support, shoot it dry. Either return to port or use as missile/torpedo sponge.
Also, this might be a Chinese export item; "Guided Missile Destroyer for Small Navy".
Just buy container ships on market. Used container ships could go as cheap as 2-3 millions per hull. You could buy several dozens and just mothball them till needed.
Yes, but we want to help build up the industrial base. Buying new helps that.
And while the cheapest ships are probably better (GULP!) than a lot of what we have in "Ready" Reserve, they might not be much better in a little bit of time.
Hard to build up industrial base for civilian ships, if there is no local demand for such...
But this is a case where the government demand is there. What did the The Other Sal estimate, we need a 100 medium-sized tankers? Plus freighters and RO-ROs. 30-year life span, we could keep a smaller yard busy doing that, no problem.
Yikes! Export to say NorK!
I like the idea, but think the manning estimates are a bit low. It would be prudent to study the old Project Araphoe plans…or dust that whole project off and revive it with modern hardware. Berthing containers, weapons containers, sensor containers, etc.
But the biggest headache is mindset. Back in the 1980s, the Navy was thinking about war constantly. 35 years of Hot Peace and the unending Operation USELESS DIRT treadmill have worn all that away. We need to revive the Fleet Problems of the 1930s. And hold simulated Fleet Problems to get Admirals and their command staffs proficient. Which means having enough people to have some of them constantly training - remember that in World War 2, the Pacific Fleet could execute faster than staffs could plan…so Halsey and Spruance wound up alternating command to buy planning time.
Thanks! I knew that Spruance and Halsey both commanded in the Pacific, but didn’t realise why.
We're not serious in any way about getting ready for China.
Just shot off a bunch of Tomahawks into Nowhere, Nigeria. Some of which were duds.
The crew of the USS Gerald R. Ford had a reasonable expectation of being home for Christmas when they left Norfolk on June 24, 2025. They're going back and forth with their escorts south of Hispaniola. I think most of us here will be able to imagine the deckplate sentiments of the crew. Morale and resulting retention is important.
Finally, Netanyahu has ordered his servant to get ready to bomb Iran again. Open sources say we're already flying Patriot batteries in.
Madness.
Just shot off a bunch of Tomahawks into Nowhere, Nigeria. Some of which were duds.
Cool story bro. Link on the duds?
Won't bother with you on the "servant" bit. Cry more.
You sound like you don't like it here. As my mom's branch manager Mike Coleman used to say, "If you're not happy, get happy!"
Project Araphoe doesn't google 😳
There are one type more:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMS_Ulster_Queen
Royal Navy's auxilary anti-aircraft cruisers; basically warships, rebuild from avaliable ferry hulls. They have "proper" turrets, fire control systems, even some armor.
The Chinese ship, IMHO, close to them.
A Passenger ferry! Dang You could mod out a Cruise ship the same way and actually do some real damage.
Chinese "car ferries" are stressed to support decks full of MBTs. This isn't apparently a common design feature of most non-Chinese car ferries. Nor is being able to roll vessels in and out of the water.
Good Intel!
At the more spectacular, but might lead to uncontrolled escalation:Some of these have sailed well in advance, these being normal freighters that routinely sail the same route, and at some hour of the night they all pop the lids on their containers and fire. The targets are ships anchored at docks, docking facilities, and nearby transport, e.g., rail hubs, in American harbors. oil storage facilities and fuel tanker loading facilities are also good. These are all targets on our west, east, and south coasts. --we have a Navy, but no way to resupply it, at least short-term, from CONUS.
More spectacular, but a greater likelihood of uncontrolled escalation: Using longer range missiles, target the distillation and hydrogenation towers of every oil refinery in the US, and if you think NATO will ride to the rescue, in NATO. The American economy collapses.
And then the four hundred Minutemen speak their final word, and China is sorry they woke up that morning. Or that flight of B-2s or B-21s evaluates just how overbuilt the Three Gorges Dam really is. In any case that won't save them from starvation when their entire coastline becomes a Highway of Death.
China would do much better to look at Russia for gains.
But the Chinese will see our nuclear strike coming and return the favor, likely including our allies, and world civilization comes to an end.
Our DoD leadership (for decades not just current) suffers from a lack of ingenuity and imagination. There are some there, they buck-trends and 'think-outside-the-box' but they have to simultaneously navigate their way around all the pitfalls of maintaining a career that requires conformity until they can achieve a decision-making position/rank. These people need to be elevated and those working to crush and subdue them need to be exposed & ousted.
I would ask you this simple question: do we promote for “ingenuity and imagination”? Where are the incentives and disincentives for such personnel? Likewise, especially for the US Navy, where has it prioritized combat experience and overseas experience over CONUS staff and DC duty? Which career milestones are briefed, and which are not? What do selection boards tell us?
I think that's the crux. For senior leadership looking to advance such individuals, they're going to have to start looking at the promotion boards, who man's & administers them and what benchmarks are absolute in order to be up for selection; particularly around the O-4, -5 & -6 boards where the up-or-out mantra is ever present.
Wasn't too long ago that scuttlebutt was rampant regarding the career-path of a SWO in light of the many ship navigation errors. This officer's career would have more shore-duty & post-department head time than sea tour time, resulting in an individual who was more prepared to navigate the bureaucratic challenges instead of being able to successfully run a ship and her crew.
When it comes to weapons development and how to employ them, we've had the Red Sea and all the fun that region has, and Ukraine with the introduction of the high-value, small-scale, persistent threat environment where imagination and ingenuity has been the rule. For the Army guys, the field-expedient solution is the solution, leadership and initiative is pushed down the chain. For the Navy the lack of small-boys and the fleet architecture centered solely around the CVBG and its network, inherently prevents innovation and ingenuity because of the overwhelming demand to network & integrate.
Seven years ago - https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2019/january/converting-merchant-ships-missile-ships-win - nothing new under the sun.
Bonus points for the Honor Harrington reference. I'd say we need more of the Navy brass reading David Weber, but I'm afraid they'd just take the wrong ideas from it. We're not Manticore with technology that's so good it can completely outclass a navy that's twice its own size. (In fact, we might not have the technical edge at all these days.)
Love his writing, too (despite clashing with him in heated discussions numerous time, when his forum was still running. Eh... good ol' times)))
I thought I recognized your name. From what I could tell, he (usually) enjoyed, or at least appreciated, those exchanges as well.
Hope so) At least by now we are in good speaking terms on Facebook (he rarely wrote anywhere else now)
How big is the Chinese merchant fleet, 1. How many torpedoes are in inventory?
2. How many VLS tubes are afloat?
This is an excellent platform for war at sea after the 1st week.
About 5500 cargo ships are sailing under PRC flags. About 1/5 of all world merchant fleet, to be exact.
More or less a rhetorical question to make a point. Warshots have been a discussion on the porch for quite a long time.
All they need to do is put One Missile on one ship each and you have a real headache!
So, an Arsenal ship with USNR mnning? Interesting concept and prbably doable. I like it.
More than merely arsenal ship - this gal have full radar suit of frigate. She could provide both area air defense and self-defense against multiple targets.
And the germans are playing with ideas about unmanned missile ships:
https://strategypage.com/htmw/htsurf/articles/2025122953240.aspx#gsc.tab=0
I like the aux cruiser/missile ship idea better.
The American version of this is to grab our offshore opvs and especially FSVs. The actual planned manning of Mariner and Ranger OUSV has 16 berths. They can also be configured for an extra room to support a crew if 18 like those just built in Singapore. That would be the best type to use but any that have multiple similar hulls would be a good start. The. Feed them from LMSR or container feeders that have their own cranes or any container terminal. Flood the zone.
It reminds this civilian of pictures of the Soviet rocket artillery mounted on trucks, or the American Calliope (think it was called that - it was a rack of rockets on top of a tank in WW2).
I suppose the idea is "quantity is a quality in its own right"?
Now, one thing to consider would be China's submarine force, wouldn't it? Here in Sweden, submarines have been a cornerstone of being prepared for Soviet/Russian aggression since the 1950s at least, since they are so cost effective - in our case at least, there not being all that many of us.
Just thinking aloud, really.
Hey, you're everywhere! 🤣
Like the rash! Or herpes the love-bug. (Or was that Herbie?)
Yah, saw this Stack among Chris Bray's list of recommendations.
Glad you're here, from the token landlubber!
And USSR was always sincerely puzzled why Sweden is preparing for something USSR never actually planned...