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The Drill SGT's avatar

lots of links. at least one is dead. this was the best

https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2015/03/18/report-security-lapses-led-to-fatal-confrontation-at-norfolk/?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email

I'm obviously not a Navy guy, but Dang, you guys screwed the pooch here. Observations

- Why did the Gate OIC keep his job? A year later the article says: "The unnamed police OIC who watched Savage pass through the gate without proper ID (and failed a half a dozen more times) remains red-tagged and was not working in any law enforcement capacity as of March 19," WTF?

- I've been OIC of Nuke weapons security teams, and we always issued loaded weapons to units that took weaps out in the field (to prevent somebody stealing our MGs). seems to me, If I were the Capt of the DDG, I'd want the OOW with a pistol and the POOW with baton. If Deadly force was not automatically invoked by a special order, e.g. penetrations of an exclusion area, then the guy with the pistol, should be in the second line, and the baton in the first. The ship's Capt is betting his career on good judgement of the deck watch, I'd arm the OOW first

- the OOW actions seemed passive.

- Mayo, no body armor?

- throughout every interaction, they failed these gunfight rules: "Decide to be aggressive enough, quickly enough.", and "Be polite. Be professional. But have a plan to kill everyone you meet."

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John S.'s avatar

Ten years on, what has changed?

What has been done to prepare and protect against not just a single drugged up civilian trucker, but a team of two or more motivated people with hostile intentions on behalf of terrorist or hostile nation goals?

Base perimeter fencing, gates and guards are not bad, and have successfully detected and thwarted some unauthorized entries...... that we know of. What about waterfront access, not just to swimmers but a recreational craft with partiers- who aren't?

Pier head security another critical access control point. Probably not manned by our best and brightest, or even shown any appreciation for the importance of their boring duties.

For ships, our precious few ships, for decades the quarterdeck was manned by the OOD (unarmed), the POOW, armed with a pistol everyone hoped they would not lose overboard or negligently discharge, but otherwise was grossly unqualified beyond maybe having been able to make it go "bang" and hit the ocean in a fam fire underway a year earlier. Also a messenger (unarmed), and all with no body armor. A ship's CO has the authority to arm all three quarterdeck watchstanders, require body armor, and actually do meaningful small arms training, even though "we have always done it the other way" forever.

But, what about water borne threats in port CONUS. Those supposed partiers mentioned above- what if it is a single occupant in a simple outboard powered skiff? Just about anything that floats can carry the estimated 500 pounds of C-4 which nearly sank USS Cole in Aden. Worse, the Houthis and Ukrainian forces have successfully sunk large ships with drone boats. Would a drone boat look much different than other civilian in San Diego, Norfolk or Mayport waters?

Do our Rules of Engagement support active force protection, or are they written by JAG types looking to prevent lawsuits or liability if a sailor acting in the scope of their employment and security duties shoots up a boat full of civilians, or a pizza delivery guy on the mid watch? I'd put the JAG types on the security watch bill permanently, but that's just me.

We are not serious about force protection, and MA2 Mayo's heroism has taught us little, IMHO.

Every skipper should read about VADM John D. Bulkeley ("Sea Wolf" by William Breuer) for some inspirational ideas on force protection, maintenance and leadership.

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