Oilers can be tough. Nowadays we don't even arm our oilers (or AEs etc.). Furthermore, I see that MSC now plans to place several of the CLF ships in reduced operating status due to lack of crew to man them. No logistics train = inability to fight a campaign at sea.
Watch for a move to shift MSC manning back to military personnel. No worries about working hours, conditions or pay with sailors not represented by a union.
Ignoring the fact that we had a 7,000 sailor shortfall in recruiting, and reportedly 18,000 seagoing billet went unfilled.
Without beans, bullets and fuel oil, we cannot even wage a defensive war, let alone win one, against China, Iran, Russia, or even the Houthis. Fighting more than one regional conflict is no longer a capability we even claim to be pursuing.
Are MSC ships really unarmed? Not even CWIS? That is a level of stupidity which is unfathomable. Maybe it would offend the mariners' union or something, but it is a death sentence to our fleet survival.
Yes, the supply class fast combat support ships were constructed with CWIS and sea sparrow, but they were moved to MSC and all the armament (and most defensive systems) were removed. But it's not like CVNs need supplies, right? Which is why they got rid of two of the four ten years ago.
MSC was always civilian manned and the fleet auxiliaries were manned by Sailors. I don't know who the bright boy was that thought turning the auxiliaries over to MSC was a good idea.
Additionally, even if there are logistics ships in quality and quantity sufficient to support the fleet, it may be for naught if the fleet lacks ships in the requisite numbers to escort them to and from supply ports/strike groups.
Your very last sentence truly hits the mark. As Capt Mongo points out…our sea going logistics shortfall not just in the Pacific, but worldwide, will not end well for the USN, our Allies or the US.
By taking out 12 unarmed, mechanically questionable MSC ships, the PLAN can keep the USN bottled up East of the International Date Line without firing one missile. We have no secure forward expeditionary logistics bases. We are confined to six or seven established ports that will be wrecked on Day 1.
I read the Ship that Wouldn't Die a few years ago. Well worth the time. Some bad decisions were made by a few, but a great deal of heroism was displayed by many.
I got choked up reading Captain Phillips' Action Report. Amazon has inexpensive used copies of The Ship That Wouldn't Die. Bought a copy to learn more. Without levying any criticism, Neosho's gumption to save their ship far exceeded Bonhomme Richard's. Captain Phillips' call for leniency for the three Officers found wanting in their performance was a surprise. I thought about it and finally figured it was a fair decision given that they had performed well from Pearl Harbor up to that point and that they might just redeem themselves in what looked to be a long war. I hope they did.
In the report I saw 7 digit numbers next to most of the Enlisted men cited. Bit of nostalgia there. In 1965 I was given service number 138 68 18. Shortly after, the D and B service numbers were assigned. That was the great divide (such as it was) between the Oldsters and the Noobs. (Hah! I was 17 and clueless.) Any faux bragging rights we might have had went away when we began using our SSAN. I use variations of mine for PIN's. So easy to remember.
There is a job for everyone in the naval service, the puzzle palace keeps forgetting this word “logistics” and as Napoleon reminds “an army fights on its belly.” Whether Sailors or Marines, the day comes when the cooks grab weapons and take up the fight. The Ship that wouldn’t die is a classic story of never give up and never give in. There were Naval Gunfire Liaison officers on Guadalcanal, when their ransom d’etre sailed over and off the horizon, they became forward observers for the First Marine Division artillery….you never know until you’re there!
A great vid by the "Other" Sal showcased how critical and valuable the AO's were at this stage of the war.
Before the loss of the Neosho, there were six. If the Japanese had concentrated on bagging the other 5 (they were very busy shuttling fuel from San Pedro to Pearl when they were weren't tasked with UNREPing), then the offensive ops into Guadalcanal would not have been possible....
Seems like the commendations far outweigh the censured. Some people can rise to FbF status. While in this case a very few found wanting.
Oilers can be tough. Nowadays we don't even arm our oilers (or AEs etc.). Furthermore, I see that MSC now plans to place several of the CLF ships in reduced operating status due to lack of crew to man them. No logistics train = inability to fight a campaign at sea.
Given the civilian manning of the auxiliaries, I have my doubts they will be manned if shots are ever exchanged in anger.
Technically they are CIVMARs and government employees--and aren't supposed to be able to opt out.
I doubt you can make them stay.
We may well be finding out before too long.
Yep! I hope not, however.
We won't have time to bring them on line and man them before the war ends. Probably as a loss for us.
Watch for a move to shift MSC manning back to military personnel. No worries about working hours, conditions or pay with sailors not represented by a union.
Ignoring the fact that we had a 7,000 sailor shortfall in recruiting, and reportedly 18,000 seagoing billet went unfilled.
Without beans, bullets and fuel oil, we cannot even wage a defensive war, let alone win one, against China, Iran, Russia, or even the Houthis. Fighting more than one regional conflict is no longer a capability we even claim to be pursuing.
Are MSC ships really unarmed? Not even CWIS? That is a level of stupidity which is unfathomable. Maybe it would offend the mariners' union or something, but it is a death sentence to our fleet survival.
Yes, the supply class fast combat support ships were constructed with CWIS and sea sparrow, but they were moved to MSC and all the armament (and most defensive systems) were removed. But it's not like CVNs need supplies, right? Which is why they got rid of two of the four ten years ago.
MSC was always civilian manned and the fleet auxiliaries were manned by Sailors. I don't know who the bright boy was that thought turning the auxiliaries over to MSC was a good idea.
💯
Additionally, even if there are logistics ships in quality and quantity sufficient to support the fleet, it may be for naught if the fleet lacks ships in the requisite numbers to escort them to and from supply ports/strike groups.
Cdr Sal,
Your very last sentence truly hits the mark. As Capt Mongo points out…our sea going logistics shortfall not just in the Pacific, but worldwide, will not end well for the USN, our Allies or the US.
By taking out 12 unarmed, mechanically questionable MSC ships, the PLAN can keep the USN bottled up East of the International Date Line without firing one missile. We have no secure forward expeditionary logistics bases. We are confined to six or seven established ports that will be wrecked on Day 1.
“Amateurs talk strategy and professionals talk logistics.” —attributed to General Omar Bradley
This account truly describes the fog of war.
From the full report:
> The reply received was "EXPEDITE TRANSFER OF SURVIVORS." This was followed shortly afterward by the flag hoist "EMERG VICTOR."
FbF indeed!
I read the Ship that Wouldn't Die a few years ago. Well worth the time. Some bad decisions were made by a few, but a great deal of heroism was displayed by many.
Suffered. Endured. Persevered.
I got choked up reading Captain Phillips' Action Report. Amazon has inexpensive used copies of The Ship That Wouldn't Die. Bought a copy to learn more. Without levying any criticism, Neosho's gumption to save their ship far exceeded Bonhomme Richard's. Captain Phillips' call for leniency for the three Officers found wanting in their performance was a surprise. I thought about it and finally figured it was a fair decision given that they had performed well from Pearl Harbor up to that point and that they might just redeem themselves in what looked to be a long war. I hope they did.
In the report I saw 7 digit numbers next to most of the Enlisted men cited. Bit of nostalgia there. In 1965 I was given service number 138 68 18. Shortly after, the D and B service numbers were assigned. That was the great divide (such as it was) between the Oldsters and the Noobs. (Hah! I was 17 and clueless.) Any faux bragging rights we might have had went away when we began using our SSAN. I use variations of mine for PIN's. So easy to remember.
I wondered when that changed. Dad had a service number, I used my ssan (‘71).
Like Enterprise, Samuel B. Roberts, Wasp, Hornet, Ranger, etc....Neosho should always be present in the Navy.
There is a job for everyone in the naval service, the puzzle palace keeps forgetting this word “logistics” and as Napoleon reminds “an army fights on its belly.” Whether Sailors or Marines, the day comes when the cooks grab weapons and take up the fight. The Ship that wouldn’t die is a classic story of never give up and never give in. There were Naval Gunfire Liaison officers on Guadalcanal, when their ransom d’etre sailed over and off the horizon, they became forward observers for the First Marine Division artillery….you never know until you’re there!
The good old days, when we had destroyers to escort loggy ships....
Good times, good times.
The current government is going to mothball 17 support ships and reevaluate their crews possibly to discharge them.
A great vid by the "Other" Sal showcased how critical and valuable the AO's were at this stage of the war.
Before the loss of the Neosho, there were six. If the Japanese had concentrated on bagging the other 5 (they were very busy shuttling fuel from San Pedro to Pearl when they were weren't tasked with UNREPing), then the offensive ops into Guadalcanal would not have been possible....
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gv6lfke6lEY&t=872s