I'm sorry...did they just sort of forget about this and now have to relearn it? I don't think so...I think is was probably our SOF/training cadres that worked with the Ukrainians to go after the command posts because we know the value of doing so. That we've had the luxury in recent conflicts, due to the enemy, doesn't mean we'd do the same against a near-peer.
The Biden Administration has committed to replacing all of DOD's gasoline and diesel vehicles with electric powered equivalents by the year 2030, with the exception of the heavy armored vehicle fleet (tanks, AFVs, APC's, etc.) which are to be fully replaced by the year 2050.
Given that DOD's formally stated top priority is supporting the Biden Administration's commitment to fighting climate change, then we must assume that all of the mobile equipment needed to support Lt. Colonel Arrol's vision for a distributed command post architecture must be EV's of one kind or another.
Here is my question for Lt. Colonel Arrol. Is there an EV equivalent of the M1087 Expandable Van Shelter in the acquisition pipeline, and if so, will the EV equivalent of the M1087 be in service by 2030?
Supposing that an EV equivalent of the M1087 is in service by 2030, how will it and all the other kinds of EV's needed to support a distributed command post architecture be recharged as needed?
For example, is a mobile micro-reactor power station under consideration for such a purpose, one which would support all the other power needs of a distributed architecture command post?
Assuming that the micro-reactor power station itself is a valuable target for destruction by enemy attack, will the NBC teams attached to the distributed command post elements be trained for the radiological consequences of a destroyed micro-reactor power station?
We would wish it was a joke, but it's not a joke. These people are completely serious about it. On April 26th, in testimony to Congress, Energy Secretary Jennifer Granholm said she supports requiring the military to have an all-electric vehicle fleet by 2030.
Senator Ernst: “Do you support the military adopting that EV fleet by 2030?”
Secretary Granholm: “I do, and I think we can get there as well. And I do think that reducing our reliance on the volatility of globally traded fossil fuels where we know that global events such as the war in Ukraine can jack up prices for people back home does not contribute to energy security. I think energy security is achieved when we have homegrown, clean energy that is abundant like you see in Iowa. We think we can be a leader globally in how we have become energy independent.”
The DOD now has a scorecard to keep itself accountable as it advances environmental justice for communities across America. The DOD has 640 staff working on environmental justice, either in a full-time or part-time capacity.
President Biden said last April: “One of the things I found out as President of the United States, I get to spend a lot of that money. We’re going to start the process where every vehicle in the United States military, every vehicle, is going to be climate-friendly — every vehicle — I mean it. We’re spending billions of dollars to do it.”
Getting back to the topic of this article ....
One has to ask the question, how does electrifying every mobile vehicle which supports Lt Col. Arrol's vision for a distributed command post architecture add to the combat effectiveness of that architecture?
Furthermore, how does spending many billions of dollars electrifying every mobile vehicle employed by the US military improve the combat effectiveness of the US military as a whole?
How can spending these many billions of dollars electrifying all these military vehicles be justified when it means that we won't be producing as many 155mm artillery shells as we need, or as many stand-off munitions as we need, or as many new FFG-62 frigates as we need, or as many new combat aircraft as we need.
How could massive semi-mobile sites with enormous RF signatures that rely on continuous high-bandwidth connections to fixed immobile CONUS data centers go wrong in a full-blown war between peers?
I keep getting told (mostly by USAF folks) that CPs and AOCs are no longer needed because everyone will just take their secure laptops to off-base hotels where they will set up their mobile phones and Starlink and/or Iridium connectivity, and run the war from a big conference room.
I think the Air Force is going to be very disappointed at the quality of the hotels in Bakhmut. The don’t even have a single properly maintained golf course.
Air Force thinkers (there are some) have been talking about the vulnerability of large, fixed targets like an AOC for a long time. Still, our focus on improving AOCs was to standardize procedures and train better. I don't think they are ready to operate in a mobile (move once every day) configuration. Our 'mobile' radar units went from movable (move twice per war, once to get in position & once to go home) to somewhat more movable, but we didn't exercise actually tearing down and returning to service at a different location.
Reading his article I think he understands the issue only "kind-of". The Russian senior officers were forward because they can't trust anything they don't see with their own eyes. And, unless they face to face tell a subordinate to do something they can't trust it will be done. That's the kind of Army Russia has built.
The problem the US has are different and will only be reinforced by the solution he proposes. If you are fighting a near-peer they can: A) destroy your critical space assets, B) render them unusable by jamming, C) locate your SatComm systems using orbital assets of their own and directly target your high-bandwidth continuously transmitting nodes with long-range precision munitions.
Relying on magic ('quantum') to make the problem go away doesn't make the problem go away. We have managed to lose every war where we have had these high-bandwidth and highly connected forces. Unlike WW2 where limited voice comms sufficed. We talk a lot about mission command, but there seems to be a lot of miles long screwdrivers involved when we actually do it in combat. As we got rid of the ground forces spread spectrum high bandwidth low probability of intercept system (EPLRS) in favor of all satcom all the time I hope that it doesn't go as bad as I fear.
"The Russian senior officers were forward because they can't trust anything they don't see with their own eyes. And, unless they face to face tell a subordinate to do something they can't trust it will be done. That's the kind of Army Russia has built."
Fortunately, the US military services recruit only the best volunteers expressing boundless creativity and exhibiting the highest degree of personal initiative. We don't need senior leadership at the front lines or even in theater, just a secure high-speed data link back in CONUS to report success to. Heck, even middle leadership in theater only needs to be there to get their cards punched so that they are eligible for their next rank. The American soldier, airpersons, sailors, and Marines can be counted on to execute their orders, adapt as necessary, and succeed at all costs even when they know it might get their butt chewed in the end. That is how we train and that is what we can expect.
As a former infantryman (23 years), one of the worst habit we lost in the GWOT in the Army was the lost art of "digging in". We used to teach our kids to start digging a fighting position in basic infantry training and reinforced at their first tactical unit. We did this because we were focused on a war in Europe against the WARSAW PACT and they were heavily tilted towards their MASSIVE advantage in basic artillery in high intensity combat.
Dunno how many remember that the Blue Ridge and Mt. Whitney were actually built as Amphibious Command Ships. It was only later that they fell into the role of Fleet Flagships.
But anyway, I would suggest that the Command Ships being nailed may be the first overt action of a war.
I had a Corps Commander a few years back who often remarked that there are very few new lessons to be learned, most everything now are just lessons repeated.
Another good reason to have command ships (LCC's or JCC's) that provide mobility and additional security to a JTF. AT least an LCC can be defended against incoming fires by escorts.
Nah, the Air Force doesn't like those. AFAIK they plan to dump them all without replacement as part of the zoomie version of "Divest to Invest". Not sure if they will be allowed, but the replacement was cancelled in 2018 and 707s are old airframes.
We can do the JSTARS functions from space . . . . . no need to bother with manned aircraft. Didn't you get the memo? Just toss up some unknown number of new satellites, communicating via some unknown number of relay satellites, to some unknown ground processing facilities who can then forward the tracks to some unknown number of C2 facilities who can forward pass the track data to a shooter someplace who does not have actual organic sensor data on the targets. Who gets the courtmartial or testifies in Congress when the target turns out to be a bus full of school kids?
So, are we prepared to carry out combat operations in the absence of command posts?
How well do we understand "commander's intent?" Do we have appropriate degrees of delegated authority to act in absence of frequent "helpful" guidance from "higher?"
Or, a cynic might ask if a few command posts being taken our might not improve combat effectiveness.
The Army is addressing this with a new mobile command post concept. Unfortunately too many commanders are wedded to the connectivity/C5ISR capabilities from GWOT FOBs and expect the same levels while mobile.
Fascinating stuff. Will listen
If it's not fast, agile and constantly moving it is dead on todays battlefield.
The next big war will rapidly degenerate into a slugging match using second tier weapons and tactics.
The Top weapons will be expended at a frightening rate.
If it can be heard or seen it will be hit. If it can be hit, it will be killed...
Good thing we have a ridiculous amount of Harpoons..smh
Indeed!
I'm sorry...did they just sort of forget about this and now have to relearn it? I don't think so...I think is was probably our SOF/training cadres that worked with the Ukrainians to go after the command posts because we know the value of doing so. That we've had the luxury in recent conflicts, due to the enemy, doesn't mean we'd do the same against a near-peer.
The Biden Administration has committed to replacing all of DOD's gasoline and diesel vehicles with electric powered equivalents by the year 2030, with the exception of the heavy armored vehicle fleet (tanks, AFVs, APC's, etc.) which are to be fully replaced by the year 2050.
Given that DOD's formally stated top priority is supporting the Biden Administration's commitment to fighting climate change, then we must assume that all of the mobile equipment needed to support Lt. Colonel Arrol's vision for a distributed command post architecture must be EV's of one kind or another.
Here is my question for Lt. Colonel Arrol. Is there an EV equivalent of the M1087 Expandable Van Shelter in the acquisition pipeline, and if so, will the EV equivalent of the M1087 be in service by 2030?
Supposing that an EV equivalent of the M1087 is in service by 2030, how will it and all the other kinds of EV's needed to support a distributed command post architecture be recharged as needed?
For example, is a mobile micro-reactor power station under consideration for such a purpose, one which would support all the other power needs of a distributed architecture command post?
Assuming that the micro-reactor power station itself is a valuable target for destruction by enemy attack, will the NBC teams attached to the distributed command post elements be trained for the radiological consequences of a destroyed micro-reactor power station?
Wish it was a joke...
https://youtu.be/un5N690N3MY?t=6
We would wish it was a joke, but it's not a joke. These people are completely serious about it. On April 26th, in testimony to Congress, Energy Secretary Jennifer Granholm said she supports requiring the military to have an all-electric vehicle fleet by 2030.
Senator Ernst: “Do you support the military adopting that EV fleet by 2030?”
Secretary Granholm: “I do, and I think we can get there as well. And I do think that reducing our reliance on the volatility of globally traded fossil fuels where we know that global events such as the war in Ukraine can jack up prices for people back home does not contribute to energy security. I think energy security is achieved when we have homegrown, clean energy that is abundant like you see in Iowa. We think we can be a leader globally in how we have become energy independent.”
The DOD now has a scorecard to keep itself accountable as it advances environmental justice for communities across America. The DOD has 640 staff working on environmental justice, either in a full-time or part-time capacity.
President Biden said last April: “One of the things I found out as President of the United States, I get to spend a lot of that money. We’re going to start the process where every vehicle in the United States military, every vehicle, is going to be climate-friendly — every vehicle — I mean it. We’re spending billions of dollars to do it.”
Getting back to the topic of this article ....
One has to ask the question, how does electrifying every mobile vehicle which supports Lt Col. Arrol's vision for a distributed command post architecture add to the combat effectiveness of that architecture?
Furthermore, how does spending many billions of dollars electrifying every mobile vehicle employed by the US military improve the combat effectiveness of the US military as a whole?
How can spending these many billions of dollars electrifying all these military vehicles be justified when it means that we won't be producing as many 155mm artillery shells as we need, or as many stand-off munitions as we need, or as many new FFG-62 frigates as we need, or as many new combat aircraft as we need.
The Soviets went in big with this concept back in the day...
What could possibly go wrong?
The Soviet Union's Deadly Abandoned Nuclear Generators
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NT8-b5YEyjo
How could massive semi-mobile sites with enormous RF signatures that rely on continuous high-bandwidth connections to fixed immobile CONUS data centers go wrong in a full-blown war between peers?
I keep getting told (mostly by USAF folks) that CPs and AOCs are no longer needed because everyone will just take their secure laptops to off-base hotels where they will set up their mobile phones and Starlink and/or Iridium connectivity, and run the war from a big conference room.
I keep not believing it, but they keep saying it.
I think the Air Force is going to be very disappointed at the quality of the hotels in Bakhmut. The don’t even have a single properly maintained golf course.
Air Force thinkers (there are some) have been talking about the vulnerability of large, fixed targets like an AOC for a long time. Still, our focus on improving AOCs was to standardize procedures and train better. I don't think they are ready to operate in a mobile (move once every day) configuration. Our 'mobile' radar units went from movable (move twice per war, once to get in position & once to go home) to somewhat more movable, but we didn't exercise actually tearing down and returning to service at a different location.
I suspect people are going to be disappointed when they discover the off-base hotel is the back of an APC.....
Reading his article I think he understands the issue only "kind-of". The Russian senior officers were forward because they can't trust anything they don't see with their own eyes. And, unless they face to face tell a subordinate to do something they can't trust it will be done. That's the kind of Army Russia has built.
The problem the US has are different and will only be reinforced by the solution he proposes. If you are fighting a near-peer they can: A) destroy your critical space assets, B) render them unusable by jamming, C) locate your SatComm systems using orbital assets of their own and directly target your high-bandwidth continuously transmitting nodes with long-range precision munitions.
Relying on magic ('quantum') to make the problem go away doesn't make the problem go away. We have managed to lose every war where we have had these high-bandwidth and highly connected forces. Unlike WW2 where limited voice comms sufficed. We talk a lot about mission command, but there seems to be a lot of miles long screwdrivers involved when we actually do it in combat. As we got rid of the ground forces spread spectrum high bandwidth low probability of intercept system (EPLRS) in favor of all satcom all the time I hope that it doesn't go as bad as I fear.
"The Russian senior officers were forward because they can't trust anything they don't see with their own eyes. And, unless they face to face tell a subordinate to do something they can't trust it will be done. That's the kind of Army Russia has built."
Fortunately, the US military services recruit only the best volunteers expressing boundless creativity and exhibiting the highest degree of personal initiative. We don't need senior leadership at the front lines or even in theater, just a secure high-speed data link back in CONUS to report success to. Heck, even middle leadership in theater only needs to be there to get their cards punched so that they are eligible for their next rank. The American soldier, airpersons, sailors, and Marines can be counted on to execute their orders, adapt as necessary, and succeed at all costs even when they know it might get their butt chewed in the end. That is how we train and that is what we can expect.
As a former infantryman (23 years), one of the worst habit we lost in the GWOT in the Army was the lost art of "digging in". We used to teach our kids to start digging a fighting position in basic infantry training and reinforced at their first tactical unit. We did this because we were focused on a war in Europe against the WARSAW PACT and they were heavily tilted towards their MASSIVE advantage in basic artillery in high intensity combat.
Think about sound-powered telephone and assault wire. Simple technology has its uses.
So more Command Ships, and keep a bunch of M113s so leadership can't be targeted after the balloon goes up?
"So more Command Ships..."
Dunno how many remember that the Blue Ridge and Mt. Whitney were actually built as Amphibious Command Ships. It was only later that they fell into the role of Fleet Flagships.
But anyway, I would suggest that the Command Ships being nailed may be the first overt action of a war.
You have a point.
Sigh, another damned lesson we have to relearn.
I had a Corps Commander a few years back who often remarked that there are very few new lessons to be learned, most everything now are just lessons repeated.
Another good reason to have command ships (LCC's or JCC's) that provide mobility and additional security to a JTF. AT least an LCC can be defended against incoming fires by escorts.
...and more JSTARS. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5augcVbN0Bg
Nah, the Air Force doesn't like those. AFAIK they plan to dump them all without replacement as part of the zoomie version of "Divest to Invest". Not sure if they will be allowed, but the replacement was cancelled in 2018 and 707s are old airframes.
We can do the JSTARS functions from space . . . . . no need to bother with manned aircraft. Didn't you get the memo? Just toss up some unknown number of new satellites, communicating via some unknown number of relay satellites, to some unknown ground processing facilities who can then forward the tracks to some unknown number of C2 facilities who can forward pass the track data to a shooter someplace who does not have actual organic sensor data on the targets. Who gets the courtmartial or testifies in Congress when the target turns out to be a bus full of school kids?
The shooter, of course.
So, are we prepared to carry out combat operations in the absence of command posts?
How well do we understand "commander's intent?" Do we have appropriate degrees of delegated authority to act in absence of frequent "helpful" guidance from "higher?"
Or, a cynic might ask if a few command posts being taken our might not improve combat effectiveness.
The Army is addressing this with a new mobile command post concept. Unfortunately too many commanders are wedded to the connectivity/C5ISR capabilities from GWOT FOBs and expect the same levels while mobile.