It appears that France is getting a bit touchy about criticism of its defense spending…which is good. Whatever gets action…faster.
France rejected criticism from new U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio that it lagged in defence, saying it met NATO's target to spend 2% of GDP on its military, was on course to double spending by 2030, and fields forces capable of major missions abroad.
…
In an interview on Thursday, Rubio included France among big European countries he said were spending too little.
"It's interesting - and in fairness Poland, Lithuania and Estonia, the closer you are to Russia, the more they are spending as a percentage of GDP on national defence - but then you have countries like France and Germany, big, powerful economies and they don't spend as much on national security," Rubio told The Megyn Kelly Show podcast.
He said countries such as France and Germany assume the United States will protect them if they are attacked, so they "can instead spend that money on this enormous social safety net".
In response, the French Foreign Ministry said France was among the 23 NATO member countries that already spend at least 2% of GDP on defence, and is due to double its defence spending by 2030.
They just got across the line this year. Barely. However, let’s give credit where credit is due. Thank you for doing the bare minimum for our alliance’s collective defense and giving yourself more ability to act alone in your own interests if so needed…like a proper nation.
This has more to do with France than NATO, don’t forget that. Keep in with France that there is an undercurrent that really wishes the USA would decouple from Europe. For over a thousand years since Charlemagne split his empire in three, France has long aspired to be the premier power in Europe and resents any power that obstructs that goal. France cannot convincingly argue that the rest of Europe should follow its security lead when its own military is undercapitalized.
I’m not a fan of monocausal theories, but responding to Russia’s threat to the east should Ukraine fall, a desire to shut up the USA bleating on about 2%, and the larger EU security posture…those are your top-3 reasons for this move.
In NATO, outside the USA and Great Britain there are two continental powers that are essential in order to keep NATO strong, France and Germany. They also are the two primary EU military powers.
France knows that the USA needs to be part of NATO, but they don’t like America’s dominance of it. That is the primary reason why France, more than any other EU nation, advocates for a stronger EU military option outside NATO. As Germany won’t challenge them and no one else gets close (though Poland is making a run at it), it would be France that would be primary in any stronger EU military structure. This desire is always in the background.
The NATO reporting is the best reference mark, and one should look at more than just % of GDP, this is becoming my preferred graph. What you are spending it on tells an important story too.
Where you want to be is in the upper-right-hand quadrant. That means you are not just “spending your fair share” but that your military is not just a civil service jobs program…you are buying kit to fight with.
Norway, Bulgaria, Sweden, Romania, Great Britain, Hungary, Finland, Latvia, Greece, Estonia, and Poland get a gold-star-happy-faces. They aren’t just in the best quadrant, they are above the alliance averages as well.
North Macedonia, Denmark, Lithuania, USA, Turkey, Montenegro, The Netherlands, Czechia, and Albania get a gold star. Above both minimums, but a bit below the alliance average.
Yes, USA is in that 2nd tier list.
The upper-left-hand quadrant are like the smart students who are lazy. They are spending on the right things, but not spending enough. Italy, Portugal, Croatia, Slovenia, Spain, and Luxembourg are in the under-achiever club. They make us sad, but they have promise.
Then there are the free-riders in the bottom-left-hand quadrant. The ones that really should be dropped back or sent to an alternative school. There used to be a lot more of them, but with plenty of time to get with the program most have moved on to better quadrants, but in their arrogance and sense of entitlement, some refuse. Belgium and Canada. I don’t see Iceland on this list, but I believe they are here as well.
France, thankfully, are moving in the right direction, but will the weak Macron government really be able to double defense spending in five years? Considering what was happening just eight weeks ago, sounds a bit optimistic.
On Wednesday, the Council of Ministers adopted a so-called special law that allows France to continue the 2024 budget into 2025 — a tool designed to avoid a U.S.-style government shutdown. The text will go through parliament but lawmakers cannot amend it.
That means a €3.3 billion defense spending boost that was part of a seven-year military planning law is off the cards for now. It also imposes a freeze of sorts on the armed forces ministry, which will not be able to hire new people or launch new programs until a proper 2025 budget is approved by parliament.
“The military is worried, and that’s normal, everyone is in a bit of a wait-and-see mode,” Hélène Conway-Mouret, a Socialist senator who co-drafted a report on France’s 2025 defense budget, told POLITICO.
“We need to make sure the political consensus that emerged in 2024 to increase defense spending continues,” she said, adding that “even with the €3.3 billion boost, the seven-year military planning law is not ambitious enough.”
Like the USA, they have a nuclear force that is a little long in the tooth that needs attention and a broader defense industrial base that is fragile from years of neglect.
Investment in conventional weaponry will likely bear the brunt of any cutbacks because French decision-makers “will not sacrifice nuclear deterrence,” said an industry official, speaking on condition of anonymity to talk more freely.
There is little expectation of a new budget before February at the earliest, several French officials, military officers and lawmakers said.
“The question is: How long will it last?” the industry official said. “The longer this goes on, the more serious the consequences are going to be, we have a somewhat fragile defense industrial base.”
If they strive for 4% of GDP, perhaps they will get to 3% in 5 years. That would be great. It would be great for France, NATO, and the USA. I’d take it.
The rest of Europe needs to join them — to get in that upper-right quadrant—for three primary reasons.
First, the best way to keep the USA enthusiastic about the NATO alliance is to take away the #1 reason for opposition to it in the USA—the appearance of free riding. This isn’t a hard nut to crack.
Second reason is a properly resourced European military will be a bulwark against whatever becomes of Russia. Russia has been a looming threat over Europe for five centuries, and we should assume that regardless of war, politics and demographics, she will still be a concern through mid-century, if not the rest of the century. A strong Europe will not only be the best way to deter a threat from the east, they also be ready to act in their interest in the Middle East and Africa. Those pressures from economics, demographics, and war from those regions will only grow towards mid-century, drawing Europe in to the problem with or without the USA.
Third and most critical reason is that there is a better than average chance that the USA will be involved in a Great Pacific War with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) at some point in the next decade to mid-century. If the USA is smart in building our and our allies deterrence, and lucky that cool heads will win the argument in the PRC, then that war may never come. However, should it come, we know a couple of things:
Europe will demur from joining the fight in the Pacific except maybe one or two nations sending token forces, or for France and the UK keeping the fight out of their possessions. We don’t expect anything different than we saw in Vietnam or the British saw in The Falkland Islands from our allies. It’s OK, it won’t be a surprise.
Should that war come, it will be a near run thing for the USA and almost all its military force will be in the INDO-PACIFIC, not in Europe. A Great Pacific War may devolve in to another world war, but probably not…but that does not mean that other powers may not take advantage of a distracted and perhaps “on its heals” USA to pursue their national goals that might be contrary to Europe’s interests. If so, Europe will be mostly on its own…except for a token force from the USA, maybe.
As I’ve been reminding all my European friends for over two decades: the USA is just one election, natural disaster, or Great Pacific War away from simply walking away from our primary role in defense of Europe. Any of these “white swans” could come with little to no warning. Europe need to be ready to stand on their own at worst, or more likely, with Europe being an “economy of force” concern for the USA. Best case, a stronger Europe will make for a stronger NATO which will make for a more peaceful future.
That should be an easy argument to make.
CDR Sal, you are spot on with the analysis. Worked with NATO Allied Command Transformation for many years. We used to note it was "a soft collection effort disguised as a jobs program". Poland and Finland have seen reality, and are responding accordingly, sharply departing from their recent past. Germany is engaging in industrial and economic suicide despite getting their noses rubbed in "green energy reality" by the dunkelflaute (sp?) or "dark doldrums". (No sun and no wind = zero "green" energy). France continues their schizoid internal and international policies that can at best be described as the actions of a tantrum prone three year old who has a better energy policy but out of touch elite governance with little self awareness. (Not sure they have ever recovered from the losses of WW I / II). Conflict in the Pacific will be a genuine "hold your breath moment" for Europe. Fingers crossed.
I can *almost* understand Slovenia being behind the power curve, but Belgium? Someone needs to remind them that flat geography equates to vulnerability, as in the Great Power events of the last century.