Given the unknowns, as acknowledged in the "hedging", the divestment of organic resources while you are still in a "campaign of learning" seems premature - and advocates are being Gung Ho and throwing out the baby with the bath water. What is the result if you get 80% of the way through your "campaign of learning" and the lesson is..."yep, we still needed to do (some of, any of) those things we got rid of!"? Too late, because now all you have is the plyers and duct tape you asked for in the budget.
Perhaps it is best not to start with the big picture concept and plan from the top down to fit the strategy. Let's lay out a war game and start with, "If I want to send 50 Marines with a HIMAR to an island to interdict shipping, how do I get them there, provide security and logistics, keep them from being discovered prematurely, communicate with them and...in the event the Chinese drop in with a couple of hundred troops, some fast movers, and a couple of amphibious armored vehicles...how do I get my Marines OUT faster than I got them in?" From there, how do I support a network of these positions and ensure ALL of those things can be done in each local - and move them quickly to keep the Chinese from locating them and targeting them?
From there, how does all of that fit within the war plan? If the scenario is Taiwan, what are we "keeping the door open" for? If the islands we are on interdict shipping in the SCS, great....but what does that do in the Taiwan Strait? How does it enable the Navy to get there? The Marines can't keep corridors open against missiles. Most importantly - do they still have the punch in the MEUs that would be necessary to land on and take out those artificial islands the Chinese built?
The LAW will get you there, but it isn't fast enough to evac or even move troops around the islands quickly. They aren't going to be making supply drops either - won't be enough of them to go around. So that means you need something fast and long range for supply and evac - Mark VI patrol boats as connectors and Ospreys (long range and have great utility for movement and resupply). Sooooo....that leads us back to the big deck amphibs for flight operations for the Ospreys, for servicing the Mark VIs, and for having some on hand air support should it be needed since the Marines won't have organic indirect fires above mortars or whatever they have with them on the island.
This isn't meant to be exhaustive...but illustrative. You need to keep some of the things being thrown away and we haven't even gotten to larger order operations. I would agree with minimizing tanks for the West of Guam operations....but what about somewhere else? Be nice to have them around if you had to take a hostile beach and keep a beachhead until the Army does arrive.
I believe what we have is a concept of operations for a PARTICULAR battle, if it is fought the way we believe it will go....but we are giving up a Swiss Army knife with swords in it for a stiletto.
What has surprised me about Gen. Berger is my perception of his tone deafness.
Given the unknowns, as acknowledged in the "hedging", the divestment of organic resources while you are still in a "campaign of learning" seems premature - and advocates are being Gung Ho and throwing out the baby with the bath water. What is the result if you get 80% of the way through your "campaign of learning" and the lesson is..."yep, we still needed to do (some of, any of) those things we got rid of!"? Too late, because now all you have is the plyers and duct tape you asked for in the budget.
Perhaps it is best not to start with the big picture concept and plan from the top down to fit the strategy. Let's lay out a war game and start with, "If I want to send 50 Marines with a HIMAR to an island to interdict shipping, how do I get them there, provide security and logistics, keep them from being discovered prematurely, communicate with them and...in the event the Chinese drop in with a couple of hundred troops, some fast movers, and a couple of amphibious armored vehicles...how do I get my Marines OUT faster than I got them in?" From there, how do I support a network of these positions and ensure ALL of those things can be done in each local - and move them quickly to keep the Chinese from locating them and targeting them?
From there, how does all of that fit within the war plan? If the scenario is Taiwan, what are we "keeping the door open" for? If the islands we are on interdict shipping in the SCS, great....but what does that do in the Taiwan Strait? How does it enable the Navy to get there? The Marines can't keep corridors open against missiles. Most importantly - do they still have the punch in the MEUs that would be necessary to land on and take out those artificial islands the Chinese built?
The LAW will get you there, but it isn't fast enough to evac or even move troops around the islands quickly. They aren't going to be making supply drops either - won't be enough of them to go around. So that means you need something fast and long range for supply and evac - Mark VI patrol boats as connectors and Ospreys (long range and have great utility for movement and resupply). Sooooo....that leads us back to the big deck amphibs for flight operations for the Ospreys, for servicing the Mark VIs, and for having some on hand air support should it be needed since the Marines won't have organic indirect fires above mortars or whatever they have with them on the island.
This isn't meant to be exhaustive...but illustrative. You need to keep some of the things being thrown away and we haven't even gotten to larger order operations. I would agree with minimizing tanks for the West of Guam operations....but what about somewhere else? Be nice to have them around if you had to take a hostile beach and keep a beachhead until the Army does arrive.
I believe what we have is a concept of operations for a PARTICULAR battle, if it is fought the way we believe it will go....but we are giving up a Swiss Army knife with swords in it for a stiletto.
When you kill all the sacred cows, make sure they're all your brand.
Sal! Great stuff here! I’m an arty guys…no strong opinions, of course. Keep on keeping!
Thanks
If you can get Bob for an hour, I'll listen.
ANd ironically for an IT/cyber guy, when I hear talk of the super amazeballs C4ISR or whatever the new soup is, I think to myself, "about that..."