The exquisitely expensive and exotic for which we will never have enough, maintenance availability periods that stretch on & on and supply chain headaches that can't be overcome... Yet for the large USV program, the Navy's PEO sees containerized strike packages for this class of ship because they can mix things up quite easily. Hmm... perhaps a lightly manned alternative would fit the bill rather than waiting several more years for the Navy to answer the question if they can build an engineering plant that can be left unattended for extended periods for a LUSV? Heaven forbid if we were to do something so unsexy as containerized long range strike weapons on a ship whose roots were more mundane. Such a ship being built and maintained by multiple shipyards and which can be replenished within theatre??? Why should we do such a mundane thing?
What exactly is our foreign policy you want to risk nuclear war over? Because it’s to be regarded as near certainty in full war with a nuclear power. Even mostly one way from USA we’d be guilty of the worst genocide and aggressive war in history, and the map answers the question of aggression.
Frankly you want a large force in being you would not risk, Admiral Fischer, but like to lose it anyway.
The Marines are bored and want a fight, let them have one.
If you’re going to do Plan Dog with Moscow instead of Berlin and Beijing instead of Tokyo, admit it , and proceed from that End to means and ways.
Under ways; Any full on war with a peer nuclear power should be assumed to escalate to nuclear war. This must be a core planning assumption, or it is irresponsible fantasy.
No the world won’t end, it will suffer and continue, to the disappointment of many no doubt.
So be clear what’s involved, and do abandon ridiculous notions of deterrence- we are aggressing not deterring, look at the map.
A possible incentive to posting things on Guam is that it's a US territory. Someone may intend a tripwire effect. If China hits a ship in the South China Sea, or a base in the Phillipines, Americans and the US Congress will receive it differently than a strike on Guam, or so the decision-maker may hope China will suppose. Eleventy-dimensional chess? Who knows. Western powers think a lot about "posture" and how to send subliminal messages about our intentions. As the recent RUSI report on the war in Ukraine noted, sophisticated strategies like that are often lost on an unsophisticated opponent.
Guam is a trip wire most certainly. Perhaps consider how China has to grapple with protecting it's freight and oil deliveries along thousands of miles of ocean. How would the U.S. and/or it's allies likely respond should China strike say Japan or Guam? I don't imagine the Chinese are anxious to see oil and/or critical raw materials deliveries evaporate overnight. As for China's "blue water" navy? How much experience do they have operating far from their backyard? Do they have the logistic support ships to support a CSG transiting the Indo-Pacific? If you're the USN, I'd pretty much make sure everyone one of those PLAN logistics ships becomes a new reef in short order. That leaves a China CSG transitting the Indo-Pacific with a potentially interesting dilemma. A prospect probably not lost on the Chinese. Hopefully calmer heads will prevail.
Wouldn't Guam just be in the same position - though somewhat better, at range - that Taiwan and Japan (US bases) are in? Anything fixed in the entire mid-Pacific West is targetable by China. So is your suggestion we just seed the playing field and try to breach it AFTER they attack? Retreating from the area doesn't seem to communicate "we're hear to stick by our partners and allies"...seems more like, "we're going to protect our boys and toys, good luck, and we'll makes sure to "avenge 'ye after 'ye are gain".
I would think, in line with your strategy, MORE would be better so they can't mass against ONE area without overlapping firepower from other bases or naval forces. On the other hand, WE do have an actual blue water navy that can mass at, say, artificial islands and take them out....if the PLAN wants to come out with their carriers to play, well...that works for us.
The new base in Guam is much more about former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's decision to reduce Marine presence in Okinawa than adding to the US ability to manage war with China. We are moving further away, understanding our bases in Japan are at risk- this is not about that, nor of building up in the Pacific. We seem to have missed that part of the history. This may not be the best option for lay down in the Pacific across the joint force to deal with China. It may be questionable the degree to which our strategy for China is dominated by Taiwan, in many ways to the exclusion of everything else, as the Chinese continue to expand their reach and influence. The BRI is hardly gold-plated, but it is massive outreach, along with many other actions that carry China and Chinese influence far outside the First Island Chain and at least to their base in Djibouti- if not beyond.
High pressure concrete and deep burial and numerous dispersion sites are cheaper than high precision long range missiles. If you make the target list too long, and increase the number of assets that must be expended to neutralize even empty but not ignorable sites than you reverse the A2D2 strategy
Perhaps its time to reestablish a base in the Marshall Islands, specifically Majuro Atoll. It served well as the Fifth Fleet's anchorage in 1944.
Conventional deterrence by punishment as practiced by the modern USA means "save your shit for the war you can't deter".
The recent 2022 OT&E release has some good data on recent missile tests.
The exquisitely expensive and exotic for which we will never have enough, maintenance availability periods that stretch on & on and supply chain headaches that can't be overcome... Yet for the large USV program, the Navy's PEO sees containerized strike packages for this class of ship because they can mix things up quite easily. Hmm... perhaps a lightly manned alternative would fit the bill rather than waiting several more years for the Navy to answer the question if they can build an engineering plant that can be left unattended for extended periods for a LUSV? Heaven forbid if we were to do something so unsexy as containerized long range strike weapons on a ship whose roots were more mundane. Such a ship being built and maintained by multiple shipyards and which can be replenished within theatre??? Why should we do such a mundane thing?
What exactly is our foreign policy you want to risk nuclear war over? Because it’s to be regarded as near certainty in full war with a nuclear power. Even mostly one way from USA we’d be guilty of the worst genocide and aggressive war in history, and the map answers the question of aggression.
Frankly you want a large force in being you would not risk, Admiral Fischer, but like to lose it anyway.
The Marines are bored and want a fight, let them have one.
If you’re going to do Plan Dog with Moscow instead of Berlin and Beijing instead of Tokyo, admit it , and proceed from that End to means and ways.
Under ways; Any full on war with a peer nuclear power should be assumed to escalate to nuclear war. This must be a core planning assumption, or it is irresponsible fantasy.
No the world won’t end, it will suffer and continue, to the disappointment of many no doubt.
So be clear what’s involved, and do abandon ridiculous notions of deterrence- we are aggressing not deterring, look at the map.
A possible incentive to posting things on Guam is that it's a US territory. Someone may intend a tripwire effect. If China hits a ship in the South China Sea, or a base in the Phillipines, Americans and the US Congress will receive it differently than a strike on Guam, or so the decision-maker may hope China will suppose. Eleventy-dimensional chess? Who knows. Western powers think a lot about "posture" and how to send subliminal messages about our intentions. As the recent RUSI report on the war in Ukraine noted, sophisticated strategies like that are often lost on an unsophisticated opponent.
Guam is a trip wire most certainly. Perhaps consider how China has to grapple with protecting it's freight and oil deliveries along thousands of miles of ocean. How would the U.S. and/or it's allies likely respond should China strike say Japan or Guam? I don't imagine the Chinese are anxious to see oil and/or critical raw materials deliveries evaporate overnight. As for China's "blue water" navy? How much experience do they have operating far from their backyard? Do they have the logistic support ships to support a CSG transiting the Indo-Pacific? If you're the USN, I'd pretty much make sure everyone one of those PLAN logistics ships becomes a new reef in short order. That leaves a China CSG transitting the Indo-Pacific with a potentially interesting dilemma. A prospect probably not lost on the Chinese. Hopefully calmer heads will prevail.
Be sure and make plans for a very fast retaking of Henderson Airport, as the Chinese have the contract to run it for the Guadalcanal Government.
Wouldn't Guam just be in the same position - though somewhat better, at range - that Taiwan and Japan (US bases) are in? Anything fixed in the entire mid-Pacific West is targetable by China. So is your suggestion we just seed the playing field and try to breach it AFTER they attack? Retreating from the area doesn't seem to communicate "we're hear to stick by our partners and allies"...seems more like, "we're going to protect our boys and toys, good luck, and we'll makes sure to "avenge 'ye after 'ye are gain".
I would think, in line with your strategy, MORE would be better so they can't mass against ONE area without overlapping firepower from other bases or naval forces. On the other hand, WE do have an actual blue water navy that can mass at, say, artificial islands and take them out....if the PLAN wants to come out with their carriers to play, well...that works for us.
The new base in Guam is much more about former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's decision to reduce Marine presence in Okinawa than adding to the US ability to manage war with China. We are moving further away, understanding our bases in Japan are at risk- this is not about that, nor of building up in the Pacific. We seem to have missed that part of the history. This may not be the best option for lay down in the Pacific across the joint force to deal with China. It may be questionable the degree to which our strategy for China is dominated by Taiwan, in many ways to the exclusion of everything else, as the Chinese continue to expand their reach and influence. The BRI is hardly gold-plated, but it is massive outreach, along with many other actions that carry China and Chinese influence far outside the First Island Chain and at least to their base in Djibouti- if not beyond.
High pressure concrete and deep burial and numerous dispersion sites are cheaper than high precision long range missiles. If you make the target list too long, and increase the number of assets that must be expended to neutralize even empty but not ignorable sites than you reverse the A2D2 strategy
Did you read the report on the recent CSIS Taiwan war game?