I'm sorry...did they just sort of forget about this and now have to relearn it? I don't think so...I think is was probably our SOF/training cadres that worked with the Ukrainians to go after the command posts because we know the value of doing so. That we've had the luxury in recent conflicts, due to the enemy, doesn't mean we'd do the same against a near-peer.
The Biden Administration has committed to replacing all of DOD's gasoline and diesel vehicles with electric powered equivalents by the year 2030, with the exception of the heavy armored vehicle fleet (tanks, AFVs, APC's, etc.) which are to be fully replaced by the year 2050.
Given that DOD's formally stated top priority is supporting the Biden Administration's commitment to fighting climate change, then we must assume that all of the mobile equipment needed to support Lt. Colonel Arrol's vision for a distributed command post architecture must be EV's of one kind or another.
Here is my question for Lt. Colonel Arrol. Is there an EV equivalent of the M1087 Expandable Van Shelter in the acquisition pipeline, and if so, will the EV equivalent of the M1087 be in service by 2030?
Supposing that an EV equivalent of the M1087 is in service by 2030, how will it and all the other kinds of EV's needed to support a distributed command post architecture be recharged as needed?
For example, is a mobile micro-reactor power station under consideration for such a purpose, one which would support all the other power needs of a distributed architecture command post?
Assuming that the micro-reactor power station itself is a valuable target for destruction by enemy attack, will the NBC teams attached to the distributed command post elements be trained for the radiological consequences of a destroyed micro-reactor power station?
How could massive semi-mobile sites with enormous RF signatures that rely on continuous high-bandwidth connections to fixed immobile CONUS data centers go wrong in a full-blown war between peers?
I keep getting told (mostly by USAF folks) that CPs and AOCs are no longer needed because everyone will just take their secure laptops to off-base hotels where they will set up their mobile phones and Starlink and/or Iridium connectivity, and run the war from a big conference room.
Reading his article I think he understands the issue only "kind-of". The Russian senior officers were forward because they can't trust anything they don't see with their own eyes. And, unless they face to face tell a subordinate to do something they can't trust it will be done. That's the kind of Army Russia has built.
The problem the US has are different and will only be reinforced by the solution he proposes. If you are fighting a near-peer they can: A) destroy your critical space assets, B) render them unusable by jamming, C) locate your SatComm systems using orbital assets of their own and directly target your high-bandwidth continuously transmitting nodes with long-range precision munitions.
Relying on magic ('quantum') to make the problem go away doesn't make the problem go away. We have managed to lose every war where we have had these high-bandwidth and highly connected forces. Unlike WW2 where limited voice comms sufficed. We talk a lot about mission command, but there seems to be a lot of miles long screwdrivers involved when we actually do it in combat. As we got rid of the ground forces spread spectrum high bandwidth low probability of intercept system (EPLRS) in favor of all satcom all the time I hope that it doesn't go as bad as I fear.
As a former infantryman (23 years), one of the worst habit we lost in the GWOT in the Army was the lost art of "digging in". We used to teach our kids to start digging a fighting position in basic infantry training and reinforced at their first tactical unit. We did this because we were focused on a war in Europe against the WARSAW PACT and they were heavily tilted towards their MASSIVE advantage in basic artillery in high intensity combat.
Another good reason to have command ships (LCC's or JCC's) that provide mobility and additional security to a JTF. AT least an LCC can be defended against incoming fires by escorts.
So, are we prepared to carry out combat operations in the absence of command posts?
How well do we understand "commander's intent?" Do we have appropriate degrees of delegated authority to act in absence of frequent "helpful" guidance from "higher?"
Or, a cynic might ask if a few command posts being taken our might not improve combat effectiveness.
The Army is addressing this with a new mobile command post concept. Unfortunately too many commanders are wedded to the connectivity/C5ISR capabilities from GWOT FOBs and expect the same levels while mobile.
Fascinating stuff. Will listen
If it's not fast, agile and constantly moving it is dead on todays battlefield.
The next big war will rapidly degenerate into a slugging match using second tier weapons and tactics.
The Top weapons will be expended at a frightening rate.
I'm sorry...did they just sort of forget about this and now have to relearn it? I don't think so...I think is was probably our SOF/training cadres that worked with the Ukrainians to go after the command posts because we know the value of doing so. That we've had the luxury in recent conflicts, due to the enemy, doesn't mean we'd do the same against a near-peer.
The Biden Administration has committed to replacing all of DOD's gasoline and diesel vehicles with electric powered equivalents by the year 2030, with the exception of the heavy armored vehicle fleet (tanks, AFVs, APC's, etc.) which are to be fully replaced by the year 2050.
Given that DOD's formally stated top priority is supporting the Biden Administration's commitment to fighting climate change, then we must assume that all of the mobile equipment needed to support Lt. Colonel Arrol's vision for a distributed command post architecture must be EV's of one kind or another.
Here is my question for Lt. Colonel Arrol. Is there an EV equivalent of the M1087 Expandable Van Shelter in the acquisition pipeline, and if so, will the EV equivalent of the M1087 be in service by 2030?
Supposing that an EV equivalent of the M1087 is in service by 2030, how will it and all the other kinds of EV's needed to support a distributed command post architecture be recharged as needed?
For example, is a mobile micro-reactor power station under consideration for such a purpose, one which would support all the other power needs of a distributed architecture command post?
Assuming that the micro-reactor power station itself is a valuable target for destruction by enemy attack, will the NBC teams attached to the distributed command post elements be trained for the radiological consequences of a destroyed micro-reactor power station?
How could massive semi-mobile sites with enormous RF signatures that rely on continuous high-bandwidth connections to fixed immobile CONUS data centers go wrong in a full-blown war between peers?
I keep getting told (mostly by USAF folks) that CPs and AOCs are no longer needed because everyone will just take their secure laptops to off-base hotels where they will set up their mobile phones and Starlink and/or Iridium connectivity, and run the war from a big conference room.
I keep not believing it, but they keep saying it.
Reading his article I think he understands the issue only "kind-of". The Russian senior officers were forward because they can't trust anything they don't see with their own eyes. And, unless they face to face tell a subordinate to do something they can't trust it will be done. That's the kind of Army Russia has built.
The problem the US has are different and will only be reinforced by the solution he proposes. If you are fighting a near-peer they can: A) destroy your critical space assets, B) render them unusable by jamming, C) locate your SatComm systems using orbital assets of their own and directly target your high-bandwidth continuously transmitting nodes with long-range precision munitions.
Relying on magic ('quantum') to make the problem go away doesn't make the problem go away. We have managed to lose every war where we have had these high-bandwidth and highly connected forces. Unlike WW2 where limited voice comms sufficed. We talk a lot about mission command, but there seems to be a lot of miles long screwdrivers involved when we actually do it in combat. As we got rid of the ground forces spread spectrum high bandwidth low probability of intercept system (EPLRS) in favor of all satcom all the time I hope that it doesn't go as bad as I fear.
As a former infantryman (23 years), one of the worst habit we lost in the GWOT in the Army was the lost art of "digging in". We used to teach our kids to start digging a fighting position in basic infantry training and reinforced at their first tactical unit. We did this because we were focused on a war in Europe against the WARSAW PACT and they were heavily tilted towards their MASSIVE advantage in basic artillery in high intensity combat.
So more Command Ships, and keep a bunch of M113s so leadership can't be targeted after the balloon goes up?
Sigh, another damned lesson we have to relearn.
Another good reason to have command ships (LCC's or JCC's) that provide mobility and additional security to a JTF. AT least an LCC can be defended against incoming fires by escorts.
So, are we prepared to carry out combat operations in the absence of command posts?
How well do we understand "commander's intent?" Do we have appropriate degrees of delegated authority to act in absence of frequent "helpful" guidance from "higher?"
Or, a cynic might ask if a few command posts being taken our might not improve combat effectiveness.
The Army is addressing this with a new mobile command post concept. Unfortunately too many commanders are wedded to the connectivity/C5ISR capabilities from GWOT FOBs and expect the same levels while mobile.