Flatley's son was probably a Flag by then. Not sure if my skipper made any connection other than Flatley (the 3rd.) had been skipper of VF-31 about 10 years earlier.
Thatch not only developed the “weave” he had to persuade Big Navy Air to move to the 4 finger element instead of the 3 aircraft pursuit tactics of the 20-30’s. He did this as a LCDR. Thatch made more efficiency’s and contributions as an JO than most flag officers will in their lifetime. Not a slander against any flag officer, simply Jimmy wasn’t afraid to take a risk or speak out of turn.
VADM Cooper committed a typical error because our flags don’t understand nor appreciate history. So they pull the quotes out of their ass. I could see on VADM Cooper’s face that as he said what he said, even he didn’t quite believe he said it. Or he got all warm inside thinking he had a pull quote for Nora. Hard to tell.
Time for the GOFOs to re-take Naval History 101 and 102. And not just for this particular cause. I would also suggest a course in logic, but that may be a bridge too far.
Not a bridge too far, Alan, if they take Logic 095, a remedial prep course for Logic 101. It's 2024. There's a remedial course for everything and I think Tuition Assistance will pay 75%. .
What would happen to someone who asked: How will sanctions defeat Russia when 100 Wehrmacht and SS divisions couldn’t ? That person would have to drink poison too.
To avoid taking Sal’s great post too far off topic, I will refrain from making any references any more modern than John Adams, Abraham Lincoln, and Woodrow Wilson.
In 1967 until December 1968, I served with USS Waddell DDG-24. During that time we deployed to Tonkin Gulf three times for patrols lasting between 42 and 45 days. [Between patrols, maintenance, rearmament and crew recovery were required]. While on patrol, we were generally flagship, naval air and gunfire support, Tonkin Gulf. From August of 1968, USS New Jersey BB-62 became available. [I thought it ironic that in the past battleships commanded destroyers, while we were commanding a battleship]. Apart from engaging enemy ground targets along the DMZ, we often engaged in offensive strikes against detected enemy missile boats and enemy coastal defense batteries. Rarely, the enemy would try to attack ships with SS-N-2 Styx anti-ship missiles, MiG-17/19/21 jets, or sometimes combinations of missiles and aircraft. Generally, we tried to attack missile boats before they could launch, rendering defense unnecessary. Only one attack delivered ordnance against Allied forces between 1968 and the end of the war in 1972 - a single 250 kg bomb from a MiG-17 - which was unopposed because it was undetected. The worst defeat was caused by USAF, which got confused trying to intercept enemy helicopters and ended up attacking (and hitting) DDG HMAS Hobart - after which the enemy helicopters engaged USS Boston, Hobart and two ancient US gun type destroyers of WW2 vintage. Never mind Boston and Hobart were SAM ships with heavy AAA guns, so far as we know the enemy helos were not hit. However, I am aware of no other instance of enemy offensive use of helicopters. These began the confusing night battle shelling the DMZ and ended it shelling four Allied warships with 37 mm and 20 mm guns. The briefing I attended post battle claimed that the helicopters were Mi-6's - the world's largest - a type not known to be in service with North Vietnam. For which reason it was thought they must be PLAAF, which owned three we knew about. There were also a small number of successful enemy mine attacks hitting mainly auxiliary ships or transports. The most dramatic fight was a night raid trying to sever the sea line of communications between Malaysia and Cambodia. This moved eight times the tonnage into Southern Vietnam (III Corps area) than came down the Ho Chi Minh Trail every day. We engaged a very large number of armed junks (fitted with 122 and 152 land type gun howitzers). They did not follow the Western playbook and scatter, electing instead to run right through our line (possibly the last line of battle by gunships in naval history) instead. This was judged too dangerous and never tried again. The enemy Sea LOC remained operational until the U.S. Army's "incursion into Cambodia" finally cut it in 1972. Few are aware there was actual naval combat in the Vietnam War. We don't brag about a campaign we didn't win.
I never quite understood why we didn't blockade North Vietnamese ports as early as 1964 or 1965. Either you go to war - or you don't. This is what happens when you have a president who thinks he's a military genius because he was awarded a silver star for flying around in an airplane.
Was on USS Lowry DD770 in mid-1968 when we traded shells with a number of North Vietnam shore batteries. Ship was one of the "ancient US gun type destroyers of WW2 vintage" as you said. She was less than 25 years old then, had been FRAM'ed, and could put out a decent broadside with her six 5" 38's. Also witnessed New Jersey fire the big guns then.
The Newport News was mothballed just inside the main gate at Philadelphia Naval Shipyard along with two other gun cruisers when I was stationed there in the mid-to-late '80s. She was missing a barrel in her number 2 turret due to an explosion/accident similar to what happened to the Iowa.
The Edson (DD-946) was in our squadron and based out of Newport, RI. She took a hit from a shore battery in Vietnam. I recall some damage being pointed out to us when we were onboard for a meeting, but I don't recall exactly where the damage was (it's only been about 35 years or so!).
CIC was underneath the island on USS Hancock. Adjacent to CIC was the EW room with a passageway running fore to aft. On the starboard side of that passageway was the repaired scar of a Kamikaze hit from the Okinawa Campaign. It was a good reminder and reality check that the workplace could be dangerous.
I clearly remember Newport News pulling into Subic from the gun line... had its gun covers half way on and from the NAVMAG ammo pier, it looked like the barrels had melted. Had to truck over to Subic main side after work to see for sure. What a sight!
many thanks ... an old shipmate sent me this ... i had the same thought when i heard VADM C.'s spot on 60 Minutes ... I said to myself, "what about the gunline in Vietnam -- that got pretty hot at times" ... SWO's from that era didn't get V's on their NCMs and NAMs for having shiny shoes ... however, I would give VADM C the benefit of the doubt on his comment regarding ops in 5th fleet and WWII ... we simply don't value history much in our service ... there's no H (for history) in STEM .... and thanks again for that great video ... i got a little chill listening to the skipper.
I'll apologize right now and wait for the incoming (figuratively). I agree with VADM Cooper.
Taking a single round through the after stack on an Adams-class DDG is not the same as facing kamikazes off Okinawa, the massive German guided munitions in the Med, the night fighting in the Solomons or the North Atlantic convoys. Not in scale and not in risk or losses.
The mindset of the WWII veterans and leaders lasted somewhat through the generation that followed, and perhaps in a few trained by the second generation, but it is almost entirely gone, not just gone but actively discouraged in my experience. .
I knew I was in the wrong Navy when I went in to my "Weapons" Department Head to discuss a material casualty in one of our mounts and his response was "I don't want to talk about the guns, I want to talk about your Division Officers Notebook". Now I'll own to the fact that I had NOT filled out a binder page on each of my guys; but I KNEW them. I knew them because they taught me about my guns and fire control systems. I was down in my spaces, book in hand and a Third Class GMG or FTG alongside. I knew which nasty places they frequented in Subic.
The Fleet sent me to two schools as a GunBoss; Magazine Sprinkler and Gunnery Admin (NARS, ATR's and "keeping the books"). My counterpart on the Aussie DDG we tied up alongside in Singapore was a gunnery expert. Just one example.
I was privileged to know many of those WWII Navy guys; that's what prompted me to choose SWO and Destroyers. I'll drop two names; one you should know, another one most won't; RADM "Julie" Becton and RADM "Andy" Hill. I never saw the like of either in my time in the Fleet; I certainly wasn't tested as they were.
If you want to talk about USN surface combat in Vietnam, you should be talking about Elliot Williams, for one.
One clarification; I don't agree with VADM Cooper that we are really in combat -yet. Using CIWS for it's intended purpose is getting pretty close, though.
I don't want to get into a p*ssing contest, that was not my intent.
I'll just sum up the thrust of my remarks by repeating something I've said on occasion "The surface Navy has not really been to war since 1945 - and it shows"
We didn't really get into the war until the Marines landed at da Nang, about February 1965, when I was in basic training. Prior to that, there were no actual combat units in country - SOF excepted. We were told "you could be sent direct to combat" so training became more focused than usual. The Navy had not yet shortened its schools (to save money), so we became the leaders for what followed. Just slightly more senior with somewhat more training. By age 22 I felt like an "old man" compared to the 18 and 19 year olds coming out of training schools. We did NOT know about the secret deal between LBJ and Mao, which meant North Vietnam's Air Force had sanctuary bases in PRC, and other things. However, it also meant PLA would not enter the war as it had done in 1950 in Korea.
gotta agree, the whole World War II comment blew my mind. Argument for more PME! Looking forward to this series.
Had a VF-31 skipper who had no idea Thach had commanded the Squadron or Butch O'Hare was a member of said Command.
Unforgivable. Likely didn’t know who Flatley was either.
Flatley's son was probably a Flag by then. Not sure if my skipper made any connection other than Flatley (the 3rd.) had been skipper of VF-31 about 10 years earlier.
That’s why I said He likely didn’t know Flatley… tbe legacy is strong.
Thatch not only developed the “weave” he had to persuade Big Navy Air to move to the 4 finger element instead of the 3 aircraft pursuit tactics of the 20-30’s. He did this as a LCDR. Thatch made more efficiency’s and contributions as an JO than most flag officers will in their lifetime. Not a slander against any flag officer, simply Jimmy wasn’t afraid to take a risk or speak out of turn.
VADM Cooper committed a typical error because our flags don’t understand nor appreciate history. So they pull the quotes out of their ass. I could see on VADM Cooper’s face that as he said what he said, even he didn’t quite believe he said it. Or he got all warm inside thinking he had a pull quote for Nora. Hard to tell.
300 rounds incoming. 732 rounds sent back, plus many 500 lbs bombs. The bigger pucker factor and sense of regret had to be ashore.
Time for the GOFOs to re-take Naval History 101 and 102. And not just for this particular cause. I would also suggest a course in logic, but that may be a bridge too far.
Not a bridge too far, Alan, if they take Logic 095, a remedial prep course for Logic 101. It's 2024. There's a remedial course for everything and I think Tuition Assistance will pay 75%. .
And with all of the college loans being paid by the White House, the last 25% will be paid for as well.
Those college loans are having the payer shifted from the hopefully new/repeat dem voter to us, not the White House...
Oh, I fully realize that. The White House has no money itself to give away. But it seems to do so anyway, adding with impunity to the national debt.
Aristotle was canceled. No course in logic. Sorry.
And they killed Socrates.
He challenged the Deep State. He pointed out that many of the people in power were ignorant and had no idea what they were doing.
What would happen to someone who asked: How will sanctions defeat Russia when 100 Wehrmacht and SS divisions couldn’t ? That person would have to drink poison too.
"How will sanctions defeat Russia..."
Why, the same way sanctions caused Japan to cease its aggression against China in 1941, silly boy.
Wow. I learn so much in this chatroom.
To avoid taking Sal’s great post too far off topic, I will refrain from making any references any more modern than John Adams, Abraham Lincoln, and Woodrow Wilson.
They were canceled too.
Woodrow was the model for Jill Biden.
In 1967 until December 1968, I served with USS Waddell DDG-24. During that time we deployed to Tonkin Gulf three times for patrols lasting between 42 and 45 days. [Between patrols, maintenance, rearmament and crew recovery were required]. While on patrol, we were generally flagship, naval air and gunfire support, Tonkin Gulf. From August of 1968, USS New Jersey BB-62 became available. [I thought it ironic that in the past battleships commanded destroyers, while we were commanding a battleship]. Apart from engaging enemy ground targets along the DMZ, we often engaged in offensive strikes against detected enemy missile boats and enemy coastal defense batteries. Rarely, the enemy would try to attack ships with SS-N-2 Styx anti-ship missiles, MiG-17/19/21 jets, or sometimes combinations of missiles and aircraft. Generally, we tried to attack missile boats before they could launch, rendering defense unnecessary. Only one attack delivered ordnance against Allied forces between 1968 and the end of the war in 1972 - a single 250 kg bomb from a MiG-17 - which was unopposed because it was undetected. The worst defeat was caused by USAF, which got confused trying to intercept enemy helicopters and ended up attacking (and hitting) DDG HMAS Hobart - after which the enemy helicopters engaged USS Boston, Hobart and two ancient US gun type destroyers of WW2 vintage. Never mind Boston and Hobart were SAM ships with heavy AAA guns, so far as we know the enemy helos were not hit. However, I am aware of no other instance of enemy offensive use of helicopters. These began the confusing night battle shelling the DMZ and ended it shelling four Allied warships with 37 mm and 20 mm guns. The briefing I attended post battle claimed that the helicopters were Mi-6's - the world's largest - a type not known to be in service with North Vietnam. For which reason it was thought they must be PLAAF, which owned three we knew about. There were also a small number of successful enemy mine attacks hitting mainly auxiliary ships or transports. The most dramatic fight was a night raid trying to sever the sea line of communications between Malaysia and Cambodia. This moved eight times the tonnage into Southern Vietnam (III Corps area) than came down the Ho Chi Minh Trail every day. We engaged a very large number of armed junks (fitted with 122 and 152 land type gun howitzers). They did not follow the Western playbook and scatter, electing instead to run right through our line (possibly the last line of battle by gunships in naval history) instead. This was judged too dangerous and never tried again. The enemy Sea LOC remained operational until the U.S. Army's "incursion into Cambodia" finally cut it in 1972. Few are aware there was actual naval combat in the Vietnam War. We don't brag about a campaign we didn't win.
I never quite understood why we didn't blockade North Vietnamese ports as early as 1964 or 1965. Either you go to war - or you don't. This is what happens when you have a president who thinks he's a military genius because he was awarded a silver star for flying around in an airplane.
I believe one Robert Strange McNamara was the essence of that problem.
At least McNamara never went to the hospital without telling the president so there!
For the same reason that idiotic, self-defeating ROE's were dictated.
Either you go to war or don't. If you do, then let the military professionals do their job without political micromanagement.
Was on USS Lowry DD770 in mid-1968 when we traded shells with a number of North Vietnam shore batteries. Ship was one of the "ancient US gun type destroyers of WW2 vintage" as you said. She was less than 25 years old then, had been FRAM'ed, and could put out a decent broadside with her six 5" 38's. Also witnessed New Jersey fire the big guns then.
And we still haven’t talked about the Brown Water Riverine Navy….
Polite Flag don't discuss brown water.
Very few discuss Brown Water. Tom Cutler's book remains the single best source I know of.
Nice FbF pull.
The Newport News was mothballed just inside the main gate at Philadelphia Naval Shipyard along with two other gun cruisers when I was stationed there in the mid-to-late '80s. She was missing a barrel in her number 2 turret due to an explosion/accident similar to what happened to the Iowa.
The Edson (DD-946) was in our squadron and based out of Newport, RI. She took a hit from a shore battery in Vietnam. I recall some damage being pointed out to us when we were onboard for a meeting, but I don't recall exactly where the damage was (it's only been about 35 years or so!).
CIC was underneath the island on USS Hancock. Adjacent to CIC was the EW room with a passageway running fore to aft. On the starboard side of that passageway was the repaired scar of a Kamikaze hit from the Okinawa Campaign. It was a good reminder and reality check that the workplace could be dangerous.
I clearly remember Newport News pulling into Subic from the gun line... had its gun covers half way on and from the NAVMAG ammo pier, it looked like the barrels had melted. Had to truck over to Subic main side after work to see for sure. What a sight!
many thanks ... an old shipmate sent me this ... i had the same thought when i heard VADM C.'s spot on 60 Minutes ... I said to myself, "what about the gunline in Vietnam -- that got pretty hot at times" ... SWO's from that era didn't get V's on their NCMs and NAMs for having shiny shoes ... however, I would give VADM C the benefit of the doubt on his comment regarding ops in 5th fleet and WWII ... we simply don't value history much in our service ... there's no H (for history) in STEM .... and thanks again for that great video ... i got a little chill listening to the skipper.
I'll apologize right now and wait for the incoming (figuratively). I agree with VADM Cooper.
Taking a single round through the after stack on an Adams-class DDG is not the same as facing kamikazes off Okinawa, the massive German guided munitions in the Med, the night fighting in the Solomons or the North Atlantic convoys. Not in scale and not in risk or losses.
The mindset of the WWII veterans and leaders lasted somewhat through the generation that followed, and perhaps in a few trained by the second generation, but it is almost entirely gone, not just gone but actively discouraged in my experience. .
I knew I was in the wrong Navy when I went in to my "Weapons" Department Head to discuss a material casualty in one of our mounts and his response was "I don't want to talk about the guns, I want to talk about your Division Officers Notebook". Now I'll own to the fact that I had NOT filled out a binder page on each of my guys; but I KNEW them. I knew them because they taught me about my guns and fire control systems. I was down in my spaces, book in hand and a Third Class GMG or FTG alongside. I knew which nasty places they frequented in Subic.
The Fleet sent me to two schools as a GunBoss; Magazine Sprinkler and Gunnery Admin (NARS, ATR's and "keeping the books"). My counterpart on the Aussie DDG we tied up alongside in Singapore was a gunnery expert. Just one example.
I was privileged to know many of those WWII Navy guys; that's what prompted me to choose SWO and Destroyers. I'll drop two names; one you should know, another one most won't; RADM "Julie" Becton and RADM "Andy" Hill. I never saw the like of either in my time in the Fleet; I certainly wasn't tested as they were.
If you want to talk about USN surface combat in Vietnam, you should be talking about Elliot Williams, for one.
Standing by...
One clarification; I don't agree with VADM Cooper that we are really in combat -yet. Using CIWS for it's intended purpose is getting pretty close, though.
Oh, and the Adams, I'm referring to is NOT Hoel.
The Adams DDG you are referring to is also not USS Goldsborough that had 3 killed by enemy fire while on the gun line IIRC.
No.
I don't want to get into a p*ssing contest, that was not my intent.
I'll just sum up the thrust of my remarks by repeating something I've said on occasion "The surface Navy has not really been to war since 1945 - and it shows"
No one I knew who served on the gun line thought it compared in any serious way to the horrendous losses and bravery off Okinawa.
But VADM Cooper said the current action in the Red Sea is the most serious surface action since WWII and that is what we are criticizing here.
Yeah, I get that critique and share it, sorry if I didn't express that very well.
All of the action is against drones. No surface ships, no subs, no manned aircraft, no shore batteries.
We didn't really get into the war until the Marines landed at da Nang, about February 1965, when I was in basic training. Prior to that, there were no actual combat units in country - SOF excepted. We were told "you could be sent direct to combat" so training became more focused than usual. The Navy had not yet shortened its schools (to save money), so we became the leaders for what followed. Just slightly more senior with somewhat more training. By age 22 I felt like an "old man" compared to the 18 and 19 year olds coming out of training schools. We did NOT know about the secret deal between LBJ and Mao, which meant North Vietnam's Air Force had sanctuary bases in PRC, and other things. However, it also meant PLA would not enter the war as it had done in 1950 in Korea.