Good FbF. I alst=so was saddened by our senseless Afghan withdrawal, the loss of our Shipmates there and the way we've abandoned many of our Afghan allies.
In 1987 I had joined a forward deployed Navy squadron aboard the USS Midway. First voluteer department head in many, many years. The XO (soon to be CO) was my Maintenance Officer (to my AMO) in a previous squadron. His wife and he made me a member of their family, asking me (a bachelor) to babysit their kids a couple of weekends...a major messure of trust.
Newly married, I reported and was made a direct input MO. About 6 months after the XO took over as Skipper, his pilot flew them into the water on one dark, dark night on a low altitude (EMCON) departure. I had to give his Eulogy and pack his belongings. I was 31...tougher than combat and I shed more than a few tears in private.
His photo and bio still sit on my mantle as a reminder that "freedom isn't free" and in the blink of an eye a valued life can be snuffed out.
At some point, we understand it's a dangerous business. Naval Aviation has lot of hazards in it, but there's quite number of other items. I've got five names I post every year. One Marine, three Sailors, one Guardsman who I knew. Not one was in combat. Two were suicides, three traffic accidents.
In 2008, we heard about MM3 Gentile, who was killed in the rudder ram aboard NEBRASKA. Ships are dangerous places, and it does us well to remember that.
As for our friends, it is a shame. Same as it was in Saigon in 1975. I knew Army and Marine Corps veterans who were deeply unhappy upon seeing a documentary about the Fall of Saigon, as they felt it was the same as what they were seeing from where they served.
I've got three that I served with closely in very different roles. One was killed combat (Iraq), one in training (parachute), and one suicide while deployed.
Perhaps that's why the phrase "Happy Memorial Day" never feels right to me, but I do honor and remember them, particularly on this day.
This is the part of military life, especially military aviation, that nobody talks about. We talk about safety, try to practice it...but sometimes, good, competent men are lost simply because their luck ran out. Odin wanted him for Valhalla, and the Valkyries were authorized overtime to get him.
It's a thought best kept stuffed in the back of our minds...but sometimes it slips out.
Full Bore Indeed. Several ago I gave a Memorial Day speech at my church. Plenty of Vietnam and Korea elderly vets in the congregation. I started by telling of the time my Father took me to the Viet Nam Memorial Wall, and walked down the panels until he got to April 1967, and he would stop and touch a name, tell me how he died, where he was from, married or single, and any other memories he could. It was so painful to watch my DAD cry (kids know Dads never cry). By the time we reached his last month in command there were 8 folks following to listen to each name. And even the ones that died in non-combat activities were given the same degree of tearful remembrance. I told the congregation I didn't have a wall for those friends who died while I was in service. But 5 names in 22 years was way too many. I told the stories of how they lived, and flew, and died. 2 helicopter mishaps, 2 fixed wings mishaps, and 1 alcohol related death. All good guys, all left grieving families and shipmates and they were just as valuable - and valued- as those names on the Wall. Got photos of 4 on the office wall, frozen in time, eternally young and seemingly bound for the Naval greatness they deserved. But God had other painful plans. And I still miss them every day. "Freedom is paid for with the blood of Patriots". Amen.
Excellent piece as always. Thought provoking and certainly brings back memories of many squadron mates who perished in A-6 Intruder accidents. Every squadron I served in lost aircrew during my time there. I went to too many memorial services and observed too many missing men flyovers. RIP shipmates.
We Army Aviators used to have ghoulish discussions with ground types who like to whine about us earning our flight pay….we finally were able to silence them by declaring that we were all in it together playing “flight pay bingo”…each month on flight status, we received a nice chit in the grand game of life or death bingo…and each and every go ‘round, someone’s name was called…we would matter of factly explain it was tragic for the crew of an AH-1 or 64, or an OH-58….but when flying UH-1, UH-60 or CH-47, everyone along for the ride were unwitting players in the “game” of flight pay bingo…took them awhile to let that thought settle in….then BS’ing would stop. MIL flying was always a game of when, not if….
The first 4 paragraphs of LT Dorn's obituary, written by his wife, made my eyes tear up.
My recollection of shipmates who died on duty: 2 motorcycle accidents, 3 car accidents, 1 suicide, 2 drug overdoses, 1 pulmonary embolism, 2 from a fall. R.I.P. to all.
A number of years ago, when stationed at PHNSY, I had the opportunity to help lead a group of Boy Scouts in their Memorial Day work to place wreaths on graves at the national cemetery at Punch owl Crater. I took the opportunity to point out to them the very young ages of most of those buried there. I believe identified several who had probably been crew of landing craft in the Pacific Theater. It sobered up a number of them. Salute!
Kabul was just Saigon done over, some in Government at the time were against going into Afghanistan stated "It will be another Vietnam" and those were the loyal opposition (D), and once Bush was gone they set about to make it another Vietnam, but they had to find someone feeble to take the Blame, Obama didn't want it said he lost the war he was trying to lose. So here comes old senile Joe.
Peacetime deaths happen, it is dangerous to be in the military war or peace.
It is dangerous to be a Veteran when war is done.
This memorial holiday we owe all those who died, were maimed, forever touched by war and simply vanished while protecting us or training to protect us.
In Iraq we lost a family member, My third cousin, 101st Airborne.
After a big fight which the Paratroopers won hands down coming back to base their vehicle over turned at high speed and injured and killed a lot of men.
Strange, people expect men and women will die in combat but to die after the battle, unwounded, by accident is still hard to grasp.
Memorial day, it is all we have to remember the best of us.
Pfc Jason Rother USMC, K 3/2 2d Mar Div FMF 1969-1988
Last known duty 29 Palms Training base California. Road Guide.
He was missing for 40 hours before anyone in the command reported it, and it was only when the armory turned up his weapon missing did a search began, but his Lt had forgotten where he left him.
Four months later a truck driver noticed and M-16 lying on the road. And Pfc Rother was finally found.
All it takes is a screw up and people die.
Here is to Jason, he tried, walked 17 miles without water in 24 hours and died only two miles from main side.
I remember reading about this when it happened, but then never heard what accountability happened afterward. Brief Wiki article on the event here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jason_Rother_incident The accountability here, though I can't link a reference:
Appellant, a Marine officer, was tried on various dates in January and February 1989 by a general court-martial with members at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. Contrary to his pleas, he was convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer by driving while intoxicated, driving with a revoked driver's license, being drunk, and having an open container of liquor in the vehicle he was driving; failure to obey a lawful order; and dereliction of duty, in violation of Articles 133, 92(2), and 92(3), Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC §§ 933, 892(2), and 892(3), respectively. Appellant was sentenced to dismissal from the United States Marine Corps, confinement for 4 months, and total forfeitures. On July 11, 1989, the convening authority approved only as much of the sentence as provided for dismissal, confinement for 49 days, and total forfeitures. On October 31, 1991, the Court of Military Review affirmed the findings and sentence. ***
we find no legal error in the members' findings that First Lieutenant Lawson was derelict in the performance of his duty to post road guides in pairs at designated checkpoints and to obtain a roster of individuals to be posted. See generally United States v. Dellarosa, 30 MJ 255 (CMA 1990).
The opinion by the court below sets forth a detailed exposition of the facts concerning the granted issue. 33 MJ at 953–57. In substance, that court found that, during a field training exercise, appellant was assigned the “duties of (1) posting road guards in pairs along a route designated for a battalion-sized motorized night movement, (2) obtaining a roster of Marines posted as road guides, and (3) providing the roster to Captain Edwards, the appellant's superior coordinator for this movement.” The battalion commander “had stressed personnel accountability at all times because *417 of harsh desert conditions and the number of key new people in the battalion.”
It was determined that “appellant had some discretion in posting guides in that he could add road guides, but they all had to be posted in pairs and on the movement route.” Specifically, on August 30, 1988, “appellant was detailed to reconnoiter the route of advance and to post road guides at four predetermined checkpoints at major road intersections. He was to post two guides at each location, a buddy system.” Captain Edwards “tasked appellant” to obtain a roster of the posted individuals and give it to him before leaving “to post the road guides.” It was further found that “[a]ppellant understood these leadership obligations but did not discharge them.”
During the pre-mission briefing, the battalion commander “initially said road guides could be ... posted” individually. However, by the time the briefing was over “it was clear ... that guides were to be posted in pairs and not separated. This was consistent with ... battalion policy and, at the moment, driven by darkness and desert safety concerns. Specific and detailed instructions for road guide posting and recovery operations were not given to Captain Edwards or appellant by the battalion commander.” 33 MJ at 953. Nevertheless, the battalion commander's “order in regard to the conduct of the movement and his guidance on posting road guides were” found to be “adequate in detail to fix the main obligations and establish responsibilities for execution.”
After “inadequate” preparation and planning, “[a]ppellant left to post the road guides.” His detail was “two Marines short of the requisite manpower,” and appellant did not make “a list of road guides and their posts. Appellant did not provide any guide list to Captain Edwards.” 33 MJ at 954. When appellant attempted to reach Checkpoint 1, he was uncertain and confused as to its true location. Appellant first posted Lance Corporals Key and Rother at a point he originally believed was Checkpoint 1. Doubting his action, appellant picked up Key and proceeded “to the real Checkpoint 1.” There he posted Lance Corporal Key. He left Lance Corporal Rother where he had originally posted him. Prior to departing the vicinity of Checkpoint 1, appellant was aware “that Lance Corporal Rother was not posted at the correct checkpoint”; appellant “left” him “at a rock about 200 yards off the main road and some 400 yards from the designated Checkpoint 1.” The Court of Military Review found “that mission performance and speed of movement were the paramount concerns to” appellant, “despite the safety emphasis in the battalion.”
The record shows that “[a]ppellant did not record Lance Corporal Rother's name or his location when he posted him at the rock. He ignored warnings about posting in pairs given by Lance Corporals Adamson and Key, reminding them that he was the senior.” 33 MJ at 955. The court below found that “[a]ppellant was not concerned that the guides might be afraid or in danger.” Appellant testified at trial and maintained on appeal that tactical considerations influenced him to post Lance Corporal Rother alone and at a distance of some 400 yards from Checkpoint 1. He completed his assigned mission between 10:00 and 11:00 p.m., and “[t]he battalion began its tactical movement at” 11:00 p.m.
At 5:30 p.m., September 1, 1988, over 40 hours after posting the road guides, “appellant revealed Lance Corporal Rother's split posting at Checkpoint 1 when Captain Henderson, Lance Corporal Rother's company commander, confronted appellant about the missing Rother.” Lance Corporal Rother was not picked up during recovery operations and was “found dead” (33 MJ at 957) from exposure in the desert in early December 1988.
***
Appellant challenges his conviction of dereliction of duty on the basis that the military judge erroneously instructed the members on the appropriate legal standard which they must use in determining the criminality of his conduct under Article 92(3). He observes that the military judge instructed1 the members on nonperformance of duty in terms of simple negligence. Final Brief at 15. He contends that this standard “is not an appropriate standard against which to judge the actions of professional officers faced with difficult, tactical decisions while in the performance of their duties.” Final Brief at 16. Finally, he concludes by asserting that “gross negligence” is the appropriate standard for measuring the criminality of his nonperformance of duty on the night in question. Final Brief at 20.
Appellant supports his conclusion with a multi-step analysis. First, in his oral argument before this Court and his supplemental filing, he suggests that Congress in enacting Article 92(3) adopted precodal legal authorities providing for two standards of negligence in dereliction-of-duty cases, i.e., simple negligence and culpable inefficiency (gross negligence). Second, in his final brief, he asserts that it is basically unfair to apply the simple-negligence standard in reviewing tactical decisions of military line officers under Article 92(3) because of the higher standard of review required in other military professional judgment cases and in civilian criminal negligence cases. Alternatively, he contends that our case law also indicates a simple-negligence standard should be used only in cases involving the nonperformance of uncomplicated military duties. Thus, it should not be used in a nonperformance case like his which purportedly involves more sophisticated tactical decisions.
***
More particularly, appellant urges this Court to compare the military line officer's performance of professional duties with the functions of legal counsel during the conduct of a trial. The basis for this comparison is his assertion that both the military line officer and the trial attorney are required to make certain tactical decisions throughout the course of performing their respective duties. All such decisions he asserts should be presumed competent and not faulted unless they constitute “gross negligence.” ***
United States v. Lawson, 36 M.J. 415, 416–24 (C.M.A. 1993).
Thanks for this focus on the caliber of men and women who answer the call in peacetime and give their lives not in war. My binoculars tend to focus on those USNA classes peopled with Mids born after I graduated who are now the flags like Gilday who are answering a different call leading the Navy into different battles. These differences make him and his fellow flags worthy on this Memorial Day of The Admiral Byng reward.
In 1995 four Army Ranger trainees died of hypothermia in a swampy part of Eglin AFB. If all military training was 100% safe it'd probably be ineffective. Even so, young men go into it willingly.
Good FbF. I alst=so was saddened by our senseless Afghan withdrawal, the loss of our Shipmates there and the way we've abandoned many of our Afghan allies.
In 1987 I had joined a forward deployed Navy squadron aboard the USS Midway. First voluteer department head in many, many years. The XO (soon to be CO) was my Maintenance Officer (to my AMO) in a previous squadron. His wife and he made me a member of their family, asking me (a bachelor) to babysit their kids a couple of weekends...a major messure of trust.
Newly married, I reported and was made a direct input MO. About 6 months after the XO took over as Skipper, his pilot flew them into the water on one dark, dark night on a low altitude (EMCON) departure. I had to give his Eulogy and pack his belongings. I was 31...tougher than combat and I shed more than a few tears in private.
His photo and bio still sit on my mantle as a reminder that "freedom isn't free" and in the blink of an eye a valued life can be snuffed out.
God Bless America, and have a good Memorial Day.
At some point, we understand it's a dangerous business. Naval Aviation has lot of hazards in it, but there's quite number of other items. I've got five names I post every year. One Marine, three Sailors, one Guardsman who I knew. Not one was in combat. Two were suicides, three traffic accidents.
In 2008, we heard about MM3 Gentile, who was killed in the rudder ram aboard NEBRASKA. Ships are dangerous places, and it does us well to remember that.
As for our friends, it is a shame. Same as it was in Saigon in 1975. I knew Army and Marine Corps veterans who were deeply unhappy upon seeing a documentary about the Fall of Saigon, as they felt it was the same as what they were seeing from where they served.
I've got three that I served with closely in very different roles. One was killed combat (Iraq), one in training (parachute), and one suicide while deployed.
Perhaps that's why the phrase "Happy Memorial Day" never feels right to me, but I do honor and remember them, particularly on this day.
This is the part of military life, especially military aviation, that nobody talks about. We talk about safety, try to practice it...but sometimes, good, competent men are lost simply because their luck ran out. Odin wanted him for Valhalla, and the Valkyries were authorized overtime to get him.
It's a thought best kept stuffed in the back of our minds...but sometimes it slips out.
For all our complaints about the Navy? Far fewer Cruise Books have a Memoriam Page.
Full Bore Indeed. Several ago I gave a Memorial Day speech at my church. Plenty of Vietnam and Korea elderly vets in the congregation. I started by telling of the time my Father took me to the Viet Nam Memorial Wall, and walked down the panels until he got to April 1967, and he would stop and touch a name, tell me how he died, where he was from, married or single, and any other memories he could. It was so painful to watch my DAD cry (kids know Dads never cry). By the time we reached his last month in command there were 8 folks following to listen to each name. And even the ones that died in non-combat activities were given the same degree of tearful remembrance. I told the congregation I didn't have a wall for those friends who died while I was in service. But 5 names in 22 years was way too many. I told the stories of how they lived, and flew, and died. 2 helicopter mishaps, 2 fixed wings mishaps, and 1 alcohol related death. All good guys, all left grieving families and shipmates and they were just as valuable - and valued- as those names on the Wall. Got photos of 4 on the office wall, frozen in time, eternally young and seemingly bound for the Naval greatness they deserved. But God had other painful plans. And I still miss them every day. "Freedom is paid for with the blood of Patriots". Amen.
Excellent piece as always. Thought provoking and certainly brings back memories of many squadron mates who perished in A-6 Intruder accidents. Every squadron I served in lost aircrew during my time there. I went to too many memorial services and observed too many missing men flyovers. RIP shipmates.
We Army Aviators used to have ghoulish discussions with ground types who like to whine about us earning our flight pay….we finally were able to silence them by declaring that we were all in it together playing “flight pay bingo”…each month on flight status, we received a nice chit in the grand game of life or death bingo…and each and every go ‘round, someone’s name was called…we would matter of factly explain it was tragic for the crew of an AH-1 or 64, or an OH-58….but when flying UH-1, UH-60 or CH-47, everyone along for the ride were unwitting players in the “game” of flight pay bingo…took them awhile to let that thought settle in….then BS’ing would stop. MIL flying was always a game of when, not if….
The first 4 paragraphs of LT Dorn's obituary, written by his wife, made my eyes tear up.
My recollection of shipmates who died on duty: 2 motorcycle accidents, 3 car accidents, 1 suicide, 2 drug overdoses, 1 pulmonary embolism, 2 from a fall. R.I.P. to all.
A number of years ago, when stationed at PHNSY, I had the opportunity to help lead a group of Boy Scouts in their Memorial Day work to place wreaths on graves at the national cemetery at Punch owl Crater. I took the opportunity to point out to them the very young ages of most of those buried there. I believe identified several who had probably been crew of landing craft in the Pacific Theater. It sobered up a number of them. Salute!
My Dad is there. Section 65, Site 2293. BTGC WWII KOREA
Can't ever take your eye off the ball...
https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/MR-Book-Reviews/May-2019/Book-Review-003/
Very well said (written). Thank you for the reminder.
Kabul was just Saigon done over, some in Government at the time were against going into Afghanistan stated "It will be another Vietnam" and those were the loyal opposition (D), and once Bush was gone they set about to make it another Vietnam, but they had to find someone feeble to take the Blame, Obama didn't want it said he lost the war he was trying to lose. So here comes old senile Joe.
Peacetime deaths happen, it is dangerous to be in the military war or peace.
It is dangerous to be a Veteran when war is done.
This memorial holiday we owe all those who died, were maimed, forever touched by war and simply vanished while protecting us or training to protect us.
In Iraq we lost a family member, My third cousin, 101st Airborne.
After a big fight which the Paratroopers won hands down coming back to base their vehicle over turned at high speed and injured and killed a lot of men.
Strange, people expect men and women will die in combat but to die after the battle, unwounded, by accident is still hard to grasp.
Memorial day, it is all we have to remember the best of us.
Here is a name to remember a training death.
Pfc Jason Rother USMC, K 3/2 2d Mar Div FMF 1969-1988
Last known duty 29 Palms Training base California. Road Guide.
He was missing for 40 hours before anyone in the command reported it, and it was only when the armory turned up his weapon missing did a search began, but his Lt had forgotten where he left him.
Four months later a truck driver noticed and M-16 lying on the road. And Pfc Rother was finally found.
All it takes is a screw up and people die.
Here is to Jason, he tried, walked 17 miles without water in 24 hours and died only two miles from main side.
Semper Fidelis.
I remember reading about this when it happened, but then never heard what accountability happened afterward. Brief Wiki article on the event here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jason_Rother_incident The accountability here, though I can't link a reference:
Appellant, a Marine officer, was tried on various dates in January and February 1989 by a general court-martial with members at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. Contrary to his pleas, he was convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer by driving while intoxicated, driving with a revoked driver's license, being drunk, and having an open container of liquor in the vehicle he was driving; failure to obey a lawful order; and dereliction of duty, in violation of Articles 133, 92(2), and 92(3), Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC §§ 933, 892(2), and 892(3), respectively. Appellant was sentenced to dismissal from the United States Marine Corps, confinement for 4 months, and total forfeitures. On July 11, 1989, the convening authority approved only as much of the sentence as provided for dismissal, confinement for 49 days, and total forfeitures. On October 31, 1991, the Court of Military Review affirmed the findings and sentence. ***
we find no legal error in the members' findings that First Lieutenant Lawson was derelict in the performance of his duty to post road guides in pairs at designated checkpoints and to obtain a roster of individuals to be posted. See generally United States v. Dellarosa, 30 MJ 255 (CMA 1990).
The opinion by the court below sets forth a detailed exposition of the facts concerning the granted issue. 33 MJ at 953–57. In substance, that court found that, during a field training exercise, appellant was assigned the “duties of (1) posting road guards in pairs along a route designated for a battalion-sized motorized night movement, (2) obtaining a roster of Marines posted as road guides, and (3) providing the roster to Captain Edwards, the appellant's superior coordinator for this movement.” The battalion commander “had stressed personnel accountability at all times because *417 of harsh desert conditions and the number of key new people in the battalion.”
It was determined that “appellant had some discretion in posting guides in that he could add road guides, but they all had to be posted in pairs and on the movement route.” Specifically, on August 30, 1988, “appellant was detailed to reconnoiter the route of advance and to post road guides at four predetermined checkpoints at major road intersections. He was to post two guides at each location, a buddy system.” Captain Edwards “tasked appellant” to obtain a roster of the posted individuals and give it to him before leaving “to post the road guides.” It was further found that “[a]ppellant understood these leadership obligations but did not discharge them.”
During the pre-mission briefing, the battalion commander “initially said road guides could be ... posted” individually. However, by the time the briefing was over “it was clear ... that guides were to be posted in pairs and not separated. This was consistent with ... battalion policy and, at the moment, driven by darkness and desert safety concerns. Specific and detailed instructions for road guide posting and recovery operations were not given to Captain Edwards or appellant by the battalion commander.” 33 MJ at 953. Nevertheless, the battalion commander's “order in regard to the conduct of the movement and his guidance on posting road guides were” found to be “adequate in detail to fix the main obligations and establish responsibilities for execution.”
After “inadequate” preparation and planning, “[a]ppellant left to post the road guides.” His detail was “two Marines short of the requisite manpower,” and appellant did not make “a list of road guides and their posts. Appellant did not provide any guide list to Captain Edwards.” 33 MJ at 954. When appellant attempted to reach Checkpoint 1, he was uncertain and confused as to its true location. Appellant first posted Lance Corporals Key and Rother at a point he originally believed was Checkpoint 1. Doubting his action, appellant picked up Key and proceeded “to the real Checkpoint 1.” There he posted Lance Corporal Key. He left Lance Corporal Rother where he had originally posted him. Prior to departing the vicinity of Checkpoint 1, appellant was aware “that Lance Corporal Rother was not posted at the correct checkpoint”; appellant “left” him “at a rock about 200 yards off the main road and some 400 yards from the designated Checkpoint 1.” The Court of Military Review found “that mission performance and speed of movement were the paramount concerns to” appellant, “despite the safety emphasis in the battalion.”
The record shows that “[a]ppellant did not record Lance Corporal Rother's name or his location when he posted him at the rock. He ignored warnings about posting in pairs given by Lance Corporals Adamson and Key, reminding them that he was the senior.” 33 MJ at 955. The court below found that “[a]ppellant was not concerned that the guides might be afraid or in danger.” Appellant testified at trial and maintained on appeal that tactical considerations influenced him to post Lance Corporal Rother alone and at a distance of some 400 yards from Checkpoint 1. He completed his assigned mission between 10:00 and 11:00 p.m., and “[t]he battalion began its tactical movement at” 11:00 p.m.
At 5:30 p.m., September 1, 1988, over 40 hours after posting the road guides, “appellant revealed Lance Corporal Rother's split posting at Checkpoint 1 when Captain Henderson, Lance Corporal Rother's company commander, confronted appellant about the missing Rother.” Lance Corporal Rother was not picked up during recovery operations and was “found dead” (33 MJ at 957) from exposure in the desert in early December 1988.
***
Appellant challenges his conviction of dereliction of duty on the basis that the military judge erroneously instructed the members on the appropriate legal standard which they must use in determining the criminality of his conduct under Article 92(3). He observes that the military judge instructed1 the members on nonperformance of duty in terms of simple negligence. Final Brief at 15. He contends that this standard “is not an appropriate standard against which to judge the actions of professional officers faced with difficult, tactical decisions while in the performance of their duties.” Final Brief at 16. Finally, he concludes by asserting that “gross negligence” is the appropriate standard for measuring the criminality of his nonperformance of duty on the night in question. Final Brief at 20.
Appellant supports his conclusion with a multi-step analysis. First, in his oral argument before this Court and his supplemental filing, he suggests that Congress in enacting Article 92(3) adopted precodal legal authorities providing for two standards of negligence in dereliction-of-duty cases, i.e., simple negligence and culpable inefficiency (gross negligence). Second, in his final brief, he asserts that it is basically unfair to apply the simple-negligence standard in reviewing tactical decisions of military line officers under Article 92(3) because of the higher standard of review required in other military professional judgment cases and in civilian criminal negligence cases. Alternatively, he contends that our case law also indicates a simple-negligence standard should be used only in cases involving the nonperformance of uncomplicated military duties. Thus, it should not be used in a nonperformance case like his which purportedly involves more sophisticated tactical decisions.
***
More particularly, appellant urges this Court to compare the military line officer's performance of professional duties with the functions of legal counsel during the conduct of a trial. The basis for this comparison is his assertion that both the military line officer and the trial attorney are required to make certain tactical decisions throughout the course of performing their respective duties. All such decisions he asserts should be presumed competent and not faulted unless they constitute “gross negligence.” ***
United States v. Lawson, 36 M.J. 415, 416–24 (C.M.A. 1993).
Thanks for this focus on the caliber of men and women who answer the call in peacetime and give their lives not in war. My binoculars tend to focus on those USNA classes peopled with Mids born after I graduated who are now the flags like Gilday who are answering a different call leading the Navy into different battles. These differences make him and his fellow flags worthy on this Memorial Day of The Admiral Byng reward.
That was good info! And what I read as well.
My Time at 29 Stumps was with a BLT training there in a Desex.
Posted much the same way as an LP at night and they were late to pick up all of the Patrols and LP's.
Didn't pick us up till way late in the afternoon almost evening.
Two Canteens of water went fast.
never did hear what the SNAFU was this was some 16 years before this incident.
The Base is huge. I am shocked more of this doesn't happen?
In 1995 four Army Ranger trainees died of hypothermia in a swampy part of Eglin AFB. If all military training was 100% safe it'd probably be ineffective. Even so, young men go into it willingly.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1995/02/17/four-soldiers-die-in-ranger-training/b3a1393b-1522-4569-9e84-d9ea83c886bb/